Bronda G. Messamore v. Misti Blake

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0759-MR
BRONDA G. MESSAMORE AND H.
KEITH MESSAMORE APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-00135
MISTI BLAKE APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND
REMANDING
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BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: This is a personal injury action in which Bronda G. Messamore
and her husband, H. Keith Messamore (Appellants), appeal the summary judgment
of the Union Circuit Court entered in favor of Misti Blake (Appellee). The
Messamores argue that the circuit court erred in its application of the sudden
emergency doctrine and that issues of fact remain that preclude summary
judgment. After our review, we are compelled to agree. Consequently, we vacate
and remand for further proceedings.
In September 2018, the Messamores were injured when the vehicle in
which they were traveling was struck by a vehicle being driven by Blake. In the
mid-afternoon, Blake was driving north on Highway 130 within four miles of her
home between Morganfield and Uniontown when she approached “Sample’s
Curve.” In her deposition, Blake described this portion of the road as a “blind
curve.” She admitted that the curve was particularly dangerous and that it was not
uncommon for collisions to occur there. She knew that it was marked as a no-
passing zone. Blake explained that it was raining moderately and that she slowed
down to thirty-five (35) miles per hour to round the curve.
As she entered the curve, she saw -- stopped in her lane of travel -- an
ambulance with emergency lights activated and flashing. The ambulance was
responding to the scene of a vehicle that had left the roadway. Blake explained
that she “[d]idn’t see anything coming opposite lane. Swerved into their lane a
little bit and seen Lucy Campbell [Ms. Messamore], and I sideswiped her car[.]”
Blake indicated that she (Blake) swerved into the oncoming lane of travel to avoid
“taking out the back of the ambulance.” Blake testified that she did not know
whether the speed limit was thirty-five (35) miles per hour or twenty-five (25)
miles per hour. She said that she knew that if she “even tried to brake like I was
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going to take it [the ambulance] out[.]” She denied seeing anyone directing traffic
around the ambulance and explained that she collided with the Messamores’
vehicle in the curve before she “got up to the ambulance.” She indicated that she
hit the brake and lost control of her vehicle. “It was like I hit glass. It was like I
just skidded.”
Her driver-side headlight and fender struck halfway down the
Messamores’ driver-side door and continued down the length of their rear
passenger door. Blake indicated that the Messamores’ vehicle was completely in
its own lane of travel when she encountered it. She remembered that a text had
come in to her cell phone, that the cell phone was in the cupholder next to her, and
that she had asked her passenger to read it.
In her deposition, Ms. Messsamore testified that she and her husband
waited at an accident scene between five and ten minutes before they were cleared
by an individual directing traffic to proceed in their lane of travel. As she drove
into Sample’s Curve, Messamore saw another man flagging traffic and slowed her
vehicle. She saw Blake’s vehicle approaching at about forty (40) miles per hour or
forty-five (45) miles per hour when the tires on the approaching vehicle suddenly
“locked up,” and the vehicle slid into hers.
In his deposition, Mr. Messamore testified that as he and his wife
entered Sample’s Curve, he saw “a good Samaritan” motioning Blake’s vehicle to
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stop. Half a second later, Blake’s vehicle entered their lane of travel and struck the
driver’s side of their vehicle. He indicated that Blake’s vehicle was traveling fast.
The collision report prepared by a Union County Sheriff Department
investigator confirms that it was raining and that the pavement was wet at the time
of the collision. An eyewitness reported that Blake: disregarded a gentleman
attempting to stop her vehicle, encountered the Messamores’ vehicle in Sample’s
Curve, applied the brakes, and slid into the Messamores. The narrative portion of
the report concluded as follows: “It is unknown if [Blake] ignored the traffic
controller and drove past him or if she simply did not see him as the [sic] was
raining moderately at the time.” The report identified a slippery surface as an
environmental factor contributing to the collision. It identified Blake’s disregard
of traffic control (the center line) and her failure to keep proper control of her
vehicle as contributing human factors.
In September 2019, the Messamores filed a negligence action against
Blake in Union Circuit Court. Blake answered and denied that her negligence
caused the collision. Following discovery, Blake filed a motion for summary
judgment. She argued that the Messamores could not show that she breached the
duty of care because the sudden emergency doctrine applied to the undisputed
facts. The Messamores opposed the motion and filed a memorandum in support of
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their position. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment in June
2021. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Messamores argue that the circuit court erred by
concluding that Blake’s decision to enter their lane of travel did not breach the
duty of care as a matter of law. We agree.
Summary judgment is properly granted where “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR1 56.03. Upon our review, we must consider whether the circuit court
correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning
Blake’s alleged negligence and if it properly concluded that she was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App.
1996). Because summary judgment involves only questions of law and not the
resolution of disputed material facts, we do not defer to the trial court’s decision.
Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1992).
Instead, we review the trial court’s interpretations of law de novo. Cumberland
Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007).
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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In Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court
of Kentucky explained that the sudden emergency doctrine is used to evaluate the
conduct of one who is unexpectedly confronted with an emergency situation that
allows no time for deliberation. The doctrine defines the duty of care expected of a
prudent person in an emergency situation. Id. It applies only where a defendant
encounters a condition that he has had no reason to anticipate and that has not
resulted from his own negligent conduct. Id. Whether the encounter was sudden
and unexpected and whether it was reasonably apparent to the driver that he would
be involved in a perilous collision are typically factual issues to be resolved by a
jury. Brown v. Todd, 425 S.W.2d 737, 739-40 (Ky. 1968).
Our courts have recognized that the presence of other vehicles in
one’s lane of travel could conceivably create an emergency for a driver that would
justify a sudden emergency qualification of the driver’s duty of care. Regenstreif,
supra. In the emergency, the obligation to obey a specific duty may yield, but only
where the driver invoking the doctrine has not caused the emergency to arise.
Henson v. Klein, 319 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Ky. 2010). The fact that a driver is not
negligent after the emergency has arisen does not preclude liability for her tortious
conduct that produced the emergency. Id.This case centers around the issue of whether Blake’s driving created
the emergency. The circuit court reviewed the record and determined that the
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Messamores failed to present any evidence to refute Blake’s testimony that she
was not driving too fast for the road conditions surrounding this event. However,
having reviewed Blake’s deposition, we find no such testimony. Instead, Blake
indicates only that she was driving thirty-five (35) miles per hour and that she did
not know the speed limit.
On the contrary, the Messamores testified that Blake was driving fast.
The collision report prepared by the investigator for the sheriff’s department
identified Blake’s failure to keep proper control of her vehicle as a relevant factor
in the collision. Furthermore, he indicated that she either “ignored the traffic
controller and drove past him” or failed to see him because of the rain. It had been
raining for some time before the collision, and Blake is charged with knowing that
the road might be slippery and that visibility might be reduced. She admitted that
the curve was particularly dangerous.
No one indicated that Blake was driving slowly, cautiously, and
attentively. Instead, the Messamores offered affirmative evidence indicating that
Blake was driving negligently as she rounded the curve and entered their lane of
travel to avoid the ambulance. Ordinarily, when a vehicle is struck in its own lane
of travel, the vehicle in the lane of oncoming travel is presumed to be at fault.
Paducah Area Public Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. App. 1983).
Moreover, the sudden emergency doctrine cannot aid the defendant where her
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decision to enter the lane of oncoming traffic resulted from a situation that could
reasonably have been anticipated. Id.Under these circumstances, we conclude that Blake was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. It was for a jury to determine whether Blake was
negligent by: driving too fast for road conditions; failing to notice the man
flagging her to slow her vehicle; crossing the center line to avoid the ambulance
because she could not stop her car; losing control of her vehicle on the wet
pavement as she tried to avoid the Messamores’ oncoming vehicle; and, ultimately,
colliding with the Messamores.
The summary judgment of the Union Circuit Court is vacated, and this
case is remanded for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nathan Lee Bishop S. Madison Gray
Henderson, Kentucky Davis L. Hunter
Henderson, Kentucky
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