George Anthony Slaughter, as Father and Next Friend of His Minor Child George Albert Slaughter v. Keith A. Slaughter, as an Individual and as Successor Trustee of the Revocable Trust Agreement of George A. Slaughther

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0100-MR
GEORGE ANTHONY SLAUGHTER,
AS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF
HIS MINOR CHILD GEORGE
ALBERT SLAUGHTER; AND
TABATHA LAND, AS MOTHER
AND NEXT FRIEND OF HER MINOR
CHILD GEORGE ALBERT
SLAUGHTER APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-02822
KEITH A. SLAUGHTER, AS AN
INDIVIDUAL AND AS SUCCESSOR
TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
TRUST AGREEMENT OF GEORGE
A. SLAUGHTER APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MAZE,1 AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: George Anthony Slaughter and Tabatha Land, parents and
next friends of George Albert Slaughter, appeal the Fayette Circuit Court’s opinion
and order granting summary judgment to Keith A. Slaughter, in the parents’ action
to recover alleged trust fund proceeds on behalf of their minor son. We affirm.
George A. Slaughter (George) was the father of George Anthony
Slaughter (Tony), who is the father (with Tabatha Land) of George Albert
Slaughter (Junior). George worked for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet until
he became disabled in the early 2000s. George was one of nine siblings. In 2010,
George contacted attorney John D. Meyers, Jr., requesting assistance with estate
planning. George expressed his desire to make Junior (born in 2004, and who
suffers from autism, cerebral palsy, and other challenges) the beneficiary of
George’s estate. Meyers drafted several testamentary documents, including: a
“pour over” type will, with George’s brother Keith Slaughter named as executor,
where the remainder of the probate assets would pass to the trust; a trust document,
with Junior as the beneficiary, whereby George was the trustee during his lifetime
and Keith the successor trustee, with Frances Jordan (a niece) as alternate
successor trustee; and a financial power of attorney naming Keith as the attorney in
fact and with Frances again as alternate. Meyers stated that he had no further
1
Judge Irv Maze concurred in this Opinion prior to his retirement from the Court of Appeals.
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conversations with George about his estate after the documents were prepared and
signed.
In 2015, George opened eight payable upon death (POD) accounts
with the Commonwealth Credit Union. Each of these accounts listed Keith as the
sole beneficiary. Keith was also the sole beneficiary listed on George’s Kentucky
Public Employees deferred compensation account. The latter designation was
made in 2008.2
In June 2016, George died from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
accident. George’s will was admitted to probate. In November 2016, Keith was
appointed executor of George’s estate. The probate assets at the time of George’s
death consisted of some insurance proceeds,3 rental property in Lexington, and
some personal property. According to the terms of the will, after payment of debts
and expenses, the remainder of George’s assets were to go to Junior’s trust. The
POD accounts and deferred compensation accounts were considered non-probate
items and passed directly to Keith.
In September 2020, Tony and Tabatha, on behalf of Junior, brought
suit against Keith in his individual and trustee capacities. The gist of Junior’s
2
Frances Jordan was listed as contingent beneficiary on this document.
3
The record indicates that these proceeds were from a wrongful death claim stemming from the
automobile accident, reduced by a medical subrogation claim related to George’s care prior to
his death.
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complaint was that George intended Junior to inherit everything he owned, and that
Keith’s designation as beneficiary of the POD and deferred compensation accounts
was meant only insofar as Keith was named successor trustee of the trust created
for Junior.
In October 2021, after discovery was completed, Keith moved for
summary judgment. Junior answered and filed a motion for summary judgment of
his own. A hearing on the competing motions was held on December 14, 2021,
and the circuit court entered its order denying Junior’s motion and granting Keith’s
motion for summary judgment two weeks later. Junior timely appealed.
We begin by stating the standard of review, recently summarized in
Lawson v. Smith, 652 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Ky. App. 2022):
The standard of review upon appeal of an order
granting summary judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916
S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing CR[4] 56.03).
Upon a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
inferences in the record are viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party and “all doubts are to
be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Thus,
a summary judgment looks only to questions of law, and
we review a trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777,
781 (Ky. App. 2016); see also Blackstone Mining Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010), as
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2011). However,
“[a] party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot
rely on the hope that the trier of fact” would simply
“disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but
must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky. App.
2012) (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 481).
With these standards in mind, we turn to Junior’s appeal.
Junior first argues that Keith was never intended by George to inherit
the lion’s share of George’s assets. To support this argument, Junior references
depositions and affidavits of family members and acquaintances that attest to the
fact that it was George’s wish for Junior’s trust to be the recipient of George’s
accumulated wealth. There was also parol evidence regarding Keith’s financial
soundness5 compared to Junior’s multiple physical challenges which will make it
significantly more difficult to achieve financial independence when he reaches
majority.
However, the POD accounts are contractual in nature and are not
considered part of the probate estate. Instead, they are governed by Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 391.300(10), namely, ‘“P.O.D. account’ means an account
payable on request to one (1) person during lifetime and on his death to one (1) or
more P.O.D. payees, or to one (1) or more persons during their lifetimes and on the
5
Keith is an electrical engineer with a master’s degree.
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death of all of them to one (1) or more P.O.D. payees[.]” And KRS 391.300(11)
states, “‘P.O.D. payee’ means a person designated on a P.O.D. account as one to
whom the account is payable on request after the death of one (1) or more
persons[.]” The circuit court concluded, pursuant to these two statutory sections,
as well as the fact that the POD instruments themselves contained no ambiguities,
that “[e]xtrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to vary the terms of a written
instrument[,]” and “[t]he intention of parties . . . must be gathered from the four
corners of that instrument.” Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky.
2000) (citations omitted). The credit union PODs name Keith as beneficiary, not
as trustee of Junior’s trust, but as an individual. The PODs were established after
George signed the will and trust documents. It was thus incumbent upon George to
designate Keith in his capacity as successor trustee in order for the PODs’ assets to
be payable, upon George’s death, to Junior’s trust. But the PODs make no mention
of the trust and only list Keith as beneficiary in his individual capacity.
A similar analysis applies to the Kentucky Public Employees deferred
compensation funds, which was established prior to the will’s existence. Had
George intended to amend Keith’s capacity as beneficiary from individual to
trustee, he was required to do so after 2010 and before his death. Neither the will
nor the trust reference the deferred compensation account and vice versa. As the
circuit court stated, “the Retirement Account is a contract between the Decedent
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and the Kentucky Public Employees’ Deferred Compensation Authority, and its
beneficiary designation form is a part of the contract.” Again, applying contract
law, the four corners of the document dictate that extrinsic evidence cannot be used
to alter its terms. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d at 178. We find no error in the circuit
court’s determination that Keith was the intended beneficiary of those accounts.
We likewise are not persuaded by Junior’s argument that the circuit
court erred by failing to apply the doctrines of the “polar star rule” or “testatorial
absolutism.” Neither is applicable under the facts of this case. The contracts are
unambiguous, and George’s mental capacity was not at issue. We find no error in
that regard.
Junior’s final argument is that George’s true intent, by designating
Keith as successor trustee, was that all assets naming Keith as beneficiary, both
prior to and after George established Junior’s trust, be made to Keith solely as
trustee, rather than in his individual capacity. In support of this assertion, Junior
points to the following language in Article 3 of the trust document: “After my
death the trust property, including any property payable to the Trustee as a result of
my death, shall be disposed of as provided in this Article.” Junior urges that the
circuit court erred in ignoring this language.
We decline to address this issue other than again to state that all
documents before us – testamentary and otherwise – are unambiguous and should
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be discerned on the contents within their four corners. All cases cited by Junior
can be distinguished from the situation within the Slaughter family.
The circuit court was correct in determining that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and that Keith Slaughter was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Lawson, 652 S.W.3d at 645.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Douglas T. Hawkins Escum L. Moore, III
Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
John D. Meyers, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
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