Dakota Miller v. T & J Land Co., LLC

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1570-MR
DAKOTA MILLER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MICHAEL O. CAPERTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-00512
T & J LAND CO., LLC APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: Dakota Miller1 (“Miller”) appeals from the order of the Knox
Circuit Court dismissing his claims against T&J Land Co., LLC (“T&J Land”) as
barred by KRS2 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year statute of limitations. At issue is whether
1
Also known as “Cody” Miller.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
the MVRA,3 and its two-year statute of limitations, governs Miller’s claims. We
hold that it does. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
According to the complaint, on December 30, 2016, Miller was
attempting to buy insurance at a State Farm office in Barbourville, Kentucky when
a vehicle crashed into the building, hitting him and causing serious injury. T&J
Land owns and operates Union Plaza Shopping Center where the State Farm office
was located. On December 7, 2018, Miller filed a complaint4 against T&J Land in
Knox Circuit Court, alleging negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and punitive damages.
T&J Land moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was filed outside KRS
413.140(1)(a)’s one-year statute of limitations, while Miller responded that his
claims were governed by the MVRA’s two-year statute of limitations. KRS
304.39-230(6). The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed Miller’s
complaint. This appeal followed.
Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is
a question of law, which an appellate court reviews de novo. Estate of Wittich By
& Through Wittich v. Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Ky. 2017) (citation omitted).
3
Motor Vehicle Reparations Act.
4
Before suing T&J Land, Miller filed a separate action against Barbourville Development Co.,
Ltd, Cumberland River Land Company, LLC, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
Jeffrey Branum, Roger F. Hughes, and Wendy E. Simpson. That action was dismissed by
summary judgment and affirmed on appeal. See Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
2018-CA-001866-MR, 2020 WL 1074788, at *1 (Ky. App. Mar. 6, 2020), discretionary review
denied (Oct. 21, 2020).
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The sole question on appeal is whether the MVRA applies to Miller’s claims. If
so, the MVRA’s two-year statute of limitations controls and the circuit court’s
grant of dismissal was error.
In Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Ky. 1987), our
Supreme Court discussed the difference between the MVRA’s and KRS
413.140(1)(a)’s statute of limitations:
The one-year personal injury statute of limitations, KRS
413.140(1)(a), is a general statute of limitations “for an
injury to the person of the plaintiff.” It does not speak to
motor vehicle accidents as such, and, indeed, it is so old
that it may well have preexisted the advent of the motor
vehicle. On the other hand, KRS 304.39-230(6) is a
special statute of limitations, part of a comprehensive,
integrated code (the MVRA) applicable to the rights and
liabilities of motor vehicle accident victims. Our rules of
statutory construction are that a special statute preempts a
general statute, that a later statute is given effect over an
earlier statute, and that because statutes of limitation are
in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer
period of limitations should prevail where two statutes
are arguably applicable.
“The two year statute of limitations set forth in the MVRA applies
only to those actions within the purview of the statute.” Floyd v. Gray, 657
S.W.2d 936, 939 (Ky. 1983). In Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky.
1984), the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he purview of the Act is
motor vehicle accident victims.” Here, Miller’s complaint alleges that he was
struck by a vehicle while waiting inside a State Farm office when the vehicle
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breached the exterior of the building. Put simply, because Miller is a motor
vehicle accident victim, he is within the purview of the act. Pursuant to Troxell,
“KRS 304.39-230(6) applies rather than . . . KRS 413.140(1)(a) in the present
situation where the cause of action is both a motor vehicle accident and a personal
injury claim.” 730 S.W.2d at 528. Therefore, Miller’s claims were not barred by
statute of limitations and the circuit court wrongly dismissed his complaint.
T&J Land argues that the MVRA is inapplicable because neither party
was maintaining, operating, or using a motor vehicle, citing KRS 304.39-060(2)(c).
However, “KRS 304.39-060 is not concerned with whether the action is against a
motorist or nonmotorist, but with entirely different subjects, abolishing tort
liability for certain elements of damages and in certain types of cases where
damages do not exceed certain thresholds.” Bailey, 662 S.W.2d at 834. As noted
in Bailey,
the only actions for tort liability abolished by Section
.060 of MVRA are those against “the owner, registrant,
operator or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to
which security has been provided as required” by the
Act. Against all other persons, motorists and
nonmotorists, the “action for tort liability” is not
abolished . . . .
Id. at 835.
In fact, T&J Land’s argument is merely a slight variant of the one
explicitly rejected in Bailey. There, the appellee argued that KRS 304.39-230(6) is
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only applicable with respect to actions for tort liability against an owner, operator,
or occupant of a motor vehicle. The Court disagreed, holding that KRS 304.39-
230(6) is not so limited: “[t]he literal language of this Section of the statute covers
any ‘action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060,’ not just one
‘against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle,’ as appellee
contends.” Bailey, 662 S.W.2d at 834-35. It further noted the “obvious
inconsistencies and litigation problems that would be created if we were to
interpret [the] MVRA to carve out a different statute of limitations in [a] claim
against [a] motorist” and a nonmotorist. Id. at 834.
T&J Land tries to distinguish Bailey by noting that the plaintiff in that
case was operating a motor vehicle while Miller was not. We find this difference
to be of no consequence. As recognized in Bailey, and noted above, “[t]he purview
of the Act is motor vehicle accident victims.” Bailey, 662 S.W.2d at 835. Miller is
a motor vehicle accident victim, and as such, is within the purview of the MVRA.
Whether he was operating a motor vehicle is inconsequential.
Therefore, the order of the Knox Circuit Court is reversed, and this
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph B. Venters Robert E. Maclin, III
Somerset, Kentucky Drake W. Staples
Lexington, Kentucky
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