Paris City Commission v. John Vance

RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0852-MR
PARIS CITY COMMISSION; CITY OF
PARIS; DARON JORDAN, CITY
MANAGER IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY WITH THE CITY OF
PARIS; MATT PERRAUT; MAYOR
MICHAEL J. THORNTON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY WITH THE
CITY OF PARIS; MICHAEL
KENDALL; PARIS BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; TIM GRAY; AND
WALLIS BROOKS APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-00206
JOHN VANCE; GUY HUGUELET;
MARY ANN HAYES; RANDY
DARNELL; AND STEVE WRIGHT
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2021-CA-0879-MR
JOHN VANCE; GUY HUGUELET;
MARY ANN HAYES; RANDY
DARNELL; AND STEVE WRIGHT CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-00206
PARIS CITY COMMISSION; CITY OF
PARIS; DARON JORDAN, CITY
MANAGER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MATT
PERRAUT; MAYOR MICHAEL J.
THORNTON; MAYOR MICHAEL J.
THORNTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MAYOR; MICHAEL
KENDALL; PARIS BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS AND ITS
MEMBERS IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; TIM
GRAY; AND WALLIS BROOKS CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND VACATING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This case involves 47 acres of property located in Paris,
Kentucky (hereafter, the “Property”). Representatives of the city of Paris,
Kentucky, applied for a zoning map amendment to rezone the Property from a
conservation district to light industrial. The Paris City Commission and its
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representatives (hereafter, “the City”), entered into a non-disclosure deal with a
prospective corporate purchaser to conceal its identity. It appears that a bourbon
distillery was to be built on the Property. The local planning and zoning
commission (“Planning Commission”) held a hearing during which evidence was
presented, and then voted six to three to deny the zone map amendment. The
Planning Commission was overruled by a unanimous vote by the City.
The Appellees are local residents, John Vance, et al., (hereafter “the
Residents”). Due to their objections to the zoning decision, Residents filed suit
pursuant to KRS1 100.347(3) against the City. The Bourbon Circuit Court
subsequently issued a judgment in the Residents’ favor, thereby abrogating the
City’s ordinance adopting the map amendment. The court specifically found that
the City’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and that Appellees
were denied due process.
The City appealed to this Court as a matter of right. Case No. 2021-
CA-0852-MR. The Residents did not file a brief in that case. However, they
cross-appealed the circuit court’s dismissal of their civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C.2 § 1983. Case No. 2021-CA-0879-MR. For the following reasons, we
affirm the circuit court in part, reverse in part, and vacate.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
United States Code.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR3 56.03. And as the Kentucky Supreme Court observed in Hilltop Basic
Resources, Inc. v. County of Boone:
since zoning determinations are purely the responsibility
and function of the legislative branch of government,
such determinations are not subject to review by the
judiciary except for the limited purpose of considering
whether such determinations are arbitrary. [American
Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky.
1964)]. Arbitrariness review is limited to the
consideration of three basic questions: (1) whether an
action was taken in excess of granted powers, (2)
whether affected parties were afforded procedural due
process, and (3) whether determinations are supported by
substantial evidentiary support. Id.180 S.W.3d 464, 467 (Ky. 2005). “Substantial evidence means evidence
that is sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.” Smith v.
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Kentucky, 515 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Ky. App. 2017) (citation
omitted).
However, decision makers are not free to be biased or
prejudicial when performing nonjudicial functions. To
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the contrary, any bias or prejudicial conduct which
demonstrates “malice, fraud, or corruption” is expressly
prohibited as arbitrary. National-Southwire Aluminum [v.
Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 785 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Ky. App.
1990)]. Furthermore, decisions tainted by conflicts of
interest or blatant favoritism are also prohibited as
arbitrary. See [City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470
S.W.3d 173, 177 (Ky. 1971)].
Hilltop Basic Res., Inc., 180 S.W.3d at 469. With these standards in mind, we turn
to the facts of the present case.
ANALYSIS
KRS 100.213 is of primary relevance to our analysis. It requires the
following:
(1) Before any map amendment is granted, the planning
commission or the legislative body or fiscal court must
find that the map amendment is in agreement with the
adopted comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of such a
finding, that one (1) or more of the following apply and
such finding shall be recorded in the minutes and records
of the planning commission or the legislative body or
fiscal court:
(a) That the existing zoning classification given to the
property is inappropriate and that the proposed
zoning classification is appropriate;
(b) That there have been major changes of an
economic, physical, or social nature within the
area involved which were not anticipated in the
adopted comprehensive plan and which have
substantially altered the basic character of such
area.
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In the present case, the City complied with this statutory directive.
More precisely, the City issued thirty-three findings of fact in support of the
ordinance authorizing the zoning amendment. Therein, the City specifically found
that the zone change was appropriate. See KRS 100.213(1)(a). The findings
generally focused on the economic benefits of rezoning the Property as light
industrial. The City cited to continued declines of the tobacco and golf course
industries in Kentucky. See KRS 100.213(1)(b). It specifically found that the
Property has historically been used for tobacco warehouses, many of which are
now abandoned. Id. The City also specifically found that the Stoner Creek
Country Club located on the Property had become defunct. Id.
As to due process, the Residents and their counsel were permitted to
voice their concerns at a lengthy hearing before the Planning Commission. There
is no indication that the City failed to consider the Commission’s record and
recommendation. See KRS 100.211(2). See also Hilltop, 180 S.W.3d at 469
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“The fundamental requirement of
procedural due process is simply that all affected parties be given the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”).
We are not the entity most apprised of the uniquely local concerns at
issue here. Rather, this Court is ultimately charged with determining whether the
legislative decision was arbitrary. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that it was
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not. Although the details of the underlying development deal may have been
controversial and confined, there is nothing cited in the record indicating that the
City’s decision was arbitrary. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted and
emphasis added) (“At its core, arbitrariness review is concerned primarily with the
product [of legislative or administrative action], and not with the motive or method
which produced it.”).
To reiterate, the governing legislative body here is the City. Having
considered the proposition, the City’s representatives unanimously voted for the
amendment – supported by thirty-three findings of fact. In consideration of our
standard of review and the robust separation of powers provisions contained in our
state constitution, absent a serious infirmity of substance or procedure, we will not
interfere with the City’s judgment. We see no such infirmity here.
In their cross-appeal, the Residents argue that the circuit court
erroneously granted summary judgment in the City’s favor. They specifically
argue that they were entitled to discovery concerning their civil rights claims, that
the court erred in concluding the City was entitled to legislative immunity, and also
erred in concluding that their civil rights claims were not viable. Because we agree
with the circuit court that the civil rights claims were not viable, we need not
address discovery or immunity.
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A panel of this Court has addressed the dismissal of a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 arising from a zoning decision:
[T]he question of whether a plaintiff like SouthPointe is
permitted to bring additional claims hinges on whether a
Kentucky statute provides both the unlawful action and
the remedy. KRS 100.347 does. Like the Robbins
plaintiffs, SouthPointe has not shown that its harms arise
from anything other than a planning commission decision
and is therefore limited to its statutory action pursuant to
KRS 100.347. See Greater Cincinnati Marine Service,
Inc. v. City of Ludlow, 602 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1980)
(holding that claims which are broader in scope than
implicated within the context of a zoning appeal may be
brought by a separate complaint).
SouthPointe Partners, LLC v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, No. 2019-CA-1784-MR,
2021 WL 1936084, at *8 (Ky. App. May 14, 2021), discretionary review
denied (Mar. 16, 2022).4 See also Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC,
854 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2017); Brooks v. Oldham Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, No.
2011-CA-001015-MR, 2012 WL 5629734, at *9 (Ky. App. Nov. 16, 2012); and
Anderson v. Collins, 191 F.3d 451, 1999 WL775925, at *5 (6th Cir. Sep. 24, 1999)
(Nelson, J., concurring).
The Residents have not cited any binding authority to the contrary,
and we are aware of none. We specifically find SouthPointe Partners, LLC and its
reasoning to be persuasive. Like that case, the Residents have “not shown that
4
SouthPointe Partners’ petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court on October 3, 2022.
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[their] harms arise from anything other than a planning [] decision and is therefore
limited to its statutory action pursuant to KRS 100.347.” SouthPointe Partners,
LLC, 2021 WL 1936084, at *8.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Bourbon Circuit Court’s
order entered on July 2, 2021, dismissing Appellees’/Cross-Appellants’ claims.
We REVERSE and VACATE its order entered on May 12, 2021.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/ BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-
CROSS-APPELLEES: APPELLANTS:
Jeffrey C. Mando T. Bruce Simpson, Jr.
Jennifer L. Langen Lexington, Kentucky
Covington, Kentucky
Bryan H. Beauman
Lexington, Kentucky
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