Rhonda M. Wilson v. Sarah S. Holt

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0467-MR
RHONDA M. WILSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JEFF L. DOTSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-00276
SARAH S. HOLT AND TOMMY
OWENS USED CARS, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: Rhonda M. Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals, for a second time,
from an order of the Boyle Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
Tommy Owens Used Cars, LLC (“Used Cars”). Based on our review, we reverse
and remand.
The following is a summary of the background of this case from the
first appeal:
This case arose out of a car accident between
Wilson and Sarah S. Holt (“Holt”). On October 14,
2016, Trevor Tarter (“Tarter”) purchased a car from Used
Cars via a conditional sales contract. Upon purchasing
the car, Tarter signed a document titled “Agreement to
Provide Physical Damage Insurance.” The agreement
included spaces for the purchaser to list his contact
information, information about the car, the insurance
agent, and the insurance company. Although Tarter
signed the agreement, acknowledging he “ha[d] arranged
for the required insurance through the insurance company
shown below,” Tarter did not provide the information of
an insurance agent or insurance company.[1]
On July 27, 2017, Holt was operating the car
Tarter purchased via the conditional sales contract on
U.S. Highway 150 in Boyle County when the car collided
with Wilson’s car. At the time of the accident, the dealer
held the title to the car.
Following the accident, Wilson filed a complaint
against Holt, Used Cars, and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company. Upon filing a motion
for summary judgment, the circuit court dismissed State
Farm from the suit pursuant to an order entered March 6,
2020.
On September 14, 2020, Used Cars moved for
summary judgment arguing Tarter was deemed the owner
of the car under KRS[2] 186.010(7)(a) and (b), even
though Used Cars still held title to the car. Wilson
1
On remand, Used Cars presented evidence that Holt provided proof of insurance the same day
Tarter drove the car off the lot.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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opposed the motion arguing Used Cars failed to consider
KRS 186.010(7)(c), which requires dealers to comply
with the requirements of KRS 186A.220, for Tarter to be
deemed to be the owner of the car for statutory purposes.
KRS 186A.220 requires dealers to obtain proof of
insurance from the purchaser, and Used Cars failed to
obtain proof that Tarter had an insurance policy covering
the car. Wilson argued, because Used Cars failed to
obtain proof of insurance, Used Cars was deemed to be
the owner of the car and was liable for the collision.
After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit
court granted summary judgment in favor of Used Cars.
The circuit court found Used Cars substantially complied
with the statute because Used Cars submitted the
agreement under which Tarter averred he had an
insurance policy covering the car. [The first] appeal
followed.
Wilson v. Holt, 2020-CA-1623-MR, 2021 WL 5406358, at *1 (Ky. App. Nov. 19,
2021).
In the first appeal, we held the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment. Used Cars’ reliance on Tarter’s signature averring that he had an
insurance policy covering the car did not meet the KRS 186A.220(5)(b)
requirement for Used Cars to obtain proof of insurance before Tarter drove the car
off the lot. Wilson, 2021 WL 5406358, at *3.
On remand, Used Cars renewed its motion for summary judgment
based on evidence in its possession, but that it failed to include with its first motion
for summary judgment. Tre Owens (“Tre”) took over the business after his
grandfather, Tommy Owens, passed away. Tre recalled Holt provided proof of
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insurance to Used Cars the same day Tarter purchased the vehicle. Used Cars
attached to its motion a screenshot of an email from Holt dated the same day Tarter
purchased the car with an insurance card attached to the email. Used Cars did not
submit any evidence that the insurance card was provided before Tarter drove the
car off the lot.
The circuit court heard oral argument from the parties and took the
matter under submission. The video recording was not made part of the record.
On April 13, 2022, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Used
Cars, finding Used Cars strictly complied with the statute because it obtained
“insurance cards bearing the same date the car was purchased by Trevor Tarter.”
Record (“R.”) at 219. This second appeal followed.
On appeal, Wilson argues the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment because: (1) the motion was barred by the law of the case doctrine; (2)
Used Cars failed to comply with KRS 186A.220; and (3) there were genuine issues
of material fact.
First, Wilson argues Used Cars summary judgment motion was barred
by the law of the case doctrine.
The law of the case doctrine is “an iron rule, universally
recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate
court in the same cause is the law of the case for a
subsequent trial or appeal. . . .” Union Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. Blackwel’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542
(Ky. 1956). That doctrine is the mechanism by which
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matters once litigated and finally determined remain so.
TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Kentucky Labor Cabinet, 474 S.W.3d 153,
158 (Ky. App. 2014).
The law of a case is a strict rule, but there are exceptions and limits to
its application. In Patmon v. Hobbs, 495 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Ky. App. 2016), this
Court explained “the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to the extent that an
issue was actually resolved. As stated in H.R. ex rel. Taylor v. Revlett, 998 S.W.2d
778, 780 (Ky. App. 1999), ‘[t]he crucial requirement is that the appellate court
enters a final decision on the question rather than merely commenting on the
issue.’” This Court applied this principle to the facts of the case:
“Although Patmon I placed the burden of proof on Patmon on remand to
demonstrate American Leasing had the financial ability to perform the O’Reilly
leases, Patmon I did not address the proof necessary to meet that burden.” Id.Here, we simply held the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Used Cars because it failed to obtain proof of insurance for
the car Tarter purchased. We did not hold that because of Used Cars’ failure to
submit adequate proof of insurance in support of its motion for summary judgment,
it was the statutory owner of the car and thus liable to Wilson for damages
stemming from the accident. We did not dictate that the parties were prohibited
from submitting additional evidence on the matter of Used Cars’ liability and did
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not direct the circuit court to enter an order denying Used Cars’ motion for
summary judgment. We simply remanded the case for further proceedings leaving
the circuit court with discretion to determine how to proceed. Thus, we do not
believe the law of the case squarely applies in this instance.
Second, Wilson argues Used Cars failed to comply with KRS
186A.220. In the first appeal, we held the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment because Used Cars failed to obtain proof of insurance from Tarter under
KRS 186A.220(5)(b), which provides:
The dealer may, with the consent of the purchaser,
deliver the assigned certificate of title, and other
appropriate documents of a new or used vehicle, directly
to the county clerk, and on behalf of the purchaser, make
application for registration and a certificate of title. In so
doing, the dealer shall require from the purchaser proof
of insurance as mandated by KRS 304.39-080 before
delivering possession of the vehicle.
(Emphasis added.)
Our decision in the first appeal was based on Gainsco Companies v.
Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633 (Ky. 2006). There, a dealer sold a car to a purchaser but
failed to discuss insurance coverage. Id. at 635. The dealer sold the car on a
Saturday and verified insurance coverage on Monday. Id. The purchaser was in
an accident three days after the dealer verified the purchaser’s insurance coverage.
Id. Our Supreme Court held: “By failing to strictly comply with the statutory
procedures of KRS 186A.220(5),” the dealer “failed to validly transfer ownership
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of the truck to” the purchaser. Id. at 637. “Accordingly, Gainsco is the primary
insurer of the car because” the dealer “continued to be the owner of the truck at the
time of the accident. The fact that [the purchaser’s] insurance policy would have
covered the vehicle if he had become the owner is, therefore, completely
irrelevant.” Id.
In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550 (Ky.
2018), our Supreme Court examined the distinction between transactions between
a dealer and a purchaser for use and dealer-to-dealer transactions and left Gainsco
intact. The Supreme Court analyzed KRS 186A.220 in the context of dealer-to-
dealer transactions and held “substantial compliance, i.e., late compliance,” with
sections 1 to 4 “may still allow the dealer to take advantage of the exception in
KRS 186.010(7)(c).” Id.However, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Gainsco regarding KRS
186A.220(5) in transactions between a dealer and a purchaser for use:
the burden is on the dealer, when selling to a purchaser
for use, to actively verify that the buyer has insurance
before transferring possession of the vehicle. Failure to
promptly comply with the requirements of KRS
186A.220(5) in a transaction with a purchaser for use
cannot be cured and the dealer may still be considered
the “owner” of the vehicle in question.
565 S.W.3d at 567 (emphasis added). The Court opined that compliance “cannot
be cured,” but use of the word “may” in its discussion of whether a dealer may be
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considered the owner of the vehicle left the section open to possible future
exceptions. Id. However, Gainsco remains good law. No Kentucky case has held
substantial compliance is sufficient for the proof of insurance requirement of KRS
186A.220(5)(b).
We now turn to application of Gainsco to the facts of this case. Tarter
purchased a vehicle from Used Cars on October 14, 2016, under a conditional sales
agreement. Tarter signed a form agreeing to provide physical damage insurance,
but the form does not include his insurance agent and company information. On
remand, Used Cars submitted a screenshot of an email dated October 14, 2016, at
11:19 a.m. from Sarah Holt with an insurance card for the purchased vehicle. R. at
204. Used Cars did not submit evidence that the insurance card was submitted
before Tarter drove the car off the lot. Approximately nine months later, on July
27, 2017, Holt was driving the purchased car and was in an accident with Wilson.
Because Tarter purchased the car under a conditional sales contract, the dealer still
held the title on the date of the accident. The circuit court found Used Cars
“strictly complied with KRS 186A.220 and [was] not liable for damages resulting
from the automobile collision that is the subject of this case” because Used Cars
submitted “a copy of an email and automobile insurance cards bearing the same
date as the car was purchased by Trevor Tarter.” R. at 219.
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This finding does not comport with the plain language of Gainsco and
Armstrong. Used Cars admits in its brief that Holt produced the insurance card
“the same day as the sale of the vehicle.” Appellee Brief at 4. There is no
evidence Used Cars strictly complied with the statute by obtaining proof of
insurance before Tarter drove the car off the lot as required by our Supreme Court.
Though the accident occurred months after Tarter drove the car off the
lot, Used Cars still held the title to the car under the conditional sales contract.
Had Used Cars not retained the title to the car, it likely would not be liable for this
accident. Used Cars had two opportunities to prove it strictly complied with the
proof of insurance requirement and has failed to do so both times. It submitted no
evidence to prove the insurance card was submitted before Tarter drove off the lot.
The screenshot of Holt’s message is insufficient. Used Cars did not accompany
the screenshot with an affidavit from either Holt or Tre. And, if Used Cars had
received the message before Tarter drove the car off the lot, the insurance
information would have been listed on Tarter’s paperwork. It was not. Instead,
Used Cars relied on Tarter’s promise to provide proof of insurance.
Though the Supreme Court of Kentucky hinted in Gainsco that it
might consider exceptions to the strict compliance proof of insurance requirement,
it has not done so. We are “bound by and shall follow applicable precedents
established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.”
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Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 1.030. Thus, even if we were sympathetic to Used
Cars, we lack the authority to deviate from our Supreme Court’s holding that car
dealers must strictly comply with the proof of insurance requirement in KRS
186A.220(5)(b) by obtaining before a car leaves the lot.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Boyle Circuit
Court and remand with instructions to deny Used Cars’ motion for summary
judgment finding it the owner of the car for failing to strictly comply with KRS
186A.220(5)(b) and, thus, liable for the collision.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: While I acknowledge this Court is
constrained by our Supreme Court’s decision in Gainsco, I nevertheless agree with
the dissent in that decision that this ensuing result is absurd and unreasonable.
Justice Graves, writing the dissent in this four-to-three decision aptly stated:
“A statute should not be interpreted so as to bring about
an absurd or unreasonable result. The policy and purpose
of the statute must be considered in determining the
meaning of the words used.” Kentucky Industrial Utility
Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d
493, 500 (Ky. 1998). It elevates form over substance to
an unreasonable degree to hold an automobile dealer,
who takes the necessarily remedial steps, indefinitely
responsible for the insurance coverage on a vehicle that
was transferred to an insured owner simply because
verification did not occur in the proper sequential order.
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Gainsco Companies v. Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Ky. 2006) (Graves, J.,
dissenting). Justice Graves further noted:
If there was a deficiency in [the dealership’s] verification
of insurance at the time of the sale, the transfer of
ownership of the vehicle was completed when [the
dealership] directly contacted [the insurance company]
on the following Monday. Although this verification
occurred after possession of the vehicle was transferred
where KRS 186A.220 requires verification before the
transfer of possession, it nevertheless cured any
deficiency.
Id. Herein, the automobile accident occurred more than nine months after Tarter
purchased the vehicle from Used Cars. There appears to be no dispute that Tarter
actually had obtained insurance the same day he purchased it. Nevertheless,
apparently, under Gainsco, the failure to ensure insurance coverage prior to
transfer of possession renders a car dealership liable for any automobile accident
for at least as long as the buyer keeps the car. Such is the poster image of an
absurd interpretation of KRS 186A.220. I would affirm.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TOMMY
OWENS USED CARS, LLC:
Larry F. Sword
Somerset, Kentucky Jamie Wilhite Dittert
Katie Bouvier
Lexington, Kentucky
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