Citation Numbers: 485 S.W.2d 759
Judges: Cullen, Hill, Milliken, Neikirk, Osborne, Palmore, Reed, Steinfeld
Filed Date: 9/27/1972
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/1/2021
By Chapters 188 and 320 of the Acts of the 1972 Regular Session, and by House Bill No. 5 enacted at the First Extraordinary Session of 1972, the Kentucky Gener
Prior to the enactment of the 1972 legislation, KRS 117.620 provided that a voter could register by appearing in person at a designated office or branch office.
The representatives of both major party organizations in Jefferson County (and, it appears, elsewhere in the state), the Attorney-General, the Secretary of State, and the State Board of Election Commissioners all interpreted KRS 117.620 in its amended form as authorizing any voter to register simply by filling out the application form provided for in KRS 126.160 (as amended by Chapter 320 of the Acts of 1972) and causing it to be delivered to the appropriate registration office, without a personal appearance by the voter at the office. A large number of registrations were made in that manner during the recent summer. Believing that interpretation to be erroneous, the Board of Registration Commissioners of Louisville brought the instant action, alleging that the proper construction of KRS 117.620 is that the only persons entitled to register by “absentee application” are ⅜ those who are absent from their places of residence at the time of making application for registration and who will also be absent voters at the next election; in other words, that absentee registration is solely for absentee voters.
The circuit court rejected the registration board’s interpretation and entered judgment adopting the construction permitting any qualified voter to register by application without personally appearing at the registration office or branch office. The registration board has appealed.
The issue is solely one of interpretation of a statute that has application only as to a limited period of less than five months. We conceive that no useful purpose would be served by setting forth in this opinion a detailed history and analysis of the legislation involved. The question simply is: What did the legislature intend? We believe the answer can better be found in a practical evaluation of the circumstances than in an exercise in semantics. Baker v. White, 251 Ky. 691, 65 S.W.2d 1022; Grieb v. National Bank of Kentucky’s Receiver, 252 Ky. 753, 68 S.W.2d 21; Martin v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696, 125 S.W.2d 241; Green v. Moore, 281 Ky. 305, 135 S.W.2d 682; Hamilton v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 695.
The primary circumstance was the existence of a compulsion to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 437; 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.) as amended in 1970 (Public Law 91-285; 84 Stat. 314), and with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274. The climate was one favoring liberalization of registration requirements. A complete revision of
In the meantime, pending the taking effect of the comprehensive revision, the legislature at the regular 1972 session was concerned with accomplishing some liberalization for the 1972 presidential election to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and when Dunn v. Blumstein was decided the legislature was called into the extraordinary session to make further liberalizations to comply with that decision. In accomplishing these liberalizations there was no reason for the legislature to continue, pending the 1972 election, the requirement of registration by personal appearance at the registration office. Registration by application forwarded to the office could be permitted without any implementation problems or time-shortage obstacles. No evil has been suggested that could derive from so doing.
It is to be considered, therefore, that every inducement was towards facilitating the registration process and encouraging the registration of voters. So when the legislature, in Chapter 320 of the 1972 Acts, authorized any legal voter to register by absentee application, the indications are strong that the intent was to permit registration by forwarded application for any voter and not merely those persons who would be absent voters. The law previously had authorized “absent registrations” by absent voters in military service, without any mention of that authorization in KRS 117.620, so when the category of permissible absent voters was enlarged in 1972 there was no need to amend KRS 117.620 to mention it.
There appear to be only two possible reasons that could have prompted the legislature to amend KRS 117.620. One would be simply to call attention to laws under which an absent voter could register by mailed application; the other would be to grant a right of registration by forwarded application to all voters. The latter reason is so much more likely that we are convinced it was the reason by which the legislature acted.
The construction so placed on the amendment results in the qualifying of a large number of voters who registered by forwarded application in accordance with the construction made by practically all concerned public and party officers. The result is in the public interest, in which, of course, the legislature always is presumed to act. A contrary construction, disfranchising those voters, is not compelled to be reached. Election statutes should be construed liberally in favor of furthering the right of suffrage. 25 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, sec. 5, p. 695. This includes registration statutes, which will be construed to give the electors the fullest opportunity to vote consistent with reasonable precautions against fraud. 25 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, sec. 97, p. 785.
The judgment is affirmed.
. Absentee registration by persons in military service was provided for, however, in KRS Chapter 126.