Robert Andrew Sharp v. Robbin Nelson

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1005-MR
ROBERT ANDREW SHARP1 APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT
v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00479
ROBBIN NELSON; HEATHER ANNE
SHARP; AND WARREN COUNTY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, JUDGE: Robert Andrew Sharp appeals from an order of the Warren
Family Court that clarified language contained in a previous order entered on
February 20, 2019, upon motion of non-party Warren County Public Schools
(“WCPS”). The family court clarified that the language contained in the February
1
We note that the notice of appeal identifies Appellant as Robert Andrew Sharp; however, he is
consistently identified throughout the record before us as Robert Andrew Sharp, Jr. We omit
“Jr.” consistent with the notice of appeal.
20, 2019 order meant that Robert could not receive any educational records from
WCPS regarding his two children with the exception of report cards. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the sixth action before this Court filed by either Robert; his
mother, Robbin Nelson (paternal grandmother to the children); or Jerry Wells
(Robbin’s husband and a non-party to the underlying action).2 The extensive
factual and procedural history of this action was detailed by this Court in Nelson v.
Sharp, No. 2019-CA-000441-ME, 2020 WL 1969918 (Ky. App. Apr. 24, 2020).
Briefly, Heather and Robert were going through divorce proceedings beginning in
2014. At that time, Robbin came before the family court after filing a motion to be
named de facto custodian for Heather and Robert’s two children. Neither Heather
nor Robert was present at the hearing and, although the family court granted
Robbin’s motion, it later made a finding that Robbin’s testimony at the hearing
was fraudulent.
A custody battle ensued, including an attempt by Robert, Robbin, and
Robbin’s husband, Jerry Wells, to terminate Heather’s parental rights by filing an
action in Tennessee so that Robbin and Jerry could adopt the children. Robert
consented to the adoption of his children by Robbin and Jerry. However, the
2
See also Nos. 2017-CA-0427-ME; 2017-CA-0528-OA; 2018-CA-1467-OA; 2018-CA-1535-
MR; and 2019-CA-0441-ME.
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family court in Kentucky ultimately retained jurisdiction. Robbin continued to
have custody of the children, but Heather and Robert were granted visitation by the
family court. In September 2016, Heather filed a motion to modify custody. Due
to constant delay tactics by Robbin, Heather’s motion was not heard until October
12, 2018; however, the family court granted temporary sole custody of the children
to Heather in March 2017. The family court also entered an order in November
2017, temporarily ceasing all contact between Robbin and the children. We note
that even after Robbin was ordered to have no contact with the children, she
continued to place calls to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”)
alleging abuse of the children by Heather. All referrals were unsubstantiated.
The family court ultimately awarded sole custody of the children to
Heather and ordered ongoing no contact between Robbin and the children. In
analyzing the motivation of the parties, the family court found that
[t]he motivations of Robert and [Robbin] are the
same. Their motivation is not based on the best interest of
the minor children. It is clear to the Court that they do
not seek a return of the children as a result of their best
interest, but they seek return of the children in order to
somehow punish Heather. This is evident, in part, by the
numerous administrative complaints filed against Heather
and those seeking to provide assistance to her. The Court
finds Robert and [Robbin] would rather the children be
placed with strangers in foster care than with Heather.
The Court is very disturbed by their thinking and their
actions.
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Nelson, 2020 WL 1969918, at *9. Nevertheless, the family court permitted Robert
continued visitation with the children. This Court affirmed the family court.3
While the case was on appeal in No. 2019-CA-0441-ME, the
acrimony between the parties continued. On January 31, 2019, Robert appeared in
person at the children’s school, attempting to obtain information regarding an eye
examination performed on one of the children. The school declined to give Robert
any paperwork, but Robert later testified the school nurse informed him of the
results of the eye examination. The same day, Robbin called the school, alleging
physical abuse of the children by Heather. The school, in turn, called CHFS to
report the substance of Robbin’s telephone call.4 On February 1, 2019, Robbin
called CHFS to report medical neglect of the children by Heather. The same day,
Heather filed an emergency motion to cease Robert’s visitation, alleging Robert
was using his visitations with the children to gather information to use against
Heather, contrary to prior orders of the family court.
The family court conducted a hearing on February 5, 2019. Janet
Glover, investigative worker for CHFS, testified that, based on the information she
had at the time, she anticipated the most recent referrals would be unsubstantiated.
3
We note that, although Robert was named as an appellee in No. 2019-CA-0441-ME, he did not
file a brief.
4
At the hearing on February 5, 2019, the family court ordered the CHFS worker to reveal the
referral sources for the telephone calls made regarding the children on January 31, 2019, and
February 1, 2019.
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Ms. Glover also testified that the most recent referral of February 1, 2019, was the
fifth since 2017.5 Robert also testified. He admitted to having discussions with
Robbin regarding things the children told him during his visitation, and also shared
the results of the eye examination with her. On February 20, 2019, the family
court entered an order stating, in relevant part, that “Robert is not to be involved in
decision making regarding the children or to gather information concerning the
children.” Robert filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order. The family
court granted his motion in part, and entered an order on March 8, 2019, that
altered or amended specific portions of the February 20, 2019 order. However, the
portion ordering Robert not to gather information about the children was not
altered or amended in any way.
On or about February 16, 2021, Robert sent a letter to Warren County
Public Schools, demanding information for both children. The letter stated, in
relevant part,
[b]ased on my concerns I am requesting a copy of
all records and documents on my children as named
above, as I am allowed to do under The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). This
request is specifically for all school records and
associated documents that pertain to my children
including but not limited to the report of the testing for
the audio processing disorder which you should have on
5
Ms. Glover testified that, although she had documentation with her for only four referrals, she
was sure five referrals had been made to CHFS since 2017, based on a form she initially saw in
preparation for her testimony.
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file, ADHD testing for my son including teacher notes or
psych testing/evaluation that would lead to that
diagnosis, current and past curriculums, what if any
accommodations are being provided for either of my
children, names of their teachers, class size, test[] scores,
past and present grades, enrollment forms, medication
forms, emergency contact forms, approved individual
forms for pick up drop off, attendance logs, internal and
external communications that pertain to my children,
documentation by teachers, school nurses, social worker,
psychologist, psychiatrist, any licensed professional
regarding testing/treatment/recommendations, contact
with any attorney, judge, law enforcement or child
protective services, and any communication from any
and all sources related to my children which are
maintained in any form hardcopy, electronic, or
otherwise, and the log-in information whereby I can
access by [sic] children’s school activity and progress.
Rather than provide the requested information to Robert, WCPS filed
a motion with the family court as a non-party on March 16, 2021. The motion
requested clarification of the family court’s February 20, 2019 order. Specifically,
it requested the family court clarify whether the language that read “Robert [Sharp]
is not to be involved in decision making regarding the children or to gather
information concerning the children” meant that he shall not obtain copies of the
children’s education records he was seeking. WCPS did not take a position on the
matter. Robert filed a response, arguing that the subject matter of the February 20,
2019 order had “nothing to do with the subject matter of the pending motion by the
non-party [WCPS].” He asserted the family court never entered an order
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restricting him from obtaining the children’s school records and that he was
entitled to the records under FERPA.
The family court conducted a telephonic hearing on April 20, 2021.
Robert argued that KRS6 403.330 did not prevent him from obtaining the school
records and that no prior order of the family court prevented him from obtaining
same. He also argued the order entered on March 8, 2019, in response to his
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the February 20, 2019 order, had no prohibitions.
Heather argued the February 20, 2019 order came about because Robert attempted
to obtain medical records from the school which, in turn, resulted in Robbin
making more referrals to CHFS. Heather asserted any attempt by Robert to obtain
records of any sort was not in good faith. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
family court addressed its ongoing concern that Robert gathers information to
share with Robbin, resulting in more referrals to CHFS and ongoing litigation to
keep Heather in court to “basically starve her out financially.”
On May 18, 2021, the family court entered an order prohibiting
Robert from acquiring any school records of the children with the exception of
report cards. Robert filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order or to make
specific findings of fact to support entry of the order. Robert argued no evidentiary
hearing occurred in response to WCPS’s motion, and therefore, the record was
6
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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devoid of any evidence to support the family court’s order. The family court
denied Robert’s order to alter, amend, or vacate, but did make additional findings
including, in relevant part, that the full evidentiary hearing Robert insisted was
lacking occurred on February 5, 2019. The family court again referenced Robert’s
repeated attempts to gather information and pass it along to Robbin for ongoing
referrals to CHFS and litigation as a means to harass Heather. This appeal
followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As an appellate court, we are required to give deference to the trial
court’s interpretation of its own orders. Unless that interpretation is manifestly
unreasonable, we will affirm.” VP Louisville, LLC v. NBH Bank, N.A., 578 S.W.3d
753, 757 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Robert argues the family court erred in interpreting its February 20,
2019 order as prohibiting him from obtaining the children’s school records from
WCPS. He also argues that the family court erred in finding that Robert
continually reported Heather to CHFS as a means of harassment. We disagree.
Robert’s first argument centers primarily on the lack of an evidentiary
hearing in response to WCPS’s motion. We agree with the family court and
Heather that the evidentiary hearing occurred on February 5, 2019. The family
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court then entered an order on February 20, 2019, and a second order on March 8,
2019, that altered or amended certain portions of the February 20, 2019 order, but
left unaltered the portion that stated, “Robert is not to be involved in decision
making regarding the children or to gather information concerning the children.”
Neither of those orders were appealed. In seeking clarification of the February 20,
2019 order, WCPS in no way took a position, nor did it put forth any evidence
beyond the letter received from Robert. The orders entered by the family court on
May 18, 2021, and July 30, 2021, in no way altered the February 20, 2019 order.
Considering the order was entered as a result of Robert’s attempts in 2019 to
obtain records from the children’s school, it is not manifestly unreasonable for the
family court to interpret its order as preventing Robert from gathering information
from the children’s school.7
Robert also argues KRS 403.330 does not prevent him from accessing
school records. The statute states, in relevant part,
(1) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at
the time of the custody decree, the custodian may
determine the child’s upbringing, including his
education, health care, and religious training, unless the
court after hearing, finds, upon motion by the
noncustodial parent, that in the absence of a specific
7
As an extension of his first argument, Robert also contends that, by limiting his access to the
children’s school records, the family court’s order is “tantamount to modifying his visitation
rights without a[n] evidentiary hearing[.]” This argument simply has no basis in fact or law.
The cases cited by Robert, Kulas v. Kulas, 898 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. App. 1995), and Smith v. Smith,
869 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. App. 1994), are wholly unrelated to the issues presented in this appeal. We
decline to further address this portion of Robert’s argument.
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limitation of the custodian’s authority, the child’s
physical health would be endangered or his emotional
development significantly impaired.
Robert points to a 1990 opinion of the Kentucky Attorney General in
support of his argument. Robert is correct that the opinion generally indicates
KRS 403.330 does not ban a noncustodial parent from inspecting educational
records. However, the opinion also states
there is no language specifically extinguishing the
general right of a noncustodial parent to review a child’s
educational records. Absent express statutory language
banning a noncustodial parent from reviewing a child’s
educational records, or an agreement or a court order
establishing such ban, we believe a noncustodial parent
has the same entitlement as a custodial parent to review a
child’s educational records.
1988-1991 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen 2-370, Ky. OAG 90-52, 1990 WL 512598, at *1
(Jul. 23, 1990) (emphasis added).8
“While we are not bound by opinions of the Attorney General; this
court can, however, afford them great weight.” Louisville Metro Dep’t of
Corrections v. King, 258 S.W.3d 419, 421-22 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted).
8
Notably, Robert does not argue the applicability of 34 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) §
99.4, which is part of FERPA and cited by WCPS, and states
[a]n educational agency or institution shall give full rights under
the Act to either parent, unless the agency or institution has been
provided with evidence that there is a court order, State statute, or
legally binding document relating to such matters as divorce,
separation, or custody that specifically revokes these rights.
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In this instance, we agree with the Attorney General’s opinion that KRS 403.330
does not restrict a noncustodial parent’s access to school records in the absence of
a court order stating otherwise. Here, the family court’s order provided Robert
was not to gather information about the children, including school records.
Accordingly, we discern no error.9
Finally, Robert argues the family court erred when it found, in its July
30, 2021 order (in reference to the February 20, 2019 order) that, “[i]t had become
clear to the Court that [Robert] and [Robbin] were continually reporting [Heather]
to [CHFS] without cause and as a means of harassing [Heather].” We disagree
with Robert. The record before us reveals that Robert has been continually acting
in concert with Robbin to affect the custody proceedings at every turn and to
provide information to Robbin so that she could make referrals to CHFS. Even
after Robbin was ordered to have no contact with the children, the referrals to
CHFS continued. As previously stated, at the hearing on February 5, 2019, Robert
testified and admitted to having discussions with Robbin regarding things the
9
We agree with the family court that Kentucky courts have not yet interpreted 34 C.F.R. § 99.4and/or KRS 403.330 to address when a court may restrict a noncustodial parent’s rights to
inspect educational records. Robert argues the family court mistakenly relied on caselaw from
New York in support of its order, specifically Page v. Rotterdam-Mohonasen Cent. Sch. Dist.,
109 Misc. 2d 1049, 1051, 441 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). However, the issue before
this Court is not when a court may restrict a noncustodial parent’s rights, but rather, if the
language contained in the February 20, 2019 order, as interpreted by the orders entered on May
18, 2021, and July 30, 2021, in fact restricted Robert’s right to inspect educational records. We
therefore decline to further address Robert’s argument that the citation to New York law was in
error.
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children told him during his visitation, and also shared the results of the eye
examination with her. Despite this testimony, he also stated he was unsure how
Robbin received the information that resulted in the two most recent referrals to
CHFS. It was not unreasonable for the family court to conclude that Robbin
acquired the information from Robert. Nor would it be unreasonable to conclude
that Robert knew precisely what Robbin would do with said information. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the family court asked Robert no less than four times
what it could do to prevent him from gathering and reporting information
regarding the children to Robbin. Robert was evasive, but eventually stated that he
did not know. We agree with the family court and a prior panel of this Court that,
based on their conduct, it appears that Robert and Robbin would prefer the children
be in foster care with strangers than with their mother.10 Despite the no-contact
order between Robbin and the children, Robert has admittedly continued to
provide her with information that has resulted in ongoing litigation and more
referrals to CHFS. We empathize with the family court’s obvious frustration. We
discern no error.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Warren Family Court.
10
See Nelson, 2020 WL 1969918, at *10.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HEATHER
ANNE SHARP:
Kenneth A. Meredith II
Bowling Green, Kentucky Casey A. Hixson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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