Total Home Protection v. Andrew J. Scheumann

RENDERED: JULY 1, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0532-MR
TOTAL HOME PROTECTION APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-001489
ANDREW J. SCHEUMANN AND
CHAPIN E. SCHEUMANN APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Total Home Protection (“THP”) appeals the
Jefferson Circuit Court order denying its motion to dismiss and to compel
arbitration. Upon review of the record and relevant caselaw, we reverse and
remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2018, Appellees Andrew and Chapin Scheumann (together,
the “Scheumanns”) purchased their home in Louisville and entered into a Platinum
Home Warranty Agreement (“Agreement”) with THP. The Agreement stated that
THP would cover the costs to repair or replace covered systems outlined in the
plan (e.g., the water heater, heating system, refrigerator, etc.). Section IX of the
Agreement provided that the parties would resolve all disputes arising under the
contract through mandatory arbitration; the Scheumanns would waive certain types
of damages; limit their recovery to $1,500; waive their right to a jury trial; and
waive their right to litigate any disputes arising under the contract in the courts. In
pertinent part, the Agreement stated:
IX. MEDIATION
...
A. Any and all disputes, claims and causes of action
arising out of or connected with this Agreement
shall be resolved individually, without resort to
any form of class action, and exclusively by the
American Arbitration Association under its
Commercial Mediation Rules. Controversies or
claims shall be submitted to arbitration regardless
of the theory under which they arise, including
without limitation contract, tort, common law,
statutory, or regulatory duties or liability.
B. Any and all claims, judgments and awards shall be
limited to actual out of pocket costs incurred to a
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maximum of $1500 per claim, but in no event
attorneys’ fees.
C. Under no circumstances will you be permitted to
obtain awards for, and you hereby waive all rights
to claims, indirect, punitive, incidental and
consequential damages and any other damages,
other than for actual out-of-pocket expenses, and
any and all rights to have damages multiplied or
otherwise increased. . . .
...
D. . . . THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT
THEY WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT TO
LITIGATE THROUGH A COURT, TO HAVE A
JUDGE OR JURY DECIDE THEIR CASE AND
TO BE PARTY TO A CLASS OR
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION, HOWEVER,
THEY UNDERSTAND AND CHOOSE TO
HAVE ANY CLAIMS DECIDED
INDIVIDUALLY, THROUGH ARBITRATION.
In January 2019, the Scheumanns’ heating system stopped working
properly, so they alerted THP of the issues and requested that THP repair it under
the Agreement. In accordance with the Agreement, THP assigned a contractor to
address the Scheumanns’ request. After some apparent poor communication and
incompetent work on the part of the contractor, the contractor failed to resolve the
issues. As a result, the Scheumanns were without a functioning furnace for a week
and bought a space heater to keep their residence warm.
After two months of disagreements and miscommunication between
the parties, on March 8, 2019, the Scheumanns filed a complaint against THP and
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the contractor1 in Jefferson Circuit Court, despite the arbitration agreement. The
first amended complaint,2 amended on March 21, 2019, alleged THP transacted
business without authority; violated the Consumer Protection Act; breached the
Agreement; committed two counts of fraudulent misrepresentation; negligently
hired or retained the contractor; committed negligence; committed gross
negligence; and that Section IX of the Agreement, including the arbitration clause,
was unconstitutional.
After alleged difficulties serving process to THP – in which THP later
filed affidavits arguing it was never properly served – the Scheumanns filed an
affidavit claiming THP was properly served on March 26, 2019. Therefore, the
Scheumanns claimed a responsive pleading was due no later than April 15, 2019.
When they did not receive as much, they moved for default judgment on April 17,
2019. The circuit court then granted default judgment on April 19, 2019.
In pertinent part, the tendered order said, “Default Judgment is entered
in favor of [the Scheumanns] and against [THP] on Count XVI of [the
Scheumanns’] First Amended Complaint, Constitutionality of Section IX of
[Agreement].” It further detailed that it would issue a subsequent order concerning
1
As the claims against the contractor are not before us, we will focus only on the claims
involving THP.
2
The first amended complaint updated THP’s address after service to the original address was
unsuccessful.
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a hearing on damages. After the damages hearing, the circuit court issued an order
in October 2019 that awarded the Scheumanns a total of $108,901.12, detailed as
follows: $665.17 in actual damages (the maximum allotted); $25,000 for mental
and physical pain and suffering of Andrew Scheumann; $25,000 for mental and
physical pain and suffering of Chapin Scheumann; $50,000 in punitive damages;
$998 for violating KRS3 14A.9-0104 (the maximum allotted); and $7,237.95 for
legal fees and expenses.5
At some point thereafter, with that damages award in hand, the
Scheumanns filed the judgment in THP’s home state to recover the listed damages.
At that point, THP claimed it first became aware of the Scheumanns’ case against
it. As such, THP filed a motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment in
April 2020. In that motion, THP argued, in pertinent part, that it was not properly
served and that the circuit court did not have proper jurisdiction because the
Scheumanns agreed to mandatory arbitration. Further, THP argued that the
judgment awarding damages should be vacated because the court made no findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support the award and the vast majority of the
3
Kentucky Revised Statute.
4
This statute, titled “Authority to transact business required; certificate of authority required for
award of state contract; exception for foreign insurer[,]” governed THP’s business transactions in
Kentucky.
5
Although the Scheumanns are pro se appellees, and were pro se plaintiffs below, Chapin
Scheumann is a licensed and practicing attorney in Kentucky and billed her hours accordingly.
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award – aside from $665.17 in actual damages – was specifically prohibited by the
Agreement.
The next month, in May 2020, the circuit court entered an order
setting aside and vacating the default judgment, in part (“Order Vacating in Part”).
It ordered “that the 4/19/19 Order Granting Default Judgment stands, however, the
Order of Judgment entered in this proceeding on October 18, 2019, as to damages,
in favor of the [Scheumanns] is set aside, and vacated and declared null and void.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [THP] is hereby granted a new hearing on
damages.” The Order Vacating in Part did not contain “final and appealable”
language.
THP then filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in
February 2021.6 THP asked the circuit court to dismiss the case and compel the
parties to arbitrate as required under KRS 417.060(1). In April 2021, the circuit
court denied THP’s motion, stating it had previously held in its default judgment
that the arbitration provision in the Agreement was unconstitutional. In so
concluding, the circuit court determined the “procedural posture of this action
compels denial of THP’s motion.”
THP now appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration,
arguing that the circuit court erred when it (1) failed to enforce a valid arbitration
6
The status of the new hearing on damages is not clear in the record.
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agreement; (2) found the arbitration provision was unconstitutional; and (3) failed
to provide appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[A]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is
immediately appealable. KRS 417.220(1). See also
Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d
335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001). The enforcement and effect
of an arbitration agreement is governed by the Kentucky
Uniform Arbitration Act (KUAA), KRS 417.045 et seq.,
and the Federal Arbitration Act, (FAA) 9 U.S.C.[7] §§ 1 et
seq. “Both Acts evince a legislative policy favoring
arbitration agreements, or at least shielding them from
disfavor.” Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d
581, 588 (Ky. 2012).
But under both Acts, a party seeking to compel
arbitration has the initial burden of establishing the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 589.
That question is controlled by state law rules of contract
formation. Id. at 590. The FAA does not preempt state
law contract principles, including matters concerning the
authority of an agent to enter into a contract and which
parties may be bound by that contract. Arthur Andersen
LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630-31, 129 S. Ct. 1896,
1902, 173 L. Ed. 2d 832 (2009). Since this matter is
entirely an issue of law, our standard of review is de
novo. Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 340.
New Meadowview Health and Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Booker, 550 S.W.3d 56, 58 (Ky.
App. 2018) (footnote omitted).
7
United States Code.
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ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Scheumanns argue that this Court does not
have the requisite jurisdiction to review this claim under Pavkovich v. Shenouda,
280 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App. 2009). We do not agree. Alternatively, THP argues
this appeal is properly before this Court and that the circuit court’s denial of its
motion to compel arbitration did not comply with Kentucky law. We agree.
A. Jurisdiction
Before we analyze THP’s claims regarding the circuit court’s denial
of it motion to compel arbitration, we will address the Scheumanns’ argument that
this Court does not have proper authority to review such claims. Citing to this
Court’s decision in Pavkovich, the Scheumanns claim THP forfeited its
opportunity to challenge the circuit court’s findings regarding the arbitration clause
when it failed to appeal the Order Vacating in Part. Therefore, the Scheumanns
argue that the arbitration issue is not properly before this Court. We find the
Scheumanns’ argument to be unconvincing under Pavkovich.
In Pavkovich, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in
hopes of invalidating an arbitration clause the circuit court had previously upheld.8
Id. at 586. After hearing the motion, the circuit court denied it and confirmed its
8
The plaintiffs learned they needed to submit a claim for fraud in the inducement of the contract
in order to attack the validity of the arbitration agreement. Id. A standard fraud claim would not
suffice, as they had previously attempted. Id.-8-
referral to arbitration. Id. The plaintiffs did not appeal that order. Id. About a
week later, the circuit court “ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs’
Complaint be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.” Id. The judge
then wrote in the order that the parties were referred to arbitration. Id. This Court
explained that such order “was a final and appealable judgment” under CR9 54.01.
Id. Therefore, when the plaintiffs failed to “file a motion to alter, amend or vacate
th[at] judgment within ten (10) days as required by CR 59.05[ ] [n]or . . . file a
notice of appeal of th[e] judgment within thirty (30) days . . . as required by CR
73.02(1)(a)[,]” the circuit court “no longer had subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.Instead, the plaintiffs waited a few months then filed a motion asking
the circuit court “to order the parties to commence arbitration[,]” toll the
“contractual requirement for notice of arbitration[,]” and amend its previous order
to say the same. Id. However, the circuit court explained that it had already
referred the claims to arbitration; therefore, the circuit court “no longer [had]
jurisdiction over any of the issues outlined in [the] action and, accordingly,
w[ould] refer all claims to arbitration.” Id. at 586-87. The plaintiffs then appealed
that order. Id. at 587.
In the meantime, the plaintiffs finally provided arbitration notice to
the appropriate parties; however, by that time, three and a half years had passed
9
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
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since the plaintiffs discovered their claim, so the arbitrator dismissed the
proceedings. Id. The plaintiffs then tried to vacate that arbitration award with the
circuit court instead of filing a new action under KRS 417.160.10 Id. This Court
found that the matter involving the circuit court was already final by that point;
therefore, as it had stated, it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. By
extension, “this Court did not obtain jurisdiction to address that dismissal.” Id.Further, this Court found:
“[T]he source of the court’s jurisdiction to act in
arbitration matters is wholly derived from the Uniform
Arbitration Act.” Artrip v. Samons Const., Inc., 54
S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ky. App. 2001). And so we look to
the Act.
KRS 417.060(3) and (4) contemplate the situation the
[plaintiffs] faced in August 2004.
(3) If an issue referable to arbitration under the
alleged agreement is involved in an action or
proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction
to hear applications under subsection (1) of this
section [to compel arbitration], the application
shall be made therein. Otherwise and subject
to KRS 417.210, the application may be made in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
(4) Any action or proceeding involving an issue
subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for
arbitration or an application therefor has been
made under this section; or if the issue is
severable, the stay may be with respect thereto
10
KRS 417.160 “provides that a Court may vacate the decision of an arbitrator under specific
circumstances.” Pavkovich, 280 S.W.3d at 587.
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only. When the application is made in such action
or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall
include such stay.
Unfortunately, the [plaintiffs] did not seek
application to compel arbitration while the Jefferson
Circuit Court still retained jurisdiction. Had they done
so, the court would have had to comply with KRS
417.060(3) and (4). Instead, the court ordered all claims
dismissed with prejudice, and no appeal was taken from
the order. This left the [plaintiffs] in the same position
with regard to the arbitration as if no litigation had ever
been filed. Consequently, when they were displeased
with the arbitrator’s determination, they were required to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Jefferson Circuit Court all
over again.
Id.Citing Pavkovich, the Scheumanns claim the circuit court here also
lost its jurisdiction, thereby removing this Court’s jurisdiction to review the claims.
However, Pavkovich is clearly distinguishable from the case before us. Here, the
circuit court neither dismissed the claims nor referred the claims to arbitration. In
fact, the record does not suggest that the circuit court ever reviewed the Agreement
or arbitration clause at all. Instead, the circuit court granted default judgment on
the Scheumanns’ claims wholesale and failed to address the specific issue of
arbitrability at any point throughout the proceedings below.
Because the circuit court did not refer the claims to arbitration nor
dismiss the claims, the attempted comparison to Pavkovich is unconvincing.
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Therefore, the circuit court retained its jurisdiction over the Scheumanns’ claims
when it denied THP’s motion to compel arbitration.
B. Lawfulness of Appeal
Now, we turn to THP’s claims. First, THP argues that it properly
appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration; and second, that the circuit
court’s denial did not comply with Kentucky caselaw. Alternatively, the
Scheumanns argue that THP should not have appealed the motion to compel
arbitration and instead should have appealed the Order Vacating in Part.
Generally, for this Court to review an order, it must be final and
appealable. CR 54.02.11 Typically, those “magic words” – final and appealable –
must be present in the order. Id. However, “[t]he magic words required by CR
54.02 for finality” are not required when the order is final in spirit and leaves
“nothing to adjudicate regarding the rights and priorities of the parties.” Security
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Mayfield v. Nesler, 697 S.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Ky.
1985).12 While the Scheumanns insist THP should have appealed the Order
11
In pertinent part, CR 54.02 states, “The judgment shall recite such determination and shall
recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is interlocutory and subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.”
12
There, our Supreme Court determined the order was final and appealable because it “set out
the validity, amount and priority of each of the claims of the parties . . . .” Id. at 138.
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Vacating in Part, THP argues that that order was not final and appealable.
Therefore, THP argues it was proper to file a motion to compel arbitration and then
appeal its denial. We agree.
Not only did the Order Vacating in Part not contain the “final and
appealable” language, but it also did not resolve all of the claims and liabilities in
the lawsuit. The order specifically stated the “Order Granting Default Judgment
stands, however, the Order of Judgment entered in this proceeding on October 18,
2019, as to damages, in favor of the [Scheumanns] is set aside, and vacated and
declared null and void. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [THP] is hereby granted
a new hearing on damages.” (Emphasis added.) In Chittum v. Abell, 485 S.W.2d
231, 237 (Ky. 1972), this Court held that an order was not “final” where the circuit
court reserved the issues of damages for a later trial, even when the magic “final
and appealable” language was used. Therefore, we do not agree with the
Scheumanns’ argument that the Order Vacating in Part, which reserved the issue of
damages for a later hearing, was appealable under CR 54.02. This is especially so
because the damages hearing would require analysis of the same Agreement that is
under scrutiny for the arbitration issue. Therefore, THP was not permitted – much
less required – to appeal the Order Vacating in Part as the Scheumanns suggest.
Consequently, it was not improper for THP to file the motion to
compel arbitration. And, as our caselaw has long emphasized, a circuit court’s
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denial of a motion to compel arbitration is appealable. American General Home
Equity, Inc. v. Kestel, 253 S.W.3d 543, 547 n.2 (Ky. 2008) (citing Fayette County
Farm Bureau Federation v. Martin, 758 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky. App. 1998) (“an
order denying a motion to compel arbitration . . . is explicitly held to be appealable
under KRS 417.220(1)(a)”)); New Meadowview Health, 550 S.W.3d at 58 (citing
KRS 417.220(1) (“[A]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is
immediately appealable.”)); Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 340 (“[B]ecause an ordinary
appeal at the close of litigation will not often provide an adequate remedy for the
wrongful denial of a right to arbitrate, KRS 417.220 provides in pertinent part
that . . . [a]n appeal may be taken from . . . [a]n order denying an application to
compel arbitration made under KRS 417.060[.]”). Therefore, the order denying
THP’s motion to compel arbitration is properly before this Court.
Next, we must address whether the circuit court’s order denying
THP’s motion to compel arbitration was lawful. Our Supreme Court explained the
role of the circuit court when faced with a motion to compel arbitration in Jackson
v. Legacy Health Services, Inc., 640 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Ky. 2022) (citations and
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
Arbitration agreements, as with any other valid
contract, are generally enforceable. State courts must
compel arbitration when there is a valid, written
arbitration agreement between the parties.
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Disputes concerning arbitration agreements may
implicate both the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act
(KUAA), and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under
both Acts, “a party seeking to compel arbitration has the
initial burden of establishing the existence of a valid
agreement to arbitrate.” When the burden has been met,
the party seeking to avoid the agreement must then rebut
the presumption that the agreement is valid. “[T]he
existence of a binding agreement to arbitrate is
necessarily a threshold consideration for a trial court
faced with a motion to compel arbitration. Disposition
of that issue, as both the United States Supreme Court
and this Court have long recognized, implicates state law
contract principles.”
The first step, our Supreme Court explained, is for the circuit court to
determine whether the arbitration agreement is binding using state contract
principles. Id. See also General Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18, 20 (Ky.
App. 2006) (“the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is a threshold matter to
be resolved by court.”). Then, the circuit court “may deem arbitration agreements
invalid due to ‘generally applicable contract defenses,’ but not because of
‘defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’” Jackson, 640 S.W.3d at 732 (quoting
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622, 200 L. Ed. 2d 889(2018)).
Here, the circuit court made no determination concerning whether
there was a binding agreement to arbitrate using state law contract principles.
Instead, the circuit court – contrary to the overwhelming preference to enforce
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arbitration agreements – found the arbitration clause to be “unconstitutional” based
solely on the fact of a default judgment alone, i.e., without conducting any legal
analysis of its own. However, as we have earlier stated, the Order Vacating in Part
was not final and appealable, leaving THP no option but to then file the motion to
compel arbitration. It is clear the circuit court did not properly apply Kentucky
precedent regarding arbitration agreements and failed to make any actual
determination regarding this Agreement. The circuit court simply believed it was
bound by the language in its “default judgment,” even though that was set aside, in
part, by the Order Vacating in Part.
The circuit court failed to follow the first step of the required analysis.
In so doing, it failed to comply with Kentucky precedent and CR 52.01, which
requires the circuit court to conduct a proper review of the record and to provide
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Skelton v. Roberts, 673 S.W.2d
733, 734 (Ky. App. 1984) (citing Elkins v. Elkins, 359 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1962)).
Therefore, the circuit court is directed to vacate the judgment below
and enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to validity and
enforceability of the Agreement and upon THP’s motion to compel arbitration.
CONCLUSION
We hereby REVERSE and set aside the Jefferson Circuit Court order
denying THP’s motion to compel arbitration. These matters are hereby
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REMANDED to the circuit court to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions
of law as to the arbitration agreement consistent with this Opinion and the
authorities cited herein.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I must respectfully dissent with the
majority’s decision herein. I believe the majority has misinterpreted Appellees’
basis for reliance upon Pavkovich. I see this case as a procedural issue, not
necessarily a jurisdictional one. Lost in the majority’s analysis is the fact the trial
court herein granted a default judgment to Appellees. Appellant eventually sought
to vacate that judgment as provided procedurally under our Civil Rules. However,
rather than appeal that judgment, it filed a wholly separate motion to dismiss.
Were it not for the default judgment already entered, and made final by the trial
court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to vacate – which was not appealed – the
motion to dismiss may have been proper. This case presents an unusual procedural
posture.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Scott P. Zoppoth Andrew J. Scheumann, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky Chapin Elizabeth Scheumann, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
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