Citation Numbers: 89 Ky. 165
Judges: Pryor
Filed Date: 10/10/1889
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
delivered the opinion oe the court.
This appeal is prosecuted by John P. Morton & Co. and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company from a judgment of the Campbell Chancery Court in favor of the appellee, J. R. Hallam.
The actions were instituted to enforce a lien assorted by the appellee as an attorney at law for his fees- under a contract with John P. Morton & Co., who were his clients, in a litigation with the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company. The lien, as is alleged, existed on the stock of the Cincinnati and Lexington Railway Company that was created by the purchase, through a syndicate, of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company, John P. Morton & Co. being one of the purchasers, and accepting for the debts against the old company stock in the new company, the Cincinnati and Lexington Railway Company. The old company, the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company, was largely indebted to the firm of John P. Morton & Co., and becoming insolvent, the appellee, J. R. Hallam, was employed, in conjunction with R. YY. Woolley and Bodley & Simrall, by the firm of JohnP. Morton & Co., to secure in some way, by suit, these large sums of money due the firm. They •entered into a written contract, by which they were to bring one or more suits, as, in their judgment, njigiit be
Certain actions were instituted under this contract in the courts of Jefferson county against the Louisville, Cincinnati and' Lexington Railroad Company, and judgments recovered for large sums of money, amounting, in the aggregate, to about one hundred and. thirty thousand dollars, including the interest. The indebtedness was evidenced by written obligations, and no controversy existed as to the right to a judgment except as to usury alleged to have been embraced in the transactions. In September, 1874, this corporation, or its' property, had been placed ip the hands of a receiver at the suit of one Douglas, then pending in the Louisville Chancery Court, for the benefit of the holders of certain mortgage bonds. The contract with the appellee was made in December following, and in the condition the railroad company was then, millions of dollars had to be paid by reason of liens before the unpreferred creditors could share in the proceeds of the railroad property. Upon a return of no property, John P. Morton & Co., through their counsel, had an attachment levied on the railroad property, including all the rights, franchises, &c., pertaining to it; and their suits being consolidated with that of Douglas and other actions, the road, together with its property, franchises, &c., was sold and purchased by a syndicate, of which
That firm, instead of making their debts, had incurred a much greater liability by becoming bound, as purchasers of the old road, with several millions of dollars of liens, prior in law and equity to their purchase, and which had to be satisfied. They acquired no lien or preferred claim, by reason of the attachment levied on this railroad property, that placed them in any better condition than any unsecured creditor; but, on the contrary, were risking a loss of more money by entering into the syndicate and forming a new corporation, that in running the road might meet with the fate of the old corporation. The stock in the new corporation, the Cincinnati and Lexington Railway Company, was issued under the agreement between those who purchased the road, John P. Morton & Co. being among the number ; and the appellee, Hallam, as the attorney for that firm, had no interest in the stock, and was, in no manner, connected with the purchase. He had sued the appellant, on the contract of employment, in the Jefferson Court of Common Pleas in March, 1879, and appellant had procured this stock, and entered into the syndicate in the year 1877. under which the purchase was made. No lien
The appellants resided in the city oí Louisville, and so did the chief officers of the corporations made defendants to this action, and the right of the appellee to maintain his action is based upon the fact that the garnishee, or rather the Louisville and Nashville Railroad- Company, had been served in the county of Campbell, and that this corporation had purchased of John P. Morton & Co. the stock of the Cincinnati and Lexington Railway Company that had been assigned or issued to him by the syndicate creating this last company, and that having a lien, by reason of his services as attorney, on the property rights and franchises of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company, the Louisville and Nashville. Railroad Company must be presumed to have had notice of his lien when it purchased the stock of John P. Morton & Co.; that the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company had acquired stock in the new company on which he held a lien as an attorney, by reason of the judgment obtained against the old company. It is insisted by the appellees that the service of process on the station agent of the corporations was not a legal service, and by John P. Morton & Co., that the appellant had no right to prosecute this action against him to enforce the lien, until he first established a valid claim upon which to base his lien; and to do this, he was compelled to bring his suit where the defendant lived, in the absence of an actual service in the county where the action was instituted. His action in the Jefferson
What character of lien, assuming that a valid claim existed on the part of the appellee against Morton & Co., did the appellee have on the property and stocks, sold the appellant, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company? We have looked to the facts of this, record, and are unable to find any rule of law or equity, or statutory regulation, with regard to the fees of counsel,. that would create such a lien.
The action of Douglas, in the interest of bond-holders, as well as the actions of the appellants, Morton & Co., against the old or first-named corporation, had gone to judgment. Prom that judgment the appellee, as attorney, claims the lien originates. That judgment was to sell all the property rights and franchises of the' corporation. The sale was made, and the road purchased by the syndicate for eight hundred thousand dollars, and bonds executed for the purchase money. The purchasers took the property, subject to the liens of bond-holders, that amounted to several millions of dollars. All the creditors, including bond-holders, as well as John P. Morton & Co., looked to this judgment to satisfy their claims. The attachment by appellant was gone, in so far as it created any lien, because the property was sold to satisfy it. The bond-holders had priority, for the reason the sale was subject to their' lien. John P. Morton & Co., as well as the other creditors, could look to nothing else but this judgment of sale, or the bonds executed in pursuance of the judgment, to satisfy their demands, and when it clearly ap
If John P. Morton & Co. got nothing by the judg
The fact that appellee’s clients made by the purchase would affect them if the appellee, by his contract, was entitled to any part of what was made by the venture but when the rights of tona fide purchasers are concerned, it presents a different question.
There being no lien to assert against the appellant, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, the-judgment below was erroneous, and is reversed, with directions to dismiss the petitions, as to both the appellants in both appeals, without prejudice.