Citation Numbers: 12 Ky. Op. 53, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 889, 1883 Ky. LEXIS 133
Judges: Lewis
Filed Date: 4/19/1883
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
Opinion by
By Gen. Stat. 1881, ch. 24, § 10, it is provided that “No deed of trust or mortgage, conveying a legal or equitable title to real or
So if even it be true, which we think has been shown, that the paper was signed and delivered by Hoover to appellants, and therefore valid as a mortgage of the lots of land as between the parties to it, still it is not valid against appellee who is a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless he at the time he purchased had notice it was so executed and delivered. Whether he had such notice is the only question in the case.
. We think that the 'averment by the -appellee in his answer that he “had no knowledge or information whether or not his codefendant, Hoover, ever signed or agreed to sign said pretended mortgage to the plaintiff only from what the parties told him,” when considered in connection with the recital of what the plaintiffs claimed and what took place between him -and Hoover, amounts to a sufficient denial of the allegation in the petition on that subject and puts in issue the question of notice. Whether he had such notice or not must therefore depend upon the evidence.
Appellant, Haynes, does not in his deposition say that he informed appellee that the mortgage had been executed, but simply that Hoover and appellant, Blue, and himself had-agreed to give them a mortgage. In fact, Haynes states in his deposition that he is not positive Hoover did sign it. Appellee in his deposition states that when Hoover came to him to sell the lots he asked him if appellants did not have a mortgage on the land, and that Hoover told him in replj' that they had not; that they had given him a mortgage to acknowledge but that he had not done it and did not intend to do it. At that time Hoover had the mortgage in his possession and read it- to- appellee.
There is no evidence whatever of an affirmative nature that appellee was ever informed or knew the mortgage had been signed by Hoover. On the contrary, the language oí the appellant, Haynes, at the time he was attempting to sell the land to appellee as Hoover’s agent, that “Hoover had agreed to give them a mortgage,” considered in connection with the possession of the paper by Hoover and his declaration at the time he sold to appellee, was well calculated to satisfy appellee that it had not been signed but that it was
The judgment must be affirmed.