James Menary v. Sullivan & Cozart, Inc.

RENDERED: JULY 29, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1596-MR
JAMES MENARY AND DOREEN APPELLANTS
MENARY
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-006010
SULLIVAN & COZART, INC.; APPELLEES
BROWN WILSON DEVELOPMENT,
INC.; BROWN-FORMAN
CORPORATION; MAIN STREET
REVITALIZATION LLC; MESSER
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; AND
WHISKEY ROW LLC
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, MCNEILL, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a “trip and fall” case wherein Appellant, Doreen
Menary, filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court against numerous landowners, general
contractors, and subcontractors, alleging negligence as a result of injuries she
sustained after she fell while walking along Main Street in Louisville, Kentucky.
Doreen’s husband, James Menary, filed a claim from loss of consortium. It is
unclear what caused Doreen to fall. At the time her injuries, however, two
construction projects were being undertaken on neighboring properties in the area.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of all remaining defendants –
Sullivan & Cozart, Inc., Brown-Foreman Corporation, Whiskey Row LLC, Messer
Construction Company, Main Street Revitalization LLC, and Brown Wilson
Development, Inc. (collectively referred to as Appellees).1 James and Doreen
appeal to this Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR2 56.03. In negligence cases, while duty is an issue of law, “[b]reach and
injury, are questions of fact for the jury to decide.” Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons,
113 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).
1
All governmental entities and employees named in the complaint were dismissed from the case
in an earlier order dated March 26, 2018.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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ANALYSIS
Because it is undisputed that none of the Appellees in the present case
owned the property where Doreen’s injury occurred, the line of cases applied to
premises owners are inapplicable here. See Kentucky River Medical Center v.
McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010) (hospital might reasonably foresee that curb
located at emergency room entrance was a tripping hazard); Shelton v. Easter Seals
Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. 2013) (wires on the floor near a hospital bed could
be considered by the jury to be an unreasonable risk). Furthermore, the Menarys
have not presented any evidence indicating, in this instance, that any Appellee
could be held liable for injuries occurring upon or outside the premises owned by
another. See Martin v. St. Joseph Health System, Inc., No. 2011-CA-000645-MR,
2012 WL 4036997, at *1 (Ky. App. Sep. 14, 2012); and Boland-Maloney Lumber
Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Ky. App. 2009). In that same vein, the
circuit court in the present case specifically found the following:
In this case, Doreen Menary can present evidence of
injury but has failed to produce proof that any of the
remaining defendants owed her a duty that they breached.
This is fatal to her claim.
....
Unfortunately for the Menarys, the law does not extend a
legal duty beyond the business premises unless the owner
or agent of the owner caused the defects in the
sidewalk. . . . The Plaintiffs valiantly try to create an
issue by arguing that the sidewalks abutting the
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properties contained defects in the form of barricades
closing off the sidewalk and corralling pedestrians into
the street. But according to the affidavits, [Louisville]
Metro Government, not the abutting owners, put concrete
“Jersey” barriers in place as early as 2011. It was the city
that obstructed the sidewalk for the safety of pedestrians.
However, Doreen Menary has not testified that a
barricade or item used in construction caused her injuries.
She contends instead that a defect in the street, in an area
not under the control of any of the remaining defendants,
was the cause.
....
[F]our people allegedly witnessed the fall. One witness
located the fall on the sidewalk. The other two placed
the fall in the street. Not one of the witnesses could say
exactly at what address the fall occurred. Doreen
Menary herself was not sure where it occurred. . . .
Either way, if the fall occurred on the sidewalk or in the
street, it was an area controlled by Metro Government
and not controlled by the remaining defendants.
The Menarys have not presented any evidence of record or legal authority that
would negate the circuit court’s judgment as a matter of law.3 In so holding, we
3
We note that, in requesting that this Court “view the applicable legal authorities through a more
modern, enlightened lens[,]” the Menarys cite to City of Louisville v. Nicholls, 158 Ky. 516, 165
S.W. 660 (1914). Although that case of minimal precedential value, it has been cited in one
relatively recent published opinion. See Brooks v. Seaton Place Homeowners Association, Inc.,
522 S.W.3d 871 (Ky. App. 2017). Therein, the Court concluded:
there was no evidence presented to indicate that the Greenwells
had made any use of the sidewalk upon that occasion or that they
had taken any action with respect to passage of pedestrians on the
sidewalk. Consequently, the trial court did not err by concluding
that the Greenwells did not owe Brooks a duty of care with respect
to her use of the public sidewalk.
Id. at 875 (emphasis in original).
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echo the circuit court’s sentiments that although “[t]his result might seem harsh or
unfair . . . [t]he law simply does not permit a jury to decide such matters on purely
speculative grounds.” Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s summary judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES MESSER
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
James L. Conkin, Jr. BROWN-FORMAN
Bradley D. Harville CORPORATION; AND WHISKEY
Louisville, Kentucky ROW LLC:
Daniel E. Murner
Elizabeth Winchell
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES MAIN
STREET REVITALIZATION LLC
AND BROWN WILSON
DEVELOPMENT, INC.:
David K. Barnes
Matthew R. Londergan
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SULLIVAN
& COZART, INC.:
Diane M. Laughlin
Louisville, Kentucky
Therefore, having considered Nicholls as applied by Brooks in the context of the present record,
we reiterate that there is no cause for reversal.
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