Earnest Bradley Hall Jr v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1719-MR
EARNEST BRADLEY HALL, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CR-00147
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Earnest Bradley Hall, Jr., appeals from an order of the Floyd
Circuit Court denying his motion to return personal property seized upon his arrest.
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate and remand.
Hall was arrested on or about July 13, 2013, in Floyd County,
Kentucky, after a law enforcement officer approached Hall’s vehicle and witnessed
Hall engaged in oral sex with a juvenile. Upon Hall’s arrest, various items of
personal property were seized. Hall was indicted on September 18, 2013, under
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 510.155, unlawful use of electronic means
originating or received within the Commonwealth to induce a minor to engage in
sexual or other prohibited activities. On February 19, 2014, the Commonwealth
motioned the circuit court to dismiss the indictment because Hall had been indicted
in federal court “for the conduct that resulted in the Floyd County indictment.”
The circuit court granted the motion and the indictment against Hall was dismissed
by order entered the following day.
On June 30, 2017, more than three years after the indictment was
dismissed, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the circuit court pursuant to KRS
500.090 for forfeiture and destruction of twenty-three items of personal property
seized upon Hall’s arrest. The Commonwealth cited KRS 218A.410, which refers
to property subject to forfeiture following a conviction for certain offenses in KRS
Chapter 218A related to controlled substances. The matter came before the circuit
court for a hearing on July 6, 2017. Only the Commonwealth was present. After
reviewing the motion, the court stated on the record, “Well, we are not going to
destruct anything because we probably don’t have it. So, that is moot.” However,
an order was never entered denying the Commonwealth’s motion.
On August 29, 2019, Hall, pro se, filed a motion from federal prison
for the return of his personal property seized upon his arrest. Hall included a list of
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twenty-nine items of personal property he sought returned.1 The matter came
before the circuit court on October 31, 2019. Hall was not present. The
Commonwealth advised the circuit court that the property Hall sought had already
been forfeited. The circuit court entered an order on November 4, 2019, that
simply overruled the motion. The circuit court entered a second order on
November 12, 2019, that also overruled the motion, but indicated the court had
been “advised that said property has been forfeited.”
Hall subsequently filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a
notice of appeal. The motion came before the circuit court on December 5, 2019.
Only the Commonwealth was present and informed the circuit court, “You could
appoint a million counsels and there’s nothing I could do because the property has
been forfeited.” The circuit court overruled Hall’s motion, but a written order does
not appear in the court record. This appeal follows.
In forfeiture proceedings, the circuit court’s factual findings are
reviewed on appeal for clear error, while its rulings of law are reviewed de
novo. Commonwealth v. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Ky. 2008).
Hall’s primary argument on appeal is that his personal property was
improperly forfeited because he was neither indicted nor convicted under KRS
1
According to Earnest Bradley Hall, Jr.’s motion, the motor vehicle that was seized had
apparently been returned to Hall’s mother.
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218A. We agree that Hall was not convicted of any crime in the Floyd Circuit
Court; therefore, his personal property was not subject to forfeiture. However, the
disposition of his personal property is unclear from the record before us. We
therefore vacate the circuit court’s order denying the return of Hall’s property and
remand for factual findings regarding the disposition of the personal property.
Hall was indicted under KRS 510.155. Although we agree KRS
Chapter 218A is inapplicable only to the extent Hall was not indicted nor convicted
for an offense related to controlled substances, KRS 500.0922 also allows for
forfeiture of personal property provided various criteria are met. KRS 500.092
provides, in relevant part:
(1) (a) Notwithstanding KRS 500.090, all personal
property which is not used as a permanent residence in
this state which is used in connection with or acquired
as a result of a violation or attempted violation of any
of the statutes set out in subsection (3) of this section
shall be subject to forfeiture under the same terms,
conditions, and defenses and using the same process
as set out in KRS 218A.405 to 218A.460 for
property subject to forfeiture under that chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding KRS 500.090, all real
and personal property in this state which
is used in connection with or acquired as a
result of a violation or attempted violation
of KRS 531.310 or 531.320 shall be
subject to forfeiture under the same terms,
conditions, and defenses and using the
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 500.092 became effective on June 25, 2013, or approximately two
and one-half weeks before Hall’s arrest in Floyd County.
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same process as set out in KRS 218A.405
to 218A.460 for property subject to
forfeiture under that chapter.
(2) Administrative regulations promulgated under KRS
218A.420 shall govern expenditures derived from
forfeitures under this section to the same extent that
they govern expenditures from forfeitures under KRS
218A.405 to 218A.460.
(3) The following offenses may trigger forfeiture of
personal property under subsection (1)(a) of this
section:
(a) KRS 17.546;
(b) KRS 508.140 and 508.150 involving the
use of any equipment, instrument,
machine, or other device by which
communication or information is
transmitted, including computers, the
Internet or other electronic network,
cameras or other recording devices,
telephones or other personal
communications devices, scanners or
other copying devices, and any device
that enables the use of a transmitting
device;
(c) KRS 510.155[.]
KRS 500.092(1), (2), and (3) (emphasis added).
Turning to KRS Chapter 218A for the proper procedural process, we
note KRS 218A.460(2) instructs:
Following conviction of a defendant for any violation
of this chapter, the court shall conduct an ancillary
hearing to forfeit property if requested by any party other
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than the defendant or Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth’s attorney, or county attorney if the
proceeding is in District Court, shall initiate the hearing
by filing a motion requesting entry of a final order of
forfeiture upon proof that the property was being used in
violation of the provisions of this chapter. The final
order of forfeiture by the court shall perfect in the
Commonwealth or appropriate law enforcement agency,
as provided in KRS 218A.420, right, title, and interest in
and to the property. The Commonwealth may transfer
any real property so forfeited by deed of general
warranty.
Hall was not convicted of a crime in the Floyd Circuit Court.
Therefore, any forfeiture of his personal property, if it occurred, was improper. At
the various hearings before the circuit court, the Commonwealth insisted Hall’s
property had already been forfeited; however, the circuit court did not grant the
Commonwealth’s motion, filed in 2017, to forfeit and destroy the property. Now,
before this Court, the Commonwealth acknowledges Hall raises a valid point in his
assertion that there is no record of when or if his personal property was forfeited.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that Hall’s personal property
had already been forfeited was clear error. The disposition of Hall’s property
remains unknown. We therefore vacate the order of the Floyd Circuit Court and
remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andrea Reed Daniel Cameron
Assistant Public Advocate Attorney General of Kentucky
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky Christina L. Romano
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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