Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wayne Riley, Administrator for the Estate of Archimedia Deleara Riley

RENDERED: OCTOBER 21, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1115-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ERIC J. HANER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-002568
WAYNE RILEY, ADMINISTRATOR
FOR THE ESTATE OF ARCHIMEDIA
DELEARA RILEY; ALEXANDRIA
BOLTON; ALLIANCE REALTY LLC;
ALLTRADE SERVICE SOLUTIONS,
LLC; BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
HOMESERVICES PARKS AND
WEISBERG REALTORS; C3
HOLDINGS, LLC; CARLA HARRIS,
ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE
ESTATE OF KAMERON DONTE
HARRIS; DANESHA PEDEN;
MICHAEL COOPER,
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE
ESTATE OF SAVANNAH MIKAYLA
COOPER; AND WAYNE RILEY,
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF
SKYE RILEY, A MINOR APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND K. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: The Commonwealth appeals from an order directing it to
turn over discovery, which it had previously produced in a criminal matter, to a
civil litigant suing the criminally accused. The Commonwealth argues that the
court had no authority to issue the order because it enjoys sovereign immunity and
cannot be so compelled. The Commonwealth also argues, in the alternative, the
court abused its discretion by issuing an order on a non-party, requiring it to
produce documents which might compromise either its prosecution of the accused
or the accused’s rights. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand this matter
for a determination as to whether the accused’s motion to stay the original order,
requiring her to turn over the Commonwealth’s initial discovery materials, should
be granted.
FACTS
In December of 2017, a fire consumed an apartment building in south
Louisville, killing several residents and injuring another. In May of 2018, the
estates and survivors of those who perished in the fire filed suit against various
entities, among them, Alltrade Service Solutions LLC (hereinafter, “Alltrade”)
-2-
which “owned, operated and managed” the apartment building.1 That matter was
assigned to Division One.
Danesha Peden was charged with various criminal offenses relating to
the apartment fire.2 The criminal matter was assigned to Division Six.
Alltrade filed a motion seeking discovery from Peden of all materials
turned over to her by the prosecution in the criminal case. A motion to compel
Peden to turn over the materials was filed in January of 2020. Division One
granted the order and ordered the guardian ad litem assigned to Peden to obtain the
materials from her criminal defense attorney.
The public defender assigned to represent Peden in the criminal matter
appeared before Division One and moved for a stay of the order requiring his client
to turn over materials, arguing irreparable injury could result from the
dissemination of the information in an ongoing capital criminal matter. Rather
than ruling specifically on Peden’s motion, Division One entered an order
requiring the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office to turn over the materials it had
turned over to Peden in the criminal case.
The Jefferson County Commonwealth’s Attorney informed Division
One that the question of the discoverability of such materials was before this Court
1
According to the amended complaints filed by Appellees in the trial court.
2
Jefferson Circuit Court, No. 17-CR-003708.
-3-
in another matter and the issuance of an opinion was forthcoming.3 Division One
took no immediate action.
In April of 2021, Division Six entered an order prohibiting the parties
from sharing the discovery materials from the criminal case.
When the action before this Court was decided on procedural
concerns and the merits of the discoverability question were not reached, Alltrade
again filed a motion in Division One to compel the Commonwealth to turn over the
discovery. The trial court ordered the Commonwealth to provide the court “a
complete electronic copy of the discovery materials previously produced” in the
criminal matter for an in camera inspection, and the court would provide counsel
copies of all relevant documents after its inspection. It is from this order that the
Commonwealth appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity is a question of
law, to be reviewed de novo. Louisville Arena Auth., Inc. v. RAM Eng’g & Const.,
Inc., 415 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Ky. App. 2013). Determinations concerning discovery
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite,
Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., 373 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Ky. 2012).
3
Commonwealth v. Edwards, No. 2020-CA-0984-OA.
-4-
ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth argues that sovereign immunity prevents the trial
court from ordering it to act. If the Commonwealth is correct, there is no need for
us to consider whether the trial court’s order is otherwise proper, so we will first
determine if sovereign immunity prevents the trial court from ordering the
Commonwealth to turn over the documents produced in the criminal case.
We note at the outset of our analysis that the Commonwealth did not
argue to the trial court that sovereign immunity prevented the court from ordering
it to produce the discovery materials. But as the Commonwealth points out,
preservation is not required. See Wells v. Commonwealth Department of
Highways, 384 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1964) (holding because sovereign immunity can
only be waived by the General Assembly, it can be raised as a defense for the first
time on appeal).
1. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity, broadly, prohibits suits against the
Commonwealth. Our Supreme Court explained the concept in Yanero v. Davis:
[S]overeign immunity is a concept that arose from the
common law of England and was embraced by our courts
at an early stage in our nation’s history. [Reyes v. Hardin
Memorial Hospital, 55 S.W.3d 337, 338 (Ky. 2001)]. It
is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that precludes
the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the
state has given its consent or otherwise waived its
immunity. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts §
-5-
895B(1) (A.L.I. 1979); 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Territories,
and Dependencies, § 99 (1974). This principle was
recognized as applicable to the Commonwealth of
Kentucky as early as 1828. Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7
T.B. Mon.) 439, 441 (1828).
65 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Ky. 2001).
It matters not whether the entity involved here is named as the
“Commonwealth of Kentucky” or the “Commonwealth’s Attorney”; either proper
party would enjoy sovereign immunity, were it to apply in this action. “The
absolute immunity from suit afforded to the state also extends to public officials
sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party
against which relief in such cases is sought.” Id. at 518.
Whether a prosecutor or a prosecutorial agency enjoys sovereign, or
“absolute” immunity or only “qualified” immunity turns on which role the agency
and its personnel are embodying at the time the acts complained of occurred.4
4
Official immunity can be absolute, as when an officer or employee
of the state is sued in his/her representative capacity, in which
event his/her actions are included under the umbrella of sovereign
immunity as discussed in Part I of this opinion, supra. Similarly,
when an officer or employee of a governmental agency is sued in
his/her representative capacity, the officer’s or employee’s actions
are afforded the same immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself,
would be entitled, as discussed in Part II of this opinion, supra.
But when sued in their individual capacities, public officers and
employees enjoy only qualified official immunity, which affords
protection from damages liability for good faith judgment calls
made in a legally uncertain environment. 63C Am.Jur.2d, Public
Officers and Employees, § 309 (1997). Qualified official
immunity applies to the negligent performance by a public officer
or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those
-6-
When the prosecutorial agency is acting as investigator, prior to litigation, only
qualified immunity is enjoyed, while when performing an advocacy role, absolute
immunity is enjoyed.
These allegations occurred beyond the investigation
phase of the case. Rather, the alleged failure to disclose
evidence occurred at a point in time when the prosecutors
were acting as advocates. Thus, we hold that the
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity. See
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-74, 113 S. Ct.
2606, 2616, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209, 226 (1993).
Our holding reflects the policy decision made by
this Court in McCollum v. Garrett, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 530(1994), in which we drew a distinction between a
prosecutor’s role as investigator and his or her role as an
advocate for the Commonwealth:
During the time in which [the prosecutor]
essentially acted as an investigator, the protection
available to him was qualified immunity. Upon
the commencement of prosecution and the
assumption of his role of prosecutor, [the
prosecutor’s] immunity became absolute.
involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal
deliberation, decision, and judgment, id. § 322; (2) in good faith;
and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority. Id. § 309;
Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 895D cmt. g. [1979]. An act
is not necessarily “discretionary” just because the officer
performing it has some discretion with respect to the means or
method to be employed. Franklin County v. Malone, [957 S.W.2d
195, 201 (Ky. 1997)] (quoting Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky.,
330 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1959)). Qualified official immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be specifically pled. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980).
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-22.
-7-
Id. at 535.
Jefferson Cnty. Com. Attorney’s Off. v. Kaplan, 65 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2001), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 21, 2002).
The Commonwealth argues that it is not just the imposition of a
lawsuit against the sovereign, which is prohibited by sovereign immunity except
when waived by the General Assembly, but any judicial process cannot be
instituted or carried out against the Commonwealth without its consent. The
Commonwealth argues that the discovery order here purports to compel it to act,
which implicates its immunity.
We disagree with the Commonwealth. We believe that sovereign
immunity is limited to instances where the Commonwealth or a division thereof is
being named in an action. “The General Assembly may, by law, direct in what
manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth.” KY.
CONST. § 231. The Commonwealth can cite to no example in the jurisprudence of
this jurisdiction where any other understanding is evinced. Rather, caselaw
supports just the opposite conclusion.
We begin with this caveat:
[s]overeign immunity is founded on the notion that
the resources of the state, its income and property,
cannot be compelled as recompense for state
action that harms a plaintiff through the ordinary
suit-at-law process.
-8-
[Commonwealth v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 396
S.W.3d 833, 836 (Ky. 2013)]. We follow it with this
caveat:
a declaratory judgment action is not a claim for
damages, but rather it is a request that the
plaintiff’s rights under the law be declared. There
is no harm to state resources from a declaratory
judgment. When the state is a real party in
interest, the state is merely taking a position on
what a plaintiff’s rights are in the underlying
controversy.
Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Frontier Hous., Inc., 536 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Ky. App.
2017).
The Commonwealth’s argument conveniently ignores caselaw
involving discovery violations by the sovereign or its agencies; if entities of state
government could not, because of immunity, be ordered to tender discovery, there
would be no caselaw involving allegations of discovery violations by agencies.
But such exist.
We hold that a party to litigation may seek public
records from a nonparty public agency through discovery
requests, including a notice to take deposition and
subpoena. If the nonparty public agency objects, then the
trial court must determine whether the records are
discoverable or not in that case.
Parish v. Petter, 608 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Ky. App. 2020).5
5
See also Grant v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 39 (Ky. 2008) (holding Commonwealth’s failure
to provide discovery required reversal of conviction); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 4,
6-7 (Ky. 1995). (“[I]t is imperative that the Commonwealth provide full and timely discovery
pursuant to [Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure] RCr 7.24 and 7.26. Failure to do so will
result in severe sanctions.”).
-9-
We hold that immunity does not protect the Commonwealth from
being ordered to produce discovery as a matter of course. Therefore, we turn to the
question of whether it was proper for Division One to order the Commonwealth as
a non-party to the lawsuit to tender discovery from the criminal case.
2. Discovery Order was an abuse of discretion
The Commonwealth insists that it was an abuse of discretion for
Division One to order the Commonwealth, as a non-party, to turn over discovery
when a party to the action, Peden, possessed the materials sought. We find that the
court did abuse its discretion in entering the order; not because it is improper for
the Commonwealth to turn over the discovery, but because the court did not first
determine whether the tender would violate a party’s constitutional rights.
Peden’s criminal defense counsel refused to turn over the materials,
citing the possibility of implicating her rights vis-à-vis the criminal prosecution in
which the death penalty was a possibility. Not knowing that Division One had
ordered the discovery from the criminal case be turned over, Division Six entered
an order sealing the discovery in the criminal case. When Division Six learned that
Division One had previously entered an order for the discovery to be turned over, it
abated its order sealing the discovery. Division One then sidestepped the question
of whether Peden’s rights would be implicated by requiring the criminal case
-10-
discovery to be turned over and ordered the Commonwealth to provide it. That
was an abuse of discretion.
In O’Connell v. Cowan, 332 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2010), a criminal
defense attorney was charged with intimidating a witness in a criminal matter in
which he represented the defendant. In the criminal proceeding against him, the
attorney sought the prosecutor’s file in an attempt to determine the basis for the
charge against him, which he claimed was false. The prosecutor willingly turned
over all discovery materials in the original criminal case file, but resisted being
deposed, citing privilege. The trial court ordered the prosecutor to submit, citing
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 26.02(3)(a),6 finding the attorney was in
substantial need of the information and was unable to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the information by other means. The prosecutor filed a petition for a
6
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under paragraph (1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party’s representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation.
CR 26.02(3)(a).
-11-
writ of prohibition in this Court, which denied the relief. The prosecutor appealed
as a matter of right to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which reversed this Court, and
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether there was the requisite
“compelling need” to vitiate the work product privilege and require the tender.
Notably, the Court did not hold that the Commonwealth was not subject to the
order.
Though the materials sought here are of a different character than
those sought in the O’Connell case, it is illustrative that the Supreme Court ruled
not that the materials were not discoverable at all, but remanded for a
determination of whether there was sufficient reason to possibly implicate the
attorney work product privilege. In the present case, the privilege is not in any
way implicated because Alltrade did not seek the entire prosecution file, but only
those preliminary materials turned over to the defense via RCr 7.24. But the
question of whether Peden’s rights would be implicated was not resolved by the
court.
The Commonwealth does not have standing to assert the
constitutional rights of an individual. “Ordinarily, a litigant may only assert his
own constitutional rights or immunities.” Associated Indus. of Kentucky v.
Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Ky. 1995). However, we find that the
court’s order forced the Commonwealth to again raise the issue of Peden’s rights
-12-
since the court failed to address that question when it did not address Peden’s
motion to stay the order.
We find that Division One abused its discretion, however, in not
ruling on Peden’s motion to stay the order promulgated by it ordering her to turn
over the discovery provided her, a party to the action before it. Alltrade may well
be correct that there was nothing in the materials which implicated Peden’s rights,
but that finding was never made by Division One. Therefore, we remand this
matter for a determination as to whether Peden is entitled to a stay of that order.
We agree with the Commonwealth that if Peden’s objection is well
taken, then any order requiring the discovery materials to be turned over violates
Peden’s rights. We hold Division One abused its discretion in not addressing
whether Peden’s constitutional rights would be violated by requiring the discovery
materials from the criminal prosecution be turned over to the civil plaintiff before
the resolution of the criminal case.
CONCLUSION
We find that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order
requiring the Commonwealth to tender the discovery without first addressing the
motion for a stay of the order compelling the same from Peden, a party to the
action. We vacate and remand for a determination as to whether Peden’s motion
for a stay ought to be entered.
-13-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
ALLTRADE SERVICES
Daniel Cameron SOLUTIONS, LLC:
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph M. Effinger
Matthew F. Kuhn Ryan D. Nafziger
Solicitor General Robert L. Whitmer
Louisville, Kentucky
Brett R. Nolan
Principal Deputy Solicitor General ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Grabowski
Assistant Solicitor General Ryan D. Nafziger
Frankfort, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Daniel J. Grabowski
Frankfort, Kentucky
-14-