Aaron Caldwell v. Kevin Mazza

RENDERED: DECEMBER 9, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0699-MR
AARON CALDWELL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-00117
KEVIN MAZZA APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND MAZE, JUDGES.
MAZE, JUDGE: Aaron Caldwell (Caldwell) appeals from an order of the Morgan
Circuit Court dismissing his petition for a declaration of rights in which he
challenged the results of a prison disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of an
institutional infraction. Finding no error in the circuit court’s order, we affirm.
Caldwell is a state prisoner currently housed at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex. But during the period at issue, Caldwell was housed at the
Green River Correctional Complex. On December 11, 2020, Officer Darren Croft
witnessed Caldwell engaged in a physical altercation with inmate Demarcus
Harris. That inmate was found to have been injured. A photograph was taken and
attached to Part I of the Disciplinary Report Form. Sergeant Jordan Jackson was
assigned to investigate the matter. He interviewed Officer Croft, Caldwell, and
Harris. He also reviewed the photo. Jackson found that Harris’s injuries were
consistent with the use of a weapon. Caldwell was charged with “7-02-Physical
action resulting in death/injury of another inmate.” At the final hearing he was
found guilty and assessed a penalty of “30 [days of disciplinary segregation (DS)],
Credit for time served [(CTS)] 30 days. 60 days non-restorable [good time loss
(GTL)].” However, on appeal to Warden Mazza, reinvestigation was ordered.
That reinvestigation resulted in a review of video footage. Sergeant
Jackson reported that it appeared that Caldwell was making “slicing motions”
during the altercation, then attempting to conceal an object in his waistband. He
interviewed Officer Wesley Cooper who indicated that a handmade weapon
fashioned out of a toothbrush was located in the shower where Caldwell was being
strip-searched. Following a second disciplinary hearing, Caldwell was once again
found guilty. He was assessed a penalty of “30 days DS with 30 days CTS. 270
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days Non-restorable GTL.” On this second appeal to the warden, no due process
violation was found.
Caldwell then filed his petition for declaration of rights. Upon
the warden’s motion, the petition was dismissed. The circuit court found that
“[d]ue process has been afforded to the Petitioner in the prison disciplinary
context.” The court noted that since the disciplinary review relied upon
photographic and video evidence as well as witness testimony there was at least
“some evidence” that Caldwell had “attempted to cause death or serious physical
injury” and therefore dismissal of his petition was appropriate. (Emphasis
original.)
On appeal, Caldwell makes three arguments. First, he contends that
the circuit court erred in finding that the weapon belonged to him, since although
he had been charged with “possession of dangerous contraband” that charge was
dismissed due to lack of evidence. Second, Caldwell asserts that the charged
inchoate offense is unduly vague because it does not sufficiently set forth the
prohibited conduct and therefore violates due process. Finally, he states that the
court abused its discretion by failing to consider all the arguments that he set out
before it, including the lack of reliable evidence, lack of an impartial decision
maker, and the inability to call witnesses.
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The record before the Court does not support Caldwell’s assertion that
he was initially charged with “category 6-03 possession of dangerous contraband
pursuant to CPP[1] 15.2.” The initial Disciplinary Report Form dated December
29, 2020, attached as Exhibit “A” to the warden’s motion to dismiss reflects only
the charge of “7-02-Physical action resulting in death/injury of another inmate.”
Exhibit “D” to the motion reflects that a Uniform Citation issued by the Kentucky
State Police was tendered by Caldwell as evidence at the February 21, 2021,
hearing on this matter. It states that Caldwell was charged with Assault, 4th
Degree (Minor Injury) and Promoting Contraband – 1st Degree in connection with
what seems to be the same incident. However, there is no information regarding
the resolution of these charges by the courts and no indication that Caldwell was
ever subject to discipline with respect to any contraband. Therefore, his argument
that there was no evidence that the weapon was his has no merit.
While Caldwell has attempted to argue that his due process rights
were violated because the offense with which he was charged, “7-02-Physical
action resulting in death/injury of another inmate,” was impermissibly vague, this
argument is without merit based upon the plain language of CPP 15.2. “Physical
action” is defined as “fighting, hitting, kicking, shoving, pushing, biting, using
force or other types of physical contact[.]” CPP 15.2 further defines “serious
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Corrections Policy and Procedure.
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physical injury” as that which requires more than basic first aid. CPP 15.2, II, E
provides that an attempt to commit such an act constitutes the violation itself. A
statute or rule is vague if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning.” State Bd. For Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Howard, 834
S.W.2d 657, 662 (Ky. 1992) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.
Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973)). Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133,135
(Ky. 2009). No such “guess work” is required to determine what conduct is
prohibited by CPP 15.2. Therefore, it is not void for vagueness and Caldwell’s due
process rights were not violated by its application.
As noted in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963,
2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), inmates subject to prison disciplinary proceedings
are not entitled to the same due process rights as those in full scale criminal
prosecutions. Prisoners subject to discipline require merely: (1) advance written
notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of
the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. at 563-67, 94
S. Ct. at 2978-80. Part I of each Disciplinary Report Form signed by Caldwell
indicates that he acknowledged having received a copy of the report, having been
advised of the right to call witnesses and to have legal representation. Each such
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form also indicates that no witnesses were requested. At the January 10, 2021,
hearing, Caldwell acknowledged that he had received a copy of the report and the
24-hour notice and had been given sufficient time to consult with his legal
representative. On appeal to the warden, reinvestigation was ordered. Following
reinvestigation, the investigating officer prepared an amended Disciplinary Report,
also signed by Caldwell, and the matter was once again referred to the Adjustment
Committee. On appeal, the warden found that no due process violation had
occurred. Clearly, Caldwell has failed to demonstrate the existence of any
procedural due process violations.
As stated in Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky. App. 2003),
“The courts only review the decisions of the Adjustment Committee and prison
officials are afforded broad discretion. This Court must affirm if there is ‘some
evidence’ supporting the charge. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional
Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356(1985).”
In Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-56, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, the Supreme Court
held demonstrating the existence of “some evidence” “does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether
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there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.”
Here, as in Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky. App. 1997),
even though the evidence may not be conclusive, it is sufficient for a
decisionmaker to draw a reasonable inference. The type of injuries sustained by
Harris and the slashing motions made by Caldwell during the altercation lead to the
inference that a slashing-type weapon was utilized. Such a weapon was found in
the shower with Caldwell during a strip search. One might then infer that this was
the weapon used to inflict the injuries on Harris. Further, as noted by the circuit
court, the nature of the weapon itself could lead to the “logical conclusion” that it
was intended to cause serious injury. This Court can find no error in the lower
court’s legal analysis.
Accordingly, we affirm the Morgan Circuit Court’s order of
dismissal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Aaron Caldwell, pro se Peter W. Dooley
West Liberty, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky
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