Rq Floors, Corp. v. Bpm Lumber, LLC

RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2020; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-000990-MR
RQ FLOORS, CORP. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ERNESTO M. SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-03311
BPM LUMBER, LLC APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: RQ Floors, Corp. (“RQ Floors”) appeals from the
Fayette Circuit Court’s order requiring RQ Floors to pay a portion of the attorney’s
fees incurred by BPM Lumber, LLC (“BPM”) in a breach of contract dispute.
Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
BACKGROUND
This litigation involves a breach of contract claim by BPM against RQ
Floors. BPM produced and distributed hardwood lumber and other related wood
products. RQ Floors manufactured and sold hardwood flooring. Between
February and May of 2018, RQ Floors solicited the business of BPM for three
orders of lumber. In connection with such orders, RQ Floors executed a Business
Credit Application (the “Credit Application”), which provided that BPM would
provide certain goods to RQ Floors on credit. The Credit Application contained
the following language:
TERMS. Applicant(s) further agrees that, in the event
any balance, past due or contested, is placed with a
collection agency or attorney for collection, applicant(s)
agree to pay all reasonable collection or attorney’s fees
plus court costs incurred.
After the execution of the Credit Application, BPM specifically
manufactured the contracted goods and timely delivered them to RQ Floors, which
RQ Floors accepted. Despite appropriate demand by BPM, RQ Floors failed to
pay for the contracted goods. RQ Floors’ outstanding balance totaled $77,749.35.
On September 18, 2018, BPM filed a complaint against RQ Floors for
one count of breach of contract and one count of unjust enrichment. Subsequently,
on April 2, 2019, BPM filed a motion for summary judgment containing a ledger
stating the fees incurred by BPM during the litigation to be $6,826.05, along with a
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sworn affidavit of BPM’s counsel. In the affidavit, BPM’s counsel again stated the
amount of attorney’s fees incurred by BPM as of the date of the filing of its motion
for summary judgment and affirmed that the fees incurred were customary and
reasonable given the complexity of the litigation. RQ Floors filed a response to
BPM’s motion for summary judgment in which RQ Floors asserted that the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees could not adequately be determined by the
affidavit and ledger, and that BPM should have instead submitted the actual
itemized invoices issued by BPM’s counsel.
The trial court entered an order on April 23, 2019, granting summary
judgment in BPM’s favor in the amount of $93,905.32, which comprised the
principal amount ($77,749.35), overdue assessment fees ($9,329.92), and BPM’s
costs and attorney’s fees incurred ($6,826.05), plus post-judgment interest at the
maximum legal rate from the date of the judgment until paid. On May 28, 2019,
upon RQ Floors’ motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, the trial court
submitted an amended order clarifying that any post-judgment interest would
accrue at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of judgment until paid. The
court further denied BPM’s oral requests to review the itemized invoices submitted
by RQ Floors’ counsel.
On June 26, 2019, RQ Floors filed a timely notice of appeal of the
trial court’s order and amended order.
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ANALYSIS
a. Standard of Review
Under Kentucky law, an award of attorney’s fees is reviewed by this
Court using an abuse of discretion standard. Allison v. Allison, 246 S.W.3d 898,
909 (Ky. App. 2008); see also Miller v. McGinty, 234 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Ky. App.
2007). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
b. Discussion
RQ Floors does not dispute that BPM is entitled to a judgment in
BPM’s favor regarding the underlying debt owed and, pursuant to the Credit
Application, BPM’s reasonable attorney’s fees. Rather, RQ Floors argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on the affidavit and ledger
submitted in BPM’s motion for summary judgment to determine the
reasonableness of BPM’s counsel’s fees and for failing to conduct its own review
of the specific itemized invoices of BPM’s counsel. RQ Floors further argues that
it was impossible for the trial court to determine the enforceability of the
contractual provision contained in the Credit Application awarding attorney’s fees
under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 411.195 without further information
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concerning counsel’s hourly rate and whether the fees were “actually paid or
agreed to be paid.”
Kentucky courts have stated that the primary consideration in a trial
court’s award of attorney’s fees is that “such award be reasonable.” Brooks v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 332 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Ky. App.
2009). As further stated in A & A Mechanical, Inc. v. Thermal Equipment Sales,
Inc., “a trial court should require parties seeking attorney fees to demonstrate that
the amount sought is not excessive and accurately reflects the reasonable value of
bona fide legal expenses incurred.” 998 S.W.2d 505, 514 (Ky. App. 1999)
(citation omitted). Additionally, the existence of other reasonable conclusions as
to the reasonableness of an awarded attorney’s fee is not a sufficient basis for
overturning the award where the trial court’s determination is reasonable. Id.
When the trial court has acted reasonably in awarding attorney’s fees, it has
fulfilled its obligation. Id.
Here, RQ Floors argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
reviewing only the affidavit and ledger provided by counsel to determine the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. The record reflects, however, that the trial
court considered not only the affidavit and ledger submitted by BPM’s counsel, but
also the overall history of the case. Such history indicates that the litigation in this
case was based on an undisputed account balance, as well as the fact that RQ
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Floors may have increased - by its own actions - the amount of attorney’s fees
owed to BPM’s counsel. Further, the record reflects that the trial court considered
the ratio of BPM’s attorney’s fees to the principal amount of the overall
indebtedness, as well as the fact that the litigation involved motions, memoranda,
and arguments to the court. The trial court appropriately considered all the
information before it to determine whether an award of attorney’s fees was
reasonable in this case, and we, therefore, cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to BPM.
RQ Floors further argues that it was “impossible” for the trial court to
determine whether BPM’s counsel’s fees were paid or agreed to be paid as
required by KRS 411.195 without reviewing the applicable itemized invoices.
KRS 411.195 states that a contractual provision awarding attorney’s fees is only
enforceable “to the extent actually paid or agreed to be paid[.]” The foregoing
language does not require, nor have Kentucky courts interpreted such language as
requiring, a trial court to review an attorney’s itemized invoices before awarding
attorney’s fees in every case. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding the attorney’s fees, as the language in the Credit Application
clearly indicated that RQ Floors had previously agreed to pay such attorney’s fees,
and both the ledger and the affidavit were sufficient to prove that BPM had either
actually paid the fees or had agreed to pay the fees.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Ross Stinetorf M. Scott Mattmiller
Thomas D. Bullock Eric C. Eaton
Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
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