Nicholas Charles Breiner v. Jon Ledford

RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0327-MR
NICHOLAS CHARLES BREINER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-90068
JON LEDFORD APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GOODWINE, MAZE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: Nicholas Charles Breiner (“Breiner”), a former middle
school employee, filed suit against Jon Ledford (“Ledford”), a Court Designated
Worker (“CDW”), and the Board of Education of Montgomery County for
discrimination in violation of KRS1 344.040 and defamation. The Montgomery
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, and Breiner appealed. After careful review
of the record and applicable law, finding no error, we affirm.
On April 10, 2018, Breiner filed a complaint in the Montgomery
Circuit Court raising issues of violation of KRS 344.040 and defamation against
Ledford in both his official and individual capacities and the Board of Education of
Montgomery County. Prior to the events that transpired, Breiner was employed as
the Director of Vocal Music and Director of the Theater Department at McNabb
Middle School in Montgomery County. On April 7, 2017, Breiner disclosed his
sexual orientation as a bisexual male on social media. A few days later, Deputy
Superintendent Rick Culross called a meeting to question Breiner about his sexual
orientation.
On April 11, 2017, Ledford attended a confidential meeting regarding
a student at the middle school as part of his statutory duties as a CDW. Breiner
alleged, before or during the meeting, Ledford made several comments about
Breiner’s interactions with students related to his sexual orientation. Specifically,
Breiner alleged Ledford accused him of improperly “openly pushing the ‘gay’
agenda on students and trying to turn them ‘gay.’” Record at 3. Breiner contends
Ledford’s alleged statements were defamatory.
Breiner alleged, after the meeting Ledford attended, he suffered
disparate treatment from the administration of McNabb Middle School. On May 8,
-2-
2018, the Board of Education terminated Breiner. The principal informed Breiner
he was terminated due to budget restraints, his performance, and protocol. Breiner
discovered his position was filled by a heterosexual female two months later.
Breiner contended his treatment and termination amount to discrimination due to
his sexual orientation.
Before the Board of Education responded to the complaint, the circuit
court entered an agreed order dismissing Breiner’s claims against the Board of
Education.
In response to Breiner’s complaint, Ledford moved to dismiss
Breiner’s claims against him in both his official and individual capacities. Ledford
argued he was immune from suit under the doctrines of qualified official immunity
and quasi-judicial immunity and argued Breiner’s complaint was deficient.
Breiner responded to the motion, conceding Ledford was entitled to immunity in
his official capacity and opposing the motion as to Ledford’s individual capacity.
On July 16, 2019, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the
complaint. Breiner filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate on July 24, 2019,
arguing the circuit court failed to make findings that Ledford was acting in his
capacity as a CDW when he made the alleged statements under Yanero v. Davis,
65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001). Ledford opposed the motion, arguing the circuit court
-3-
was not required to issue findings of fact in ruling on the motion to dismiss under
CR2 12.02(f).
On November 5, 2019, the circuit court vacated its order dismissing
Breiner’s complaint and ordered an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Yanero.
Ledford responded to the circuit court’s order with a motion for reconsideration
and reinstatement of the order dismissing the complaint. Ledford argued the
parties fully briefed Yanero when arguing the motion to dismiss, and Breiner did
not request an evidentiary hearing in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate. On
February 17, 2020, the circuit court entered an order reinstating the July 16, 2019
order dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Breiner argues the circuit court erred in dismissing his
complaint because: (1) Ledford was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; (2)
Ledford was not entitled to qualified official immunity; and his complaint was
sufficient.
Our standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is as
follows:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted admits as true the material
facts of the complaint. So a court should not grant such a
motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
proved. . . . Accordingly, the pleadings should be
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-4-
liberally construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true. This
exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the
trial court to make findings of fact; rather, the question is
purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court
must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be
proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s
determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.
Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Likewise, “[t]he question of immunity is a matter of law which
this Court reviews de novo.” Sangster v. Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure, 454
S.W.3d 854, 856 (Ky. App. 2014) (citations omitted).
Based on our review of the record and applicable case law, Ledford
was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, so we need only address Breiner’s first
argument. Breiner argues Ledford was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
because his alleged defamatory statements about Breiner were not within the scope
of his employment as a CDW. In response, Ledford argues he was entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity because he acted in his official capacity when making the
alleged statements.
“Absolute immunity against suits for money damages is ‘well
established’ for judges, and such immunity has also been extended to non-judicial
officers performing ‘quasi-judicial’ duties.” Sangster, 454 S.W.3d at 858
-5-
(citations omitted). Kentucky extends quasi-judicial immunity “to those persons
performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these
persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id. In
determining whether quasi-judicial immunity applies, we apply a “functional
approach” in which we “‘look[] to’ the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it. The party claiming absolute immunity
bears the burden of establishing a justification for that immunity.” Id. at 858-59(citation omitted). This doctrine “applies to officials other than judges” when the
official performs “a function requir[ing] exercise of discretionary judgment.” Id. at
859.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky extended the doctrine of quasi-
judicial immunity to CDWs in Horn by Horn v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 173(Ky. 1995). There, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held the CDW acted within the
scope of her employment and was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity based on the
following reasoning:
[W]e hold that the acts of the CDW were protected by
quasi-judicial immunity as Haynes was acting within the
scope of her employment and under the direction of a
judge of the court. Here, we agree with the Court of
Appeals when it stated: “In this instance the court
designated worker was that officer who carried into
effect what was required to be done by the court. We can
think of no better example of where absolute immunity
attaches. . . .” The Appellant would have us believe that
the CDW was acting outside the scope of employment
-6-
when she accompanied the juvenile to the detention
center because Haynes testified that her purpose in
making the trip was to get a glimpse of this new facility.
Notwithstanding the CDW’s motives, however, the fact
remains that Haynes would not have been allowed access
to the detention center were she not employed as a court
designated worker. It would be splitting hairs indeed to
divvy up the CDW’s actions into categories of within and
without scope of employment based upon some
subjective rationale utilized by the CDW in assessing her
daily routine moment by moment. Rather, we believe the
better route flows from Appellee’s argument that the
totality of Haynes’ function as a court designated worker
should govern rather than the happenstance of her being
in the car with Appellant. We agree with the opinion by
the Court of Appeals in Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc., Ky.App.,
612 S.W.2d 756 (1980), which, while involving quasi-
judicial immunity for a prosecutor, applies equally with
regard to the duties of the CDW in the case at bar, in that
quasi-judicial immunity attaches to the CDW when
working within her capacity as a court designated
worker.
Id. at 176.
Here, although the facts differ, the analysis is the same. There is no
question Ledford attended the confidential meeting to perform his statutory duties
as a CDW. As in Horn, despite Ledford’s motives in making the alleged
statements about Breiner, Ledford would not have been permitted to attend the
confidential and statutorily required meeting were he not employed as a court
designated worker. See id. Breiner requests we examine Ledford’s alleged
defamatory statements in a vacuum, arguing the statements themselves were not
made within the scope of his employment. We refuse to engage in “hair splitting”
-7-
in determining whether a party is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as Horn
requires this Court to consider “the totality of [the CDW’s] function as a court
designated worker . . . rather than the happenstance” of Ledford making an alleged
defamatory statement during his appearance as a CDW. Id. Ledford acted as a
factfinder for the court in attending the meeting, which is a discretionary act.
Although we do not condone the content of Ledford’s alleged statements, Ledford
was working in his capacity as a CDW when he allegedly made a defamatory
statement against Breiner, so Ledford is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Montgomery
Circuit Court dismissing the complaint.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove S. Chad Meredith
Lexington, Kentucky Solicitor General of Kentucky
Matthew F. Kuhn
Deputy Solicitor General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Brett R. Nolan
Special Litigation Counsel
Frankfort, Kentucky
Heather L. Becker
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-