Alex Hex v. Sam Larimer

RENDERED: JULY 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1544-ME
ALEX HEX APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE DERWIN L. WEBB, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-D-500159-001
SAM LARIMER APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON, JONES, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Alex Hex appeals from a domestic violence order
(DVO) entered against him in favor of Sam Larimer. Appellant argues that the
trial court erred in relying on an unpublished case and that threats of suicide are not
acts of domestic violence. Appellant also argues that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant and Appellee were once domestic partners. Appellant
obtained a DVO against Appellee in 2019. Then on January 16, 2020, Appellee
filed a petition for a DVO against Appellant. The trial court did not enter an
emergency protective order. After multiple continuances, a hearing was held on
November 10, 2020. That same day, the trial court granted the petition for a DVO.
The entered DVO is handwritten and short. Seeing as the wording will become an
issue later in this Opinion, we will set it forth in full. The DVO stated:
Petitioner [Larimer] claims Respondent [Hex] has thrown
glasses [at] him and has hit him. Said that [Respondent]
was emotionally abusive. Says [Respondent] was not
respectful of his privacy. Respondent allegedly
prevented Petitioner from leaving rooms. Respondent
allegedly made threats to hurt himself (suicide).
[Court] finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an
act of domestic violence has occurred and likely to occur
in the future. Ruling based on Dixon v. Dixon, 2009 WL
2341048 (Ky. App. [2009])[.]
The DVO was entered for a period of three years. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1) provides
that “[f]ollowing a hearing ordered under KRS 403.730,
if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again
occur, the court may issue a domestic violence order[.]”
KRS 403.720(1) defines “[d]omestic violence and abuse”
as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent
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physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or
assault between family members or members of an
unmarried couple[.]”
Ashley v. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d 400, 403-04 (Ky. App. 2017).
The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied
when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim
was more likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387
(Ky. App. 2007). . . . The standard of review for factual
determinations is whether the family court’s finding of
domestic violence was clearly erroneous. [Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)] 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are not
clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003).
Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114-15 (Ky. App. 2010).
“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all
the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless
of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the
fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses” because judging the credibility of
witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt
as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its]
reversal,” and appellate courts should not disturb trial
court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354 (citations omitted).
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“[I]n reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is not
whether we would have decided it differently, but
whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly
erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v.
Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation
omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s
decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Caudill, 318 S.W.3d at 115.
Appellant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
relying on an unpublished case and erred in holding that threats of suicide
constitute domestic violence. We find no error.
Appellant is correct that the trial court cited to Dixon, supra, which is
an unpublished case. The Court in Dixon held that threats of suicide can be
considered acts of domestic violence. Id. at *2. The court in this case cited to
Dixon because Appellee testified that Appellant threatened suicide on multiple
occasions. Even though unpublished cases are not binding precedent on the courts
of Kentucky, CR 76.28(4)(c), we find no error. This Court has ruled in published
cases that threats of suicide can be considered acts of domestic violence because
such statements can “terrorize the recipients of the information.” Crabtree v.
Crabtree, 484 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Ky. App. 2016); see also Ashley, 520 S.W.3d at
405. While the trial court relied on an unpublished case, published cases support
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the ultimate conclusion. We also decline to overrule our line of cases which hold
that threats of suicide can be considered acts of domestic violence.
Appellant’s next argument on appeal is that the written DVO contains
no factual findings of domestic violence or abuse. Appellant takes issue with the
trial court’s use of words like “claim” and “allegedly.” Essentially, Appellant
argues that the written DVO does not make findings that acts of domestic violence
or abuse occurred, only that they were alleged or claimed to have occurred. We
disagree. We acknowledge that the trial court used phrases like “Petitioner claims
Respondent has thrown glasses [at] him” and “Respondent allegedly made threats
to hurt himself,” but believe this is not error. The trial court’s entry of the DVO
indicates that the trial judge believed Appellee’s allegations and claims. These are
sufficient findings of fact.
Appellant’s final argument on appeal is that there was insufficient
evidence showing that acts of domestic violence or abuse may occur again, which
is a required finding. The trial court held that domestic violence occurred and was
“likely to occur [again] in the future.” The court did not specify why it held as
such and Appellant did not request additional findings. CR 52.04 states:
A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded
because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding
of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a
written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.
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We are unable to reverse and remand for the failure of the trial court to be more
specific; however, we can still review the sufficiency of the evidence even if
Appellant did not request additional findings. CR 52.03.
Here, we believe there was sufficient evidence, based on the
preponderance of evidence standard, that acts of domestic violence or abuse may
occur again. As previously mentioned, Appellant obtained a DVO against
Appellee in 2019. Even after the issuance of that DVO, Appellant continued
contacting or attempting to contact Appellee. For example, Appellant contacted
Appellee’s place of employment and spoke to his supervisor. According to
Appellee’s testimony, Appellant informed the supervisor that Appellee was a
terrible person and was suspected of criminal behavior. Appellee testified that
Appellant did this on two occasions and Appellee believed Appellant was trying to
get him fired. Then, after Appellee filed his petition for a DVO, Appellant posted
disparaging comments about Appellee on social media sites. These examples
might not rise to the level of domestic violence, but they suggest Appellant was
unable to leave Appellee alone, even after obtaining a DVO against him. It was
not unreasonable for the trial court to hold future acts of domestic violence could
occur.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David B. Mour Mary Rives Chauvin
Louisville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
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