Christopher P. Mays v. Benny Patrick

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0549-MR
CHRISTOPHER LEE MAYS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE DAVID A. BARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-90059
BENNY PATRICK;
JESSICA PATRICK; AND
ELIZABETH GRACE MAYS APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE,
JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: This case presents an underlying issue with well-settled law:
whether a Trial Court properly granted summary judgment and ordered specific
performance of a purchase agreement for residential real property. The underlying
issues are intermixed with allegations that the Trial Court was languishing under
an appearance of partiality. We affirm the order granting summary judgment
because the Trial Court has since recused from the case, the parties did not request
that the Trial Court retroactively vacate the summary judgment order, and we have
thoroughly examined the record and conducted a de novo review of the summary
judgment issues and find no error. We begin with a detailed history of the
underlying facts and proceedings, as there was significant confusion leading up to
the order being entered and appealed.
BACKGROUND
In March 2020 Christopher Lee Mays (Christopher) and Elizabeth
Grace Mays (Elizabeth) entered into a Divorce Contract while their marital
dissolution action was pending in Menifee Circuit Court. Pursuant to the terms of
the Divorce Contract, it was agreed that Christopher would receive all right, title,
and interest in the marital residence located in Frenchburg, Kentucky.1 On June
22, 2020, the Trial Court ordered the Decree for Dissolution of Marriage, which
adopted the terms of the Divorce Contract.
Between the Divorce Contract’s execution and the Decree for
Dissolution of Marriage’s entry, Christopher executed a purchase contract agreeing
1
Though Christopher and Elizabeth disagree about the legal effect of this Divorce Contract,
Christopher admitted this term of the Divorce Contract in his answer to the underlying
Complaint (as did Elizabeth in her answer as well, although it was ultimately stricken as
untimely).
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to sell the aforementioned marital residence to Benny and Jessica Patrick (the
Patricks), with the Patricks also agreeing to purchase the same from Christopher.
The purchase contract used was a form prepared by the Lexington-Bluegrass
Association of REALTORS®, containing certain boilerplate terms with blanks for
conditions such as earnest money, financing, a closing date, and the like. The
majority of the blanks were filled in, and several boxes had been checked on the
form. It appears that Christopher and the Patricks executed the purchase
agreement with digital signatures. The purchase agreement stated that closing
“shall occur on or before 07/03/2020”; it did not include language indicating that
time was of the essence.
The closing, however, did not occur. The Patricks allege that this was
caused by a protest made by Elizabeth. According to the Patricks, on July 3, 2020,
they mailed to the Mays a demand letter seeking performance pursuant to the terms
of the purchase agreement. Neither Christopher nor Elizabeth honored the requests
of the demand letter.2
The Patricks filed a Complaint in Menifee Circuit Court on August
28, 2020. In their Complaint, the Patricks alleged the foregoing and prayed that
2
As shown below, Christopher later claimed that the Patricks had not yet secured financing and
were not prepared to close; the Patricks claimed their appraiser was not permitted access to the
residence’s interior for an appraisal, thus prohibiting the Patricks from securing financing.
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the Trial Court would grant: (1) specific performance pursuant to the terms of the
purchase agreement; (2) attorney’s fees and costs related to the case; (3) damages
incurred in good faith reliance on the contract; and (4) any and all other relief to
which they may appear entitled.
The record from this point forward is replete with procedural
anomalies leading to much confusion. There appears to have been some issue with
service as both summonses are in the record and marked “unclaimed.” In spite of
the problems with service, the Patricks nonetheless moved for a final hearing in
November of 2020, serving the motion on whom they believed to be the attorneys
representing Christopher and Elizabeth. Christopher’s purported attorney then
filed a notice of nonrepresentation. In January of 2021, the Patricks then moved
for summary judgment against Christopher and Elizabeth. Almost a month later,
service of process was finally effected on Christopher.
On February 1, 2021, a few days after Christopher was served, the
Trial Court then sua sponte entered an order giving Christopher and Elizabeth ten
days to file motions for summary judgment and all parties five days to reply, as the
Trial Court recognized that the Patricks’ motion for summary judgment had been
sent to an unused e-mail address.
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Christopher then filed his Answer on February 24, 2021. Elizabeth
filed her Answer and Cross-Claim against Christopher on March 23, 2021. Three
days later, the Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Patricks.
On April 1, 2021, Christopher moved to vacate the order granting
summary judgment. Christopher noted that the Patricks had filed for summary
judgment before Christopher had been served with process. An affidavit signed by
Christopher was attached to the motion. Additionally, Christopher noted that “[a]t
no point has Christopher Mays received a physical copy of the Motion for
Summary Judgment by any means whatsoever.” Christopher argued in his motion
to vacate that he had not been given proper notice of the motion, that there had
never been a hearing on the motion, and that there were genuine issues of material
fact that precluded granting summary judgment. Elizabeth likewise filed a motion
to vacate, incorporating Christopher’s reasons and also arguing that specific
performance should not be granted because the Patricks had not secured financing
by the closing date. Elizabeth further moved the Trial Court to recuse because the
Trial Court’s son-in-law was a first cousin to Jessica Patrick.
On April 13, 2021, the Trial Court vacated the summary judgment
against Christopher because he had not properly received service of process. The
Trial Court noted:
It is understandable that new counsel for Christopher
would be confused in simply looking at the record, with
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little to nothing having been filed, and much of the
confusion stemming from the representations made at
hearings and conference calls, one of which is not part of
the record, and the other requires digging deeper and
reviewing the recording of the hearing. Having said that,
Christopher is correct that Summary Judgment, as to him,
is inappropriate and, therefore, is VACATED.
The Trial Court denied Elizabeth’s motion to vacate, noting that her
Answer was almost 90 days late with no request for leave to file a late Answer, and
that her motion to vacate largely parrots Christopher’s. The Trial Court converted
the summary judgment order into a default judgment against Elizabeth and struck
Elizabeth’s late-filed Answer. The Trial Court appears to have denied the motion
to recuse, but, curiously, indicated that the Trial Court “will endeavor to obtain a
substitute Judge for the jury trial to be held in this matter . . . .”
Next, Christopher filed a response to the Patricks’ motion for
summary judgment, claiming a material issue of fact existed because the Patricks
allegedly had not secured the financing or appraisals necessary to close on July 3,
2020. Christopher’s newly-retained counsel also noted that he intended to conduct
discovery, and thus granting summary judgment was premature. Christopher
subsequently filed of record discovery requests he propounded on the Patricks; he
also conducted depositions of the Patricks’ real estate agents and appraiser and
filed those of record. Christopher purportedly deposed the Patricks’ loan agent,
but that deposition is not filed of record.
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In November of 2021, the Patricks filed an Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment against Christopher, requesting specific performance pursuant
to the terms of the purchase agreement, with a reservation of rights to seek
attorneys’ fees and damages.3 At a hearing on December 9, 2021, the Trial Court
granted counsel for Christopher the full 30 days he requested to file a response.
No response was filed because counsel for Christopher forgot to file a response.
On February 16, 2022, the Trial Court entered an Order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of the Patricks. The Trial Court held that the
Divorce Contract was a valid and enforceable contract, with no evidence that it
should be modified pursuant to CR4 60.02. Furthermore, as the Divorce Contract
had no legal restrictions against sale or alienation, it transferred full equitable title
to Christopher and left Elizabeth with only bare legal title pursuant to Nelson v.
Mahurin, 994 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. App. 1998) and Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381(Ky. 1979). The Trial Court further held that the purchase agreement did not state
time was of the essence as to the closing date, and no evidence had been presented
that the closing date was vital to the terms of the purchase agreement. Thus,
pursuant to Bennett v. Stephens, 293 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1956), the Trial Court held
that the failure to close on or before the date did not vitiate the contract. Pursuant
3
Elizabeth never contested the default judgment.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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to Billy Williams Builders and Developers Inc. v. Hillerich, 446 S.W.2d 280 (Ky.
1969), the Trial Court ordered specific performance and ordered that all proceeds
from the sale be held in escrow pending a determination of any damages to which
the Patricks may be entitled. The order was designated final and appealable.
On February 22, 2022, Christopher filed a motion pursuant to CR
59.05 and 60.02 to vacate the February 16, 2022, order granting partial summary
judgment. The only ground raised to vacate the order was that counsel for
Christopher forgot to file a timely response. On March 10, 2022, the Trial Court
held a hearing on the motion, wherein the Trial Court judge made the following
statement to counsel for Christopher:
Oddly enough, when this case first started one of the
bailiffs told me that your clients [sic] felt like they could
wear the Patricks out by delay, delay, delay, because the
Patricks had sold their house, as you know, in
anticipation of completing the transaction, and then the
wheels fell off the cart.
...
And after all this, all the digging in the weeds, you know
some representations were made, and I even went up and
looked at the divorce case, the file on the divorce case,
‘cause it was represented to me that [Christopher] had
conveyed an interest to [Elizabeth] before the signing of
the purchase agreement. Well, that wasn’t borne out by
the actual file itself, it to me was signed after
[Christopher] had equitable title to the property by virtue
of the property settlement agreement and signed the
purchase agreement. I would be glad to help you out, but
this case has gone on too long.
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In response, counsel for Christopher averred: (1) that the Patricks had
a contract to sell their house before entering the purchase agreement with
Christopher; and (2) whether the Patricks would be ready to close in a reasonable
amount of time was an outstanding question, as an appraisal was still needed, after
which the bank would need a few weeks to approve financing. The Trial Court
responded that it had already ruled on those issues.
Christopher filed a notice of appeal, and though “[a] notice of appeal,
when filed, transfers jurisdiction of the case from the circuit court to the appellate
court[,]” City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990),
Christopher nonetheless filed a motion5 pursuant to KRS6 26A.015 requesting the
Trial Court judge recuse himself. Christopher argued that recusal was mandated
due to statements the judge made at the March 10, 2022, hearing indicating he had
engaged in or overheard conversations with the bailiff about this case and further
indicating that the judge had conducted an independent investigation into the facts
by reviewing the file in the marital dissolution action between Christopher and
Elizabeth. Christopher did not request the Trial Court to vacate its previous order.
5
At the hearing on this motion, the Trial Court noted it had lost jurisdiction, but counsel for
Christopher argued that because the issue of damages remained, the case was still properly
before the Trial Court even though the summary judgment issue of specific performance was on
appeal.
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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The Trial Court clarified his previous statement regarding the communications
with the bailiff. The Trial Court indicated he made a “misstatement” regarding
having a conversation with the bailiff, but instead had overheard bailiffs talking:
I overheard a conversation leaving the courtroom that the
bailiffs were having. That conversation was reflected in
my comments that apparently they were right, because
two un-responded motions for summary judgment is
unusual and appeared to be a delaying tactic, but that’s
part of the case that’s on appeal.
Counsel for Christopher further argued that the Trial Court made a
factual misstatement at the previous hearing regarding the Patricks having already
sold their house anticipating a closing with Christopher. Counsel noted that the
requests for admissions, which had not been filed in the record, showed only that
the Patricks entered into a purchase agreement with another party to sell the
Patricks’ house prior to entering into a purchase agreement with Christopher.
Counsel for Christopher argued that the statements in toto showed at least an
appearance of partiality. The Trial Court then recused, not announcing any
reasoning from the bench. A subsequently entered order recusing was likewise
summary in nature. Christopher timely filed a second notice of appeal.7
Christopher also filed a supersedeas bond.
7
Christopher filed two notices of appeal, both timely, the first not naming all the parties and only
appealing from the March 18, 2022, order, and the second naming all the parties and additionally
appealing the order granting summary judgment. Between the two notices of appeal,
Christopher changed counsel, and thus each notice was filed by separate counsel. As the instant
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ANALYSIS
Christopher raises seven allegations of error regarding the proceedings
below. They can be grouped into two main issues: (1) substantive issues relating
to the grant of summary judgment; and (2) procedural ramifications of the Trial
Court’s recusal. We will address the recusal issues first after addressing the
briefing errors we encountered.
I. Briefing Errors.
Considering the confusion in the record below that was created by
actions undertaken by all parties involved in this case, it seems we could expect
Christopher’s brief in this Court to comply fully with our procedural rules and
bring about some measure of clarity. Unfortunately, his brief does not, and we
pause here briefly to discuss those errors. Principally, Christopher does not
include at the beginning of his Argument section and subsections any preservation
statements as were required by the former CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).8 For this violation
case involves only one case and one judgment, only one notice of appeal was necessary. Cf.
W.L.C. v. Commonwealth Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 484 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Ky.
App. 2016) (“Because there were two separate cases and two separate judgments, two separate
notices of appeal should have been filed.”). Regardless, both notices were timely filed, and thus
this procedural anomaly does not require us to create jurisdiction retroactively, see, e.g., City of
Devondale, 795 S.W.2d at 957. We nonetheless caution litigants in the future to be careful to
appeal from the judgment, and not the order denying the CR 59.05 relief, which is interlocutory,
and also to name all the requisite parties in the notice of appeal. See Ford v. Ford, 578 S.W.3d
356 (Ky. App. 2019).
8
As of January 1, 2023, this Rule and many others have been replaced by the Kentucky Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP). As the briefs in the instant case were filed prior to the effective date
of RAP, we utilize the prior rule.
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alone we could dismiss the appeal, see, e.g., Krugman v. CMI, Inc., 437 S.W.3d
167 (Ky. App. 2014) (dismissing appeal when brief failed to include preservation
statements at the onset of each of nine argument sub-sections), or review only for
manifest injustice, see, e.g., Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky.
2021) (“the manifest injustice standard of review is reserved only for errors in
appellate briefing related to the statement of preservation”).
Additionally, Christopher claims in one of his argument sub-headings
that “palpable error” occurred below, and yet his brief neither cites to CR 61.02,9
the substantial error rule in civil cases, nor to RCr10 10.26, the criminal rule
counterpart, both of which have been interpreted “identically.” Nami Resources
Company, L.L.C. v. Asher Land and Mineral, Ltd., 554 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Ky.
2018). Furthermore, other than in the heading to this argument, Christopher
neither utilizes the word “palpable” nor makes any argument regarding how this
alleged error amounts to palpable error or how said palpable error resulted in
manifest injustice. Christopher’s briefing error runs in the face of longstanding
jurisprudence that “[a]bsent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial
9
CR 61.02 reads:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered
by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
10
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in palpable error review
pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request is made and briefed by the appellant.”
Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (emphasis added).
Though Christopher’s appellate briefing errors constitute substantial
deviations from our Rules, we nonetheless have conducted a de novo review of the
summary judgment issues and further “plumb[ed] the depths of the proceeding” to
determine whether there were any “defect[s] in the proceeding [that were]
shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d
1, 4 (Ky. 2006). In so doing, we have found no error warranting reversal. Counsel
is cautioned in future filings to comply fully with the RAP briefing requirements.
II. Issues relating to the Trial Court’s recusal.
Christopher presents multiple issues with the Trial Court’s recusal that
we address together. Christopher complains that the Trial Court considered ex
parte communications, conducted an independent investigation into the facts, made
unsupported statements of material fact pertaining to the case, and formulated an
opinion about the merits of the case before discovery was taken. When presented
with a motion to recuse on these bases, the Trial Court granted said motion and
recused from the case. Because Christopher has received the relief requested
below – namely the Trial Court’s recusal – and because Christopher did not file a
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motion pursuant to CR 60.02 requesting that the Trial Court’s order be vacated due
to an appearance of impropriety, we decline to vacate the Trial Court’s order.
Both KRS 26A.015 and SCR11 4.300, Canon 2, Rule 2.11 require
judges to disqualify themselves in circumstances in which their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. Pursuant to the statute, a judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding for five enumerated reasons:
(a) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed an
opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding;
(b) Where in private practice or government service he
served as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter in controversy, or the
judge, master commissioner or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning the matter in controversy;
(c) Where he knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding;
(d) Where he or his spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of
such a person:
1. Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, or trustee of a party;
11
Kentucky Supreme Court Rules.
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2. Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding and the
disqualification is not waived by stipulation of
counsel in the proceeding filed therein;
3. Is known by the judge or master commissioner
to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
4. Is to the knowledge of the judge or master
commissioner likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(e) Where he has knowledge of any other circumstances in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
KRS 26A.015(2)(a)-(e). The Rule is similar to the statute. As the Rule is broad
and requires disqualification when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, our Supreme Court notes “that the obligation to recuse may exist
whether any of the specific circumstances delineated [in the Rules] are met.”
Abbott, Inc. v. Guirguis, 626 S.W.3d 475, 484-85 (Ky. 2021).
These dual provisions echo “the higher consideration that every
litigant is entitled to ‘nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge’
and should be able to feel that his cause has been tried by a judge who is ‘wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent.’” Dotson v. Burchett, 301 Ky. 28,
34, 190 S.W.2d 697, 700 (1945) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 295 Ky. 466,
174 S.W.2d 685 (1943), and 30 Am. Jur. Judges § 53). Analysis under the statute
and Rule seeks not to “impugn” a judge’s integrity or even to determine whether a
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judge is truly impartial, but rather to determine whether the “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Abbott, Inc., 626 S.W.3d at 485 (quoting and
abrogating on other grounds Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882
(Ky. 1992)).
In the instant case, we are not called upon to do either, as the Trial
Judge recused himself after the filing of a proper motion and consideration of the
appearance of impartiality. In fact, the Trial Court is in the “best position to
determine whether questions raised regarding his impartiality were reasonable.”
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Ky. App. 1997). We need not
“second-guess his decision.” Id.Moreover, “where an actual disqualifying condition is discovered
after entry of judgment, it does not follow automatically that the judgment must be
vacated.” Petzold v. Kessler Homes, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Ky. 2010). To
make that determination, our Supreme Court requires the analysis of three risks:
(1) the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case; (2) the risk that denial
of relief will produce injustice in other cases; and (3) the risk of undermining the
public’s confidence in the judicial process. Id. (adopting the test from Liljeberg v.
Health Services Acquisition Corporation, 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 855 (1988)).
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The analysis of those three risks is not before us, however, because
Christopher neither filed a motion to vacate the order nor requested such relief.
See Alred v. Commonwealth, Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 395 S.W.3d 417, 444
(Ky. 2012) (“Whether a defendant has properly preserved a disqualification issue
for review is a separate issue from whether a judge violated the mandatory
requirements of [the Rules] and KRS 26A.015.”). Petzold is illustrative. There,
the parties discovered after entry of a judgment and while that judgment was on
appeal that there existed a potentially disqualifying association between the trial
judge and one of the parties. 303 S.W.3d at 469. A motion pursuant to CR 60.02
was filed by one of the parties requesting that the previously-entered orders be
vacated. Id. The trial judge held a hearing and declined to vacate the orders. Id.
That order denying the CR 60.02 motion was appealed and consolidated with the
underlying orders already on appeal. Id. at 470. Accordingly, the issue of whether
to vacate the previously-entered judgment due to violations of the Rules or KRS
26A.015 was properly before the Petzold Court.
In the instant case, we have no such means to address this issue.
Because the motion to recuse was filed after the notice of appeal, Christopher had
to file a separate appeal and move to consolidate with the instant appeal to get the
issue before us. Christopher could not separately appeal, though, because his
motion was made pursuant to KRS 26A.015, and a ruling on a motion pursuant to
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KRS 26A.015 is interlocutory and not appealable. Cassetty v. Commonwealth, 495
S.W.3d 129, 135 (Ky. 2016) (“Simply put, a notice of appeal naming only an order
denying a motion to recuse, and not a final judgment, is fatally defective.”). To
effectuate his appeal, Christopher should have filed his motion pursuant to CR
60.02 and requested the extraordinary relief that the summary judgment order be
vacated. Petzold, supra. Having failed to do so, we lack jurisdiction to entertain
such claims from an interlocutory order with no notice of appeal. Tax Ease Lien
Investments 1, L.L.C. v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Ky. App. 2011) (“First, we
note that this court is required to raise a jurisdictional issue on its own motion if
the underlying order lacks finality.”).
Second, Christopher prevailed on his own motion and received
exactly the relief requested. Christopher only asked the Trial Judge to recuse,
which he did. Christopher did not request the Trial Court to vacate its previous
order. “This Court has stated on numerous occasions that ‘appellants will not be
permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate
court.’” Sneed v. University of Louisville Hospital, 600 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky.
2020) (quoting Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976),
overruled on other grounds by Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321 (Ky.
2010)). Likewise, “[a] new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999).
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Christopher received the relief he requested, and we will not review Christopher’s
new arguments and request for relief for the first time on appeal.
Finally, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and do not find that
structural error occurred in this case. See, e.g., Marchese v. Aebersold, 530
S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2017) (finding structural error when trial court should have
recused for conducting independent investigation and obtaining extrajudicial
information that resulted in explicit bias and antagonism toward party and issuance
of DVO). Unlike the taking and weighing of evidence and entry of a DVO, the
underlying order is one of summary judgment, which we review de novo, and our
review is not tainted by any appearance of impartiality. Likewise, Christopher has
a procedural mechanism pursuant to Petzold for retroactive vacatur of the
underlying summary judgment order, which he could have used and may have
obtained relief from the Trial Court’s order had he used it. Christopher’s failure to
use the mechanisms available to him fall in line with cases in which we have found
waiver of recusal issues, not structural error. Compare, Bussell v. Commonwealth,
882 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1994) (waived recusal issue because motion to recuse not
timely made), with Marchese, supra.
III. Issues relating to the summary judgment order.
We now turn to the substantive issues raised relating to the order
granting summary judgment. Christopher claims: (1) the Patricks were not
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entitled to specific performance because they were not prepared to close by the
closing date; (2) there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
time was of the essence in the contract; and (3) the order granting summary
judgment lacks any citations to the record. We discuss each issue seriatim.
A. Specific performance.
Christopher first argues that the Trial Court erred by entering
summary judgment and granting specific performance when the Patricks,
allegedly, did not strictly comply with the terms of the purchase agreement.
Christopher relies on the fact that the Patricks had not secured financing by the
closing date to support his claim. Having thoroughly reviewed the underlying
record, we find no such error.
CR 56.03 permits a trial court to enter summary judgment “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” When a trial court grants summary judgment, the standard of review on
appeal is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues
as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996), CR 56.03.
As “‘summary judgment does not require findings of fact but only an examination
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of the record to determine whether material issues of fact exist, we generally
review the grant of summary judgment without deference to the trial court’s
assessment of the record or its legal conclusions.’” Foreman v. Auto Club
Property-Casualty Insurance Company, 617 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2021) (quoting
Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010)).
Furthermore, “specific performance of a contract is not granted as a
matter of right, but is always addressed to the reasonable discretion of the court, to
be exercised according to the facts of each case. The discretion, however, is not an
arbitrary or capricious one.” West Ky. Coal Co. v. Nourse, 320 S.W.2d 311, 314
(Ky. 1959). Indeed, the discretion is tilted, as in weighing the equities, the court
must begin with an unbalanced scale. “It requires less strength of case on the side
of the defendant to resist than it does on the part of the plaintiff to invoke the right
of specific performance because if the court refuses to enforce specifically, the
party is still left to his remedy at law.” Id.While weighing the equities of granting specific performance, a court
must determine if the party requesting specific performance is “entirely free from
fraud, illegal or inequitable conduct and . . . [the party has] strict[ly] compli[ed]
with all terms of the contract[.]” Nourse, 320 S.W.2d at 314-15 (citing Asher v.
Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 129 S.W.2d 552 (1939); Miller v. Prater, 267 Ky. 11, 100
S.W.2d 842 (1937); Bluegrass Realty Co. v. Shelton, 148 Ky. 666, 147 S.W. 33-21-
(1912); and Williamson v. Ingram, 243 Ky. 749, 49 S.W.2d 1005 (1932)). If there
are breaches of the contract, the court must determine who was the first party to
breach, because “a party who commits the first breach of a contract is deprived of
the right to complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.” Nourse, 320
S.W.2d at 315.
Here, Christopher claims that the Patricks are not entitled to specific
performance because they had not obtained financing by the closing date. This
argument is unavailing and does not create a genuine issue of material fact because
it is clear from the record that the Patricks tried to obtain financing and were
otherwise prohibited from doing so due to their appraiser not being able to access
the inside of the residence. Tracy Trimble (Trimble), the appraiser, testified in his
deposition that “[t]he first request came in for an interior visit . . . I could not gain
entry to the property so I couldn’t complete the interior visit.” Trimble was later
asked to conduct an exterior visit and draft an appraisal, which he did. This
testimony indicates that the Patricks were actively attempting to obtain the
requisite financing and appraisals as required by the purchase agreement.
Moreover, Josh Brown, the buyer’s agent, testified, “Financing could
be completed by July 3rd very easily; it was not completed because of denial from
access from Chris[topher].” Mike Brown, the seller’s agent, likewise testified that
approximately two weeks before the closing date the appraiser attempted to get
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into the house but “could not get in. . . . [F]inally, the lender just said do a[n]
exterior, and that’ll be fine. And he done that, and I don’t know when that was
completed.” Christopher claims this evidence is inadmissible hearsay and could
not be considered by the Trial Court.
This argument is unavailing. First, Christopher did not make this
argument to the Trial Court for consideration, and it is axiomatic that a party
cannot “feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate
court.” Sneed, supra.
Furthermore, even had it been presented, there was no error because
the testimony was not offered for the truth of any of the matters asserted, KRE12
801(c), namely proving any fact about Christopher. Rather, the testimony went to
whether the Patricks had clean hands and complied with the terms of the contract.
Nourse, supra. The uncontroverted deposition testimony shows that the Patricks
complied with the terms of the purchase agreement and attempted to obtain the
requisite appraisal and financing in a timely fashion. They sought to obtain
financing, which led to Trimble being asked to conduct an appraisal. Trimble,
however, was not able to enter the house to conduct the appraisal. In other words,
the Patricks were “ready, able, and willing” to perform pursuant to the terms of the
contract as they were actively seeking financing. See Faulkner v. Denniston, 250
12
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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Ky. 373, 63 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1933) (“It is also the general rule that a party
seeking specific performance must show that he has performed or offered to
perform or is ready, able, and willing to perform all the essential acts required by
the contract.”).
It is irrelevant who or what prohibited Trimble from conducting the
appraisal, sufficing only that it was not the actions of the Patricks. Accordingly,
there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Patricks had
clean hands and were not the ones to breach the contract by complying and/or
attempting to comply with the terms of the contract; thus, they were not precluded
from seeking specific performance. See, e.g., Bennett, 293 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1956)
(upholding specific performance where party seeking financing did so in good faith
and within a reasonable time after the contractual due date).
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that Christopher willfully breached
the terms by refusing to convey the property to the Patricks by the agreed-to
closing date; thus he is precluded from arguing that the Patricks are in breach.
Christopher’s Answer admits the allegations in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, to
wit, “That on or about July 3, 2020, [the Patricks] were informed by Defendant
Christopher Lee Mays that he would not be selling the subject property due to
protest by Elizabeth Grace Mays.” Christopher also averred in his response to the
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motion for summary judgment13 that he “agrees that on the closing date, the
Defendant [Christopher] informed the [Patricks] he would be unable to complete
the closing on the property due to developments in his divorce, with official notice
coming in the following days.” It was Christopher, not the Patricks, who
committed “the first breach of a contract” and thus was “deprived of the right to
complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.” Nourse, 320 S.W.2d at 315.
Accordingly, nothing about the Patricks’ actions precluded the Trial
Court from granting specific performance. The evidence in the record supported
that they had clean hands and attempted to fulfill the terms of the contract. It is
clear from the record that Christopher breached the terms of the purchase
agreement. The motion having been properly supported, if Christopher wished to
oppose the grant of summary judgment, he had to “present[] at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there [was] a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky.
1991). Christopher failed to proffer any record evidence to show a genuine issue
of material fact. Accordingly, the Trial Court’s order granting specific
performance was not erroneous.
13
This response was filed on April 23, 2021, in response to an earlier motion for summary
judgment, which was granted. The Trial Court later vacated that order granting summary
judgment as to Christopher.
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B. Time is of the essence.
Next, Christopher argues that there was a genuine issue of material
fact that should have precluded entry of summary judgment, namely, whether time
was of the essence in the purchase agreement. As the argument goes, if time were
of the essence regarding the closing date, then the Patricks’ failure to obtain
financing by this date rendered the contract void. The Trial Court found that the
purchase agreement did not state that time was of the essence regarding the closing
date. Additionally, the Trial Court found that Christopher had not presented any
evidence that the closing date was vital to the terms of the contract. Having
reviewed the record and the arguments on appeal, we find no error with the Trial
Court’s order.
This Commonwealth has long held that for time to be of the essence,
the contract must expressly state the same:
Ordinarily time is not of the essence of the contract, but it
may be made so by express stipulations of the parties, or
it may be so by implication, because of the nature of the
property involved, or because of the avowed object of the
seller or purchaser, or from the nature of the contract
itself, or by one party giving the other notice that
performance must be made within a certain reasonable
time fixed in the notice.
Browning v. Huff, 204 Ky. 13, 263 S.W. 661, 662-63 (1924) (citations omitted).
We have reviewed the purchase agreement, and nothing within the
four corners shows that time was of the essence. “Whether time is of the essence
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of the contract ‘is viewed from the standpoint of the parties as gathered from the
contract involved, under the rule that unless the intention to make time of the
essence is evidenced by expression, or implication, it may not be so regarded.’”
Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of Georgetown, Kentucky v. Wilmott Hardwoods,
Inc., 171 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Distillery Rectifying & Wine Workers
International Union of America v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 308 Ky. 380,
213 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (1948)).
Without a doubt, the terms of the purchase agreement never
specifically state that time was of the essence. The closing clause states as follows:
10. CLOSING AND TITLE: The closing shall occur
on or before 07/03/2020. At closing an unencumbered
marketable title to the property shall be conveyed to
BUYER by deed of general warranty with the usual
covenants such as any national title company shall insure,
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except (a)
such liens and encumbrances as BUYER may
specifically approve and (b) easements of record and all
restrictions of record as to the use and improvements of
the property. Should the title to the property appear
defective, SELLER shall have 14 days after receipt of
notice from BUYER of such defect or defects within
which to correct same at the cost of the SELLER.
Should SELLER be unable to correct the defect, this
CONTRACT is voidable at option of BUYER and
earnest money shall be refunded to BUYER. If the
parties to this contract desire that any term of this
agreement survive the closing and transfer of deed to
BUYER, an agreement must be executed prior to closing
acknowledging such an intent.
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This clause never states that time was of the essence; in fact, no clause in the
purchase agreement states that time is of the essence.
Because the four corners of the purchase agreement do not explicitly
state that time is of the essence, “we must consider if an intention to make time of
the essence may be implied from the words of the contract.” Farmers Bank, 171
S.W.3d at 9. Here, the contract’s terms imply that the closing date is not essential
to the agreement. In fact, the purchase agreement explicitly permits additional
time after the closing date should title to the property appear defective. Had
Christopher delivered title to the Patricks that the Patricks believed to be defective,
the purchase agreement would permit the Patricks to give notice of title defects to
Christopher on or before the day of closing, which would have extended the
closing date by 14 days to allow Christopher to cure such defects. Additionally,
the specific language of the purchase agreement implies that even defective title
delivered at closing is not essential even to the contract itself, as defective title
renders the purchase agreement only “voidable at the option of BUYER”
(emphasis added). Thus, by express and implied terms, time was not of the
essence for the closing date.
Moreover, and as it relates to Christopher’s argument that the Patricks
had not obtained financing, we note that the financing provisions likewise did not
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explicitly or implicitly indicate that time was of the essence. The purchase
agreement stated in relevant part:
BUYER agrees to apply for and lock in the above-
mentioned loan within five (5) calendar days from the
date of acceptance of this CONTRACT and shall proceed
with due diligence to obtain financing. Should BUYER
be unable to obtain financing, this CONTRACT shall be
null and void, and the earnest money shall be refunded to
Buyer [sic].
Other than a time limit on the application for financing, the Patricks
were only responsible for proceeding “with due diligence” while seeking
financing; there was no date specific. As shown above, all evidence proffered
demonstrates that they were attempting to obtain the requisite appraisal for
financing. Again, the express and implied terms of the purchase agreement
support that time was not of the essence for the closing.
In strong contrast to the instant purchase agreement stands language in
other contracts that was held to make time of the essence. See, e.g., Farmers Bank,
171 S.W.3d at 9 (“If the loan is not closed by the specified closing date, this letter
and the Bank’s obligation to make a loan shall terminate without any further
liability or obligation to the Bank.”); Distillery Rectifying, 308 Ky. at 381, 213
S.W.2d at 611 (“This agreement shall be effective and shall remain in full force
and effect from the date of its execution, May 1, 1945 to May 1, 1946, and during
each year thereafter unless 90 days notice in writing is given by either party hereto
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prior to the expiration date.”);14 Asher v. Roberts, 206 Ky. 186, 266 S.W. 1089,
1089 (1924) (“[I]t is agreed that the party of the first part doth hereby bind himself
to make or cause to be made a deed of conveyance to party of the second part . . .
provided, however, that party of the second part or any one for him pays . . . the
sum of $500 within 12 months from the date of this contract.”).
In the instant case, the purchase agreement contains no such
termination, “full force and effect,” or binding language as it relates to the closing
date. Quite the opposite, the closing language includes a 14-day extension period
for alleged title defects and specific language rendering the purchase agreement
voidable, not automatically void, due to title defects. By its express terms, the
purchase agreement made the closing date not of the essence.
And while Christopher now points to evidence in the depositions as
parol evidence supporting his argument that time was of the essence, we again note
that Christopher did not present these arguments to the Trial Court, and they are
not properly before us. Cf. Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky.
1999) (“A new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
14
The Court interpreted this clause as being of the essence because, “[w]hile not expressed in
exact words, it is to be gathered without difficulty that by strong implication the requirement of
90 days written notice was essential, because termination or continuation depended upon the
required notice.” Id. at 384, 213 S.W.2d at 613.
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Christopher attempts to argue away his own deficiencies by claiming
the Trial Court prohibited Christopher from responding to the motion for summary
judgment by denying the motion to vacate. The failure to respond, however, was
solely Christopher’s. Prior to entering its order granting summary judgment the
Trial Court did, in fact, give Christopher 30 days to respond to the summary
judgment motion, which was as much time as Christopher had requested.
Christopher failed to timely file a response. His argument on appeal is not
availing.
Nonetheless, we have reviewed the depositions and find they do not
alter the analysis. First, they are depositions of the realtors, not the parties, so they
are of limited value as to the intentions of the parties at the time they made the
contract. Second, though the realtors believed that the closing should have
occurred on the date specified, they nonetheless agreed that closing dates are
frequently amended for numerous reasons, including needing additional time for
inspections and financing.
While “a new agreement between the parties extending the time is
evidence that at the time of the making of the original contract time was regarded
as of its essence[,]” Browning, 204 Ky. 13, 263 S.W. at 663 (citation omitted), in
the instant case there was neither a new agreement extending the time nor an
amendment to the purchase agreement extending the time. Additionally, the
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realtor’s testimony was not referring to the parties executing a “new agreement”
but rather to executing an “addendum” to the purchase agreement, with testimony
that such practice is common in residential real estate purchase agreements to
permit parties to obtain financing, inspections, and the like. Because such an
addendum or amendment to the purchase agreement is commonplace and
anticipated prior to signing the purchase agreement, this parol evidence serves to
bolster the fact that the parties did not intend the closing date to be essential to the
contract’s terms when they signed the purchase agreement.
Moreover, as has already been shown, it is apparent from the record
that even if the Patricks had not obtained financing by the closing date, they were
seeking to fulfill their terms of the contract in good faith. It is also apparent that
Christopher was not going to fulfill the terms of the contract by the closing date.
Such actions are sufficient to permit a trial court to grant specific performance,
even if the Patricks needed a few more days to obtain financing. Bennett, 293
S.W.2d at 880 (upholding specific performance where “Appellee in good faith
sought to consummate the contract within a reasonable time after the date
specified”). Accordingly, the Trial Court’s orders granting summary judgment and
ordering specific performance are not erroneous on the grounds raised by
Christopher.
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C. References or citations to the record.
Finally, Christopher argues that the Trial Court’s order is erroneous
because it does not contain references or citations to the record. Again,
Christopher did not raise this issue below, and it is not properly before us. Cf.
Springer, 998 S.W.2d at 446 (“A new theory of error cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.”). More importantly, our appellate review of a summary judgment
is a de novo review of the issues presented below as it “involves only legal
questions and a determination of whether a disputed material issue of fact exists.”
Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospitality Management, LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Ky.
2021) (quoting Adams v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017), and Shelton
v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013)). Accordingly, as
shown above, we have reviewed the order and the record below and find summary
judgment was properly entered.
CONCLUSION
This case involves one party’s failure to fulfill its obligations pursuant
to a residential, real estate purchase agreement while the other party was
proceeding in good faith to fulfill its obligations. The Trial Court granted
summary judgment and ordered specific performance. Neither of those decisions is
erroneous. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders granting summary judgment and
ordering specific performance.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Joshua S. Harp Howard D. Stone
Frankfort, Kentucky Owingsville, Kentucky
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