Rachael Brooks v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

RENDERED: JULY 7, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0472-MR
RACHAEL BROOKS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CR-00096
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND
REMANDING
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BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: This is an appeal from an order revoking the probation of
Rachael Brooks (“Brooks”). Also appealed are orders of the trial court requiring
Brooks to pay jail fees and reimburse the Commonwealth for extradition costs
from Oregon to Kentucky. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
Brooks pled guilty in December 2016 to three theft counts and
received a sentence of up to 15 years, which was probated for five years. The
conditions of her probation included, among other things, that she commit no new
offenses during the probation period, not possess or consume drugs, report as
directed to probation, remain in Kentucky, notify the officer of any change in
address, undergo mandatory drug screenings, and complete recommended
treatment.
Within two months, in February 2017, Brooks was arrested in
Tennessee for a failure to appear for court in Kentucky. While she was
incarcerated, she was found to have concealed crystal methamphetamine and
brought it into the detention facility. She was charged with a felony offense in
Tennessee. She served approximately 11 months there, before being transferred
back to Fulton County for a probation revocation hearing in January 2018. At that
hearing, the trial court did not revoke her probation, but held that determination in
abeyance to allow Brooks to return to a drug treatment center in Tennessee.
However, in March 2018, Brooks was arrested and charged with
another felony offense of trafficking in methamphetamine and a misdemeanor
offense of possession of marijuana. At that point, her probation was revoked, but
she was granted shock probation to attend a second substance abuse treatment
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program, in part, because she was pregnant. The original order of probation was
reinstated.
Three years later, in 2021, probation and parole filed another report of
violations by Brooks. At that point, Brooks was living in Oregon. While a
summons was issued for her to appear in Fulton County, it was acknowledged in
open court that it may not have been served, and she did not initially appear.
Thereafter, a warrant was issued for her arrest, and Brooks agreed to be extradited
to Kentucky for a probation revocation hearing in March 2022. Before that
hearing, probation and parole again generated a report detailing several violations
by Brooks, including absconding supervision, failing to report, failing to attend
substance abuse treatment, a recent arrest, and charges for driving under the
influence (“DUI”), resisting arrest, and a hit and run. A supplemental report
advised of a conviction and sentence for the DUI in Oregon.
A probation revocation hearing was conducted on March 8, 2022, and
Brooks was appointed a public defender. She admitted to committing the
violations listed by the probation officer, but spoke of the difficulties of being an
addict, living with mental illness, and her desire to be near her young son in
Oregon. After considering the evidence, the trial court found Brooks had violated
the conditions of her probation and revoked the same, sentencing her to serve the
initial 15 years. It is not lost on this Court that the revocation hearing was held
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more than three months after the original probationary period would have expired
on the 2016 guilty plea.
This appeal followed, and Brooks presents three arguments on appeal.
First, she asserts that the trial court erred by imposing jail fees without evidence
that there was a jail reimbursement policy in place, as required by several appellate
court decisions. Secondly, she maintains that the trial court erred in ordering
reimbursement of extradition expenses, which has also been addressed and found
improper, by prior decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Thirdly, she argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation without evidence
or a specific finding that she was a significant risk to the community at large.
As to the first argument, we easily find error. In its response brief, the
Commonwealth agrees that the jail fee issue should be remanded for presentation
of some evidence of a jail fee reimbursement policy pursuant to the Supreme Court
opinion in Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2022).1 We need
not discuss that error further and so remand on that issue.
Similarly, as to the second argument regarding extradition expenses,
the Commonwealth again agrees that the law is well-settled that trial courts are
1
See also Frazier v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0484-MR, 2023 WL 1485344 (Ky. App.
Feb. 3, 2023); Daniels v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0212-MR, 2022 WL 17724283 (Ky.
App. Dec. 16, 2022); Campbell v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0690-MR, 2021 WL 1051590(Ky. App. Mar. 19, 2021); Marks v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Ky. App. 2018).
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without statutory authority to order a criminal defendant to pay restitution to the
state treasury for expenses of extradition. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.3d
784, 786 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added).2 We reverse on that issue.
Finally, Brooks, citing Helms v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 637, 641
(Ky. App. 2015), argues that Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 439.3106 requires
trial courts to specifically find whether a probationer constitutes a significant risk
to the community at large or to prior victims. Brooks correctly argues that KRS
439.3106 emphasizes rehabilitation over incarceration. Helms, 475 S.W.3d at 641.
However, we disagree that, here, the statutory requirements were not met.
The first step in analyzing a probation revocation claim is
to determine whether the trial court properly considered
KRS 439.3106(1) before revoking the defendant’s
probation. [Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773,
780 (Ky. 2014)]. If the trial court considered the statute,
we then review whether its decision to revoke probation
was an abuse of discretion. Id. Accordingly, “we will
disturb a ruling only upon finding that ‘the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999)).
Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 587 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Ky. 2019).
Here, the trial court referenced the statute and considered lesser
alternatives to imprisonment throughout Brooks’ case. The trial court granted
2
See also Culver v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000209-MR, 2020 WL 1074785, at *2-3 (Ky.
App. Mar. 6, 2020).
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shock probation for a prior violation. The trial court did not use the exact wording
“significant risk” to society, but did specifically state that Brooks demonstrated
violence by being charged and convicted of DUI and that she was a “danger to
others.” The trial court’s finding was clear that her conduct endangered the
community at large. As Helms explained, there must be proof by a preponderance
of evidence of a violation and evidence that the statutory criteria have been met.
Helms, 475 S.W.3d at 645. Here, the proof established – through witness
testimony, written documentation, and Brooks’ own admissions – that she was a
significant risk to the community. We do not find the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking the probation and on that point, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven J. Buck Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Christina L. Romano
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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