Lexington Alzheimer's Investors, LLC D/B/A the Lantern at Morning Pointe Alzheimer's Center of Excellence v. Sandra Norris, as Administratix of the Estate of Rayford Charles Norris

RENDERED: OCTOBER 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0965-MR
LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER’S
INVESTORS, LLC D/B/A THE
LANTERN AT MORNING POINTE
ALZHEIMER’S CENTER OF
EXCELLENCE; BROOKE GRIFFITH,
IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE LANTERN AT
MORNING POINTE OF LEXINGTON;
GREG A. VITAL; INDEPENDENT
HEALTHCARE PROPERTIES, LLC;
AND J. FRANKLIN FARROW APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-02030
SANDRA NORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF RAYFORD CHARLES
NORRIS APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Lexington Alzheimer’s Investors, LLC d/b/a the
Lantern at Morning Pointe Alzheimer’s Center of Excellence (hereinafter referred
to as the Lantern), along with other related appellants appeal from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying their motion to compel arbitration. We find no error
and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sandra Norris was the wife of Rayford Charles Norris. Mr. Norris
was a resident at the Lantern from October 25, 2019, until March 6, 2020. Mr.
Norris died on August 9, 2020. On July 8, 2021, Ms. Norris filed the underlying
action alleging that Mr. Norris received negligent care while at the Lantern which
resulted in his death. Appellants then moved to compel arbitration because Ms.
Norris signed a mandatory arbitration agreement1 on Mr. Norris’s behalf when he
was admitted to the Lantern. The trial court ultimately held that Ms. Norris did not
have the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf as
executing such an agreement was not a health care decision. The trial court denied
Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration and this appeal followed.
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Mr. Norris would not have been able to be treated at the Lantern if the arbitration agreement
was not executed.
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ANALYSIS
“It is well established that construction and interpretation of a written
instrument are questions of law for the court. We review questions of law de
novo and, thus, without deference to the interpretation afforded by the circuit
court.” Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Appellants argue on appeal that Ms. Norris did have the authority to
enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf. They base this
argument on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 311.631(1)(c) which states:
(1) If an adult patient whose physician has determined
that he or she does not have decisional capacity has not
executed an advance directive, or to the extent the
advance directive does not address a decision that must
be made, any one (1) of the following responsible parties,
in the following order of priority if no individual in a
prior class is reasonably available, willing, and
competent to act, shall be authorized to make health care
decisions on behalf of the patient:
...
(c) The spouse of the patient[.]
Appellants’ argument is that this statute authorized Ms. Norris to enter into the
arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf because it was a health care decision.
Courts in this Commonwealth have held that when an arbitration
agreement is presented as a condition of admission to a medical facility, entering
into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. See LP Louisville
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East, LLC v. Patton, 651 S.W.3d 759, 770 (Ky. 2020), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Apr. 29, 2021); Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky.
2012). In other words, if an arbitration agreement is mandatory in order to be
treated at a medical or nursing home facility, as it was in this case, then entering
into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. Appellants argue that
KRS 311.631(1)(c) and cases like those cited above indicate that the arbitration
agreement in this case is valid.
The cases cited by Appellants and those found during this Court’s
research concern arbitration agreements as they relate to a power of attorney, but
there is no power of attorney in this case. An illustration of the cases found during
our research is still advisable. In Patton, supra, Tommy Patton was admitted into a
long-term nursing home facility in Louisville, Kentucky. 651 S.W.3d 759. Upon
Tommy’s admission into the facility, Kenneth Patton, his son, signed a mandatory
arbitration agreement as Tommy’s power of attorney. The power of attorney
documents gave Kenneth “all powers . . . necessary . . . to provide for [Tommy’s]
support, maintenance, [and] health.” Id. at 768.
A few weeks after being admitted into the facility, Tommy died.
After Tommy’s death, Kenneth filed suit against the facility. The facility then
moved to compel arbitration due to the agreement executed by Kenneth. The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that “when an agreement to arbitrate is presented as
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a condition of admission to a nursing home, unless otherwise agreed, a power of
attorney expressing general authority to make necessary health care decisions
includes the incidental or reasonably necessary authority to enter that agreement.”
Id. at 770.
Appellants argue that KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows Ms. Norris to make
health care decisions on her husband’s behalf just like the power of attorney
allowed Kenneth to make health care decisions for his father. Appellants believe
that because the arbitration agreement at issue here was mandatory for Mr. Norris
to be admitted to the Lantern, it was a necessary health care decision. We
disagree. The power of attorney in Patton gave Kenneth broad and general powers
to provide for the health of his father. According to the Kentucky Supreme Court,
that included entering into a mandatory arbitration agreement in order to have him
treated at a nursing home facility. In our opinion, the statute at issue here does not
grant such a broad array of powers.
KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows a wife to make health care decisions on
behalf of her husband; however, KRS 311.621(8) defines “health care decisions”
as “consenting to, or withdrawing consent for, any medical procedure, treatment,
or intervention[.]” We believe this is a narrow definition and does not encompass
the ability to enter into an arbitration agreement, even if the agreement was
required to be admitted into a nursing home facility. The legislature chose not to
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grant one person broad or general powers over another person’s health care
decisions. The legislature chose to allow a person to consent to medical
procedures, treatments, or interventions on behalf of another person. Entering into
an arbitration agreement is not a medical procedure, treatment, or intervention.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
KRS 311.631(1)(c) did not allow Ms. Norris to enter into an arbitration agreement
on her husband’s behalf. Entering into the arbitration agreement was not a health
care decision as defined by KRS 311.621(8). A power of attorney granting general
health care authority may encompass the ability to enter into an arbitration
agreement; however, the health care decisions granted by the statutes discussed
above do not include this power.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul A. Dzenitis Tyler S. Stewart
Emily W. Newman Lexington, Kentucky
Corey J. Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT LEXINGTON Tyler S. Stewart
ALZHEIMER’S INVESTORS, LLC Lexington, Kentucky
D/B/A THE LANTERN AT
MORNING POINTE ALZHEIMER’S Chad Gardner
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE: Lexington, Kentucky
Emily W. Newman Jake Grey
Louisville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
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