Citation Numbers: 201 S.W.2d 716, 304 Ky. 543, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 675
Judges: Cammack, Forester
Filed Date: 4/22/1947
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Affirming.
On January 1, 1946, H.E. Bloomer filed an action against Curtis Hoskins in the Bell Circuit Court to recover damages alleged to have grown out of an automobile collision brought about by Hoskins' negligence on December 24, 1945. Personal service was had on Hoskins on January 5, 1946. He filed no answer and no defense was made. On April 9, 1946, the petition was taken as true and the court ordered that a jury be empaneled on September 1, 1946, to determine the amount of damages to which Bloomer was entitled. A verdict in the sum of $500 was returned and judgment was entered accordingly.
On September 2, 1946, Hoskins filed the present equity action to have the default judgment set aside. He alleged casualty and misfortune in the employment of J.H. Taylor as an attorney, when in fact, unbeknownst to him, Taylor had been disbarred from the practice of law in Kentucky. He charged also that the Bell Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the action because he (Hoskins) was a resident of Harlan County and the accident occurred in that county. A counterclaim was set up. Bloomer's demurrer to the petition was sustained. Hoskins declined to plead further and his petition was dismissed; hence this appeal.
We will dispose of the jurisdictional question first. In his petition Bloomer charged that the collision occurred through the negligence of Hoskins as he (Bloomer) was driving his car on his side of the highway between Pathfork, Ky., and Insull, Ky., in the direction of Harlan, Kentucky. The petition was ineptly drawn, but the question is: Was it fatally defective? We think not. We will take judicial notice of the towns mentioned. Huber v. Johnson,
We turn now to the question of casualty and misfortune. J.H. Taylor was permanently barred from the practice of law in Kentucky in October, 1945. See In re Taylor,
The record shows that Hoskins gave little or no personal attention to Bloomer's action. True it is he employed J.H. Taylor to represent him, but he did not take the trouble to find out whether Taylor was a licensed attorney, and further he made no effort to determine what Taylor was doing in the way of representing him. Even after Taylor told him he had turned his case over to Mr. Hammond, it was not until long after the default judgment had been entered (April 9, 1946) that Hoskins contacted Mr. Hammond (August 28, 1946). The exercise of due foresight and diligence was required of Hoskins. The employment of counsel does not excuse a litigant from giving his case personal attention. Carter V. Miller,
For the reasons given we think the judgment should be and it is affirmed. *Page 546