Citation Numbers: 221 S.W.2d 91, 310 Ky. 552
Judges: OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE SIMS
Filed Date: 6/3/1949
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
Reversing.
This action in ejectment was brought by appellant, Richfield Coal Company, in the Bell Circuit Court against 30 defendants whom the petition averred were trespassing upon the lands of the Company lying partly in Bell County and partly in Knox County. The description of the land is not set out in the petition but is contained in an exhibit attached thereto and describes one large body of land. A special plea to the jurisdiction was filed by 28 of the defendants which set out they were citizens and residents of Knox County and their lands lie in that county and they were asserting no claim to any land situated in Bell County. This plea was sustained and the court held it had no jurisdiction over these defendants, whose lands were situated in Knox County and who made no claims to lands in Bell County, and dismissed the petition as to them. The Company appeals.
Appellant rests its case squarely on sec. 62 of the Civil Code of Practice which provides that an action concerning the recovery, partition, sale or injury to real estate "must be brought in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated." Our statute authorizing an action to quiet title (KRS
Appellees insist that as they all reside in Knox County and as the lands to which they claim title are located in that county, the Bell Circuit Court has no jurisdiction of them despite the fact that the land in controversy may be contiguous to other lands owned by the Company which are situated in Bell County. Their argument is that the Company may not acquire a tract in Knox County contiguous to land it owns in Bell County and by incorporating the two tracts into one boundary give the Bell Circuit Court jurisdiction over the land situated in Knox County. *Page 554
In the briefs it is argued that this question is one of first impression in this court. However, Collins v. Adams,
In reversing the judgment in the Collins case,
The gist of the Collins opinion,
Appellees aver in their plea to the jurisdiction that the tract of 152 1/2 acres located in Knox County, from which the lots are taken in which they claim title, has never been merged with or incorporated in any larger boundary which extends into Bell County. They insist this averment must be taken as true since the Company did not answer their plea to the jurisdiction. However, it was not necessary for the Company to answer the plea to the jurisdiction because the petition averred the Company owned a boundary of land situated partly in Bell and partly in Knox Counties upon which defendants were trespassing and asserting title, and the description attached to the Company's petition was that of one large boundary of land. Thus an issue was formed.
Appellees lean heavily upon the domestic cases of Bronaugh v. Com.,
The Bronaugh case deals with three separate patents issued by the State of Virginia in 1788, two of which were for 6000 acres each and the third for 8000 acres. The two 6000 acre tracts were in Leslie County and the 8000 acre tract was in Harlan County. The Commonwealth brought suit in the Harlan Circuit Court to forfeit title to the entire 20,000 acres for failure of the owner to pay taxes. The pleadings showed they were three separate and distinct tracts which had never been incorporated into one boundary, therefore it was decided the Harlan Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over the Leslie County lands.
We cannot see that the Elliott case has any bearing on the controversy. All it decided was that actual possession of one tract of wild, unfenced land did not give *Page 556 title to adjoining tracts with only color of title, but that actual possession of these is necessary where the four tracts are covered by four separate patents and the lands have never been merged into one body.
The Patrick case is similar to Bronaugh v. Com.,
The text in 56 Am. Jur. sec. 12, p. 15, deals with separate tracts of land lying in different counties owned by one person, and correctly says that an action to enforce rights affecting the separate tracts must be brought in the county where each is located. This section points out that there are often statutes, such as we have in this jurisdiction, providing that where one body of land lies in two counties, suit may be brought in that county in which any part of the land lies. This text in no respect is in conflict with the Collins case,
The facts in the Wolski case,
Manifestly, appellees lose sight of the fact that the lands in the instant controversy, while lying in two counties are not separate and distinct tracts, although *Page 557 they were originally separated, but at the time this action was brought constituted one body of land and was used as such for mining purposes by the owner.
As we read the annotations in 169 A.L.R. 1245, et seq., the courts, as a general rule, are inclined to construe statutes passed by the various states relative to venue, where several tracts used as one boundary lie in two or more counties, as giving jurisdiction to the court over all the land if the action is brought in the county where any of the land is located, and thus avoid a multiplicity of actions; unless it be that the tracts are wholly independent of each other as to physical connection and as to title, in which event the forum will not assume jurisdiction of land situated outside its territorial limits.
For the reasons given the judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion.