Judges: Richardson
Filed Date: 1/17/1933
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Affirming.
The determinant question presented by this appeal is one of fact, and since the facts are not disputed, therefore it becomes one of law. Consolidated Coal Company v. Ratliff,
On April 19, 1927, A.S. Haselden and Maymie Haselden were the owners of a house and lot situated in Lincoln county, Ky. They occupied it as a home, with their household and kitchen furniture. The Home Insurance Company of New York issued and delivered to them a policy of insurance, insuring the house for $1,500 and the household and kitchen furniture for $500, against loss by fire, for a period of five years, for an agreed premium, for which they executed and delivered their note payable in annual installments. At and prior to the time its policy was accepted by them, the American *Page 532 Insurance Company had issued and delivered its policy to them, insuring the same property against loss by fire for a portion of the time covered by the policy of the Home Insurance Company of New York. The agent of the Home Insurance Company of New York, and the company itself, had no knowledge of the existence of the policy of the American Insurance Company, and the Haseldens did not disclose to either of them the fact the property, at that time, was insured against loss by fire by a policy of the American Insurance Company.
On August 14, 1927, the dwelling, household, and kitchen furniture so insured by the policies of both the Home Insurance Company of New York and the American Insurance Company were completely destroyed by fire. The Home Insurance Company of New York denied its liability. The Haseldens instituted this action to recover of it $2,000, the face value of the policy. It interposed three defenses: (1) That in their written application Haseldens represented there was no insurance in any other company, covering the property, and that this statement in the application was substantially untrue, and the company, acting reasonably and naturally in accordance with the usual course of fire insurance companies, under similar circumstances, would not have accepted their application and issued the policy if the truth had been stated in it; (2) the statement in their written application that the property was not covered by other insurance was untrue and known by them to be untrue at the time of the making of the application and the receipt of the policy, and was made by them for the purpose of deceiving the insurance company and procuring its policy thereby, and that the company relied upon their statement in this respect, and was deceived into issuing its policy by reason of such untrue statement; (3) it was stipulated in the policy that, if the insured, without consent, indorsed on the policy, "has now, or shall hereafter procure any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on any of said property — then in each and every one of the above cases this policy shall be null and void."
During the progress of the trial, the insurance company dismissed so much of its answer as presented the first two defenses, and relied exclusively on the third.
In his testimony, A.S. Haselden admitted the existence of the policy with the American Insurance Company, *Page 533 and that its existence was not disclosed to the agent of the Home Insurance Company of New York, during the negotiations for, nor at the time he procured, the policy of the Home Insurance Company of New York.
The testimony in behalf of the Haseldens does not tend to show any knowledge on the part of the Home Insurance Company of New York, or its agents, of the existence of the policy of the American Insurance Company. A directed verdict for the Home Insurance Company of New York was returned by the jury; the judgment was accordingly entered. The Haseldens appeal.
It is their insistence that the provisions of the policy of the Home Insurance Company of New York upon which it relies as the basis of its defense, does not relieve the company in order to present a defense of the duty of both alleging and proving either fraud or misrepresentation of a fact material to the risk, or a breach of warranty. To sustain this argument they present section 639 Ky. Statutes; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Mullins,
The contract of insurance measures the rights of the parties thereunder, the same as a contract about any other subject-matter. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. O'Brien (Ky.)
Judgment affirmed.
Citizens' Ins. Co. of New Jersey v. Railey ( 1934 )
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Smith ( 1935 )
Consolidated Underwriters v. Richards' Adm'r ( 1939 )
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Woods ( 1934 )
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Chattanooga v. Bailey ( 1936 )
National Life & Accident Ins. v. Senters ( 1935 )
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance v. Hurt ( 1934 )
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Wilkins ( 1935 )
Hopper v. Barren Fork Coal Co. ( 1936 )