State of Louisiana v. Chaka Stewart

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #028
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 12th day of May, 2017, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2015-K-1845 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHAKA STEWART (Parish of Orleans)
C/W
2015-K-1846 Because we agree that the motions to quash were granted in error,
we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
JOHNSON, C.J., dissents.
HUGHES, J., dissents with reasons.
GENOVESE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by
Justice Hughes.
05/12/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2015-K-1845
CONSOLIDATED WITH
No. 2015-K-1846
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CHAKA STEWART
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
PER CURIAM:
We granted writs to examine the timeliness of a prosecution following
defendant’s failure to appear in court after receiving actual notice and whether the
court of appeal erroneously reversed the trial court’s ruling. The trial court granted
defendant’s motion to quash, finding the prosecution untimely. For the following
reasons, we affirm the court of appeal’s ruling, which reversed the quashal and
found the state has no affirmative duty to locate an absent defendant, and remand
these cases to the trial court for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2011, defendant was charged by bill of information with one
count of possession of marijuana, second offense; one count of possession with
intent to distribute heroin; and one count of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. On August 3, 2011, he was charged by a separate bill of information with
one count of drag racing resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court
ultimately transferred the drag racing case so as to track the previously filed
narcotics case.
Following his appearances for status hearings and pre-trial matters,
defendant received notice—proof of which is in the record—to appear on May 17,
2012. At some point before this date, however, defendant was arrested on federal
charges, and thus did not appear as scheduled on May 17, 2012. On that date, a
minute entry reflects that defense counsel did appear and announce that defendant
was detained in federal custody. The matter was continued, and the minute entry
also shows that the state indicated its intent to secure defendant’s presence for the
next scheduled court date.
On July 23, 2012, the state filed a motion and order for writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum directed to the United States Marshal Service for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, which the trial court granted. No further action was taken on
the writ, however, and thus defendant again failed to appear. The matters were
continued several times over the course of the following year, with each minute
entry indicating again that defendant was in federal custody and that the state was
to file a writ to secure his presence.
On July 23, 2013, one year after its first motion, the state filed a second
motion and order for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum—this time directed
to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where defendant was serving a federal
sentence. Still, defendant’s absence from court persisted. After several more
continuances, the trial court issued an alias capias for defendant in February 2014;
and at a bond forfeiture hearing on April 30, 2014, counsel for the surety appeared
and advised that defendant was in federal custody in Arkansas, and provided a
certificate of incarceration. The matter was continued, and on July 25, 2014,
defendant filed a motion to quash all charges on speedy trial grounds, which the
trial court granted.
The court of appeal reversed the quashal, because even though the state
knew that defendant was in federal custody, the two-year limitations period within
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which it had to bring him to trial was interrupted by defendant’s initial failure to
appear and did not begin to run anew until the surety filed the certificate of
defendant’s incarceration in Arkansas on April 30, 2014. Thus, the court of appeal
found that the state had two years from that date, i.e., until April 30, 2016, to bring
defendant to trial. State v. Stewart, 15-0135 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/15), 176 So.3d
465; 1 State v. Stewart, 15-0136 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/15).
ANALYSIS
After careful review, we find that the court of appeal reached the correct
result. We agree that when defendant failed to appear on May 17, 2012, despite
having actual notice that he was required to, the two-year period within which the
state was required to bring defendant to trial was interrupted. See La.C.Cr.P. art.
578(A)(2). We also agree that in the event of such an interruption, La.C.Cr.P. art.
579(A)(3) does not require the state to search for a defendant who has failed to
appear. State v. Romar, 07-2140 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So.2d 722. Rather, the
limitations period begins to run anew only when the state receives notice of an
incarcerated defendant’s custodial location. See, e.g., State v. Baptiste, 08-2468
(La. 6/23/10), 38 So.3d 247 (limitations period did not begin to run anew until
authorities from parish in which defendant was incarcerated contacted authorities
where charges were pending and informed them of defendant’s custodial status and
location).
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The court of appeal further found that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(C), which went into effect on August
1, 2013, retroactively applied. Article 579(C) provides that when a defendant fails to appear and
is subsequently incarcerated, he must either appear in open court where the charges are pending,
or provide the state with one of two specific forms of notice of his custodial location in order for
the limitations period to begin running anew. The court found defendant failed to meet those
specific notice requirements until April 30, 2014, upon the surety’s filing of the certificate of
incarceration.
Because it found that the trial court erred in granting the motions to quash, the court of appeal
pretermitted the issue of whether the trial court also erred in conducting the hearing on the
motion without defendant’s presence in court. Stewart, 15-0135, p. 5, 176 So.3d at 468.
3
Here, the record indicates that the state had notice of defendant’s custodial
location by July 23, 2013––when it filed its motion and order for writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum directed to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where
defendant was in federal custody. Before this date, though the record suggests the
state had some indication of defendant’s general whereabouts, i.e., according to
defense counsel’s advisement, he was “in federal custody,” the state would have
had to take affirmative steps to discern defendant’s specific location.
As we explained in Romar, the state has no affirmative duty to locate an
absent defendant. Rather, it was incumbent upon defendant to provide the state
with notice of his location to trigger commencement of a new limitations period
under La.C.Cr.P. art. 578. See Romar, 07-2140, pp. 7–8, 985 So.2d at 727 (“The
burden . . . falls not on the state to show that defendant had placed himself outside
of its control . . . but on defendant and his sureties to avoid the consequences of his
failure to appear. . . [O]ne of those consequences, since 1984, is the interruption of
the time limits placed on trial.”). Because the record does not show that the state
had notice of defendant’s custodial location before July 23, 2013, when it filed a
writ specifically directed to the Arkansas penitentiary, the trial court erred in
granting the motions to quash filed on July 25, 2014.
Unlike the court of appeal, we find it immaterial whether the more specific
notice requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(C) were met, because Subpart C did not
go into effect until August 1, 2013, after commencement of the prosecution in this
case. Given that Subpart C imposes new substantive obligations on a defendant,
and because those obligations impact a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial, it does not apply retroactively. This is consistent with the Court’s prior
decision that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(3) could not be retroactively applied. See State
v. Groth, 85-1528 (La. 1986), 483 So.2d 596, 599; see also State v. Kraft, 86-0155
4
(La. App. 5 Cir. 1987), 501 So.2d 313, 315 (“Moreover, since [La.C.Cr.P. art.
579(A)(3)] provides for an additional method for interruption of the prescriptive
period, it bears upon a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Thus, [it] should not be
given retroactive application in light of the constitutional safeguard of the right to a
speedy trial.”). Though we maintain that the state has no duty to take affirmative
steps to locate an absent defendant, we also note that in circumstances such as
these, in which the state has become aware (whether by its own efforts or
otherwise) of an absent defendant’s location, that awareness is sufficient in a case
initiated before Subpart C’s effective date to trigger the commencement of a new
limitations period. Thus, because the record supports a finding that the state was
aware of defendant’s custodial location by July 23, 2013, the limitations period of
La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 began to run anew on that date.
Moreover, we note that the limitations period has been suspended during the
pendency of this litigation following the trial court’s rulings on the motions to
quash. Though La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 provides that the filing of a motion to quash
suspends the limitations period only until the court has ruled on the motion,
because the parties have pursued review in the court of appeal and here, the
limitations period has been suspended pending finality of this review. La.C.Cr.P.
art. 922; see, e.g., State v. Fish, 05-1929, p. 4 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 493, 495
(“[C]ounsel’s motion to quash the prosecution on grounds of prescription then
suspended that date and continues to suspend it while the appellate courts review
the merits of the prescription issue.”); State v. Brocato, 99-1620 (La. App. 4 Cir.
9/15/99), 744 So.2d 178, 180 (“When the trial court granted relator’s first motion
to quash, the State could not try relator; and it remained unable to do so until the
reversal of the trial court’s ruling became final.”), writ denied, 99-2943 (La.
12/17/99), 751 So.2d 883. Once this ruling becomes final, the law affords the state
5
one year to commence trial on the charges. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 (though the
balance of the new two-year period that commenced July 23, 2013 would have
been the 363 days that remained after defendant filed the motions to quash, Art.
580 endows the state with a minimum of one year to commence trial after a
suspension of the limitations period).
Because we agree that the motions to quash were granted in error, we
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
6
05/12/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2015-K-1845
CONSOLIDATED WITH
No. 2015-K-1846
STATE OF LOUISIANA
v.
CHAKA STEWART
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
JOHNSON, C.J., dissents.
05/12/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2015-K-1845
CONSOLIDATED WITH
No. 2015-K-1846
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CHAKA STEWART
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
Hughes, J., dissenting.
Respectfully, this case must be distinguished from State v. Romar and is
much closer to State v. Baptiste.
A distinction should be drawn between the situation where a properly
noticed defendant voluntarily fails to appear in court (Romar) and the current
situation where it was physically impossible for the defendant to appear because he
was in federal custody. This fact was known to all and appears in the minutes of
court. The defendant even provided his attorney with an affidavit stating same so
that his attorney could continue to represent him in his absence. This is not a
situation where the state has no duty to locate a truly “absent” defendant pursuant
to Romar.
1
05/12/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2015-K-1845
CONSOLIDATED WITH
No. 2015-K-1846
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CHAKA STEWART
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
GENOVESE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Hughes.