State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.C.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #036
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 29th day of June, 2017, are as follows:
BY PER CURIAM:
2017-CK-0182 STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF A.C. (Parish of Washington)
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and
remand for further proceedings in the juvenile court consistent
with the views expressed here. We further note that the state,
through no fault of its own, has been unable to commence the
delinquency adjudication hearing while review of this matter was
pending, and our ruling also must become final in accordance with
La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(B), before the state can proceed. Therefore,
the 90-day time limit has not expired yet and the state has a
window, albeit a small one, in which to commence the adjudication
hearing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
GENOVESE, J., dissents.
06/29/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-CK-0182
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF WASHINGTON
PER CURIAM
On March 7, 2016, the state filed a petition alleging A.C., at the age of 14
years, committed the felony-grade delinquent acts of aggravated rape of a victim
under the age of 13 years, La.R.S. 14:42, and indecent behavior with a juvenile,
La.R.S. 14:81. That same day, A.C. appeared to answer the petition and denied the
allegations. Pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 877(B), the state had 90 days to commence
the adjudication hearing, which was until Monday, June 6, 2016. The juvenile
court set the adjudication hearing for Friday, June 3, 2016.
On that date, the state made a motion to continue the hearing alleging that
the prosecutor and the family of the victims had been out of town and witnesses
had not been subpoenaed. Counsel for A.C. objected and indicated that, as soon as
the 90-day limit passed, counsel would file a motion to dismiss the delinquency
petition. The juvenile court found there was not good cause to extend the 90-day
period and additionally dismissed the delinquency petition at that time. The state
objected and gave notice of its intent to seek supervisory review in the court of
appeal.
The court of appeal granted the state’s writ application and reversed the
ruling of the juvenile court, finding: “The district court prematurely dismissed the
[state’s] petition. See La.Ch.Code. art. 877.” State in the Interest of A.C., 16-1052
(La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/16) (unpub’d). A.C. did not apply for rehearing in the first
circuit or seek supervisory review in this court.
On October 13, 2016, A.C. moved again to dismiss the delinquency petition,
contending that the 90-day time limit had run, and argued in the alternative that the
time was not suspended when the state sought supervisory review or, if the time
was suspended, it began to run again after the court of appeal’s ruling on October
7, 2016, and had now run out. After the juvenile court denied A.C.’s motion to
dismiss, A.C. gave notice of his intent to seek supervisory review from the court of
appeal.
The court of appeal granted A.C.’s writ application and dismissed the
delinquency petition for failure to timely commence the adjudication hearing. The
court of appeal found:
When a “child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing
shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to answer the
petition.” La.Ch. Code art. 877(B). The mandatory time limitations
provided in La. Ch. Code art. 877 were set forth to ensure expedited
adjudication of children. See State v. Roberson, 2014-1996 (La.
10/14/15), 179 So. 3d 573, 576. Through no fault of the juvenile, the
mandatory time limitation for the commencement of the adjudication
hearing has exceeded the ninety-day requirement by six months.
Accordingly, the district court’s ruling denying the juvenile’s motion
to dismiss is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court
for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
State in the Interest of A.C., 16-1492 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/16) (unpub’d). One
member of the appellate panel dissented:
I find the district court did not err in denying the juvenile’s motion to
dismiss, filed on October 13, 2016. This Court’s decision in State of
Louisiana in the Interest of A.C., 2016-1052 (La. App. 1st Cir.
10/7/16) (unpublished writ action) became final on October 21, 2016
in accordance with La. Code Crim. P. art. 922(B). The motion to
dismiss the juvenile’s petition, filed on October 13, 2016, was filed
prematurely.
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Id. (Pettigrew, J., dissenting). Implicit in the dissent’s view is a determination that
the 90-day time limit was suspended while the state sought supervisory review. For
the following reasons, we find the dissent’s view is correct.
Children’s Code article 877 provides:
A. When the child is charged with a crime of violence as defined in
R.S. 14:2(B) and the child is continued in custody pursuant to Chapter
5 of this Title, the adjudication hearing shall commence within sixty
days of the appearance to answer the petition. In all other cases, if the
child is continued in custody pursuant to Chapter 5 of this Title, the
adjudication hearing shall commence within thirty days of the
appearance to answer the petition.
B. If the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing
shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to answer the
petition.
C. If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the
child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall
dismiss the petition.
D. For good cause, the court may extend such period.
In State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.M., 13-2573, p. 5 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So. 3d
1161, 1163, this court reiterated that “[t]he time limits in Article 877 are
mandatory and may not be extended absent a showing of good cause.” Moreover,
“it is incumbent upon the state to make a showing of good cause and obtain an
extension before the period has run.” Id. (quoting State in the Interest of R.D.C.,
Jr., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So. 2d 745, 749) (emphasis in original). The state
asserted that there was good cause here on day 88 before the 90-day period ran out
and the court of appeal previously found the juvenile court acted prematurely in
dismissing the petition. We need not now determine whether there was good cause
to extend the time limit because the juvenile court’s dismissal was premature.
A question remains as to the effect of supervisory review on the time limit.
In State in the Interest of R.D.C, Jr., this court noted that “given the importance of
the good cause determination, the judge should allow the state latitude to seek
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expedited appellate review of an adverse ruling. Id., 93-1865, 632 So.2d at 749. In
State in the Interest of J.M., this court provided guidance as to the procedure to
seek review of a denial of a motion to continue a delinquency adjudication hearing,
stating: “The proper procedural remedy for a denial of the motion to continue
would [be] to argue that the time limit was suspended, object to the denial for a
continuance, notice intent to seek supervisory writs, and request a stay.” State in
the Interest of J.M., 13-2573, p. 4, 156 So. 3d at 1164 (citing State in the Interest of
R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865, 632 So. 2d at 749). While the state’s decision to seek review
of a ruling is clearly within its control, the adverse ruling that prompts that decision
is beyond the state’s control. Cf. State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.D., 12-
0258, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/12), 98 So. 3d 950, 952 (“Waiting on appellate
review is a delay beyond the [s]tate’s control which impinged on its ability to
prepare for and commence the adjudication hearing.”). Here, because the juvenile
court dismissed the petition, the state could not commence the adjudication without
first seeking review and ultimately receiving a favorable ruling. While it would
have been a better practice for the state to seek a stay from the juvenile court, or
obtaining none from that court, seek a stay from the court of appeal, we find the
state’s failure to obtain a stay is not fatal under the circumstances. To find the 90-
day time limit unsuspended by appellate review would render the appellate review
process futile and the court of appeal’s initial ruling here purely academic.
Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(B), “A judgment rendered by the supreme court or
other appellate court becomes final when the delay for applying for a rehearing has
expired and no application therefor has been made.” While the Children’s Code
contains a provision authorizing supervisory review, La.Ch.C. art. 338, it contains
no provision comparable La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(B) regarding finality. Given the
fundamental necessity for rules determining finality of judgments, we proceed, as
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authorized by La.Ch.C. art. 104(1), in accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(B). As
pointed out by Judge Pettigrew in dissent, the court of appeal’s ruling, issued on
October 7, 2016, did not become final until October 21, 2016. Therefore, as Judge
Pettigrew found, A.C.’s motion to dismiss filed on October 13 was premature.
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and remand for
further proceedings in the juvenile court consistent with the views expressed here.
We further note that the state, through no fault of its own, has been unable to
commence the delinquency adjudication hearing while review of this matter was
pending, and our ruling also must become final in accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art.
922(B), before the state can proceed. Therefore, the 90-day time limit has not
expired yet and the state has a window, albeit a small one, in which to commence
the adjudication hearing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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06/29/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2016-K-0377
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
WOODROW KAREY, JR. A/K/A WOODROW KAREY, II
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU
Genovese, J., concurs in the result.