DocketNumber: No. 38169.
Citation Numbers: 31 So. 2d 601, 212 La. 79
Judges: McCALEB, Justice.
Filed Date: 6/16/1947
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The majority opinion correctly concludes that the first three contentions urged by plaintiff for the existence of a servitude across the property of defendant Thibault are without merit. Also, it properly states that Mrs. Rainey, plaintiff's author in title, did not acquire a predial servitude of passage inasmuch as her deed from Harris made no provision for it. But error has been committed, I think, in holding that the agreement to sell between Harris and Thibault contained a stipulation pour autrui favoring plaintiff which could not be abrogated by the failure of the contracting persons to include it in their subsequent act of sale.
The controverted provision of that agreement recites: "This property sold and purchased subject to vendor's previous agreement to allow owner and tenant of house directly in rear use of driveway for entering and leaving their garages." This stipulation, as its language clearly indicates, was intended exclusively for the benefit of the vendor who some years before had obligated *Page 94 himself to Mrs. Rainey, under their contract of sale, to provide for her a passageway. Although that obligation was later extinguished, as pointed out above, Harris evidently thought when contracting with Thibault that it was still effective, for otherwise it would not have been mentioned in the agreement.
But on the execution of the authentic act of sale from Harris to Thibault, the stipulation was omitted, and, as a result of the omission, it was no longer binding on either of them. Appropriate here is the following comment offered by the Chief Justice on the original hearing of Moriarty et al. v. Weiss,
When the stipulation of the excutory contract between Harris and Thibault became extinguished (because of its omission from *Page 96 the deed) there resulted also a lapse of whatever rights this plaintiff had thereunder, even though she accepted its provisions by using the driveway both before and after Thibault's acquisition of Lot "O". As before shown, such stipulation was for the exclusive benefit of Harris, and plaintiff's claim under it could be and was no better than his.
The legal situation here is analogous to that found in those cases dealing with the rights of a mortgage holder as against a person who assumes the payment of the mortgage when purchasing property encumbered with it. Therein it has been held that the mortgagee enjoys no better claim against the purchaser (the new debtor) than the vendor of the property had. Thus in Freedman v. Ratcliff,
As a prelude to the quoting approvingly of that extract in the later case of Moriarty v. Weiss (on first rehearing), supra, which *Page 97 involved the rights of a mortgagee against one assuming his mortgage, we said: "This court, in the early case of Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. 523, squarely held that stipulations of this character are not pour autrui within the meaning and contemplation of Articles 1890 and 1902 of the Revised Civil Code, but are for the benefit of the mortgage debtor or party selling the property. This rule of law has been maintained in a long and unbroken line of decisions, the last expression being found in the recent case of Freedman v. Ratcliff, * * *."
Since Harris, in the instant case, could not enforce the stipulation in question (it having been omitted from the deed), plaintiff also, under the doctrine of the cited cases, had no recourse against Thibault.
I respectfully dissent.
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