Burns v. Genovese

BARHAM, Justice

(dissenting).

R.S. 33:1555 (Act 151 of 1952, Section 2), which is found under the title “Municipalities and Parishes” and in the particular part of that title setting forth the duties and responsibilities of coroners, assigns to the coroner the detention, confinement, and commitment of the mentally ill and others. This statute declares these acts to be administrative, and that the coroner is “ * * specifically granted personal immunity, but not relieved of his official responsibility in his capacity as coroner”. R.S. 28:52 and 28:52.1 (Section 1 of Act 152 of 1952 and Section 1 of Act 701 of 1954), -under the title “Mental Health”, provide the method of making a “coroner’s commitment”. These provisions also declare that ■detentions, confinements, and commitments so made are administrative acts for which the coroner is “ * * * specifically granted personal immunity, but not relieved of his official responsibility in his capacity as coroner”. (Emphasis supplied.)

O’Rourke v. O’Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 So.2d 87 (1955), involving a 1946 commitment, was decided under earlier law, and there was no statutory provision in our law then giving personal immunity to the coroner. That case is therefore not dispositive of this matter.

Some have argued that the law does not mean to relieve the coroner if he acts negligently or erroneously. I answer: “Why would he need immunity for acts rightfully and prudently performed ?”

I find that the law specifically gives to the coroner personal immunity from civil suits for damages for the acts he performs or omits to perform in a “coroner’s commitment”, though he may be responsible by removal and is otherwise officially accountable for errors in performing these duties.

Finally, I do not believe the petition states a cause of action, and would affirm.

I respectfully dissent.

SANDERS, SUMMERS and BARHAM, JJ., • are of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted.