Judges: JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL, Attorney General
Filed Date: 11/1/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Dear Mr. Solco and Mr. Lupo:
This opinion is in response to both of your independent opinion requests, each of which address the same issues. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") initially requested an opinion from this office regarding the ownership of and management authority over the Lakefront Airport, located in New Orleans. Subsequent to that request, the Chairman of the Non-Flood Protection Asset Management Authority also submitted an opinion request for the same questions asked by the FAA. The FAA has suspended Airport Improvement Program Grant Funding until this Office provides clarification on the ownership of the Lakefront Airport and the Non-Flood Protection Asset Management Authority made this request in response to that suspension of funds.
Generally, both of your requests seek clarification regarding which State or local agency has the authority to own, manage, and contract on behalf of the Lakefront Airport. You have both also posed three more specific questions, to wit:
1. Who is the current fee owner and operator of the Lakefront Airport and what is the legal basis for that opinion?
2. Who will be the fee owner and operator of the Lakefront Airport after January 2, 2012, based on Section 6, Act 1014 of the Louisiana 2010 Regular Legislative Session ("Act 1014") and Act 363 of the Louisiana 2011 Regular Legislative Session ("Act 363")?
3. Did the State of Louisiana intend to relinquish its authority, rights, and powers to carry out its obligations to the United States under grant *Page 2 assurances given in return for federally funded improvements at Lakefront Airport?
The answer to the more general question of who has the authority to own, manage, and contract on behalf of the Lakefront Airport is addressed within the answers to the more specific questions presented below.
Who is the current fee owner and operator of the LakefrontAirport and what is the legal basis for that opinion?
La.R.S.
In 1930, the State of Louisiana amended its Constitution to allow the OLD to construct an aviation field on the banks of Lake Pontchartrain.1 That constitutional provision has now been subsumed in La.R.S. 38:300, et seq. with respect to the ownership of the Airport and other properties, La.R.S.
To enable the board of commissioners of the Orleans Levee District to perform the work herein provided for . . . the state of Louisiana hereby grants and releases to the district the title of the state in and to all public property necessary for the purposes hereof and all lands reclaimed or filled in within any levee embankments . . . the board shall have the jurisdiction, power, and authority to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of such portion of the lands reclaimed and other property acquired for the purpose of the improvement . . .
Furthermore, you note in your opinion request that the OLD has previously exercised its authority over the Lakefront Airport by entering into contractual relationships with the FAA to receive Airport Improvement Program ("AIP") funding. There is no provision in the current law that calls into question the OLD's ownership of the Lakefront Airport as established by the aforementioned statute and as exhibited by the previous relationship between the OLD and the FAA.
The more recently enacted La.R.S.
The owner of Lakefront Airport will not change in 2012 by virtue of Section 6, Act 1014 of the Louisiana 2010 Regular Legislative Session. As established by La.R.S.
As discussed below, the language contained in Section 6 of Act 10145 has generated some questions as to which version of La.R.S. 330.12 will exist after January 1, 2012. However, the provision does not call into question the ownership of the Lakefront Airport. As previously stated, La.R.S.
The reason that Act 1014 gives rise to questions about the state of the law after January 1, 2012, is because Section 2 of the act "amends and reenacts" La.R.S.
Section 2 of Act 1014 slightly amended the language of La.R.S.
Answering the question posed by your opinion request involves statutory interpretation. Any such interpretation is subject to the following general rules of statutory construction as summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Pumphrey v. City of NewOrleans, 05-979, p. 10-12 (La.4/4/06),
The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent and the ascertainment of the reason or reasons that prompted the Legislature to enact the law. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, interpretation of a law involves primarily a search for the Legislature's intent.
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the Legislature. When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the words of law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole, and laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and placing a construction on the provision in question that is consistent *Page 5 with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting it. The statute must, therefore, be applied and interpreted in a manner, which is consistent with logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the Legislature in passing it. This is because the rules of statutory construction require that the general intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the law must, if possible, be given effect. Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. It is likewise presumed that the intention of the legislative branch is to achieve a consistent body of law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has also made clear that the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored if there is any other reasonable interpretation.7 There are reasonable interpretations of Act 1014 other than a wholesale repeal of La.R.S.
Sections 1 and 2 of Act 1014 contemplate the creation of the Non-Flood Authority as a state agency within the DOTD and the transfer to the state's control of non-flood protection assets of levee districts, effective August 15, 2010. Sections 3, 4 and 5, contemplate the creation, or more accurately the constitution, of the Non-Flood Authority as a political subdivision independent of DOTD and the transfer of control over non-flood protection assets to the newly-reconstituted political subdivision, effective January 1, 2012. Obviously, the two allocations of control (not ownership) of the same assets to two distinct political entities are mutually exclusive. We believe that the Legislature in Section 6 (A) and (B) specified that the effects of the allocation to the state of control over these assets found in Sections 1 and 2 would be effective from August 15, 2010 until January 1, 2012 and the allocation of that control to an independent Non-Flood Authority found in Sections 3, 4 and 5 would not be effective until January 1, 2012. It is a reasonable interpretation to conclude that Section 6 was intended to resolve the conflicts between the mutually exclusive legislative actions that would otherwise simultaneously amend and repeal the same statutory provisions.8 On the other *Page 6
hand, the parts of Section 2 revising R.S.
There are two key elements of the Legislature's actions that support the conclusion that there was no intent to repeal La.R.S.
Second, in the 2011 Regular Legislative Session, the Legislature passed Act 363, which amended and reenacted a portion of La.R.S.
Thus, it is the opinion of this office that Act 363 amendment of La.R.S.
Considering the opinion of this office that La.R.S.
Did the State of Louisiana intend to relinquish its authority,rights, and powers to carry out its obligations to the United Statesunder grant assurances given in return for federally fundedimprovements at Lakefront Airport?
The State of Louisiana did not intend to, nor did it accomplish such a result. Regardless of the changes made to La.R.S.
When any levee board or levee and drainage board desires to sell or lease any lands which it owns, the board shall comply with the advertising and bid requirements contained in R.S.
41:131 et seq., R.S.41:1212 et seq., or R.S.41:1261 et seq., provided the aforesaid Sections do not preclude compliance with any federal contract or grant agreement or any federal laws, rules, or regulations within the area of any airport. (emphasis added)
Therefore, due to the existing obligations between the Non-Flood Authority, the OLD, and the FAA, the Lakefront Airport cannot be sold without first complying with the requirements of programs such as the AIP.
We hope this sufficiently answers your inquiry; however, if we may be of further assistance please do not hesitate to contact our office. *Page 8
Sincerely yours, JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:__________________________ STEVEN B. "BEAUX" JONES Assistant Attorney General
JDC/SBJ
. . . ownership of the Lakefront Airport remains with the Orleans Levee District. Effective January 1, 2007, the non-flood assets of the Orleans Levee District, including the airport, will be managed and controlled by the DOA [now Non-Flood Authority] as the successor to the levee board. Since the airport is a non-flood related asset, the DOA [now Non-Flood Authority] has legal authority to sign a sponsor agreement with the FAA in its capacity as successor to the Orleans Levee Board.
This opinion is also consistent with the decision in Guste v.Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District,