Judges: CHARLES C. FOTI, JR., Attorney General
Filed Date: 11/21/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Dear Speaker Salter:
Your request for an Attorney General's opinion has been referred to me for research and reply. You inquire whether the increased retirement benefits granted to peace officers (other than state troopers) at the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPS") under Act
My intent in authoring the bill was to provide certain DPS peace officers (other than state troopers) with the same retirement benefits as state troopers, calculated at 3.33% rate for all creditable service with LASERS or only for creditable service as a peace officer. It was my intent to provide for the increased benefit for all creditable service with LASERS, as evidenced by the actuarial note which calculated the actuarial accrued liability costs of the legislation based on the number of eligible employees (134) and the number of years of ALL past service credit with LASERS, not just the past credit as a peace officer. The legislature then provided funds to cover the estimated actuarial cost for this fiscal year.
Your request requires knowledge of the factual history and statutory context. Before 1997, the peace officers referred to above worked for the Department of Transportation and Development ("DOTD") as the Weights Standards Police Force. In 1997, however, a re-organization occurred at DOTD resulting in the transfer of this division to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections where these workers became "peace officers." La. R.S.
Only a careful review and analysis of the new statutory language will answer the extent to which the service benefits apply. The new law is codified at La. R.S.
Peace officers, as defined by R.S.
40:2402 (1)(a), employed by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, office of state police, other than state troopers, shall receive a maximum retirement allowance equal to three and one-third percent of average compensation, as determined under R.S.11:231 , for every year of creditable service, not to exceed one hundred percent of the member's average compensation.
This Subparagraph confers the benefit "for every year of creditable service." This language is clear and unambiguous. The legislature did not use any words of limitation or restriction of any kind within this clause. The drafters could have said "for every year of creditable service as a peace officer beginning with 1997." But the legislature did not. When the legislature has intended to place limitations on other groups, it has had little trouble finding language restricting the benefit. For instance, La. R.S.
The words used in Act 835 by the legislature render an unmistakably distinct picture of the additional benefits it intended to confer upon peace officers. "When the wording of a revised statute is clear and unambiguous . . . the law must be applied as written, and no further interpretation can be made in search of the intent of the legislature."Taggert v. Our Lady Queen of Heaven Catholic Church,
The same is shown by Act
Even if both the language and legislative history of Act 835 support the payment of benefits to peace officers at the maximum retirement allowance for every year of creditable service in LASERS, La. R.S.
Legislation providing for pension systems is remedial legislation and should be construed liberally. In 70 C.J.S. Verbo Pensions s 2, pp. 425-426, we find:
``Laws creating the right to pensions must be liberally construed with the view of promoting the objects of the lawmaking body; and their force and effect are not to be confined to the literal terms of the statute.'
In Miller v. City of Shreveport, La.App.,
90 So.2d 565 , the court said:``Statutes which are purely remedial in their nature are not subject to the rule that laws are presumed to operate prospectively and retrospectively. [Citations omitted.] Such statutes will be given a retroactive effect in the absence of language showing contrary intention. [Citations omitted.] As pointed out in Bowen v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, supra, it is essential for the legislature to alter the regulations and requirements of the pension system to keep abreast with actuarial science. Such legislation is, of course, remedial in character.'
The Trial Judge, in his written reason for judgment, very ably pointed out the general rules for statutory interpretation and the exception to the general rules, as follow sic:The general rule of statutory construction is that statutes are applied prospectively unless the contrary is expressly stated. (La. R.C.C. art. La. R.S.
1:2 ). The exception to this rule of statutory construction is that statutes which are purely remedial in their nature are presumed to operate retrospectively in the absence of language showing a contrary intention. Statutes governing pension funds are generally held to be remedial. [Citations omitted.]'
The principle of retroactivity has been applied in practice to three other recently passed retirement statutes — Act
It is the opinion of this office that Act 835 requires LASERS to pay peace officers not only for those years of service as peace officers, but "for every year of creditable service" in the retirement system. The legislative history need not be examined because Act 835 is clear and unambiguous. But if an examination and analysis of the legislative history were to be undertaken, an identical conclusion would be reached. Finally, although the general rule of statutory construction provides that statutes are to be applied prospectively, the White case indicates that Act 835 is remedial in nature, and therefore, must be given retroactive effect.
I hope this answers your inquiry, but if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
CHARLES C. FOTI, JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL
By:______________________ Christopher D. Matchett Assistant Attorney General
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