State Of Louisiana v. Kenny Veal

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCiTIT
NO. 2022 KA 0641
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
KENNY VEAL
Judgment Rendered: _ DEC 2 2022
On Appeal from the
20th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of West Feliciana
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 20602
Honorable Kathryn E. Jones, Judge Presiding
Jessica B. Weimer Attorneys for Appellee,
Samuel C. D' Aquilla State of Louisiana
Clinton, LA
Prentice L. White Attorney for Defendant -Appellant,
Baton Rouge, LA Kenny Veal
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
HESTER, J.
The defendant, Kenny Veal, was charged by grand jury indictment with
second degree murder, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1, and pled not guilty. A
unanimous jury found him guilty as charged. He was sentenced to life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He
now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Additionally, he notes the
trial court failed to inform him of the prescriptive period for post -conviction relief.
See La. Code Crim. P. art. 930. 8( C). For the following reasons, we affirm the
conviction and sentence and remand with instructions.
FACTS
On September 1, 2020, the victim, Shaquille Gray, an inmate at the Louisiana
State Penitentiary at Angola ( Angola), was stabbed to death in a fight with the
defendant in a prison dormitory.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends the State presented
insufficient evidence to show that he committed second- degree murder of the victim.
He argues the video surveillance of the incident failed to fully capture the incident —
especially the substance of the argument between himself and the victim. He argues
he acted in self-defense because he feared for his life. In the alternative, he argues
the offense was manslaughter because he acted in sudden passion after he lost control
when the victim struck him in the face.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due
process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and
inadmissible, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v.
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Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v.
Oliphant, 2013- 2973 ( La. 2/ 21/ 14), 133 So. 3d 1255, 1258- 59 ( per curiam); see also
La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1308- 09 ( La. 1988).
State v. Livous, 2018- 0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24118), 259 So. 3d 1036, 1039- 40, writ
denied, 2018- 1788 ( La. 4/ 15/ 19), 267 So. 3d 1130. When circumstantial evidence
forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, " assuming every fact to be proved that
the evidence tends to prove . . . must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." La. R.S. 15: 438; Oliphant, 133 So. 3d at 1258; Livous, 259 So. 3d at 1040.
The due process standard does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698,
703 ( per curiam). Rather, appellate review is limited to determining whether the facts
established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by
that evidence are sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Gardner, 2016- 0192 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9/ 19116), 204 So. 3d 265, 267. The
weight given to evidence is not subject to appellate review; therefore, an appellate court
will not reweigh evidence to overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilt. Livous,
259 So. 3d at 1040.
Second degree murder, in pertinent part, is the killing of a human being when
the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14: 30. 1( A)( 1). Specific criminal intent is " that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal
consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14: 10( 1). Specific intent
may be formed in an instant. State v. Mickelson, 2012- 2539 ( La. 913114), 149 So.3d
178, 183. Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but
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may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant' s
actions. Mickelson, 149 So. 3d at 182- 83.
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE
A homicide is justifiable when committed in self-defense by one who
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great
bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. La. R.S.
14: 20( A)( 1). However, a person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty
cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good
faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to
withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14: 21.
When self-defense is raised as an issue by the defendant, the State has the burden
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-
defense. The issue is whether or not a rational factfinder, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not kill the victim in self-defense. State v. Patorno, 2001- 2585
La. App. 1 st Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 822 So. 2d 141, 147.
MANSLAUGHTER
Manslaughter is, pertinently, a homicide that would be second degree murder,
but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused
by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool
reflection. La. R. S. 14: 31( A)( 1). " Sudden passion" and " heat of blood" are mitigating
factors in the nature of a defense. If the defendant establishes those factors by a
preponderance of the evidence, a verdict for murder is inappropriate. State v. Reed,
2014- 1980 ( La. 917116), 200 So. 3d 291, 311, cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 787,
197 L.Ed.2d 258 (2017); State v. Eby, 2017- 1456 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 6/ 16), 248 So. 3d
420, 424- 25, writ denied, 2018- 0762 ( La. 2/ 11/ 19), 263 So.3d 1153. However,
provocation will not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the factfinder finds the
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offender' s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have
cooled, at the time the offense was committed. See La. R.S. 14: 31( A)( 1). In other
words, if a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment,
he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act. State v. Leger, 2005- 0011
La. 7/ 10/ 06), 936 So. 2d 108, 171, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167
L.Ed.2d 100 ( 2007). Provocation and time for cooling off are determinations made by
the factfinder using the standard of the average or ordinary person with ordinary self-
elf
control.control. Reed, 200 So. 3d at 311; Livous, 259 So.3d at 1040.
Dr. Yen Van Vo was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of forensic
pathology. He performed the autopsy of the victim. The victim sustained nineteen
stab wounds, several alone that may have been fatal. The victim suffered a three -
and -one- quarter inch deep stab wound to the left ear, which damaged the left internal
carotid artery, a major blood vessel. He also suffered a five -inch deep wound to the
right side of his neck, which lacerated a vein and artery. He sustained numerous stab
wounds to the back ranging in depth from one- half inch to five inches. The wound
track predominantly showed a downward trajectory, that is the victim was stabbed
from the top of the body down towards his feet. The victim had no defensive
wounds.
On September 1, 2020, Angola Major Chad Hardy responded to the dormitory
where the incident occurred after an emergency beeper was activated by a prison
guard. The defendant was " covered in blood." The defendant stated "[ h] e shouldn' t
have fucked with me." Major Hardy reviewed video footage of the incident and saw
that the defendant swung first at the victim. The victim then tried to defend himself
from the defendant, the defendant ducked, and then the defendant jumped on top of
the victim and repeatedly stabbed him. Prior to the incident, Major Hardy had dealt
with the victim for being intoxicated on " mojo," but not for any incidents involving
violence. Major Hardy testified that the inmates knew that if they had a problem in
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the dormitory, they could talk to him, and he would move them to another area to
stop the violence.
The surveillance footage, which did not include sound, was played for the jury
at trial. It showed the defendant wearing red shorts and attacking the victim from
behind. The victim was trying to swing at the defendant, but the defendant took him
to the ground, got on top of him, and repeatedly struck him, leaving the bloodied
victim in a pool of blood. Immediately after the stabbing, the defendant walked to
the back of the dormitory, approached other inmates who backed away from him,
and then returned to the front of the dormitory.
The State introduced into evidence a ten -and -one- half inch homemade knife
shank).
Angola Investigative Services Colonel Randy Metz investigated the
incident. He testified that the shank was recovered from a laundry cart on the day
of the incident. According to Colonel Metz, the video footage showed the defendant
hand something off' after the stabbing, before returning to the front of the
dormitory. The defendant only had small lacerations as a result of the incident.
Inmate Allen Causey testified the victim had a drug problem but was " a good
dude." Inmate Shane Clifton testified the incident was the result of "some lotion."
Clifton indicated he traded " dip" to the victim for lotion, but the dip " wasn' t no
good." Clifton claimed he then gave the lotion to the defendant. Clifton stated he
gave the victim $ 4 to settle the issue, but the victim wanted to fight the defendant
and him and told them " to catch the back of the dormitory." Clifton indicated the
back of the dormitory was " a blind spot," where knives were taped to the beds.
According to Clifton, the victim punched the defendant in the face, and then " they
started squabbling" or fighting.
Inmate Preston Johnson testified the victim almost knocked the defendant
unconscious on that first lick." He stated he assumed the defendant had two knives
in his hands when he saw the defendant walking to the bathroom after the incident
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because " common sense will tell you that [ the defendant] didn' t do that with his
hand." However, in a statement Johnson gave to the police on the day ofthe incident,
he stated the defendant had " two knives, one in each hand." In that statement,
Johnson also stated that the defendant tried to give " the knife" to people, but they
refused to take it. Johnson claimed the victim' s blow on the defendant was not
shown on surveillance footage because of the angle of the cameras.
The State argued " this wasn' t just a killing. This was overkill. [ The
defendant] wanted to make sure that [ the victim] was dead." The State noted the
victim had "[ a] cluster of twelve stab wounds on his back." The State argued the
victim had no defensive wounds because he " never had a chance to fight back." The
State pointed out the surveillance video showed the defendant throwing the first
punch with the victim' s back toward him, In finding the defendant guilty, the jury
rejected the claim of self-defense and concluded that the use of deadly force under the
particular facts of this case was neither reasonable nor necessary. It was undisputed
that the defendant stabbed the unarmed victim nineteen times. Stabbing the victim in
the ear, neck, and back with a shank indicates a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm. A rational juror could have reasonably concluded that the killing was not
necessary to save the defendant from the danger envisioned by La. R.S. 14: 20( A)( 1)
and/ or that the defendant had abandoned the role of defender and taken on the role of
an aggressor and, as such, was not entitled to claim self-defense. See State v. Tran,
98- 2812 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1115199), 743 So. 2d 1275, 1291, writ denied, 99- 3380 ( La.
5126100), 762 So.2d 1101. See La. R.S. 14: 21.
After a careful review of the entire record, viewing all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have
found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of
the second degree murder of the victim and that no mitigating factors were established
by a preponderance of the evidence. The verdict returned in this matter reflects that
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the jury credited the evidence indicating that the defendant ambushed the victim and
stabbed him to death and rejected the testimony that the victim threw the first blow.
This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to
overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilt. The trier of fact may accept or reject,
in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is
conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of
the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Roberts, 2011- 2248 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
6/ 8/ 12), 2012 WL 2061519, * 4, writ denied, 2012- 1655 ( La. 1119112), 100 So. 3d
834. The jury was not irrational to find the defendant killed the victim with a specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. It took time to inflict nineteen stab
wounds on the victim. Once the jury concluded that the defendant exhibited specific
intent to kill or seriously harm the victim, the possibility of manslaughter was
foreclosed. See State v Germany, 2021- 1614 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 9126122), So. 3d
2022 WL 4477061, * 3 and State v. Baumberger, 2015- 1056 ( La. App.
3d Cir. 611116), 200 So. 3d 817, 832, writ denied, 2016- 1251 ( La. 5/ 26/ 17), 221 So. 3d
859, cert. denied, U. S. , 138 S. Ct. 392, 199 L.Ed. 2d 290 ( 2017)
T] estimony established that it apparently took time to asphyxiate the victim. It is
obvious that the jury concluded that this homicide was not committed in the heat of
blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of
his self-control."). In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say the jury' s determination
was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-
0207 ( La. 11129106), 946 So.2d 654, 662; Livous, 259 So.3d at 1043- 44. Moreover,
an appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility
of the witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis
of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the
jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 (La. 1/ 21109), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 ( per curiam);
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Livous, 259 So. 3d at 1043. To otherwise accept a hypothesis of innocence that was
not unreasonably rejected by the factfinder, a court of appeal impinges on a
factfinder' s discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law. See Mire, 269 So. 3d at 703.
This assignment of error is without merit.
FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF
The defendant notes the trial court failed to inform him of the prescriptive
period for post -conviction relief. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 930. 8( C). We agree.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930. 8( A), in pertinent part,
provides: "[ n] o application for post conviction relief, including applications which
seek an out -of t-ime appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after
the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of
Article 914 or 922." Section C of article 930. 8 states that at the time of sentencing,
the trial court shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for seeking post-
conviction relief. The trial court failed to inform the defendant of the prescriptive
period for post -conviction relief.
Failure to advise the defendant of the time limitation, however, does not
constitute grounds for reversal of the sentence or remand for resentencing. Instead,
under such circumstances, this court routinely directs the trial court to provide the
defendant with written notice of the correct prescriptive period. State v. Kott, 2006-
0973 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 28/ 06), 2006 WL 3 813 712, * 1, writ denied, 2007- 0089
La. 10/ 12/ 07), 965 So. 2d 392. Therefore, the trial court is hereby directed to give
the defendant written notice of the correct prescriptive period for applying for post-
conviction relief within ten days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written
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proof that the defendant has received such notice into the trial court record of these
proceedings.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
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