Lisa Kay Kunstman Pirosko v. Joseph J. Pirosko, III

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
aoaz ca i000
LISA KAY KUNSTMAN PIROSKO
v.
VERSUS
JOSEPH J. PIROSKO, III
JUDGMENT RENDERED: - FB 2 4 2023
Appealed from
The Twenty -First Judicial District Court
Parish of Tangipahoa • State of Louisiana
Docket Number 2004- 0001017
The Honorable Jeffery T. Oglesbee, Presiding Judge
Brett K. Duncan COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/
Hammond, Louisiana PLAINT[ FF— Lisa Kay Kunstman
Pirosko
Glen R. Galbraith COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/
Rebecca Gilson DEFENDAN'i= Joseph J. Pirosko, III
Hammond, Louisiana
T. Jay Seale, III
Georgia Kobos Thomas
April F. Jackson
Madisonville, Louisiana
BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, M.
WELCH, J.
Joseph J. Pirosko, III appeals a judgment in favor of his ex- wife, Lisa Kay
Kunstman Pirosko ( now " Gingles"), which sustained her peremptory exception
raising the objections of res judicata and peremption and dismissed, with
prejudice, Mr. Pirosko' s motion seeking a modification of the parties' consent
judgment that partitioned Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits.' For reasons that follow,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mrs. Gingles and Mr. Pirosko were married on August 10, 1979. Mrs.
Gingles filed a petition for divorce on March 26, 2004, seeking among other things
a divorce from Mr. Pirosko, as well as a partition of their community property. A
judgment of divorce was signed on June 14, 2004; the judgment of divorce also
terminated the parties' community retroactive to the date Mrs. Gingles filed her
petition for divorce. On April 25, 2005, Mrs. Gingles filed her sworn detailed
descriptive list of community assets and liabilities, and included therein as an asset
was Mr. Pirosko' s military pension benefits with the United States Army. On
October 6, 2005, the trial court signed a consent judgment that the parties had
2
entered into with regard to the partition of Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits .
According to the terms of the October 6, 2005 consent judgment, it was
entered into specifically to divide Mr. Pirosko' s " Disposable Retired Pay" and to
grant Mrs. Gingles " a [ S] urvivor [ B] enefit [ P] Ian." More specifically, the
1 The original judgment appealed in this matter, which was signed on April 18, 2022, lacked
appropriate decretal language. After the record was lodged with this Court and examined, on
October 6, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
based on this deficiency in the judgment. Thereafter, this matter was remanded to the trial court
for the limited purpose of requesting the trial court to sign an amended judgment correcting the
deficiencies in the original judgment. See Lisa Kay Kunstman Pirosko v. Joseph J. Pirosko,
111, 2022- 1000 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 9/ 22) ( unpublished action). An amended judgment was
subsequently signed by the trial court on January 4, 2023, and the appellate record supplemented
with that amended judgment. Therefore, we maintain this appeal.
2 Other than the consent judgment partitioning Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits, the record does
not reflect that the remainder of the parties' former community has been partitioned— by consent
or otherwise.
2
judgment provided that Mrs. Gingles was to receive a specific fraction of Mr.
Pirosko' s total Disposable Retired Pay commencing on the date Mr. Pirosko began
to receive his Disposable Retired Pay and ending ( except for the Survivor Benefit
Plan) on his death. ( R27- 29) It also provided that Mrs. Gingles " shall be covered
by the Survivor Benefit Plan, [ as set forth in] 10 U. S. C. §§ 1447, et seq., and shall
receive the maximum annuity allowed by law under the Survivor Benefit Plan."
This consent judgment contained " Reservation of Jurisdiction" clauses, wherein
the trial court reserved jurisdiction " to amend or modify the provisions of [ the
October 6, 2005 consent] U] udgment," for several specific purposes, including " to
terminate or suspend the payment of benefits to [ Mrs. Gingles] as a result of
remarriage, cohabitation, attainment of a certain age, ... or other events justifying a
change in payments ...."
Importantly, under the Survivor Benefit Plan set forth in 10 U.S. C. § 1447, et
seq., if a former spouse remarries before the age of 55, any annuity payable to that
former spouse under the Survivor Benefit Plan terminates effective as of the first
day of the month in which eligibility is lost; however, in such cases, the payment
of the annuity may resume upon the termination of the remarriage effective as of
the first day of the month in which the marriage is so terminated. See 10 U.S. C.
1450( b).
It is undisputed that Mrs. Gingles remarried in April 2010, that she remains
married to date, and that at the time of her remarriage, she had not reached the age
of 55. It is also undisputed that Mr. Pirosko retired in September 2017, that there
is a deduction from Mr. Pirosko' s monthly retirement benefit for the Survivor
Benefit Plan annuity granted in favor of Mrs. Gingles under the October 5, 2005
consent judgment, and that Mrs. Gingles does not actually receive an annuity under
the Survivor Benefit Plan because Mr. Pirosko is still living and she is currently
3
remarried.
These undisputed facts lie at the core of the following litigation that has
occurred between the parties,
On November 26, 2018, Mr. Pirosko filed a rule to show cause, seeking to
retroactively "[ a] mend/ [ c] orrect and/ or [ v] acate" both the June 14, 2004 judgment
of divorce and the October 6, 2005 consent judgment partitioning his military
benefits. Mr. Pirosko claimed that the judgments were null because the trial court
lacked jurisdiction and venue; he also claimed that the judgments were obtained by
fraud and ill practices. With respect to the partition of Mr. Pirosko' s military
benefits, he claimed that Mrs. Gingles was receiving an improper fraction of his
Disposable Retired Pay and that she was not eligible for the Survivor Benefit Plan
because she remarried in April 2010 prior to the age of 55. Therefore, Mr. Pirosko
sought to have both the June 14, 2004 judgment of divorce and the October 6, 2005
consent judgment partitioning his military benefits amended, corrected, and/ or
declared null.
In response to this pleading, Mrs. Gingles filed a declinatory exception
raising the objections of insufficiency of service of process and insufficiency of
citation, a dilatory exception raising the objection of unauthorized use of a
summary proceeding, a peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of
action and res judicata, and a motion to strike. Pursuant to a judgment signed by
the trial court on May 24, 2019, the trial court sustained all of the exceptions,
granted the motion to strike, and dismissed Mr. Pirosko' s claims with prejudice. 3
Mr. Pirosko filed a motion to appeal the judgment; however, the appeal was
subsequently abandoned and dismissed by this Court. See Lisa Kay Kunstman
Pirosko v. Joseph J. Pirosko, III, 2019- 0912 ( La. App. I' Cir. 1. 17120)
unpublished action).
3 The record reflects that a hearing on these exceptions was held on May 6, 2019. Mr. Pirosko
did not appear for the hearing and the hearing consisted of argument only by counsel for Mrs.
Gingles.
n
On May 28, 2019, just four days after the signing of the May 24, 2019
judgment, Mrs. Gingles filed a motion to amend the October 6, 2005 consent
judgment partitioning Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits. Therein, she sought to make
two substantive changes to that judgment: one to change calculation of her share of
the retirement benefit and the other to " eliminat[ e] the survivor benefit contained
in the original [ October 6, 2005 consent] judgment" because "[ Mrs.] Gingles ha[ d]
remarried, making her ineligible to receive that benefit." Mrs. Gingles later
voluntarily dismissed her motion, without prejudice.
Thereafter, on February 28, 2020, Mr. Pirosko filed a petition to annul the
May 24, 2019 judgment on exceptions, claiming that the judgment was an absolute
nullity because he was not properly served with the underlying exceptions pursuant
to La. R.S. 13: 3204 and 13: 3205 ( Louisiana' s long-arm statutes), and further, that
the strict requirements of those statutes were not met prior to the rendition of
judgment. In response to this petition to annul, Mrs. Gingles filed a peremptory
exception raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata. The trial
court sustained both objections pursuant to a judgment signed on October 7, 2021.
However, the October 7, 2021 judgment neither dismissed Mr. Pirosko' s petition
to annul nor did it dismiss any of Mr. Pirosko' s claims therein.
On September 29, 2021, Mr. Pirosko filed a motion for modification of the
October 6, 2005 consent judgment' and for reimbursement. Therein, Mr. Pirosko
asserted that Mrs. Gingles re -married on April 17, 2010, that she was 51 years of
age on that date, and that she remains re -married to this date. Mr. Pirosko claimed
that under 10 U. S. C. § 1450( b), Mrs. Gingles was not entitled to the Survivor
Benefit Plan, and that Mrs. Gingles had admitted same under oath during her
deposition on June 9, 2020. Mr. Pirosko further claimed that, based on the October
4 In Mr. Pirosko' s motion for modification, he inadvertently referred to the consent judgment as
the October 5, 2005 consent judgment rather than the October 6, 2005 consent judgment.
5
6, 2005 consent judgment, his retirement benefit has been and continues to be
deducted for the annuity for the Survivor Benefit Plan. Therefore, Mr. Pirosko
sought an order from the trial court recognizing that Mrs. Gingles was not entitled
to the Survivor Benefit Plan retroactive to the date of her remarriage ( to ensure that
the deduction from his retirement benefit would cease) and that any monies that
had already been deducted from his retirement be returned or paid to him.'
In response to this motion, Mrs. Gingles filed a peremptory exception raising
the objections of no cause of action, res judicata, and peremption. With respect to
no cause of action, Mrs. Gingles argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction to
modify or amend the October 6, 2005 consent judgment once it was determined to
be in compliance with federal law. Therefore, she claimed that Mr. Pirosko failed
to state of a cause of action for which the law provided relief. Next, with respect to
res judicata, Mrs. Gingles argued that the May 24, 2019 judgment and the October
7, 2021 judgment were " valid, definitive, and final," and disposed of the merits of
Mr. Pirosko' s rule by dismissing his actions seeking to vacate the October 6, 2005
consent judgment. She also asserted that the cause of action asserted in Mr.
Pirosko' s current motion to modify existed and arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the causes of action that were the subject of the May 24, 2019
judgment and the October 7, 2021 judgment. Therefore, Mrs. Gingles contended
that res judicata barred Mr. Pirosko' s action. Lastly, with respect to peremption,
Mrs. Gingles maintained that " federal peremption" barred Mr. Pirosko' s action
because federal law did not allow Mr. Pirosko to revoke his Survivor Benefit Plan
nor did it allow him to seek reimbursement for the premiums paid. Mrs. Gingles
also maintained that the relief requested by Mr. Pirosko was prohibited by " the
Barring Act," which is set forth in 31 U.S. C. § 3702( b), and that federal law
5 As previously set forth, there is no dispute that Mrs. Gingles does not receive any of the funds
deducted from Mr. Pirosko' s retirement for the Survivor Benefit Plan.
G
provided Mr. Pirosko with other remedies, which he had failed to exhaust prior to
seeking relief from the trial court.
After a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter,
the trial court overruled Mrs. Gingles' objection of no cause of action and
sustained her objections of res judicata and peremption. A judgment in
accordance with the trial court' s ruling, which also dismissed Mr. Pirosko' s motion
for modification was signed on January 4, 2023, and it is from this judgment that
Mr. Pirosko has appealed.' On appeal, Mr. Pirosko contends that the trial court
erred in sustaining the objections of res judicata and peremption.7
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Res Judicata
The peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata is based on
the conclusive legal presumption that there should be no re -litigation of a thing
previously adjudged between the same parties. Mitchell v. Aaron' s. Inc., 2018-
0131 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9121118), 257 So. 3d 812, 814; see La. C. C. P. art. 927( A)( 3).
Res judicata bars re -litigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction
or occurrence of a previous suit and promotes judicial efficiency and final
resolution of disputes. Wicker v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
Company, 2018- 0225 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 21/ 18), 257 So. 3d 817, 821.
Louisiana Revised Statute 13: 4231 sets forth the general principles for
res judicata, and it provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is
conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct
review, to the following extent:
6 See footnote 1.
7
We note that Mr. Pirosko contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence to be
submitted in support of Mrs. Gingles' objections. However, Mr. Pirosko failed to brief this
assignment of error. Therefore, in accordance with Uniform Rules— Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-
12. 4, this assignment of error is deemed abandoned. Nevertheless, we note that the only
evidence that was offered by Mrs. Gingles was the record of these proceedings.
7
1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action
existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished
and merged in the judgment.
2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action
existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished
and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to
any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was
essential to that judgment.
Under this provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized that all
of the following elements must be satisfied in order for res judicata to preclude a
second action: ( 1) the judgment is valid; ( 2) the judgment is final; ( 3) the parties
are the same;' ( 4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at
the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and ( 5) the cause or causes of
action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that
was the subject matter of the first litigation. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 2002- 1385
La. 2/ 25103), 843 So -2d 1049, 1053; see also Wicker, 257 So. 3d at 521.
However, there are exceptions to the general rule of res judicata, which are
set forth in La. R.S. 13: 4232 as follows:
A. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata
effect of the judgment;
2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice;
or,
3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring
another action.
B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in an
action for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code
Article 105, in an action for contributions to a spouse' s education or
training under Civil Code Article 121, and in an action for partition of
s In this case, the parties are clearly the same; therefore, this issue need not be addressed.
8
community property and settlement of claims between spouses under
R. S. 9: 2801, the judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to
causes ofaction actually adjudicated.
Emphasis added).
The doctrine of res judicata must be strictly construed, and
any doubt
concerning its applicability is to be resolved against the party raising the objection.
Mandalay Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Energy Development Corp., 2001- 0993 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 7/ 3/ 02), 867 So. 2d 709, 713. The burden of proving the facts
essential to support the objection of res judicata is on the party pleading the
objection. Cadle Co., II, Inc. v. Linder, 2021- 1361 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 8124/ 22),
348 So. 3d 784, 788 n. 3, writ denied, 2022- 01437 ( La. 11/ 22/ 22), 350 So. 3d 501.
Further, the res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo. Id. at 788 n.4.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we find that the trial court
improperly sustained Mrs. Gingles' objection of res judicata. First and foremost,
we note that all of these proceedings, as well as the judgments that have been
rendered, arise from Mrs. Gingles' request, in her petition for divorce, to partition
the parties' community property. Therefore, pursuant to the exception set forth in
La. R.S. 13: 4232( B), any judgment that has been rendered has the effect of res
judicata only as to causes of action actually adjudicated.
Pertinent to the issue of res judicata, the record before us contains three
judgments: the October 6, 2005 consent judgment partitioning Mr. Pirosko' s
military benefits; the May 24, 2019 judgment on exceptions; and the October 7,
2021 judgment on exceptions. However, all three of these judgments fail to satisfy
the requirements of res judicata so as to bar Mr. Pirosko' s motion to modify the
October 6, 2005 judgment.
First, the October 7, 2021 judgment sustained Mrs. Gingles' peremptory
exception raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata, which were
6
filed in response to Mr. Pirosko' s petition to annul the May 24, 2019 judgment. As
previously noted, this judgment did not, however, dismiss Mr. Pirosko' s petition to
annul the May 24, 2019 judgment or any of his claims. Absent language
determining or disposing of the merits of Mr. Pirosko' s petition to annul the May
24, 2019 judgment, the October 7, 2021 judgment is not a final judgment. See La.
C. C. P. arts. 1841 ( providing that a " final judgment" is a judgment that determines
the merits in whole or in part.) Since the October 7, 2021 judgment is not a final
judgment, it cannot serve as a basis for the objection of res judicata to Mr.
Pirosko' s petition for modification of the October 6, 2005 consent judgment
partitioning Mr. Pirosko' s retirement benefits. See Burguieres, 843 So. 2d at 1053
providing that the judgment must be final in order for res judicata to preclude a
second action).
Next, the October 6, 2005 consent judgment was a partial partition of
community property, i.e., Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits. A consent judgment is a
bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent and
thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against
the fear of loss." McDaniel v. McDaniel, 567 So. 2d 748, 750 ( La. App. 2" Cir.
1990); Boutte v, Boutte, 2019- 734 ( La. App. 3rd Cir. 718/ 20), 304 So. 3d 467,
472, writ denied, 2020- 00985 ( La. 1218120), 306 So. 3d 426, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
220, 211 L.Ed.2d 96 ( 2021). The matters addressed in a consent judgment are
generally considered to be " actually adjudicated" even though the judgment is
based on the consent of the parties rather than an adjudication by the trial court.
See Boutte, 304 So. 3d at 471- 472. In this case, although the judgment partitions
Mr. Pirosko' s military benefits ( and thus, actually adjudicated that particular
issue), it specifically contemplated a modification of that judgment by the parties,
as it expressly provided that the trial court would retain jurisdiction " to amend or
modify the provisions of [ the] Judgment," for several specifically identified
10
purposes, including " to terminate or suspend the payment of benefits to [ Mrs.
Gingles] as a result of remarriage ...." Thus, not only is Mr. Pirosko contractually
entitled, under the October 6, 2005 consent judgment, to seek a modification of
that judgment based on Mrs. Gingles' remarriage, but the October 6, 2005 consent
judgment also falls under the exception to res judicata set forth in La. R.S.
13: 4232( A)(3) ( when the judgment reserves the right to bring another action).
Furthermore, even if the October 6, 2005 consent judgment did not
contractually entitle Mr. Pirosko to bring the instant suit for a modification based
on Mrs. Gingles' remarriage or fall under any of the exception set forth in La. R.S.
13: 4232( A)(3), we also find that the October 6, 2005 consent judgment fails to
meet the other criteria under La. R.S. 13: 4231 for res judicata to apply. The cause
of action for modification of the October 6, 2005 consent judgment, which is based
on Mrs. Gingles' remarriage in April 2010, clearly did not exist at the time the
October 6, 2005 consent judgment was rendered, nor did it arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the October 6, 2005
consent judgment, which was the partial partition of community property.
Therefore, for all these reasons, we find that the October 6, 2005 consent judgment
cannot serve as a basis for the objection of res judicata to Mr. Pirosko' s petition
for modification of the October 6, 2005 consent judgment.
Lastly, the May 24, 2019 judgment sustained several exceptions filed by
Mrs. Gingles in response to Mr. Pirosko' s motion to amend, correct, vacate and/ or
nullify the October 6, 2005 consent judgment on the basis of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, and fraud and ill practices. Unlike the October 7, 2021 judgment
on exceptions, the May 24, 2019 judgment did dismiss Mr. Pirosko' s motion to
amend, correct, vacate, and/or nullify the October 6, 2005 consent judgment.
Therefore, the May 29, 2019 judgment was a valid and final judgment under La.
C. C.P. art. 1841 for purposes of res judicata. However, that judgment has res
11
judicata effect only as to the issues actually adjudicated therein, i.e., the merits of
the exceptions filed in response to Mr. Pirosko' s motion to amend, correct, vacate,
and/or nullify the October 6, 2005 consent judgment on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, and fraud and ill practices. See La. R.S. 13: 4231( 3)
and 4232( B).
We also find that the cause of action asserted in Mr. Pirosko' s motion for
modification of the October 6, 2005 consent judgment, i.e., a request for a
declaration that Mrs. Gingles was not entitled to the Survivor Benefit Plan annuity
because she remarried on April 17, 2010 before she reached the age of 55, existed
at the time of the May 29, 2019 judgment on exceptions was rendered. Indeed, Mr.
Pirosko asserted this factual basis as one of the grounds for nullifying the October
6, 2005 consent judgment on the basis of fraud and ill practice. However, we find
that the cause of action asserted by Mr. Pirosko in his motion to modify the
October 6, 2005 judgment did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
that was the subject matter of Mr. Pirosko' s motion to amend, correct, vacate,
and/ or nullify the October 6, 2005 judgment. In the action to amend, correct,
vacate, and/ or nullify the October 6, 2005 judgment, the transaction or occurrence
giving rise to the proceeding was the trial court' s purported lack of jurisdiction and
improper venue, as well as the purported fraud or ill practice by Mrs. Gingles in
obtaining that judgment, whereas the transaction or occurrence that was the subject
in the motion to modify the October 6, 2005 judgment was Mrs. Gingles'
remarriage. Although Mr. Pirosko included allegations in his motion to amend,
correct, vacate, and/ or nullify that Mrs. Gingles was not eligible for the Survivor
Benefit Plan because she remarried in April 2010 prior to the age of 55, this issue
was never addressed because Mr. Pirosko' s motion was dismissed for a host of
procedural deficiencies. Thus, the issue of Mrs. Gingles' eligibility for the
Survivor Benefit Plan was never actually adjudicated or litigated. Therefore, we
12
find the May 24, 2019 judgment cannot serve as a basis for the objection of res
judicata as to Mr. Pirosko' s motion for modification of the October 6, 2005
consent judgment.
Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in sustaining Mrs. Gingles'
peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, and its judgment in this
regard must be reversed.
Peremption
Peremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right, and
unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the
peremptive period. La. C. C. art. 3458. Thus, peremption is a period of time, fixed
by law, within which a right must be exercised or be forever lost. Borel v. Young,
2007- 0419 ( La. 11/ 27107), 989 So. 2d 42, 48. The objection of peremption is raised
by the peremptory exception. See La. C. C. P. art. 927( A)(2). Ordinarily, the
exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the peremptory exception.
Lamont v. Bennett, 2014- 2483 ( La. 6130/ 15), 172 So. 3d 620, 627. But, if
peremption is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show the action is not perempted. See Id.At the trial court and on appeal herein, Mrs. Gingles argues that the doctrine
of "federal peremption" bars Mr. Pirosko' s motion to modify because federal law
does not allow Mr. Pirosko to revoke his Survivor Benefit Plan, does not allow Mr.
Pirosko to seek reimbursement for the premiums paid, and provides Mr. Pirosko
with other remedies, which he had failed to exhaust prior to seeking relief from the
trial court. Mrs. Gingles also argues that the relief requested by Mr. Pirosko is
prohibited by " the Barring Act."
We cannot find, nor have we been directed to, any authority— statutory,
jurisprudential, or otherwise— pertaining to the doctrine of " federal peremption."
However, based on the substance of the arguments made by Mrs. Gingles— that
13
federal law prohibits Mr. Pirosko' s request under Louisiana law to modify the
consent judgment partitioning his military benefits— it appears that she is actually
referring to the doctrine of "federal preemption." Federal preemption is based on
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that
federal law shall be the " supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
See Baca v. Sabine River Authority, 2018- 1046 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12127118), 27I
So. 3d 223, 229, writ denied, 2019- 0149 ( La. 3118119), 267 So. 3d 95.
Notably, federal preemption is an affirmative defense, which under La.
C. C. P. arts. 1003 and 1005, should be pled in a defendant' s answer. Snearl v.
Mercer, 99- 1738 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2116101), 780 So. 2d 563, 572, writs denied,
2001- 1319 and 2001- 1320 ( La. 6/ 22/ 01), 794 So. 2d 800 and 801. An affirmative
defense raises new matters that, assuming the allegations in the petition to be true,
constitute a defense to the action and will have the effect of defeating plaintiffs
demand on the merits. Id.There is an implicit distinction between matters constituting affirmative
defenses and issues that are appropriately raised through the peremptory exception
such as peremption). See La. C.C.P. arts. 927 and 1005. Thus, in reviewing the
merits of Mrs. Gingles' peremptory exception raising the objection of
peremptionthe issue raised in the trial court and by this appeal -- we decline to
address any arguments made by Mrs. Gingle relating to whether federal law
preempts Mr. Pirosko' s request for relief Those issues are more appropriately
addressed as affirmative defenses. Therefore, we limit our discussion to the issue
of peremption or whether there is any period of time fixed by law— federal or
state— for the existence of Mr. Pirosko' s right to seek a modification of the consent
judgment partitioning his military benefits.
The specific relief requested by Mr. Pirsoko in his motion to modify was a
declaration that Mrs. Gingles was not entitled to the Survivor Benefit Plan annuity
14
because she remarried before the age of 55, which declaration was based on 10
U.S. C. § 1450( b). He also sought declaration that she was not entitled to that
annuity retroactive to the date she remarried, such that any monies that have been
deducted from his retirement be returned and/ or paid back to him. The face of Mr.
Pirosko' s motion does not establish that his right to seek this relief has been
perempted. Therefore, Mrs. Gingles had the burden of establishing that Mr.
Pirosko' s right to seek declaratory judgment and/ or the modification of the October
6, 2006 judgment were extinguished.
In support of Mrs. Gingles' contention that Mr. Pirosko' s claim is
perempted, she points to provisions in the statutes governing the Survivor Benefit
Plan providing that an election made for the Survivor Benefit Plan is generally
irrevocable. See 10 U.S. C. § 1448( a)( 4)( A) and ( C) and 1450( 8). She also claims
that the relief is prohibited by the " the Barring Act," which is set forth in 31 U.S. C.
3702( b).
First and foremost, we find that the Barring Act is not applicable to Mr.
Pirosko' s action. By its terms, 31 U.S. C. § 3702 applies to the settlement of
particular " claims of or against the United States Government." The specific
subsection
relied on by Mrs. Gingles- 31 U.S. C. § 3702( b) ---provides that such
claims " against the Government ... must be received ... within 6 years after the
claim accrues," with certain exceptions provided thereinafter. Since the relief
sought by Mr. Pirosko in his motion to modify the October 6, 2006 consent
judgment is not against the United States Government, but rather, is against Mrs.
Gingles, the Barring Act does not establish a peremptive period for Mr. Pirosko' s
claims against Mrs. Gingles.
Likewise, we also find no merit to Mrs. Gingles' assertion that 10 U. S. C.
1449 and 1450 set forth a peremptive period for Mr. Pirosko' s claims against
Mrs. Gingles. While these provisions contain general language setting forth a
15
general rule that the Survivor Benefit Plan election may not be revoked, those
provisions are applicable to persons who are marriednot former spouses.
Furthermore, Mr. Pirosko does not seek to revoke the designation; rather, he seeks
a declaration regarding Mrs. Gingles' eligibility for the Survivor Benefit Plan
annuity under the specific rules for the payment of such annuity to a former spouse
and the termination of that annuity as set forth in 10 U.S. C. § 1450( b).
Therefore, the provisions relied upon by Mrs. Gingles to support her
contention that Mr. Pirosko' s claims are perempted are not applicable, and further,
we can find no other peremptive period that is applicable to Mr. Pirosko' s claim.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in in sustaining the objection of peremption and
its judgment in this regard must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred
in sustaining Mrs. Gingles' peremptory exceptions raising the objections of res
judicata and peremption. Therefore, the January 4, 2023 amended judgment of the
trial court is sustaining the permptory exceptions raising the objections of res
judicata and peremption and dismissing Mr. Pirosko' s motion to modify the
October 6, 2005 consent judgment is reversed. This matter is remanded for further
proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellee, Lisa Kay
Kunstman Pirosko ( now " Gingles").
APPEAL MAINTAINED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
t[7