DocketNumber: NO. 2018–K–0280
Citation Numbers: 241 So. 3d 1153
Filed Date: 3/29/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/29/2022
[D]espite some clear dissimilarities in the details of the homicide and violence inflicted upon [the victim] and the homicide and violence involving the defendant's prior wife, the crimes "clearly express the vicious, deviant attitude that [defendant] holds toward women with whom he has a romantic relationship. This attitude is so similarly reflected in each of the crimes that [defendant] has committed that crimes are inextricably connected in the pattern ... they exhibit." [State v.] Rose, 05-0396 at p. 4 [ (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/18/06), 925 So.2d [34] at 49 (Cannizarro, J., dissenting).
The district court also observed the Second Circuit's reliance on Rose in Howard, 47,495 at 9-10,
As an initial matter, we note that an individual's "deviant attitude" toward any *1156particular group of people is not, in itself, an exception to the general rule disallowing 404(B) evidence. In Rose , the Supreme Court highlighted the defendant's "deviant attitude" in the context of an inextricable connection between all the acts in question, thereby rendering it relevant to the identity exception to La.C.E. 404(B) :
[T]he crimes revealed sufficient similarities arising from a fixed and aberrant pattern of behavior that tended to identify defendant as the perpetrator in the death of his second wife[, Ms. Rose]. The other crimes evidence was extremely probative, especially considering the circumstantial nature of the case against defendant. The prior crimes evidence tended to corroborate the remaining evidence introduced at trial. For example, the jurors heard from Mr. James that Ms. Rose and defendant were arguing on the morning of her death over a traffic ticket. They also heard from Mr. Wilson that he and defendant had engaged in a heated telephone conversation on the morning of her death in which defendant accused Mr. Wilson of having an affair with
Ms. Rose. The other crimes evidence showed defendant had previously grabbed and struck Ms. Rose during another argument when defendant accused her of not looking at him when he spoke to her. The other crimes evidence also showed defendant acted violently toward another woman with whom he had a close personal relationship [his previous wife], and eventually killed her during an argument. Thus, rational jurors could have found the similarities sufficiently probative to identify defendant as Ms. Rose's murderer because a specific pattern of violent and obsessive behavior earmarked the crimes as the work of one man and thereby "sustain[ed] the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict." Old Chief [v. United States ], 519 U.S. [172,] 187, 117 S.Ct. [644,] 653,136 L.Ed.2d 574 [ (1997) ].
Rose , 2006-0402 at 16-17,
The unique factual circumstances of Rose are not entirely comparable to the facts alleged here. Rose drew on the similarities between acts of violence against defendant's two wives, both of whom he killed. The Supreme Court highlighted the facts that both women were married to defendant when he killed them, and that both women experienced "stormy" marriages that involved times of separation. Defendant was physically violent with both women. The Court described both murders as "brutal" and as having taken place in defendant's home. After each homicide, defendant contacted his mother and fled the state. Lastly, defendant turned himself in on each incident.
The Rose Court highlighted these facts as they related to identity. That is, evidence of defendant's acts against another woman was more probative than prejudicial and admissible because the similarities between the two homicides shed light on a material issue genuinely in dispute-defendant's identity as the perpetrator. However, the identity exception is one the State has not placed at issue here.
However, Rose did address motive as well, noting that "[f]or evidence of motive to be independently relevant, it must be factually peculiar to the victim and the charged crime."
[W]e find the evidence that defendant physically abused Ms. Rose is independently relevant to show the volatile nature of the relationship between defendant *1157and Ms. Rose. This evidence tends to show defendant's motive for commission of Ms. Rose's murder. The State was attempting to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of Ms. Rose's violent death. The State's case was largely dependent on circumstantial evidence, so any evidence tending to prove that defendant had a motive or reason for committing the murder was extremely probative. See [State v. ] Lafleur, 398 So.2d [1074,] 1081. Defendant's documented physical abuse of Ms. Rose illustrates a motive factually peculiar to her murder.
Rose , 2006-0402 at 15,
While we find the district court erred in finding all of the acts relevant to the issues of motive and intent, we deny relief. Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 404(B) requires that the State "provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes[.]" Another recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting 404(B) evidence is pattern. The State did submit the pattern exception, in that "Defendant has committed multiple incidents in the past of being directly involved or happening upon a scene during incidents [of] both verbal and physical arguments with women who he is *1158either in a sexual relationship in or has been in a sexual relationship with." The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the admissibility of such pattern evidence in State v. Altenberger , 2013-2518, p. 10 (La. 4/11/14),
Lastly, we address the State's contention that Relator may not dictate its proof at trial by "stipulating" to intent. However, Relator has not stipulated to intent; Relator has argued that intent will not be an issue at trial because he plans to deny the conduct occurred. The State's notices pursuant to La.C.E. art. 404(B) both specifically describe Relator's actions of taking a gun and shooting "at" the victims. Our jurisprudence provides:
To establish the general criminal intent for an aggravated assault, jurisprudence holds that the act of pointing a weapon at another person and threatening bodily harm is sufficient to establish the element of intent. See State v. Hill , 47,568, p. 11 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/12),106 So.3d 617 , 624 (finding that aiming a pistol at a victim from point blank range and verbal threatening harm satisfies the level of proof required to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault); State v. Connors ,432 So.2d 308 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (finding that an aggravated assault occurred when defendant intentionally raised the gun as if to aim at victim and thereby placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery).
State v. Brown , 2017-0124, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/12/17),
We find that the State placed Relator on sufficient notice regarding its intent to use the prior bad acts to show Relator's pattern of abusive behavior towards women with whom he has had an intimate relationship.
Accordingly, Relator's writ is granted, but relief is denied. The acts in question are relevant and admissible to the issues of motive, as detailed above, and pattern. The Court's limiting instructions should be specific as to the legitimate purposes for which the jury may consider this evidence.
Should intent indeed become an issue at trial, the court's instructions may include language indicating the jury may consider the acts for that purpose as well.