DocketNumber: 2018 CA 0222
Citation Numbers: 265 So. 3d 1
Judges: Crain, Higginbotham, McClendon, Welch, Whipple
Filed Date: 10/31/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/29/2022
Appellant, Woman's Hospital Foundation ("Woman's Hospital"), appeals a judgment in favor of appellee, Courtney Queen, awarding damages for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall accident. For the following reasons, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying suit arises out of a personal injury suffered by Ms. Queen at Woman's Hospital in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On December 1, 2015, at around 8:50 p.m., Mr. Isiah Smith, who was employed as a floor tech at Woman's Hospital, was mopping the landing area near the second floor elevators. Ms. Queen, who had been visiting a relative at the hospital, entered the elevator on the hospital's first floor and proceeded up to the second floor.
On July 6, 2016, Ms. Queen filed suit against Woman's Hospital, alleging that Woman's Hospital was negligent for, among other things, creating a hazardous condition and failing to take steps to adequately safeguard the public. Woman's Hospital answered the petition, generally denying Ms. Queen's allegations.
Following a bench trial, the trial court adopted Ms. Queen's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Queen and against Woman's Hospital, awarding Ms. Queen $43,837.00 in damages.
Woman's Hospital has appealed, assigning the following as error:
1. The trial court erred in ruling Appellant - Defendant, Woman's Hospital Medical Center, was at fault, as the findings of the trial court ignored the clear law and jurisprudence in regards to alleged slip and falls on the premises of a hospital, and the reasonableness of the measures used by Woman's Hospital Foundation.
2. Alternatively, if this Court determines Defendant - Appellant was at fault, which is at all times denied, the trial court erred in not assessing fault to the Plaintiff - Appellee, Courtney Queen, despite her obvious comparative fault.
*33. The Trial Court erred in its excessive award of damages to the Plaintiff - Appellee, considering her limited treatment and injuries.
DISCUSSION
Every act of man that causes damage to another obliges him whose fault it happened to repair it. LSA-C.C. art. 2315. Under a negligence standard, a hospital owes a duty to its visitors to exercise reasonable care for their safety, commensurate with the particular circumstances involved, but the duty owed is less than that owed by a merchant. Terrance v. Baton Rouge General Medical Center ,
On appeal, Woman's Hospital contends that the trial court erred in finding it at fault for Ms. Queen's fall. The hospital does not dispute that there was a foreign substance on the floor of the second elevator landing area. However, the hospital avers that the trial court did not consider the reasonable measures it took to eliminate the risk caused by the dangerous condition. Specifically, the hospital avers that Mr. Smith performed his duties properly and reasonably by placing the wet floor signs in the area at issue prior to Ms. Queen exiting the elevator. Moreover, the hospital avers that the floor was not mopped when the hospital was busy. Rather, Mr. Smith indicated that he shampooed the carpets and rugs in his assigned area after he arrived at work to allow time for things to "die down" before he cleaned the elevator landings "when it's kind of slow." The hospital concludes that the measures taken were reasonable such that it is not responsible for Ms. Queen's fall.
In opposition, Ms. Queen posits that when she got off of the elevator, there was simply nowhere that she could go that was not wet. Moreover, she avers that she did not know that Mr. Smith had mopped between the wet floor sign and back wall when she exited the elevator. Rather, she believed that she was walking on a dry floor. Additionally, Ms. Queen notes that she only took four steps after she exited the elevator before she fell and only two seconds elapsed between her departing the elevator and her fall. Ms. Queen posits that no one riding on the elevator would have had prior warning that the floor was being mopped and was wet. In light of the foregoing, Ms. Queen concludes that the hospital's measures were not reasonable, and it should have done more to warn her of the floor's condition.
In Lee v. Ryan's Family Steak House Inc. ,
Finally, we find the trial judge's findings that the cone should have had "directional symbols" or arrows or language showing exactly where to go and where not to go to be unreasonable. A merchant is not the insurer of the safety of its patrons and has only a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances for the safety of its patrons. We find that an approximately three-foot-high yellow warning cone containing the universal symbol for a wet floor to be adequate to alert a patron of a hazardous condition. It would be unreasonably burdensome to require a merchant to have a supply of cones with words and arrows explaining the circumstances of every possible hazardous condition to its customers. While it may have been more prudent for Ryan's to have placed more than one cone in the area after mopping, Ms. Lee's fall would not have been prevented by the placement of multiple cones. She entered the food bar area from the direction of the parallel food bars, walked within a foot or two of the warning cone on her way to the perpendicular food bar, then discovered the water on the floor for herself before turning and returning the same way she came and falling right alongside the warning cone. (Internal citation omitted.)
Lee ,
In Mays v. Circle K. Stores, Inc. ,
Ms. Mays could not avoid seeing the sign when she entered the store, and she saw the warning sign before she reached the slippery area of the floor. The trial court found it was not necessary for any more signs to be placed due to the small floor space of the store.
Id. at p.3. It was thus determined that the store had sufficiently shown that protective measures were taken to warn customers of the potential hazard and that it did not fail to exercise reasonable care.
Recently, in Toussaint v. Baton Rouge General Medical Center ,
*5Despite BRGMC's [the hospital] assertions that it acted reasonably to eliminate the risk because its housekeeping employee followed HHS's [the housekeeping department's] policies and procedures, which were created with safety in mind, the evidence does not support this assertion. Mr. Totten and Ms. Franklin both acknowledged that Ms. Franklin was supposed to approach the spill with her housekeeping cart, including her mop bucket with wringer, additional "wet floor" signs, and anything else she might need to clean the spill, as opposed to just carrying a damp mop and one "wet floor" sign to the area. By failing to bring her cart, Ms. Franklin could not wring out her mop after mopping up the spilled water to avoid leaving excess water on the floor, and she could not use additional "wet floor" signs to warn passersby of the extent of the wet area. In addition, Ms. Franklin's inability to judge the size of the mopped area caused her to make the "questionable" decision to use only one "wet floor" sign in a situation where proper calculation of the size of the area mopped would result in the use of two signs.
Toussaint ,
In the instant case, the trial court found that Mr. Smith created a trap for those arriving on the second floor elevator landing because those departing the elevator would not be aware that he was mopping until they had exited the elevator at which time they would already be on a wet floor. Further, the trial court found that under the circumstances, Mr. Smith could have stepped forward in the front of the elevator and when the elevator door opened, he could have cautioned occupants that the entire floor was wet.
Considering the entirety of the record, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the measures taken by the hospital were not reasonable is manifestly erroneous. The footprint of the second floor elevator landing area is relatively small. Mr. Smith mopped the area at issue at a time when there were generally fewer visitors at the hospital. Mr. Smith placed two different "wet floor" warning signs to alert the public that the second floor elevator landing area had been or was being mopped. One of the warning signs was placed in front of the elevator Ms. Queen exited, and the surveillance video shows Ms. Queen walking directly past the sign prior to her fall. See Mays ,
In addition to the signage, Ms. Queen admits to seeing Mr. Smith when she stepped out of the elevator. The surveillance video shows Mr. Smith with a mop in his hands at the time Ms. Queen exits the elevator. Mr. Smith also used a mop bucket with a wringer and the surveillance video shows that Mr. Smith wrung out his mop prior to mopping the area at issue. Unlike Toussaint , there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Smith failed to follow the hospital's policies and safety procedures. Additionally, immediately following Ms. Queen's fall, another occupant of the elevator *6was able to safely traverse the same path taken by Ms. Queen.
Given the signage, the small area, Mr. Smith's presence in the area with the mop and mop bucket when Ms. Queen exits the elevator, evidence that Mr. Smith wrung the mop multiple times before its use, and no evidence that Mr. Smith failed to follow proper procedures, we find that measures taken by the hospital were reasonable. Although Ms. Queen posits and the trial court found that the hospital could have taken additional measures, the hospital need only take measures that are reasonable. Under these circumstances, the trial court was manifestly erroneous in concluding that the hospital was liable for Ms. Queen's fall.
Accordingly, we find merit in Woman's Hospitals first assignment of error. Because we find merit in Woman's Hospital's first assignment of error, we pretermit the remaining assignments of error. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court holding Woman's Hospital liable for Ms. Queen's accident.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's December 4, 2017, judgment in favor of Courtney Queen is reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Courtney Queen.
REVERSED.
Whipple, C.J. concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Higginbotham, J. concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by C.J. Whipple.
Welch J. concurs and assigns reasons.
Ms. Queen had previously traversed the second floor landing area several times that day.