Alice M. Pidgeon v. East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2021 CA 0740
ALICE M. PIDGEON
VERSUS
EAST BATON ROUGE SHERIFF' S OFFICE
Judgment Rendered. MAR 16 2022
Appealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Case No. C656417
The Honorable William Morvant, Judge Presiding
G. Karl Bernard Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
New Orleans, Louisiana Alice M. Pidgeon
Ashley M. Caruso Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Mary G. Erlingson Sid J. Gautreaux, III, in his official
Lee J. Ledet capacity as Sheriff of East Baton
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Parish
BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ.
THERIOT, J.
Alice M. Pidgeon (" Ms. Pidgeon") appeals the summary judgment by the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court, which was granted in favor of the appellee, Sid
J. Gautreaux, III, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish
Sheriff Sid Gautreaux"), and dismissed Ms. Pidgeon' s claims with prejudice. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Pidgeon is an African American female born on January 9, 1966. She
began her employment with the East Baton Rouge Sheriff' s Office (" EBRSO") as
a deputy in corrections in January 2005. She was promoted to Corporal, and
subsequently promoted to Sergeant in 2012. At the time of the incident that is the
subject of this lawsuit, Ms. Pidgeon was a sergeant. As a sergeant, Ms. Pidgeon
had supervisory authority over the corporals and the deputies who worked the C -
Shift.
On June 11, 2015, Ms. Pidgeon put her forearm around a subordinate
deputy' s neck in a chokehold manner in the lobby of the prison before a shift
briefing. Ms. Pidgeon did not release the chokehold until the subordinate deputy
stuck her key into Ms. Pidgeon' s forearm. The subordinate deputy left the lobby in
tears and went to her vehicle to call Ms. Pidgeon' s supervisor, Lieutenant Harris,
to discuss what had transpired. At about the same time, Ms. Pidgeon found
Lieutenant Harris in person and informed him about the incident. Lieutenant Harris
spoke again with the subordinate deputy about the incident in person later that
night.
On September 30, 2015, Warden Grimes learned of the incident and directed
Captain Peters to investigate the matter. Captain Peters discussed the incident with
Lieutenant Harris. Lieutenant Harris wrote a report and submitted it to Captain
Peters. After Captain Peters' investigation, he recommended that Ms. Pidgeon be
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demoted and suspended for five days for violating Policy and Procedure 01- 01. 35,
Relations with Commissioned Officers."'
The recommendation from Captain Peters went up the chain of command to
Warden Grimes. Warden Grimes determined that Ms. Pidgeon' s conduct
constituted a violent act by a supervisor upon a subordinate employee within her
chain of command. Warden Grimes found that Ms. Pidgeon violated Policy and
Procedure 03- 15, " Violence in the Workplace."' Warden Grimes recommended to
Colonel McLeary that Ms. Pidgeon be terminated. On October 2, 2015, Colonel
McLeary terminated Ms. Pidgeon' s employment with EBRSO based on her
violations of Policy and Procedure 01- 01. 35 and 03- 15.
On February 10, 2016, Ms. Pidgeon submitted a Charge of Discrimination to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (" EEOC"), and on December 19,
2016, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue to Ms. Pidgeon. In March 2017,
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Policy and Procedure 01- 01. 35 provides: " A deputy shall never behave disrespectfully or use
threatening or insulting language toward any other officer engaged in the execution of his
position or duties. Deputies shall never draw or lift a weapon toward, offer violence against,
strike or attempt to strike another officer."
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Policy and Procedure 03- 15 provides, in pertinent part:
03- 15. 01 PURPOSE
The [ EBRSO] promotes a safe [] environment for its employees. The Office is
committed to working with its employees to maintain a work environment free
from violence, threats of violence, harassment, intimidation and other disruptive
behavior.
03- 15. 03 POLICY
It is the Office' s policy to promote a safe environment for its employees and to
communicate the attitude that violent behavior will not be tolerated[.]
All reports of violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, or other disruptive
behavior in the workplace will be taken seriously and appropriately dealt with[.]
Inappropriate behavior can include oral or written statements, gestures or
expressions to communicate a direct/indirect threat of physical harm[.]
Any employee who commits an act of violence may be removed from the
premises and may be subject to disciplinary action and/ or criminal penalties. The
perpetrator shall be held accountable regardless of employment, position, or
status[.]
Any employee who reports a threat of violence, violence, or assists the Office in
an investigation of such shall not be retaliated against[.]
Employees should not ignore violent, threatening, harassing, intimidating, or
other disruptive behavior. Employees who do shall report the behavior to a
supervisor. Behavior requiring immediate attention should be addressed by a
commissioned deputy or law enforcement if available and appropriate.
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Ms. Pidgeon filed a petition for damages against EBRSO. The petition alleged that
EBRSO violated Louisiana Employment Discrimination Laws by engaging in
unlawful employment practices consisting of intentional discriminatory treatment
of Ms. Pidgeon. Ms. Pidgeon contended that EBRSO discriminated against her due
to her gender, race, and age. In December 2017, EBRSO filed an answer and a
peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. The hearing on
the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action was set for
April 23, 2018. After the hearing, the trial court sustained EBRSO' s exception
raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissed EBRSO.
On April 27, 2018, Ms. Pidgeon was granted leave to file her first amended
petition for damages. In her first amended petition, Ms. Pidgeon substituted Sheriff
Sid Gautreaux as a defendant in the place of EBRSO. Sheriff Sid Gautreaux filed a
motion for summary judgment on November 2, 2020.
A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment on April 26, 2021.
In regards to Ms. Pidgeon' s allegations of racial discrimination, the trial court
found that Ms. Pidgeon established that she was a member of the protected class,
she was qualified for the position, and she was terminated from the position.
However, the trial court found that Ms. Pidgeon did not establish that she was
replaced by someone outside of the protected class since she was replaced by an
African American person who was also a member of the protected class. Next, as
to her claim of age discrimination, the trial court found that Ms. Pidgeon did not
address whether age was a factor in her termination and there was nothing in the
record that showed that age was a factor in the termination. Thus, the trial court did
not determine whether Ms. Pidgeon was terminated from her employment due to
her age in making its ruling.
Last, as to her claim of gender discrimination, the trial court found that Ms.
Pidgeon made a prima facie showing that gender played a part in her termination.
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The burden then shifted to Sheriff Sid Gautreaux to establish a non-discriminatory
reason why Ms. Pidgeon was terminated. The trial court found the non-
discriminatory reason for Ms. Pidgeon' s termination was the incident wherein she
placed a subordinate officer in a chokehold, which was determined to be a violent
act with use of force. The trial court indicated that the burden then went back to
Ms. Pidgeon to establish that the non-discriminatory reason was a pretext. After
reviewing the evidence including the affidavits of Ms. Pidgeon and the subordinate
officer, the trial court found that there was a non- discriminatory reason for Ms.
Pidgeon' s termination and the non- discriminatory reason was not a pretext. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Sid Gautreaux and
dismissed Ms. Pidgeon' s claims with prejudice. It is from this judgment that Ms.
Pidgeon appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Ms. Pidgeon contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff Sid Gautreaux as to Ms. Pidgeon' s gender based
discrimination claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is
no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant.
Murphy v. Savannah, 2018- 0991 ( La. 5/ 8/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1034, 1038 ( per curiam).
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall
be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is
no genuine issue as to material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966A( 3). The only documents that may be filed in
support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written
stipulations, and admissions. La. C. C. P. art. 966A( 4). However, the court shall
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consider any documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment to which no objection is made. La. C. C. P. art. 9661)( 2).
The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the
mover. La. C. C. P. art. 966D( 1). Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden
of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover' s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all
essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements
essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. La. C. C.P. art. 9661)( 1).
Appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that
govern the trial court' s determination of whether summary judgment is
appropriate. Leet v. Hospital Service District No. I of East Baton Rouge Parish,
2018- 1148 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 28/ 19), 274 So. 3d 583, 587. In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to evaluate the weight of the
evidence or to make a credibility determination, but instead to determine whether
or not there is a genuine issue of material fact. Collins v. Franciscan Missionaries
of Our Lady Health System, Inc., 2019- 0577 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 298 So.
3d 191, 194, writ denied, 2020- 00480 ( La. 6/ 22/ 20), 297 So. 3d 773. A genuine
issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons
could reach only one conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate. Collins, 298
So. 3d at 194- 195. A fact is " material"
when its existence or nonexistence may be
essential to plaintiff' s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.
Simply put, a " material"
fact is one that would matter at a trial on the merits. Any
doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against
granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Collins, 298 So. 3d at 195.
M
DISCUSSION
Ms. Pidgeon contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff Sid Gautreaux as to Ms. Pidgeon' s gender based
discrimination claim.' Louisiana Revised Statutes 23: 332 governs intentional
discrimination in employment and states in relevant part:
A. It shall be unlawful discrimination in employment for an employer
to engage in any of the following practices:
1) Intentionally fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to intentionally discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, or terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of the individual' s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
2) Intentionally limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely
affect the individual' s status as an employee, because of the
individual' s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Ms. Pidgeon must show that her gender played a part in the termination of her
employment. Based on the commonality between federal and state anti-
discrimination laws, state courts may appropriately consider a federal court' s
interpretation of federal statutes to resolve similar questions concerning Louisiana
statutes and the proper burden of proof sequence. Baldwin v. Board ofSupervisors
for University ofLouisiana System, 2019- 0811 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 299 So.
3d 105, 108, writ denied, 2020- 00788 ( La. 10/ 14/ 20), 302 So. 3d 1118. Gender
discrimination may be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F. 3d 305, 309 ( 5th Cir. 2004). The type of
evidence determines the framework to be used in analyzing Ms. Pidgeon' s claim.
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S. Ct. 613, 83 L. Ed.
2d 523 ( 1985).
3 In her petition, Ms. Pidgeon filed her lawsuit against Sheriff Sid Gautreaux based on race,
gender, and age discrimination. We note she has not appealed the trial court' s ruling on race or
age discrimination.
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In cases which rely on circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d
668 ( 1973), establishes the procedural framework for analyzing motions for
summary judgment. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Ms. Pidgeon must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Willis v. Coca Cola
Enterprises, Inc., 445 F. 3d 413, 420 ( 5th Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, Ms. Pidgeon must show that: ( 1) she is a member of a
protected class; ( 2) she was qualified for her position; ( 3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and ( 4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected
class. See Rogalski v. Education Management, Inc., 2016- 0334 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
1/ 3/ 17), writ denied, 2017- 0249 ( La. 3/ 31/ 17), 217 So. 3d 363.
If Ms. Pidgeon establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a
presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to Sheriff Sid
Gautreaux to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
actions. Guidry v. Glazer's Distributors ofLouisiana, Inc., 2010- 218 ( La. App. 3rd
Cir. 11/ 3/ 10), 49 So. 3d 586, 590. If the employer produces a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the termination, the burden then returns to Ms. Pidgeon
to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the non-discriminatory reason offered
by Sheriff Sid Gautreaux is merely pretextual. See Willis, 445 F. 3d at 420. Ms.
Pidgeon may meet the burden of establishing pretext and avoid summary judgment
if the evidence taken as a whole ( 1) creates a fact issue as to whether Sheriff Sid
Gautreaux' s stated reason was what actually motivated him and ( 2) creates a
reasonable inference that gender was a determinative factor in her termination. See
Vadie v. Mississippi State University, 218 F. 3d 365, 374 n. 23 ( 5th Cir. 2000).
Ms. Pidgeon contends that she was wrongfully terminated because of her
gender. Specifically, she asserts that, even though she violated policies and
procedures of EBRSO, other similarly situated male employees received less harsh
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methods of discipline when they engaged in the same conduct. Because Ms.
Pidgeon has not offered direct evidence of discrimination, her claim is properly
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Sheriff Sid Gautreaux does not dispute that Ms. Pidgeon has shown that she
is a member of a protected class, she was qualified for her position, she suffered an
adverse employment decision, and she was replaced by a male. Since it is
undisputed that Ms. Pidgeon has established a prima facie case of discrimination, a
presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to Sheriff Sid
Gautreaux to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination.
See Guidry, 49 So. 3d at 590. Sheriff Sid Gautreaux contends that Ms. Pidgeon
violated EBRSO' s Policy and Procedure 01- 01. 35 and 03- 15 when she placed the
subordinate deputy in a chokehold. An employer' s claims that an employment
decision was based on a legitimate reason is valid if, objectively, the reason given
is legitimate, and, subjectively, the employer' s reason is not a pretext for
discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506- 07, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 ( 1993).
Sheriff Sid Gautreaux' s reason for Ms. Pidgeon' s termination is legitimate
and non-discriminatory on its face. Ms. Pidgeon placed a subordinate deputy in a
chokehold, which was a violation of EBRSO' s policies and procedures. The
subordinate deputy could not breathe and was crying while the incident occurred,
and Ms. Pidgeon did not release the chokehold until the subordinate deputy put her
key into Ms. Pidgeon' s forearm.
Further, Sheriff Sid Gautreaux' s reason for the termination is not merely a
pretext for discrimination since Ms. Pidgeon cannot show evidence of disparate
treatment or demonstrate that the proffered explanation is false. See Desport v.
Shamrock Energy Solutions, LLC, No. 19- 12446, 2021 WL 5907701, at * 4 ( E.D.
La. Dec. 14, 2021) ( Brown, CJ.). Ms. Pidgeon cannot show that she was treated
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differently than other male employees who engaged in the same conduct. The
affidavit of Warden Grimes demonstrates that Ms. Pidgeon is not the only
employee who has been terminated by EBRSO after putting a fellow employee in a
chokehold. On January 15, 2016, Deputy Percy Brignac placed Deputy Deontre
Williams in a chokehold while on duty in violation of Policy and Procedure 01-
01. 35 and 03- 15. Deputy Brignac' s employment was thereafter terminated for
putting Deputy Williams in a chokehold, similarly to Ms. Pidgeon when she put a
subordinate deputy in a chokehold.
Ms. Pidgeon contends that "[ s] he regularly watched male deputies, while
interacting with one another in [ and] around the briefing room, joke with each
other, engage in horseplay, and address one another using very coarse language."
She further alleges that "[ s] he regularly watched male deputies grab each other,
place one another in headlocks, make fun of each other' s appearance, get angry
and cuss each other out and then go about their business, without being subjected
to any disciplinary action." However, Ms. Pidgeon only states one specific incident
in her affidavit where she alleges EBRSO treated a male employee more favorably
than she was treated. Ms. Pidgeon asserts that "[ a] t or about September of 2015,
Deputy Julian Knight threw hot coffee in an inmate' s face which is a clear
violation of EBRSO policy and procedure." " Deputy Knight received a seven- day
suspension for his action, but was allowed to resume his employment at the same
rank and income." This incident involving Deputy Knight is distinguishable from
the incident involving Ms. Pidgeon because Deputy Knight' s inappropriate
conduct was not directed at an employee that he had supervisory power over.
Ms. Pidgeon was the supervisor of the subordinate officer that she put in a
chokehold. The subordinate officer was sitting down in the lobby waiting for a
briefing meeting when Ms. Pidgeon came up behind her, unannounced, and placed
her in a tight chokehold. Further, unlike jokes, horseplay, and very coarse language
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that Ms. Pidgeon contends some male deputies engage in without recourse, Ms.
Pidgeon, as a supervisor, held the subordinate deputy in a chokehold in a way
where she could not breathe, could not speak, became lightheaded, and began to
cry. Ms. Pidgeon did not release the chokehold until the subordinate officer put her
key into Ms. Pidgeon' s forearm. Her actions are clearly distinguishable from the
others she offers.
Likewise, Ms. Pidgeon cannot show that EBRSO' s reason or explanation for
terminating her employment is false. Ms. Pidgeon acknowledged that she put the
subordinate deputy in a chokehold and did not release the subordinate deputy until
the subordinate deputy put her key into Ms. Pidgeon' s forearm. Since Ms. Pidgeon
cannot show evidence of disparate treatment or demonstrate that EBRSO' s
explanation is false, we conclude that EBRSO' s reason for terminating Ms.
Pidgeon' s employment is not a pretext for discrimination.
DECREE
The summary judgment granted by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in
favor of the appellee, Sid J. Gautreaux, III, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
East Baton Rouge Parish, and against the appellant, Alice M. Pidgeon, is affirmed.
All costs of this appeal are assessed to Alice M. Pidgeon.
AFFIRMED.
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