Raihana Islam and Mohammed Islam Versus Walmart, Inc. D/B/A Walmart Neighborhood Market - Kenner and Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. D/B/A Walmart Neighborhood Market - Kenner

RAIHANA ISLAM AND MOHAMMED ISLAM NO. 21-CA-629
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
WALMART, INC. D/B/A WALMART COURT OF APPEAL
NEIGHBORHOOD MARKET - KENNER AND
WAL-MART LOUISIANA, L.L.C. D/B/A STATE OF LOUISIANA
WALMART NEIGHBORHOOD MARKET -
KENNER
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 788-716, DIVISION "P"
HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
June 08, 2022
FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
FHW
JGG
JJM
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
RAIHANA ISLAM AND MOHAMMED ISLAM
Joseph S. Piacun
Reid S. Uzee
William J. Guste, III
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
WALMART INC. AND WAL-MART LOUISIANA, LLC
Sidney J. Hardy
Denman T. Mims
Isidro R. DeRojas
Lynda A. Tafaro
WICKER, J.
This matter involves a trip and fall in a store parking lot, and the plaintiffs,
Raihana Islam and Mohammed Islam, appeal to this Court to review a summary
judgment granted in favor of defendants, Walmart, Inc. d/b/a Walmart
Neighborhood Market-Kenner and Wal-mart Louisiana, LLC d/b/a Walmart
Neighborhood Market-Kenner, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of November 2, 2017, Raihana Islam drove her vehicle to the
Walmart Neighborhood Market-Kenner, located at 3520 Williams Boulevard, to
purchase groceries. Upon arriving at the store’s parking lot, she parked her vehicle
in a space located near the front of the store, immediately adjacent to a grassy
median, a landscaped island described as a raised, sodded, curbed embankment,
separating the parking area from the main driveway in front of the market. Once
Mrs. Islam exited her vehicle, she proceeded to enter the market to shop. Sometime
thereafter, Mrs. Islam exited the market and proceeded to her vehicle by traversing
the grassy median. While traversing the grassy median, she stepped into a hole,
described by Mrs. Islam as a large circular opening that was ankle-deep and could
contain her entire foot. When her foot became lodged therein, she fell and sustained
claimed injuries to her back, neck, and shoulder. The following day, on November
3, 2017, Mrs. Islam returned to the parking lot and her husband, Mohammed Islam,
photographed the median.
On October 18, 2018, Mr. and Mrs. Islam filed suit against Walmart, Inc. d/b/a
Walmart Neighborhood Market-Kenner and Wal-mart Louisiana, LLC d/b/a
Walmart Neighborhood Market-Kenner (“Walmart”) for damages sustained in
connection with her fall. In her petition, Mrs. Islam alleged that the hole was
partially obscured by grass that had grown over the hole. She further alleged that the
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hole was located within a “well-travelled path that patrons used to enter and exit the
store from the parking lot.”
Walmart filed an Answer, alleging comparative fault and failure by Mrs. Islam
to mitigate her damages, also filing a Consent Motion for Protective Order.1 On July
22, 2020, Walmart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. After additional pleadings
were filed2 and discovery was concluded, Walmart filed a motion to reset their
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 23, 2021.
On May 14, 2021, plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Walmart’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Walmart filed a reply memorandum on May 25, 2021, to rebut
plaintiffs’ arguments and seeking to disregard plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions that
“intrude upon the domain of common sense and require no expert assistance”;
“exceed the scope of his expertise as an architect”; and “improperly invade the
province of the factfinder.”
At the June 1, 2021 hearing, the trial court considered Walmart’s motion for
summary judgment, and took the matter under advisement. On June 21, 2021, the
trial court rendered a judgment, with written reasons, granting Walmart’s motion.
The court also excluded the affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert, Ladd P. Ehlinger, offered
in opposition to Walmart’s summary judgment, and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims
against Walmart with prejudice. Accordingly, plaintiffs have timely sought the
instant devolutive appeal seeking review of the June 21, 2021 judgment granting
Walmart’s motion for summary judgment.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
1
A non-sharing protective order was issued on February 6, 2019 to require confidentiality of protected
documents and disclosure only to “qualified persons.” Protected documents were to be marked "Subject
to Protective Order.” None of the documents in this record were so designated.
2
Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages on August 5, 2020, naming
Deep South Lawn & Garden, LLC (“Deep South”), the corporation which provided landscaping and
related maintenance services for Walmart, as a defendant, and further alleging that it created or caused an
unreasonably dangerous condition relative to Mrs. Islam’s fall. Deep South filed an Exception of
Prescription, Affirmative Defenses, and an Answer to the Petition for Damages and the First
Supplemental and Amended Petition on September 17, 2020.
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Assignments of Error
On appeal, Mrs. Islam argues that the trial court erred in two respects: (1) in
sua sponte excluding the affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert, Ladd P. Ehlinger, AIA,
without conducting a Daubert3 hearing or addressing the Daubert factors and in
finding that Mr. Ehlinger’s expert conclusions were “unnecessary” and “offered
legal conclusions that invade the province of the factfinder”; and (2) in finding that
the hole that caused Mrs. Islam’s fall did not present an unreasonable risk of harm
and that Walmart did not have constructive knowledge of the hazard.
Discussion
Summary judgment shall be granted, “if the motion, memorandum, and
supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that
the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The
burden of proof is on the mover. However, if the moving party will not bear the
burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support sufficient to
establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. See La.
C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14),
171 So.3d 851, 854.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is to determine
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, one upon which reasonable persons
could disagree. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94),
639 So.2d 730. In determining whether an issue is genuine, the courts cannot
make credibility determinations, consider the merits, evaluate testimony, or weigh
evidence. Id. Further, a fact is “material” when it could insure or preclude recovery,
3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
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affect the litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal
dispute. Prince v. Rouse's Enterprises, L.L.C., 20-150 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/2/20), 305
So.3d 1078, 1082. Factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be
construed in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment, and all
doubt must be resolved in the opponent’s favor. Willis v. Medders, 00-2507 (La.
12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1049, 1050 (per curiam).
In this case, plaintiffs’ petition for damages is based on premises liability
under La. C.C. art. 2317.1.4 La. C.C. art. 2317.1 provides that “[t]he owner or
custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect,
only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could
have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise
such reasonable care.” In cases of premises liability, the plaintiff must prove that the
thing was in the defendant’s custody, that the thing contained a defect which
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to others, that this defective condition caused
the damage, and that the defendant knew or should have known of the defect.
Prince v. Rouse’s Enterprises, L.L.C., 20-150 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/2/20), 305 So.3d
1078, 1082.
In their motion for summary judgment, Walmart asserts that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as plaintiffs were unable to satisfy their evidentiary
burden at trial that the property had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of
harm to persons on the premises, or that Walmart had actual or constructive
4
Walmart discussed their liability in their motion for summary judgment under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 for
claims against merchants. Although prior cases from this Court involving falls in parking lots applied La.
R.S. 9:2800.6, that statute discusses the merchant’s premises as including “aisles, passageways, and
floors.” See, Landry v. Leson Chevrolet Co., Inc., 17-665 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/6/18), 250 So.3d 360, 371.
Thus, the premises liability statute of La. C.C. art. 2317 has been found more appropriate in recent cases.
See Taylor v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 18-238 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18) 263 So.3d 910, 914, writ
denied, 19-0154 (La. 4/8/19).
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knowledge of the risk of harm that the alleged condition on the premises posed to
others. In support of their motion for summary judgment, Walmart submitted the
following evidence: the Petition for Damages, the deposition of Mrs. Islam, and the
deposition of Mr. Islam.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs alleged that the
obscured hole had been present for a prolonged period of time and was a safety
hazard, violating the Life Safety Code. They also claimed that the hole was “located
in an area of known pedestrian and customer traffic using the landscape island as a
walkway to access the front entrance of the Walmart Market from the parking lot,”
and that Walmart knew or should have known of the condition upon inspection of
the grassy median as outlined in its safety procedures. Plaintiffs submitted evidence
which included: (1) excerpts of Mrs. Islam’s deposition; (2) photographs of
Walmart’s parking lot and the grassy median5; (3) an affidavit and curriculum vitae
of Ladd P. Ehlinger, of Ehlinger and Associates, P.C.; (4) the Scope of Work for
Landscaping Services contract executed by representatives of Walmart and Deep
South; (5) Walmart’s Standard Operating Procedure for Safety Sweeps; (6)
Walmart’s Standard Operating Procedure for the Parking Lot, Sidewalks, and
Entrance of the market; and (7) excerpts of Walmart’s corporate representative
Stephian James Ballard’s deposition.6 Based on this evidence, plaintiffs contended
5
The memorandum points out that “[p]hotographs of the landscape island taken the day after Mrs.
Islam’s fall show fresh dirt applied adjacent to the sodded area. This fresh dirt was applied to fill the hole
involved in Mrs. Islam’s fall the day before.” Walmart objected to the inclusion of this photograph as
evidence of subsequent remedial measures therefore not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event under La. C.E. art. 407. The trial court did not rule on this
objection. This Court will consider the photograph as art. 407 “does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, authority,
knowledge, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, or for attacking credibility.” In this case, the
plaintiffs were required to present evidence to show Walmart’s ownership (“or garde”) of the property,
and knowledge and feasibility of precautionary measures were also relevant.
6
On May 18, 2021, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Exhibits inadvertently excluded from their
opposition to summary judgment, specifically exhibits five through seven.
21-CA-629 5
that they had presented sufficient factual support to satisfy their evidentiary burden
at trial.
Admissibility of Expert Affidavit
Before we determine whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to
support a finding that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment, we
address the first assignment of error in which plaintiffs allege the trial court
erroneously excluded the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert. Plaintiffs produced the
affidavit of their expert architect, Ladd P. Ehlinger, to support their assertion that
Walmart’s grass median presented an unreasonable risk of harm and Walmart should
have been aware of the defect. Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Ehlinger’s opinions involve
application of a professional safety code, and will assist the trier of fact in areas of
expertise beyond that of a lay person. They assert that Walmart made no effort to
formally challenge Mr. Ehlinger’s qualifications through a Daubert hearing, and the
trial court erred by failing to conduct a Daubert analysis of Mr. Ehlinger’s
qualifications as outlined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Independent Fire Ins.
Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181 (La. 2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 235-36.
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert opinion evidence at
summary judgment is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. MSOF Corp.
v. Exxon Corp., 04-0988 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 934 So.2d 708, 717. La. Code
of Evidence Article 702 provides for the opinion testimony by a witness qualified as
an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” if their
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue, is based on sufficient facts or data, and is the product of
reliable principles and methods, reliably applied to the facts of the case.
In Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that expert opinion testimony in the form of an affidavit or deposition can be
considered on a motion for summary judgment. 755 So.2d at 235. Although it is
21-CA-629 6
true that an expert is subject to cross-examination at a deposition, affidavits are
subject to challenge as well, by way of a Daubert hearing, a motion to strike, or
counter affidavits. Id. Walmart did not request a Daubert hearing or contest the
expert’s opinions through the affidavit of another expert. Although Walmart
challenged certain opinions of Mr. Ehlinger’s affidavit in their reply memorandum,
they did not seek to strike the affidavit in its entirety. They did object to the affidavit
at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs sought to offer,
file and, introduce their exhibits.
Mr. Ehlinger reviewed the pleadings, depositions, discovery documents, and
images produced related to the claims. He also inspected the surveillance video,
parking lot, and landscape island in forming his opinion. Mr. Ehlinger’s affidavit
reports his observations that the sodding was in poor condition, not well-maintained
and worn with exposed dirt, consistent with pedestrian traffic, and that there were
paving stones on other islands. He concluded that the median violated the Life
Safety Code’s requirement for safe walking surfaces for customers. The affidavit
also contains his opinion that the hole in the grassy median developed and existed
for a prolonged period of time because it was consistent with progressive weathering
of the walkway, and would have been easily visible during inspections of the parking
lot. Mr. Ehlinger gives his opinion that the median is regularly used as a walking
surface by customers, especially those parking immediately adjacent to the
landscape island. He opines that Walmart knows these areas are used as a walkway.
Mr. Ehlinger’s opinion that the hole “presented an unreasonable risk of harm
and danger to pedestrians and customers” is a conclusory statement left to fact finder.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding some of Mr. Ehlinger’s opinions
invade the province of the fact-finder. When an expert opinion constitutes the actual
legal conclusion, it goes beyond what is helpful to the jury and is not admissible.
Burk v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 529 So.2d 515 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988).
21-CA-629 7
However, these conclusions should have been stricken from the affidavit, rather than
finding the entire affidavit to be inadmissible.
Upon review, we find that the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Ehlinger’s
affidavit was not helpful to the fact finder. Mr. Ehlinger’s opinion that the condition
of this island presents an unreasonable risk of danger relies on the Life Safety Code’s
requirement for safe and level walking surface and his finding that this median’s
surface violated that code. Mr. Ehlinger’s application of the Life Safety Code is
beyond the expertise of a lay witness, and requires the testimony of an expert with
specialized knowledge. A plaintiff was previously found to not establish the
unreasonable risk of harm of a parking lot pothole because he failed to present the
testimony of an expert. Llorence v. Broadmoor Shopping Center, Inc., 11-233 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 10/05/11), 76 So.3d 134; see also, Beckham v. Jungle Gym, L.L.C., 45-
325 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 37 So.3d 564, 567 (expert affidavit indicated that
asphalt chunks were difficult to see because their color and texture caused them to
blend in with the surrounding asphalt). Furthermore, Mr. Ehlinger’s opinion is
helpful to the factfinder to assist in their determination of whether the condition is
unreasonably dangerous. While the contested issue of whether the landscape island
is a “de facto walkway” is for the jury to determine, knowledge of the Life Safety
Code’s requirements for walking surfaces, however, would assist the jury in their
determination of the risk of danger presented.
We disagree with the trial court’s assertion that “any trier of fact is ca[pa]ble
of evaluating the dangers posed by an open hole in a grassy area without expert
testimony.” Expert testimony should assist the jury through application of technical
expertise to understand evidence or determine a fact at issue, and an expert’s
testimony should not be precluded if it is within the knowledge of ordinary citizens
if it would be helpful to the trier of fact. La. C.E. art. 702, Comment (C). At the
summary judgment stage, a trial court cannot make credibility determinations, and
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“must focus solely on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they
generate.” Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So.2d at 235-6. In Marks v. Schultz, the
First Circuit found that the trial court conducted an impermissible credibility
determination when finding that “I don’t think the expert’s opinion automatically
makes something unreasonably dangerous. I don’t think that by looking at the
pictures that that condition is unreasonably dangerous.” 20-0197 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/10/20), 316 So.3d 534, 543-44.
While in Washauer v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 03-0642 (La. App. 1 Cir.
4/21/04), 879 So.2d 195, 198-99, the appellate court concluded that the trial court
was correct in concluding that the proposed expert’s testimony would not be helpful
because his “opinions were not based on superior knowledge or experience,” the
proposed expert in that case claimed no safety expertise and did not know of any
building or safety codes that might impact the placement or securing of floor mats
in a retail store. Id. However, a finding that an expert does not have technical or
professional knowledge is a challenge to his qualifications.
The trial court did not address Walmart’s allegations that Mr. Ehlinger
exceeded the scope of his expertise as an architect when giving his opinion on
pedestrian’s semi-autonomous visual activity, erosion patterns, and Walmart’s
inspection procedures. The trial court did not make a finding as to Mr. Ehlinger’s
qualifications. This may be because Walmart did not correctly challenge Mr.
Ehlinger’s qualifications. Simply claiming that an expert is not qualified without
any facts or competing expert opinion is insufficient. Hayne v. Woodridge
Condominiums, Inc., 06-923 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 957 So.2d 804, 809. In
Hayne, the plaintiff claimed the opinions in the expert’s affidavit were outside his
expertise and without foundation, but at no time did the plaintiff properly challenge
his qualifications or submit an affidavit from a countervailing expert indicating that
the defendants’ actions were not reasonably prompt and timely. Id. In that case, this
21-CA-629 9
Court found that without facts or an opposing expert, the plaintiff’s argument did
not suffice to exclude the expert’s opinion. Mr. Ehlinger was not cross-examined
regarding his qualifications in a deposition, and Walmart did not introduce an
affidavit of an expert with a contradictory opinion.
Although plaintiffs claimed no Daubert analysis was conducted by the trial
court, there was no challenge as to the validity of the methodology employed. See
MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 04-0988 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 934 So.2d 708,
718, writ denied, 06–1669 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 78. No one challenged Mr.
Ehlinger’s affidavit on the basis of sufficiency of facts or data, or as the product of
unreliable principles and methods, or the application of those methods under La.
C.E. art. 702, which would have required a Daubert hearing. Robertson v. Doug
Ashy Bldg. Materials, Inc., 10-1552 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/4/11), 77 So.3d 339,
355, writ denied, 11-2468 (La. 1/13/12), 77 So.3d 972, and writ denied, 2011-2430
(La. 1/13/12), 77 So.3d 973, and writ not considered, 11-2433 (La. 1/13/12), 77
So.3d 973, and writ not considered, 11-2432 (La. 1/13/12), 77 So.3d 974At the summary judgment stage, the Court “must draw those inferences from
the undisputed facts which are most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So.2d at 235-6. A court should remain cognizant that
it must not attempt to evaluate the persuasiveness of competing scientific studies,
and in performing its gatekeeping analysis, the court must “focus solely on the
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Id. As the trial
court did not focus on Mr. Ehlinger’s principles and methodologies in determining
the admissibility of his opinion, the inferences from the undisputed facts in his
opinion should be drawn in favor of plaintiffs to allow his opinion. Walmart will
have the opportunity at trial to attack Mr. Ehlinger’s testimony through “[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
21-CA-629 10
burden of proof.” Blair v. Coney, 19-00795 (La. 4/3/20), reh'g denied, 19-00795
(La. 7/9/20), 298 So.3d 168 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs’ second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in finding
that the hole did not present an unreasonable risk of harm and that Walmart did not
have constructive knowledge. A summary judgment that dismisses all claims is a
final, appealable judgment. La. C.C.P. arts. 968, 1915(A). Appellate courts review
summary judgments de novo using the same criteria applied by trial courts to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Taylor v. Chipotle Mexican
Grill, Inc., 18-238 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So.3d 910, 913-14, writ denied,
19-0154 (La. 4/8/19), 267 So.3d 606. The appellate court uses the trial court’s
record, but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s
rulings, to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether
the mover-appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Louque v. Scott
Equip. Co., LLC, 16-507 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/8/17), 212 So.3d 1203, 1207, writ denied,
17-0372 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So.3d 629; Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977
So.2d 880.
Unreasonable Risk of Harm
Walmart claims that plaintiffs cannot prove there was an unreasonably
dangerous condition because the landscape island was not designated as a walkway
and minor hazards in grassy areas do not create an unreasonable risk of harm.7
Plaintiffs assert that their expert identified the hazards due to the obscured hole in
an area of high volume pedestrian traffic, near the front entrance of Walmart, which
caused injury to Mrs. Islam.
7
This Court has previously declined to find that merchants owe no duty to maintain the grassy area, as
holes created in the area could give rise to the level of unreasonable risk of harm under the reasonable
person standard. Monson v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 06-921 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/07), 955 So.2d
758, 762. Instead, this Court found the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence of notice.
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The question of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm is a
mixed question of law and fact that is to be determined by the trier of fact in light of
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Broussard v. State, through
Office of State Bldgs, Div. of Admin., 12-1238 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175, 183. To
assist the fact-finder in determining whether the condition of a thing creates an
unreasonable risk of harm, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a risk-utility
balancing test that weighs four factors: “(1) the utility of the complained-of
condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and
apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature
of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by
nature.” Id. at 184; Lincoln v. Acadian Plumbing & Drain, LLC, 17-684 (La. App. 5
Cir. 5/16/18), 247 So.3d 205, 210, writ denied, 18-1074 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d
1302. The trier of fact must decide whether the social value and utility of the hazard
outweigh, and thus justify, its potential harm to others. Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 97-1174 (La. 3/4/98), 708 So.2d 362, 365.
While summary judgment may be appropriate to resolving the issue of
whether a condition presented an unreasonable risk of danger, it is best used to
determine the legal significance of undisputed facts. Dowdy v. City of Monroe,
46,693 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 78 So.3d 791, 797-98. The determination of this
issue by the fact-finder involves balancing factors regarding the claims and interests
of the parties, social utility and burden of adequate precautions. See Dupree v. City
of New Orleans, 99-3651 (La. 8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1002, 1012. In this case, the facts
regarding whether the landscape island is a walkway are in dispute. Plaintiffs,
through the affidavit of their expert, have raised the issue of whether the landscape
island should be considered a walkway by demonstrating the worn path. By pointing
out the presence of pavers on other islands, plaintiffs offer a potential cost of
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preventing the harm which conflicts with Walmart’s assertions that removal of the
hazard would be cost-prohibitive.
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact
regarding whether a hole on a landscape island used as a walkway is an unreasonably
dangerous condition. The question is not whether plaintiffs are likely to prevail on
the factual issues at trial, but simply whether there are genuine issues of material fact
for trial. McAdams v. Willis Knighton Medical Center, 38,181 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/19/03), 862 So.2d 1186, 1192; Prince, 305 So.3d at 1086-87. As plaintiffs
provided some evidence relating to the factors, the balancing of the risk and utility
in this case should be left to the fact-finder to determine whether there is an
unreasonable risk of harm.
Knowledge
Walmart claims that plaintiffs submitted no evidence that Walmart had actual
or constructive knowledge of the hole. Plaintiffs allege Walmart had constructive
knowledge due to the expert’s opinion of the hole’s presence for a prolonged period
and the requirement of employees to inspect the landscape islands for safety hazards.
The concept of constructive knowledge under Article 2317.18 imposes a
reasonable duty on the owner or custodian to discover apparent defects in the thing
in his garde. Boutin v. Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of Baton Rouge, 14-313
(La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 164 So.3d 243, 246, writ denied, 14-2495 (La. 2/13/15)
159 So.3d 469. This Court has stated that knowledge of a dangerous condition will
be presumed “when it is shown to have existed for such a long period of time” that
those responsible, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, should have had
knowledge of the condition. Dufrene v. Gautreau Family, LLC, 07-467 (La. App. 5
8
Walmart’s motion for summary judgment alleges that the applicable substantive law in this case is set
forth in La. R.S. 9:2800.6, which requires the plaintiffs to present “positive evidence” of the existence of
the condition prior to the accident. As discussed previously, this action more appropriately falls under
general premises liability as it occurred in the parking lot.
21-CA-629 13
Cir. 2/22/08), 980 So.2d 68, 80, writs denied, 08-629, 08-628 (La. 5/9/08), 980 So.2d
694 and 698. The determination of whether an owner or custodian had constructive
knowledge of a defective condition is a question of fact. Blevins v. E. Baton Rouge
Parish Hous. Auth., 15-0896 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/16), 2016 WL 1135453, 2, writ
denied, 16-0602 (La. 5/20/16), 191 So.3d 1068.
Whether Walmart would have discovered the hole if they had exercised
reasonable care is an issue of material fact. Plaintiffs presented the evidence of
Walmart’s “Standard Operating Procedure” for its “Parking Lot and Entrance.”9 As
part of “safety sweeps,” employees are “periodically walking a department or area,
checking the conditions for safety and cleanliness.” The Parking Lot and Sidewalk
Safety Standard Operating Procedure includes the parking lot in safety sweeps, and
specifies notifying facilities maintenance for any pothole or sidewalk repairs. The
standard operating procedure for inspecting the parking lot requires employees to
inspect the landscape islands for trash and “safety hazards.” Walmart’s employee,
Stephian James Ballard, testified at his deposition that they are “in charge to look
for [holes]” as part of their safety walks. Employees are “looking for [a hole] but it
depends on if it would cause a hazard to the customer.” He also agreed that any hole
that is present could cause customers to fall and it could increase the potential hazard
of that hole if it is located in an area with increased pedestrian or customer traffic.
Although Walmart’s motion for summary judgment makes the conclusory
statements that no complaints were made to Walmart regarding the condition, it did
not support that assertion with any evidence. In a previous case before this Court,
the defendant supported its motions for summary judgment with affidavits showing
inspection efforts and lack of reported similar incidents. Scott v. Galleria Operating
9
Additionally plaintiffs introduced the contract between Deep South Lawn and Garden and Walmart.
The scope of work provides that “Contractor shall mow, edge and trim lawns to maintain an even, well-
groomed appearance.” Additionally, “Contractor shall make minor replacements and repairs to the
landscape facilities as part of the required Services set forth herein. Major items needing replacement or
repair shall be reported to Walmart’s authorized representative within 48 hours of occurrence.”
21-CA-629 14
Co., L.L.C., 17-104 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17), 230 So.3d 682, writ denied, 17-2080
(La. 2/9/18), 236 So.3d 1262. The defendant introduced the affidavit of an
administrative assistant which stated:
the Galleria (1) had no prior knowledge or notice of an alleged
defect in the area where appellant claimed she fell; (2) did not receive
any reports of an alleged defect in the area where appellant claimed she
fell; (3) did not have any employees that created the alleged hazard; (4)
has employees whose primary responsibility is to patrol the property to
report and correct hazards, and perform miscellaneous general security
and maintenance duties; (5) commissions regular inspections,
maintenance, and necessary repairs to the premises throughout The
Galleria property, including the parking garage; (6) has several trained
security officers who are on the property at any given time, roaming the
common areas, including the parking garage, and reporting any
problem areas which come to their attention; (7) has no records of
incidents, defects, or repairs in the area of appellant's alleged fall for six
months prior to this incident; (8) did not receive any reports of an
alleged defect in the area where appellant allegedly fell; and (9) has not
had any similar incidents reported regarding the area appellant
allegedly fell since this incident.
Id. At 685-6.
Although plaintiffs did not submit evidence regarding reports of similar
incidents, plaintiffs produced the deposition testimony of Walmart’s employee and
standard operating procedures from which a trier of fact might conclude that
employees, tasked with searching for safety hazards and holes in the landscape
islands, should have discovered the hole by reasonable inspection. Furthermore, as
noted in the prior section, Mr. Ehlinger’s affidavit provides opinions regarding the
hole in the landscape island existing for a prolonged period of time because it was
consistent with progressive weathering of the walkway, and would have been easily
visible during inspections of the parking lot. If a party submits expert opinion
evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that would be admissible
under Daubert (and the other applicable evidentiary rules) and is sufficient to allow
a reasonable juror to conclude that the expert’s opinion on a material fact more likely
21-CA-629 15
than not is true, the trial court should deny the motion and let the issue be decided at
trial. Independent Fire, 755 So.2d. at 236.
Therefore, when Walmart pointed to an absence of factual support for the
essential element of knowledge, plaintiffs produced some factual support from
which a factfinder could make a determination of constructive knowledge to satisfy
their evidentiary burden.
Conclusion
We find that the expert opinion evidence submitted by plaintiffs, Raihana
Islam and Mohammed Islam, in opposition to defendant, Walmart’s motion for
summary judgment should have been considered in part by the trial court. Our de
novo review of plaintiffs’ evidence produced in opposition to Walmart’s motion for
summary judgment reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and we
conclude that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court excluding the expert opinion evidence of
Mr. Ehlinger is hereby reversed, the judgment granting Walmart’s motion for
summary judgment is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
21-CA-629 16