Milton L. Crosby, Sr. and Michael A. Hinyub Versus Nelson J. Cantrelle, III and Jon Gegenheimer, in His Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
MILTON L. CROSBY, SR. AND MICHAEL A. HINYUB
Davidson S. Ehle, III
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
NELSON J. CANTRELLE, III
Stephen M. Gele
CHAISSON, J.
In this election contest suit, Milton L. Crosby, Sr. and Michael A. Hinyub
appeal the trial court’s August 3, 2020 judgment denying their Petition Objecting
to the Candidacy of Nelson J. Cantrelle, III, Candidate for Judge, Second Parish
Court, Division A. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 22, 2020, Mr. Cantrelle qualified with the Jefferson Parish Clerk of
Court to run for the position of Judge of Division A, Second Parish Court. In
accordance with the manner of qualifying provisions contained in La. R.S.
18:461(A), Mr. Cantrelle paid his qualifying fee and filed with the Clerk a signed
and notarized Notice of Candidacy form, which included the following
certification required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv):
If I am a candidate for any office other than United States
senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five
tax years, I have filed my federal and state income tax returns, have
filed for an extension of time for filing either my federal or
state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a
federal or state income tax return or both.
On July 30, 2020, Mr. Crosby and Mr. Hinyub, both registered voters in the
Parish of Jefferson, filed a Verified Petition Objecting to the Candidacy of Mr.
Cantrelle. In their petition, plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to a public records
request, the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”) responded by letter that
Mr. Cantrelle has not filed the required state tax forms for the years 2017 and
2018. They further alleged that upon information and belief, Mr. Cantrelle was
required to file the state tax forms for the last five years. They alleged, therefore,
that Mr. Cantrelle’s certification contained in his Notice of Candidacy is false.
Accordingly, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Cantrelle is disqualified to run for
judge because he both failed to file his state tax returns for 2017 and 2018 and
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falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he had filed those returns.1
Plaintiffs further alleged that Mr. Cantrelle is therefore not qualified to run in the
primary election because he has not qualified in the manner prescribed by law,
pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), and because he does not meet the qualifications
for the office he seeks in the primary election, pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(3).2
At the trial of this matter, held on August 3, 2020, plaintiffs called Vanessa
LaFleur, Director of Policy Services and a custodian of records at the LDR, to
testify regarding the public records request and search for Mr. Cantrelle’s tax
filings. Ms. LaFleur testified that four different public records requests concerning
Mr. Cantrelle’s state tax returns were received in July of 2020, that a records
search was conducted on July 29, 2020, resulting in a July 30, 2020 letter
confirming that the Department could confirm tax filings by Mr. Cantrelle for tax
years 2015, 2016, and 2019, but could not confirm filings for tax years 2017 and
2018.3
In response to these allegations, Mr. Cantrelle asserted that his 2017 and
2018 tax returns were filed on July 21, 2020, via certified mail, and thus his
certifications on his Notice of Candidacy form signed on July 22, 2020, were true
and correct. Specifically, Mr. Cantrelle testified that on July 20, 2020, he and his
wife, Chelsea Cantrelle, picked up his 2017 and 2018 state tax returns from his
accountant, Mr. Robert Logreco, and that Mrs. Cantrelle mailed them on the
1
We note that the precise language of La. R.S. 18:492, which provides the exclusive grounds for
objecting to candidacy, as it relates to the filing of tax returns, does not provide disqualification for the
actual failure to file the required tax returns, but rather provides for disqualification for the false
certification in the Notice of Candidacy that the required tax returns have been filed. This choice of
language by the Legislature has created, as will be discussed infra, an evidentiary challenge to parties to
disqualification lawsuits on these grounds.
2
Although plaintiffs cite to the “failure to qualify in the manner prescribed by law” and the
“failure to meet the qualifications of office” grounds for disqualification, there is no contention that Mr.
Cantrelle did not timely file his Notice of Candidacy and pay his qualifying fee to the Clerk of Court
pursuant to La. R.S. 18:461, or that Mr. Cantrelle does not meet the qualifications for judicial candidates
set forth in La. Const. art. V, 24(A), namely that he has been domiciled in the district for one year prior to
qualifying for the election and that he has been admitted to the practice of law for eight years preceding
the November 3, 2020 election. Apparently these alleged grounds of disqualification relate solely to the
issue of the filing of Mr. Cantrelle’s state tax returns and his certification in his Notice of Candidacy
regarding those returns.
3
A copy of the LDR’s July 30, 2020 letter was introduced into evidence by plaintiffs.
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afternoon of July 21, 2020, to the LDR. Mr. Cantrelle testified that at the moment
he qualified to run for judge on July 22, 2020, he “absolutely believed” that his
2017 and 2018 state tax returns had been mailed to the LDR the previous day and
that nothing has occurred since that day to change that belief. Lastly, Mr. Cantrelle
testified that, based upon these occurrences, he filed his 2017 and 2018 Louisiana
state tax returns before he signed the qualifying affidavit.
Mr. Robert Logreco testified that he is a Certified Public Accountant and
that he prepared Mr. Cantrelle’s 2017 and 2018 Louisiana state tax returns prior to
July 20, 2020. He further testified that Mr. Cantrelle and his wife picked up the
returns on July 20, 2020.4
Mrs. Cantrelle testified that she was with her husband at Mr. Logreco’s
office on July 20, 2020, when he picked up the 2017 and 2018 tax returns. She
further testified that she printed mailing labels and prepared registered return
receipt tags, placed the returns in separate envelopes, and took those envelopes to
the United States Postal Office in Harvey, Louisiana, where she mailed them via
registered return receipt to the LDR. Mrs. Cantrelle confirmed that the documents
contained within the envelopes that she mailed were in fact Mr. Cantrelle’s 2017
and 2018 Louisiana state tax returns.5 Lastly, Mrs. Cantrelle testified that she
followed the progress of the envelopes by entering the tracking numbers on the
receipts into the USPS online web-based tracking system, which showed that the
envelopes were “delivered” on July 27, 2020, at 7:04 a.m.6 The plaintiffs did not
call any additional witnesses in rebuttal to Mr. Cantrelle’s evidence.
4
Redacted copies of these two tax returns, showing Mr. Logreco’s signature and the date of
July 20, 2020, were introduced into evidence by Mr. Cantrelle.
5
Copies of both of the U.S. Postal Service’s Certified Mail Receipts, showing that these
envelopes were mailed via certified mail on July 21, 2020, to the LDR at P.O. Box 3440 in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, were introduced into evidence by Mr. Cantrelle.
6
Printed copies of the tracking information appearing on the USPS online web-based tracking
system for both of these certified receipts were introduced into evidence by Mr. Cantrelle. Despite the
fact that the purported delivery date was eight days prior to the trial of this matter, and that Ms. LaFleur
was appearing at trial from her office via Zoom and presumably had access to the LDR database, neither
Mr. Cantrelle nor plaintiffs asked Ms. LaFleur to either confirm or controvert this evidence of delivery to
the LDR.
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At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found the Mr. Cantrelle properly
qualified for the election and accordingly rendered judgment that plaintiffs’
petition is denied. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying
their petition because defendants failed to present evidence rebutting the testimony
of Ms. LaFleur that the 2017 and 2018 tax returns had not been filed and because
the trial court legally erred in its application of Louisiana Administrative Code
Title 61, Part 1, §4911.
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts review a trial court’s findings of fact under the manifest
error or clearly wrong standard of review. Smith v. Charbonnet, 17-0634 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055, 1059, writ denied, 17-1364 (La. 8/7/17), 222
So.3d 722. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of
credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review.
Salgado v. Tri-Par. Roofing & Home Improvements, 19-407 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/27/20), -- So.3d --. Appellate review of questions of law is simply a review of
whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect. Buford v. Williams, 11-568
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/12), 88 So.3d 540, 545, writ denied, 12-264 (La. 4/27/12), 86
So.3d 630. If a decision is based on a trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the
law, rather than an exercise of its discretion, it is not entitled to deference. North v.
Doucet, 18-437 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/1/18), 253 So.3d 815, 818, writ denied, 18-1294
(La. 8/3/18), 249 So.3d 829.
In an election contest, because election laws must be interpreted to give the
electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to the
candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate should be disqualified.
Landiak v. Richmond, 05-758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541. Although
Louisiana law favors candidacy, once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
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grounds for disqualification, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the
showing. Russo v. Burns, 14-1963 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d 1111, 1114.
La. R.S. 18:492(A) states:
An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified
as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of
the following grounds:
(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy
that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and
state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing
either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S.
18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state
income tax return or both.7
Because the ground for disqualification as it pertains to tax returns is the
falsity of the candidate’s certification in his Notice of Candidacy, and because the
Louisiana Administrative Code’s “postmark” rule allows for a retroactive “filing”
date for tax returns, courts in our state have been faced with election challenge
suits, like the one before us, where a challenged candidate has filed his Notice of
Candidacy with a certification that he has filed his required tax returns, after he has
belatedly attempted to file past due tax returns by mailing them, but before actual
physical receipt of those returns by the LDR. In these cases, courts are faced with
examining the factual circumstances surrounding the mailing of the returns in order
to determine whether the candidate’s certification of the “filing” of those returns is
truthful.
In conducting our review of this matter, before we examine the evidence that
was before the trial court regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the
mailing of Mr. Cantrelle’s returns, we must first dispose of plaintiffs’ argument
that in determining the date of filing of Mr. Cantrelle’s tax returns, he cannot rely
7
We note that with the addition of this mandatory, affirmative certification regarding tax returns
in the Notice of Candidacy, under penalty of disqualification for a false certification, the Legislature has
effectively, by statute, expanded the qualifications necessary to run for office beyond those required by
our State constitution, apparently on the questionable premise that it is merely a procedural requirement
for qualifying. However, because neither party has raised this issue, nor briefed it, we decline to discuss
it further in this opinion.
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upon the Louisiana regulation’s “postmark” rule because his 2017 and 2018 state
tax returns were already past due at the time that his wife mailed them.8 In this
regard, plaintiffs further argue that if Mr. Cantrelle cannot rely upon the
“postmark” rule, then his returns were not “filed” with the LDR at the time of his
Notice of Candidacy certification and therefore that certification is necessarily
false.
Louisiana Administrative Code Title 61, Part 1, § 4911 states:
1. Delivery by the United States Postal Service. A return, report or
other document in a properly addressed envelope with sufficient
postage delivered by the United States Postal Service is deemed
filed on the date postmarked by the United States Postal Service.
The postmark must bear a date on or before the last date prescribed
for filing the return, report or other document in order to be
considered timely filed. If the postmark on the envelope is not
legible, the taxpayer has the burden of proving the date that the
postmark was made. If the return, report or other document is sent
by United States registered or certified mail, the date of
registration is treated as the date of postmark. A postage meter date
is considered a valid postmark date provided it does not conflict
with a legible United States Postal Service postmark date. If the
dates conflict, the United States Postal Service date shall override
the meter date.
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written. La. C.C. art. 9. We
agree with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s conclusion in Russo that the language of
Louisiana Administrative Code Title 61, Part 1, §4911 is unambiguous. Russo,
147 So.3d at 1114.
The first sentence of §4911 states that “a return, report or other document in
a properly addressed envelope with sufficient postage delivered by the United
States Postal Service is deemed filed on the date postmarked by the United States
Postal Service.” Plaintiffs contend, with no apparent supporting legal authority,
8
Plaintiffs reason that, since the prescribed filing dates for the 2017 and 2018 tax returns were
May 15, 2018 and May 15, 2019, respectively, and Mr. Cantrelle acknowledges that the returns were not
mailed by Mrs. Cantrelle until July 21, 2020, Mr. Cantrelle’s tax returns were untimely, and he may not
rely on the other provisions of §4911 concerning the date of postmark as the date of filing.
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that the second sentence of the regulation, stating that “[t]he postmark must bear a
date on or before the last date prescribed for filing the return, report or other
document in order to be considered timely filed” (emphasis added), requires that a
return be mailed by its prescribed due date in order for the “postmark” rule to
control the date of filing. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that the second sentence
negates the first sentence of the regulation for returns that are already untimely
when mailed. We disagree with plaintiffs’ interpretation of §4911.
Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of this regulation, a return
that is untimely when it is mailed remains untimely for tax purposes regardless of
the “postmark” rule; however, under the unambiguous language of the first
sentence, the date of the postmark is still considered the date of filing of that
return.9 Therefore, we conclude that the “postmark” rule remains applicable to a
return that is mailed after the last date prescribed for its filing, and the trial court
did not err as a matter of law in its interpretation of §4911, finding the “postmark”
rule applicable. Mr. Cantrelle was entitled to rely on the “postmark” rule, provided
that the circumstances surrounding the mailing of his returns is sufficient to justify
that reliance. We now address that issue.
The trial court, citing §4911, found that because the returns were sent by
certified mail in a properly addressed envelope with sufficient postage, Mr.
Cantrelle’s 2017 and 2018 state tax returns were filed on July 21, 2020, the date of
the postmark, and therefore Mr. Cantrelle did not make a false certification on his
Notice of Candidacy.10
9
Contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, whether Mr. Cantrelle’s 2017 and 2018 state tax returns were
timely filed for tax purposes is irrelevant to our analysis, as La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) does not require
a candidate to certify that he has filed timely tax returns, only that he has filed tax returns for the previous
five years. Indeed, if La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) required Mr. Cantrelle to certify that he had filed
timely federal and state tax returns for the previous five years, then as of May 16, 2018, the date after
which Mr. Cantrelle’s 2017 state tax return could no longer be timely filed, unless he obtained a timely
extension for filing that return, he would be disqualified from running for elective office in Louisiana for
the next five years from that date, regardless of any subsequent measures he took regarding the filing of
his 2017 state tax return.
10
Two dates appear on the certificates: “July 21, 2019,” which appears to be a postmark date, and
“July 21, 2020,” which appears to be a date of registration. There is no explanation for this discrepancy,
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In its decision, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Russo
v. Burns, 14-1963 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d 1111. That case also involved an
election challenge on the ground that the candidate, Mr. Burns, had purportedly
falsely certified on his August 20, 2014 Notice of Candidacy that he had filed his
tax returns for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. At trial, the plaintiff, Mr.
Russo, introduced correspondence to and from the LDR wherein the LDR stated it
had no tax returns on file for Mr. Burns for the years 2010 through 2013. A
representative for the LDR also testified at trial that she was unable to locate any
tax returns filed by Mr. Burns since 2009. Mr. Burns testified that he hired a tax
preparer to file his tax returns for him in early August of 2014. The tax preparer
testified that the returns were mailed, but not sent via certified mail. A United
States Postal Service “Certificate of Mailing” dated August 15, 2014, was admitted
into evidence, and the tax preparer testified that she kept the certificate to
document the tax returns had been mailed. Mr. Russo then presented rebuttal
testimony from another individual who provided other certificates of mailing from
that same post office which showed postage paid affixed to the certificates unlike
the ones placed into evidence by Mr. Burns. The trial court found that Mr. Burns
had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the prima facie case established by Mr.
Russo. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this decision, citing the “unambiguous
language regarding filing provided by the LDR’s regulations,” in particular
Louisiana Administrative Code Title 61, Part 1, §4911. In reaching its conclusion
to disqualify Mr. Burns, the Supreme Court stated, “Without sending the returns
via certified mail or otherwise ensuring their delivery to LDR, [the candidate]
although the 2019 date appears to be in error since the first entry in the tracking information indicates that
the items were in possession of the USPS in Harvey on July 21, 2020. Regardless, §4911 provides that
“if the return, report or other document is sent by United States registered or certified mail, the date of
registration is treated as the date of postmark.” Furthermore, because both dates are before the July 22,
2020 Notice of Candidacy, this discrepancy is immaterial to our analysis.
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could not have known whether or not his tax returns had been filed pursuant to
Louisiana regulation when he signed his Notice of Candidacy.” Id. at 1114
(emphasis in original; italics added).
The case before us is factually distinguishable from Russo. Like Mr. Russo,
plaintiffs here provided evidence of correspondence from the LDR showing that,
as of July 30, 2020, tax returns for Mr. Cantrelle could not be found in the LDR’s
system. Also, a representative from the LDR testified that the tax returns were not
found.11 This evidence is sufficient to establish plaintiffs’ prima facie case.
The evidence presented by Mr. Cantrelle to rebut plaintiffs’ prima facie case
is more substantial than the evidence in Russo. Mrs. Cantrelle testified that she
placed the tax returns in the envelopes, drove them to the post office, and mailed
them to the LDR in Baton Rouge via certified mail. Copies of both of the U.S.
Postal Service’s Certified Mail Receipts were introduced into evidence. These
receipts show the amount of postage paid as well as a July 21, 2020 registration
date.12
Having found that Mr. Cantrelle was entitled to rely upon the “postmark”
rule, we conclude that this evidence alone was sufficient to prove that his 2017 and
2018 state tax returns were filed as of July 21, 2020, the date that they were mailed
by certified mail. Having mailed his returns by certified mail, Mr. Cantrelle could
have reasonably known and believed that his returns would be delivered to the
LDR and would be considered filed as of July 21, 2020. See Russo, 147 So.3d at
1114 (“without sending the returns via certified mail or otherwise ensuring
their delivery to LDR, Burns could not have known whether or not his tax returns
had been filed pursuant to Louisiana regulation when he signed his Notice of
11
The opinion in the Russo case indicates that the LDR representative performed a search of the
LDR’s records at the trial of the matter. 147 So.3d at 1113. In the matter before us, neither party
requested that Ms. LaFleur perform such a search during the trial.
12
§4911 provides that “if the return, report or other document is sent by United States registered
or certified mail, the date of registration is treated as the date of postmark.”
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Candidacy” [emphasis in original; italics added], certainly implying that Mr. Burns
could have reasonably known of delivery if he had sent his returns by certified
mail). We find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in determining that
Mr. Cantrelle’s returns were filed as of July 21, 2020, and that his certification in
his Notice of Candidacy on July 22, 2020, was not false.
Plaintiffs appear to argue in their appellate brief that the reasoning of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Russo, requires a challenged candidate who seeks to
rely upon the “postmark” rule to definitively prove actual delivery of returns
mailed by certified mail to the LDR in order to rely upon the “postmark” rule to
establish the filing date. Specifically, they cite to language from Russo, that
“returns which have not been delivered to LDR by the United States Postal
Service have not been filed pursuant to this clear language [of §4911].” Russo,
147 So.3d at 1114 (emphasis in original). While we recognize that ultimate
delivery of the tax return mailed by certified mail is required for application of the
“postmark” rule for tax purposes, we disagree with plaintiffs’ assertion that the
challenged candidate must definitively prove actual delivery of returns mailed by
certified mail to the LDR for the purpose of showing that his certification in his
Notice of Candidacy was not false. We reach this conclusion for the following
reasons.
The Supreme Court in Russo disqualified Mr. Burns on the ground that he
falsely certified that he had filed his tax returns, not on the ground that he did not
file his tax returns (which is not a ground for disqualification pursuant to La. R.S.
18:492). Therefore, while events occurring subsequent to the date of Mr. Burns’
certification (such as later actual delivery of the tax returns or no such evidence of
delivery), may serve to confirm or refute the certification of filing, those
subsequent events do not change the knowledge that Mr. Burns possessed on the
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date of his certification. Consequently, it is Mr. Burns’ knowledge of events prior
to and up until the time of his certification that is relevant to the analysis.
Mr. Burns, who was attempting to rely upon the “postmark” rule, produced
no evidence of subsequent actual delivery of his returns to the LDR. If the
Supreme Court required such proof, it would have ended its analysis by indicating
that Mr. Burns failed to prove actual delivery to the LDR. Instead, the Supreme
Court stated that “without sending the returns via certified mail or otherwise
ensuring their delivery to LDR, Burns could not have known whether or not his tax
returns had been filed pursuant to Louisiana regulation when he signed his Notice
of Candidacy.” Id. (emphasis in original; italics added). Clearly, the Supreme
Court, in disqualifying Mr. Burns for making a false certification, considered what
Mr. Burns could have known, or “could not have known,” at the time he made his
certification, based upon the circumstances surrounding the mailing (e.g., whether
the returns were mailed by certified mail).
Our interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Russo is that the
challenged candidate is not required to prove actual delivery to the LDR, but that
the challenged candidate must show reliable circumstances of mailing (e.g., by
certified mail), that would tend to ensure delivery, in order to maintain a
reasonable belief that his returns have been filed as of the date of his certification
to that effect in his Notice of Candidacy. Accordingly, for purposes of an election
challenge, although proof of subsequent actual delivery of the return to the LDR
definitely would have evidentiary value to either corroborate or refute the truth of
the candidate’s certification, it is not essential to, and its unavailability at the time
of trial is not dispositive of, the question of whether the candidate’s prior
certification was truthful.
In other words, once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case for disqualification
and the burden of proof shifts to the challenged candidate, the challenged candidate
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cannot carry his burden by simply professing a purely subjective, self-serving and
unsupported “belief” that his returns have been filed. To the contrary, the
challenged candidate must produce objective supporting evidence regarding the
circumstances of mailing (e.g., proof of mailing by certified mail) to render his
belief regarding filing a reasonable belief. In this case, Mr. Cantrelle clearly
provided such objective evidence supporting his belief regarding the filing of his
state tax returns.
Regardless of our interpretation of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Russo,
to the extent that proof of actual delivery of the returns to the LDR is required in
order to rely upon the “postmark” rule for purposes of this election challenge, we
find that Mr. Cantrelle provided sufficient proof of that delivery.
Mrs. Cantrelle testified that she followed the progress of the envelopes by
entering the tracking numbers on the receipts into the USPS online web-based
tracking system. Printed copies of the tracking information appearing on the USPS
online web-based tracking system for both of these certified receipts were
introduced into evidence by Mr. Cantrelle. Those copies show that the envelopes
were in the possession of the USPS in Harvey on July 21, 2020, and were
“delivered” on July 27, 2020, at 7:04 a.m.
In our opinion, this evidence of delivery is also sufficient to rebut plaintiffs’
prima facie case and shift the evidentiary burden back to plaintiffs to prove that the
returns were not delivered and that Mr. Cantrelle falsely certified his Notice of
Candidacy.13 In response to this evidence, plaintiffs failed to produce any contrary
13
Although plaintiffs complain that Mr. Cantrelle did not ask Ms. LaFleur at the time of trial to
confirm this delivery, we note that plaintiffs had the opportunity to ask Ms. LaFleur at the time of trial to
refute this delivery, but chose not to ask. We further note that Mr. Cantrelle has filed a motion with this
Court requesting supplementation of the record with additional attached documentation, obtained after the
trial of this matter, regarding delivery of his state tax returns. In light of this opinion, we deny Mr.
Cantrelle’s request for supplementation of the record and decline his alternative request for remand to the
trial court for the taking of this additional evidence.
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evidence and therefore failed in their burden of proof. We find no manifest error
in the trial court’s factual findings to this effect.
Plaintiffs also alleged that Mr. Cantrelle is disqualified to run for judge
because he has not qualified in the manner prescribed by law, pursuant to La. R.S.
18:492(A)(1), and because he does not meet the qualifications for the office he
seeks in the primary election, pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(3). However,
because these alleged grounds of disqualification relate solely to the issue of the
filing of Mr. Cantrelle’s state tax returns and his certification in his Notice of
Candidacy regarding those returns, and having found that Mr. Cantrelle’s
certification in his Notice of Candidacy regarding those returns was not false, we
pretermit any further discussion of disqualification pursuant to La. R.S.
18:492(A)(1) or La. R.S. 18:492(A)(3).
CONCLUSION
Having found no legal or manifest error in the trial court’s judgment denying
plaintiffs’ petition challenging the qualifications of Mr. Cantrelle, we hereby
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED
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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 10, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
20-CA-252
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DAVIDSON S. EHLE, III (APPELLANT) STEPHEN M. GELE (APPELLEE) CAREY B. DASTE (APPELLEE)
MAILED
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