Tami Jerrie Turnley v. Joseph Chad Turnley

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
JFIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2020 CW 0849R
TAMI JERRIE TURNLEY
VERSUS
JOSEPH CHAD TURNLEY
Judgment Rendered: DEC 3 0 2021
Appealed from the
Family Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Docket Number F209536
Honorable Pamela J. Baker, Judge Presiding
Lisa L. Boudreaux Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee,
Baton Rouge, LA Tami Jerrie Turnley
Brian J. Prendergast Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Baton Rouge, LA Joseph Chad Turnley
and
David M. Prados
New Orleans, LA
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
kvRC Au1
I
WHIPPLE, C.J.
In this divorce and community partition matter, the husband sought to appeal
the trial court' s April 16, 2020 judgment, which declared a Declaration of Separate
Property with Reservation of Fruits and Revenues to be invalid and unenforceable.
After this court dismissed the appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs
and ordered this court to convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writs
and to consider the application on the merits. Turnley v. Turnley, 2021- 00779 ( La.
10/ 1/ 21), 324 So. 3d 1041 ( per curiam). Thus, we convert the appeal to an
application for supervisory writs, and on review, we deny the writ application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 5, 2001, two days prior to the parties' marriage, Joseph Chad
Turnley and Tami Jerrie Turnley signed a " Declaration of Separate Property with
Reservation of Fruits and Revenues with Concurrence and Acknowledgement"
the September 5, 2001 Declaration" or simply " the Declaration"), through which
Mr. Turnley sought to declare the separate nature of his interests in several
corporations as well as all fruits and revenues that may be derived therefrom. The
September 5, 2001 Declaration was signed by a notary public, but was not signed
before two witnesses.
Both Ms. Turnley and Mr. Turnley subsequently filed petitions for divorce,
with Ms. Tumley filing her petition on June 9, 2017, and Mr. Turnley filing his
petition on May 9, 2019. By judgment dated July 2, 2019, the parties were
divorced.'
Thereafter, Ms. Turnley filed a Petition for Partition, in which she averred
that Mr. Turnley' s September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid in that it was not an
The trial court also signed a Stipulated Judgment on April 17, 2019, which provided, in
part, that " IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a Judgment shall
issue decreeing a separation of property between the parties retroactive to the date of filing the
Petition for Divorce of June 9, 2017 pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2374( C)."
2
authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged and, further, was
not filed in the conveyance records. Thus, she contended that the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property acquired during the community were
community assets to be divided between the parties. Given the dispute between
the parties as to the classification of the fruits and revenues of Mr. Turnley' s
separate property, Ms. Turnley also filed in these proceedings a petition for
declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the September 5, 2001 Declaration
was invalid for lack of conformity with the requirements of LSA-C. C. art. 2339.
Following a trial on the petition for declaratory judgment, where evidence
and testimony were introduced, the trial court signed a judgment on April 16,
2020, declaring the September 5, 2001 Declaration to be invalid and
2
unenforceable. From this judgment, Mr. Turnley sought to appeal. This court
dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a partial judgment that was not
designated as final for purposes of immediate appeal in accordance with LSA-
C. C. P. art. 1915( B)( 1). Turnley v. Turnley, 2020- 0849 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 4/ 29/ 21)
unpublished), 2021 WL 1686231. Subsequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted Mr. Turnley' s application for writs and ordered this court to convert the
appeal to an application for supervisory writs and to consider the application on the
merits. Turnley v. Turnley, 2021- 00779 ( La. 10/ 1/ 21), 324 So. 3d 1041 ( per
curiam). Thus, we convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writs and
review the merits of the trial court' s determination that the September 5, 2001
Declaration was invalid for lack of conformity with the requirements of LSA- C. C.
art. 2339.
2The April 16, 2020 judgment also ordered Mr. Tumley to provide Mrs. Turnley an
advance of $ 25, 000. 00 with full reservation of all rights to be addressed when the former
community property is partitioned; however, Mr. Turnley seeks review of only the portion of the
judgment declaring the September 5, 2001 Declaration to be invalid.
3
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to LSA-C. C. art. 2339, the natural and civil fruits of a spouse' s
separate property are community property. However, the spouse who owns the
separate property " may reserve them as his separate property by a declaration
made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly acknowledged."
Moreover, at the time of the September 5, 2001 Declaration at issue herein, LSA-
C. C. art. 2339 further provided that as to the fruits and revenues of immovables,
the declaration is effective when filed for registry in the conveyance records of
the parish in which the immovable property is located," and as to the fruits of
movables, "
the declaration is effective when filed for registry in the conveyance
records of the parish in which the declarant is domiciled." 3
Things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of
community of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse
may prove that they are separate property. LSA- C. C. art. 2340. However, the
party asserting the separate nature of the property acquired during the marriage has
the burden of overcoming a strong presumption in favor of the community, and the
proper burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of community in LSA-C. C.
art. 2340 is a preponderance of the evidence. Succession of Hebert, 2003- 0531,
2003- 0532 ( La. App. 1' Cir. 9/ 17/ 04), 887 So. 2d 98, 101, writ denied, 2004- 2571
La. 12/ 17/ 04), 888 So. 2d 872.
Through the September 5, 2001 Declaration at issue, Mr. Turnley sought to
recognize the separate nature of his pre -marriage business interests and to further
declare as his separate property the fruits and revenues of those separate business
interests accruing during the community, as follows:
Affiants [ Joseph Chad Turnley and Tammi Marie Jerri] intend
3Louisiana Civil Code article 2339 now provides that the declaration reserving the fruits
of separate property is effective when a copy is provided to the other spouse and the
declaration is filed in the appropriate conveyance records. LSA-C. C. art. 2339 ( as amended by
La. Acts 2008, No. 855, § 1, effective August 15, 2008).
L,
to married [ sic] on September 7, 2001, in East Baton Rouge Parish,
Louisiana. Affiant, Joseph Chad Turnley, presently has as his
separate property Turnley Company, Inc., which includes the
subsidiary companies of Wonder Cuts, Inc. and Tri- Star Waste
Services, Inc. Affiants hereby declare, agree and acknowledge that
Wonder Cuts, Inc. and Tri- Star Waste Services, Inc., together with
all holdings of each of those corporations and the holdings of
Turnley Company, Inc. as they exist at this time are and shall remain
the sole exclusive and separate property of Joseph Chad Turnley.
Additionally, all fruits and revenues which may be derived therefrom
shall remain the separate property of Joseph Chad Turnley. Affiants
further acknowledge that any future openings under the
aforementioned name of Wonder Cuts, Inc. or Tri- Star Waste
Services, Inc.shall be the sole exclusive and separate property of
Joseph Chad Turnley and that all fruits and revenues derived
therefrom shall likewise be the separate property of Joseph Chad
Turnley.
Affiant, Tammy Marie Jerri, acknowledges and agrees to the
designations made herein by Joseph Chad Turnley.
As stated above, both Mr. Turnley and Ms. Turnley signed the September 5,
2001 Declaration prior to their September 7, 2001 marriage, and it was also signed
by a notary public. However, the September 5, 2001 Declaration undisputedly was
not signed in the presence of two witnesses, nor was it filed in the conveyance
records either before or during the parties' marriage. Rather, on October 7, 2019,
after the July 2, 2019 judgment of divorce was rendered, retroactively terminating
the community property regime, Mr. Turnley signed an Act of Acknowledgement
and Confirmation (" the October 7, 2019 Confirmation"), through which Mr.
Turnley " recognize[ d] and acknowledge[ d]" his signature on the September 5,
2001 Declaration. Mr. Turnley then filed the October 7, 2019 Confirmation
together with the September 5, 2001 Declaration in the conveyance records of
Ascension Parish on October 17, 2019, and in the conveyance records of East
Baton Rouge Parish on October 25, 2019.
While recognizing that both Mr. Turnley and Ms. Turnley had signed the
September 5, 2001 Declaration, the trial court, in oral reasons for judgment,
nonetheless found that the Declaration lacked proper form and had not been filed
5
in the conveyance records of the appropriate parish. Moreover, while further
recognizing that Mr. Turnley had subsequently duly acknowledged his signature
and had filed the October 7, 2019 Confirmation and the September 5, 2001
Declaration for registry in the conveyance records, the trial court noted that neither
of those events had occurred prior to the termination of the community property
regime. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the September 5, 2001
Declaration was invalid and unenforceable because of the lack of proper form and
the failure to file in the conveyance records.
Mr. Turnley now argues that although the September 5, 2001 Declaration
admittedly was not signed in the presence of two witnesses or duly acknowledged
at the time of execution, it was nonetheless effective between the parties when they
signed it because Ms. Turnley had actual notice of the Declaration. According to
Mr. Turnley, the required filing of a declaration reserving the fruits of separate
property for registry in the conveyance records pursuant to the 2001 version of
LSA- C. C. art. 2339 served the dual purpose of providing constructive notice to the
other spouse and to third persons. He argues that because Ms. Turnley had actual
knowledge of the September 5, 2001 Declaration from the date of its execution by
her signature thereon ( even though her signature was not necessary), any public
policy reasons for filing the Declaration in the conveyance records were met by her
signature and corresponding immediate knowledge.' Accordingly, he contends,
because the purpose of requiring recordation is to provide knowledge, the purpose
and intent of LSA-C. C. art. 2339 was fully accomplished when the September 5,
2001 Declaration was signed by the parties.
Additionally, Mr. Turnley contends that the September 5, 2001 Declaration
Regarding its effectiveness as to third parties, Mr. Turnley contends that while the
September 5, 2001 Declaration was not filed in the conveyance records at the time it was signed,
the later filings for registry in the conveyance records of Ascension and East Baton Rouge
Parishes on October 17 and 25, 2019, effectuated notice as to third persons.
was a valid contract between the parties, and, if not immediately valid at the time
it was executed, it is now valid, retroactive to the date of its signing, as a result of
his subsequent acknowledgement and confirmation of the Declaration, as
acknowledgement of his signature could be accomplished at any time. Mr.
Turnley further asserts that to the extent the September 5, 2001 Declaration did not
comply with the requirements of LSA- C. C. art. 2339 at the time it was signed, the
Declaration was a relative nullity in that it violated a rule intended for the
protection of private parties rather than a rule of public order intended for the
protection of a large class of persons. He contends that pursuant to LSA- C. C. art.
1844, a confirmation of a relative nullity is retroactive to the date of the confirmed
act.5 Thus, according to Mr. Turnley, his later October 7, 2019 Confirmation of
the September 5, 2001 Declaration and recording of the Confirmation together
with the original Declaration retroactively cured any relative nullity in the
Declaration to the date of its September 5, 2001 execution.
At the outset, we note that Mr. Turnley' s argument that the September 5,
2001 Declaration was effective between the parties when they signed it by virtue of
Ms. Turnley' s actual notice of the Declaration completely ignores the form
requirements of LSA-C. C. art. 2339, which provides that a declaration reserving
the fruits of separate property must be " made in an authentic act or in an act under
private signature duly acknowledged." In Acurio v. Acurio, 2016- 1395 ( La.
5/ 3/ 17), 224 So. 3d 935, 938- 940, although in the context of a matrimonial
agreement signed by the parties before their marriage, 6 the Louisiana Supreme
5" Confirmation is a declaration whereby a person cures the relative nullity of an
obligation." LSA- C. C. art. 1842. Pursuant to LSA-C. C. art. 1844, "[ t] he effects of confirmation
and ratification are retroactive to the date of the confirmed or ratified obligation" although
n] either confirmation nor ratification may impair the rights of third persons."
6Pursuant to LSA-C. C. art. 2328, a " matrimonial agreement" is a contract establishing a
regime of separation of property or modifying or terminating the legal regime. Spouses may
enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage; however, they may enter into a
matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only
upon joint petition and a finding by the court that it serves their best interests and that the
spouses understand the governing principles and rules. LSA-C. C. art. 2329.
7
Court addressed the form requirements of such a matrimonial agreement, which,
similar to the form requirements of a LSA- C. C. art. 2339 declaration of
separateness, requires that the agreement be " made by authentic act or by an act
under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses." See LSA- C. C. art.
2331. In Acurio, the spouses, who were previously married to and divorced from
one another, executed a matrimonial agreement prior to their remarriage. The
document was not executed as an authentic act, having been signed by the parties
before a notary and only one witness. After a judgment of divorce was signed, the
wife sought to exclude evidence of the matrimonial agreement for failure to
comply with the form requirements of LSA-C. C. art. 2331. The trial court granted
the motion to exclude the agreement, concluding that it was null and void based
upon a lack of form prior to the entering of the marriage, noting that it was not
executed as an authentic act or as an act under private signature duly
acknowledged prior to the marriage. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the
trial court. Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 936. In reversing the appellate court, the
Supreme Court noted that the legal regime of community property is presumed,
LSA- C. C. art. 2340, and that in light of that presumption and the strong legislative
policy favoring community rights, the Court interprets statutory provisions that
waive those rights stricti juris. Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 938.
Moreover, reading the Civil Code articles addressing matrimonial
agreements in pari materia, the Court concluded that the requirements for entering
into a matrimonial agreement both before and during a marriage clearly indicated
legislative intent " to make it onerous to waive one' s community property rights, at
least to the extent that certain procedural hurdles were put in place to ensure the
parties consider the consequences of entering into a matrimonial agreement that is
not favored by public policy." Looking at the context within which the " private
signature duly acknowledged" language was placed as an alternative to the
3
authentic act, the Court further found that " the very fact that `` an act under private
signature duly acknowledged' is presented as the sole alternative to an `` authentic
act' is a telling recognition that both methods of execution are meant to be
sufficiently arduous so as to provoke thought and consideration before entering
into the agreement." Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 939- 940. Thus, the Court reasoned, " if
procedural burdens are placed on the spouses by way of authentic act before
marriage and court approval during marriage, it logically follows that the relaxed
act of signing one' s private signature, without the accompanying requirement
of it being duly acknowledged, is disallowed." Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 938
emphasis added).
We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Acurio. The fact that
an act under private signature duly acknowledged is presented " as the sole
alternative" to an authentic act as the two methods by which a spouse may reserve
the fruits of his or her separate property is a " telling recognition" that both methods
of execution are " meant to be sufficiently arduous so as to provoke thought and
consideration" before one spouse deprives the other spouse of those fruits, which,
under the governing principles of the legal regime, would otherwise become
community property. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 939- 940. Accordingly, we find
no merit to Mr. Turnley' s assertion that Ms. Turnley' s knowledge of the
September 5, 2001 Declaration at the time of its execution somehow cured the
deficiencies in its form.
Nor do we find any merit in Mr. Turnley' s contention that any deficiency in
form in the September 5, 2001 Declaration, as a relative nullity, was retroactively
cured pursuant to LSA- C. C. art. 1844, by his October 7, 2019 Confirmation of his
signature on the September 5, 2001 Declaration and the subsequent filing of the
Declaration and Confirmation in the conveyance records of Ascension and East
Baton Rouge Parishes. Rather, we note that LSA-C. C. art. 2339, as it existed at the
9
time the September 5, 2001 Declaration was signed, specifically provided that a
reservation of fruits is " effective when filed for registry in the conveyance
records,"
thus not allowing for retroactive effectiveness of such a reservation.
Emphasis added). In so providing, LSA- C. C. art. 2339 makes no distinction
between effectiveness of the reservation as to the other spouse and effectiveness as
to third persons. Moreover, we note that LSA- C. C. art. 1844 addresses
confirmation and ratification of a relatively null obligation. An obligation, by
definition is a legal relationship between two persons, LSA-C. C. 1756, whereas a
LSA- C. C. art. 2339 reservation of fruits is a unilateral declaration, rather than an
obligation.
Accordingly, the more general provision of LSA-C. C. art. 1844, stating
that the effects of confirmation of a relatively null obligation are retroactive to the
date of the confirmed obligation, cannot prevail over the more specific article
applicable to the effectiveness of a reservation of the fruits of separate property.
If, in crafting LSA-C. C. art. 2339, the legislature had intended the filing of a
declaration of separateness of fruits to impact the effectiveness of the declaration
only as to third persons and not as to the spouses, it could have enacted language to
that effect. However, the language of LSA- C. C. art. 2339 at the time of the
September 5, 2001 Declaration provided more broadly that the effectiveness of a
declaration of separateness of fruits occurs " upon filing in the conveyance
records," without distinguishing between its effectiveness between the spouses or
7See generally LSA-C. C. art. 1916 ( providing that "[ n] ominate contracts are subject to
the special rules of the respective titles when those rules modify, complement, or depart from the
rules of this title [ conventional obligations or contracts]"), and Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 938
wherein the Supreme Court rejected the husband' s attempt to rely on the general rules of
obligations for his position that there was no temporal requirement for acknowledgement of a
private signature to a matrimonial agreement, holding instead that " the collective rules assigned
to matrimonial agreements, as nominate contracts, dictate that acknowledgement of spouses'
signatures must occur prior to the marriage ...").
10
as to third persons.' LSA-C. C. art. 2339 ( prior to amendment by Acts 2008, No.
855, § 1). Thus, the fruits of separate property are community until such time as a
properly executed declaration is filed in the appropriate conveyance records. 9 See
Major v. Major, 94- 1885, 94- 1886 ( La. App. 4tn Cir. 4/ 3/ 96), 671 So. 2d 571, 580
where the parties were married on January 30, 1960, and the wife executed and
recorded a declaration, declaring that the fruits of her separate property were to be
separate, the rents from her separate property from August of 1987 forward were
her separate property). Accordingly, because neither the form nor the filing
requirements necessary to give legal effect to the September 5, 2001 Declaration
were completed at any point prior to or during the parties' marriage, we find no
error in the trial court' s determination that the Declaration was invalid and
ineffective.
Moreover, even if we were to find merit to Mr. Turnley' s arguments that the
filing of the September 5, 2001 Declaration in the appropriate conveyance records
governs the effectiveness of the declaration only as to third persons and not as to
the parties themselves where both parties signed the Declaration and
acknowledged their signatures thereon, we note that neither party duly
acknowledged their signatures until such time as the parties were already divorced
and the community regime thus terminated. While Mr. Turnley asserts that LSA -
8
Any argument that a spouse' s knowledge of such a declaration by the other spouse
somehow renders the declaration effective prior to its filing in the appropriate conveyance
records is also belied by the current, amended language of LSA- C. C. art. 2339. As stated in
footnote 3, supra, under the language of the current version of LSA-C. C. art. 2339, such a
declaration is not effective until " a copy is provided to the other spouse and the declaration is
filed for registry" in the appropriate conveyance records. ( Emphasis added). Accordingly, a
spouse' s knowledge of the declaration upon being provided with a copy thereof would be
insufficient to effectuate the declaration.
9Indeed, even if we were to consider the September 5, 2001 Declaration as a matrimonial
agreement, signed by both parties prior to their marriage through which they sought to modify
the legal regime, see LSA-C. C. arts. 2328 & 2329, the conclusion would be the same. While the
lack of recordation of such a matrimonial agreement would only restrict its effectiveness as to
third persons, see LSA-C. C. art. 2332, the failure to execute the Declaration either by authentic
act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses prior to their
marriage would render it invalid. See LSA- C. C. art. 2331 & Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 938- 940.
11
C. C. art. 183610 establishes no time restriction on when an acknowledgement of a
private signature may be made, such that the Declaration was valid upon his
acknowledgement of their signatures, we conclude that some temporal element as
to the acknowledgement of a private signature on a declaration of separateness of
fruits of separate property must exist.
In Acurio, while the parties' matrimonial agreement was not executed in an
authentic act,
it was duly acknowledged after divorce proceedings had begun.
While the appellate court reasoned that the spouses did not have to acknowledge
their signatures prior to marriage for the agreement to be valid, the Supreme Court
disagreed. Noting that an authentic act constitutes full proof of the agreement it
contains as against the parties, their heirs, and successors, thereby preventing
parties from contesting their signatures during divorce proceedings when the
parties are most contentious, the Court held that it likewise " stands to reason that
the requirement of acknowledgement is one with similar temporal constraints and
consequences such that the proof of one' s signature is as much an element of proof
as it is of required form." Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 939 ( emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court concluded that " in order to have legal validity, a
matrimonial agreement executed prior to marriage must be made by authentic act
or signed and duly acknowledged prior to marriage." Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940;
see also Rush v. Rush, 2012- 1502 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 25/ 13), 115 So. 3d 508, 511-
512 ( where parties executed a matrimonial agreement by private act prior to
marriage, but did not perfect all of the form elements required of LSA- C. C. art.
2331 prior to marriage, there was no valid matrimonial agreement).
10Louisiana Civil Code article 1836 provides in pertinent part, as follows:
An act under private signature may be acknowledged by a party to the act by
recognizing the signature as his own before a court, or before a notary public, or
other officer authorized to perform that function, in the presence of two witnesses.
An act under private signature may be acknowledged also in any other manner
authorized by law.
12
We recognize that the temporal element imposed by the Supreme Court with
regard to matrimonial agreement requiring that a spouse' s private signature be duly
acknowledged prior to marriage is justified by the fact that the procedural
requirements for spouses entering into a matrimonial agreement become more
onerous upon marriage, after which time spouses wishing to enter into a
matrimonial agreement have the heightened requirement of seeking and obtaining
court approval. See LSA-C. C. art. 2329. On the other hand, a spouse seeking to
reserve the fruits of his or her separate property during the marriage is not likewise
subjected to a more onerous procedure than that required before marriage. Rather,
a spouse seeking to reserve the fruits of separate property must adhere to the same
procedural burdens both before and during the marriage, i. e., " by a declaration
made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly acknowledged."
LSA- C. C. art. 2339.
Nonetheless, we find that, at the very least, the requirement of duly
acknowledging a spouse' s signature must necessarily occur prior to the
termination of the community regime. Indeed, the community classification of the
fruits of a spouse' s separate property ( in the absence of proper declaration of
separateness) necessarily ceases as to fruits produced after the termination of the
Pt
community regime. See Succession of Doty, 496 So. 2d 543, 544- 545 ( La. App.
Cir. 1986) ( where the husband did not file a declaration to the contrary, the fruits
of his separate property were community assets, but the wife had a right to those
fruits only during the community' s existence and not after her husband' s death).
Thus, it stands to reason that such an acknowledgement after divorce, when the
community has already ceased to exist,' I has no practical or legal effect as it is
simply too late.
IIA judgment of divorce terminates a community property regime retroactively to the
date of filing of the petition in the action in which the judgment of divorce is rendered. LSA-
C. C. art. 159.
13
Because neither the form nor the filing requirements for an Article 2339
declaration were perfected at any point during the Turnleys' marriage, the fruits of
Mr. Turnley' s separate property were necessarily community property under the
clear provisions of LSA- C. C. art. 2339. However, such a classification necessarily
terminated upon the termination of the community property regime by the parties'
divorce. Because Mr. Turnley' s acknowledgment of his signature on the
September 5, 2001 Declaration did not occur until over eighteen years later, at a
time when the parties were
already divorced and the community already
terminated, the acknowledgement clearly occurred too late to have any effect on
the otherwise invalid September 5, 2001 Declaration. As such, we find no error in
the trial court' s determination that the September 5, 2001 Declaration was invalid
and ineffective.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, as directed on remand, we convert Mr.
Turnley' s appeal of the trial court' s April 16, 2020 judgment to an application for
supervisory writs and deny the writ application.
APPEAL CONVERTED TO AN APPLICATION FOR
SUPERVISORY WRITS; WRIT DENIED.
14
TAMI JERRIE TURNLEY STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS
FIRST CIRCUIT
JOSEPH CHAD TURNLEY 2020 CW 0849R
Chutz, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority' s conclusion that the 2001 Declaration is invalid due
to noncompliance with the required statutory formalities, despite the fact that Mrs.
Turnley' s signature on the Declaration signified her knowledge of and agreement
with its contents. I concur for the purpose of noting that, given the procedural
posture of this case, this court has not considered the issue of whether Mrs. Turnley' s
concurrence in and agreement with the Declaration' s statement that the fruits and
revenues of Mr. Turnley' s separate property were to remain his separate property,
together with other pertinent circumstances, created a natural obligation on her part
to Mr. Turnley that would prevent her from claiming a portion of those fruits and
revenues. See La. C. C. arts. 1760 & 1761; Deshotels v. Deshotels, 13- 1406 ( La.
App. 3d Cir. 11/ 5/ 14), 150 So. 3d 541, 545- 46.