David Lee Creekbaum v. Taryn D. Creekbaum

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2021 CA 0527
1:
4 DAVID LEE CREEKBAUM
VERSUS
j
TARYN D. CREEKBAUM
Judgment Rendered.
DEC 0 9 2021
Appealed from the
21st Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Livingston
State of Louisiana
Case No. 167117
The Honorable Jeffery T. Oglesbee, Judge Presiding
Sherman Q. Mack Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
C. Glenn Westmoreland David Lee Creekbaum
Emily Guidry
Albany, Louisiana
Kaitlin Mayeux Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Taryn D. Creekbaum
BEFORE: GUIDRY, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
THERIOT, J.
This appeal arises from the trial court' s award of interim and final periodic
spousal support. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
David Lee Creekbaum and Taryn D. Creekbaum were married in 1985. On
June 9, 2020, David filed a petition for divorce. Taryn reconvened, alleging that
she was free from fault in the breakup of the marriage, that she is in need of
interim and final spousal support, and that David has the ability to pay such
support.
The parties entered a stipulated judgment on July 15, 2020, addressing
several issues, including interim spousal support. Pursuant to this judgment, David
was ordered to pay interim spousal support in the amount of $1, 250. 00 per month;
however, David stopped paying interim spousal support after only one payment.'
On August 31, 2020, Taryn filed a motion to compel, seeking to have the
trial court order David to answer discovery requests propounded on June 29, 2020.
The motion to compel was set for hearing on October 21, 2020, at which time the
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trial court apparently gave David ten days to respond to discovery. On October
29, 2020, Taryn filed a " Rule to Make Past Due Spousal Support Executory and
For Contempt," alleging that David failed to pay spousal support as ordered by the
stipulated judgment for the months of July, September, and October 2020, and was
presently in arrears for the total amount of $ 3, 750. 00. A trial was held on
November 19, 2020 on the issues of interim and final spousal support, past due
spousal support, and contempt.
Taryn testified that she is not actually certain that David ever made a single spousal support payment. However, in
August, she found three extra money orders in David' s Investments' rental payment drop box, which she could not
correlate to any of the rental properties. The total of the three money orders was $ 1, 250. 00, so she concluded that
they must have been an interim spousal support payment from David.
2 David' s discovery responses were not provided within ten days, and the first incomplete discovery responses were
apparently faxed to counsel for Taryn on the morning of the trial of this matter.
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Taryn testified at the trial regarding her income and expenses. Although she
worked throughout the parties' thirty-five year marriage, she never earned much
income. Taryn worked as a realtor for almost twenty years, but it was never a
consistent, stable source of income because she did not have the time to devote to
real estate.'
The parties' primary source of income throughout the marriage was
David' s business, David' s Flooring. For approximately thirty-five years, Taryn
managed the business side of David' s Flooring, but never received a salary. In
2005, the parties formed another company, David' s Investments, which owns
rental properties. Taryn utilized her real estate knowledge to acquire properties for
David' s Investments and managed the company both during and after the marriage;
however, the properties do not currently produce any income,' and Taryn was
never paid for her work there, which she described as " all -consuming" and " a
fulltime job." Taryn no longer has a real estate license because she cannot afford
the $ 2, 000. 00 license renewal fee without the income from David' s Flooring. As a
result, she currently has no income aside from spousal support, which she has not
received for several months.
Taryn calculated her living expenses for the trial using the detailed records
she kept for the household throughout the marriage. Based on her 2019 records of
the parties' household expenses, she estimated her expenses to be $ 5, 659. 64 per
month.
Taryn also testified about David' s earning capacity and means to pay
spousal support. Taryn explained that David had been in the flooring business
throughout the marriage, and David' s Flooring had always been the parties'
primary source of income. Taryn testified that the company reported income of
138, 092. 50 in 2016, $ 240, 880. 83 in 2017, and $ 144, 466. 00 in 2018. However,
3 In 2019, Taryn' s earnings from real estate were between $ 2, 000.00 and $ 3, 000. 00. In the prior three years, her
records reflect earnings from real estate of. $ 1, 712. 50 ( 2018); $ 4, 655. 00 ( 2017); and $ 1, 992. 50 ( 2016).
4 Taryn testified that the properties were purchased as investments to produce retirement income in the future for the
parties, but they currently operate at a loss.
3
Taryn alleged that in 2019, David began hiding the income from David' s Flooring
from her by no longer reporting jobs to her or allowing her to invoice customers.
The company reported only $ 50, 557. 00 in income that year. When David moved
out of the parties'
home, he took all of his tools and materials for the flooring
business with him, as well as the tools for his new lawn care business, and Taryn
believes that he is still working in both capacities, despite his claims that he is
unemployed. Additionally, Taryn testified that David withdrew $ 16, 000. 00 from
the operating account for David' s Investments several days before filing the
petition for divorce, and she believes that he received a personal injury settlement
of $25, 000. 00 in July of 2020.
David also testified at the trial regarding Taryn' s need for support. In
response to Taryn' s assertion that she has no income, David pointed out that Taryn
collects rent from the properties owned by David' s Investments, which totals
approximately $ 10, 000.00 per month when the properties are fully rented. Further,
David claimed that during the marriage, the expenses for the rental properties did
not typically exceed the rent collected each month. When questioned about the
2016- 2019 tax returns for David' s Investments, which show a loss each year,
David suggested that some of the claimed expenses are discretionary; however, he
acknowledged that Taryn handled all financial matters and he could not give a
solid answer" about those things.
Regarding his own income, David testified that he is no longer working and
receives unemployment benefits of $220. 00 per week.' Although he has been in
the flooring business for approximately forty-three years, he testified that it has
been eight or nine months since he last worked. Over the course of his trial
Although David prepared an income and expense affidavit, it was not provided to opposing counsel until the
morning of trial, and Taryn' s counsel objected to its use at trial. David' s counsel informed the trial court that she
could offer no good reason for David' s failure to respond to discovery, and David testified vaguely that he has
trouble completing written documents by himself and did not know what he needed to do with the discovery
requests. The trial court explained to the parties that it needed some evidence of David' s income and expenses in
order to determine his ability to pay spousal support, and rather than delay the matter further, the parties agreed to
allow David to testify as to those matters rather than introduce the affidavit into evidence.
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testimony, he gave several explanations for why he is not currently working.
Initially, he testified that there is no work available, although he has looked for
work both in state and out of state, and that COVID has affected his business. He
later testified that builders no longer want to hire him because he cannot afford to
carry workers' compensation and general liability insurance. Later, he testified
that although he is still physically capable of working, he has some sciatic nerve
pain and is seeking work outside of the flooring business for that reason. When
questioned by the trial court as to whom he contacted in his job search, David
answered vaguely that he " contacted a couple of outfits" about jobs that would
allow him to sit down, such as operating a forklift or lawnmower. He did get one
grass -cutting job, but explained that he was never paid for the work. He admitted
on cross examination that he had recently done a flooring job, for which he had
been paid, but he did not disclose how much he earned for that job.
David estimated that his expenses total approximately $ 2, 300. 00 per month,
including $ 325. 00 per month in rent, $ 300. 00 per month for food, $ 80. 00 per week
for fuel, $ 55. 00 per month for a cell phone, $ 30. 00-$ 50. 00 a month for household
supplies, $ 20. 00 per month for grooming, and $ 1, 250. 00 per month for interim
spousal support under the consent judgment. Since his expenses exceed his
income from unemployment, David testified that he borrows money from the
parties' adult son, with whom he currently lives, in order to meet his needs. He
admitted that he has not paid the interim spousal support agreed to in the consent
judgment because he cannot afford it.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that Taryn was free from
fault in the breakup of the marriage and is in need of spousal support. The trial
court found that Taryn' s needs total $ 5, 659. 64 a month and that her income from
real estate, when she still had a license, was minimal at best. The trial court noted
that, for unexplained reasons, David' s income dramatically decreased over the last
two years. For purposes of the support obligation, the trial court determined
David' s gross annual income to be $ 60, 000. 00, and concluded that he has the
ability to pay spousal support in the amount of $1, 750. 00 a month. Based on these
findings, the trial court ordered David to pay Taryn $ 1, 750. 00 a month as interim
spousal support, retroactive to July 1, 2020, and further ordered David to pay
Taryn $ 1, 750. 00 a month for a period of five years as final periodic spousal
support.6
David appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that he has the
ability to pay and Taryn has a need for $ 1, 750. 00 a month in interim spousal
support, and also erred in finding that Taryn is entitled to final periodic support in
the amount of $1, 750. 00 a month for a period of five years.
DISCUSSION
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the trial court may award interim
periodic support to a party, which support shall terminate one hundred eighty days
from the rendition of a judgment of divorce, unless extended for good cause
shown. La. C. C. arts. 111 and 113( A). The amount of an award of interim spousal
support is determined based on the needs of the party requesting the support, the
ability of the other party to pay, any interim or final child support obligation, and
the standard of living of the parties during the marriage. A spouse seeking interim
spousal support bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to it. Martello v.
Martello, 2006- 0594, p. 6 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 3/ 23/ 07), 960 So. 2d 186, 192. A
claimant demonstrates the need for interim spousal support if she establishes that
she lacks sufficient income or the ability to earn a sufficient income to sustain the
style or standard of living that she enjoyed while she resided with the other spouse.
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 2020- 0171, p. 3 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 11/ 6/ 20), 315 So. 3d 913,
6 The trial court judgment also held David in contempt for failure to answer discovery timely and failure to pay
spousal support due, made $ 4,400.00 in past due spousal support executory, and awarded attorney fees to Taryn in
the amount of $2, 500. 00.
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916. The needs of the claimant spouse have been defined as the total amount
sufficient to maintain that spouse in a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed
prior to the separation,
limited only by the other spouse' s ability to pay.
Rodriguez, 2020- 0171 at p. 3, 315 So. 3d at 916- 917. Once the claimant spouse has
established need, the court must examine the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support.
If the needs of the claimant spouse surpass the ability of the other spouse
to pay, interim spousal support should be fixed at a sum which will as nearly as
possible be just and fair to all parties involved. Id. In assessing a spouse' s ability
to pay, the court must consider his or her means, which includes any resource from
which the wants of life may be supplied, requiring an assessment of the entire
financial condition of the payor spouse. This assessment is not limited to income,
but also includes any resource from which his or her needs can be supplied,
including the spouse' s earning capacity. Rodriguez, 2020- 0171 at pp. 3- 4, 315
So. 3dat917.
The trial court is vested with much discretion in determining an award of
interim spousal support, and its determination will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Martello, 2006- 0594 at p. 6, 960 So. 2d at 192. Although the
trial court is vested with much discretion in awarding interim spousal support,
factual findings underlying a trial court' s decision are reviewed under the manifest
error standard of review. Rodriguez, 2020- 0171 at p. 4, 315 So. 3d at 917.
On appeal, David argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
him to pay Taryn $ 1, 750. 00 per month in interim spousal support, because Taryn
does not have a need for support and he does not have the ability to pay it.
However, our review of the record reveals ample factual support for the trial
court' s finding regarding Taryn' s needs and David' s ability to pay.
Taryn presented evidence of her lack of income and her expenses. Although
David argues on appeal that Taryn receives income from the rental properties,
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Taryn offered evidence that the expenses for these properties exceed the income,
especially since David withdrew $ 16, 000. 00 from the operating account for the
business. Further, David acknowledged that he did not handle any of the finances
during the marriage and could not give " solid" answers about these matters. The
trial court clearly believed Taryn' s testimony and the evidence presented that she
does not receive any income at this time from David' s Investments. A factfinder' s
choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot be manifestly
erroneous.
Schexnayder v. Bridges, 2015- 0786, p. 13 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 2/ 26/ 16),
190 So. 3d 764, 773.
Regarding his ability to pay, David argues that the trial court erred in finding
that he has the ability to pay $ 1, 750. 00 per month, since he testified that he has
been unable to find work for the last eight to nine months and is receiving
unemployment benefits of only $ 220 per week. David' s response to the trial
court' s questions about his search for employment was vague, and he offered no
evidence of either his search for employment or his unemployment benefits. On
cross- examination, David admitted that he had performed a flooring job recently
and received payment for the work, which he had not previously disclosed.
Additionally, Taryn introduced evidence of David' s usual earnings from his
flooring business and testified that she believed he was still working in both his
flooring and grass -cutting businesses. The trial court clearly did not believe
David' s testimony regarding his financial situation and his ability to pay support.
Whether a party is voluntarily underemployed is a question of good faith and a
fact -based determination subject to the manifest error standard of review.
Freeman v. Freeman, 2016- 0580, pp. 8- 9 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 4/ 12/ 17), 218 So. 3d 653,
659. Although the trial court did not expressly conclude that David was
voluntarily underemployed, the trial court implicitly found him to be
underemployed when it concluded that his gross annual income for purposes of
calculating spousal support is $ 60, 000. 00. Based on our review of the record, we
cannot say that this finding is manifestly erroneous.
Considering the trial court' s findings regarding Taryn' s need for support and
David' s ability to pay, we cannot say that the award of $ 1, 750. 00 per month in
interim spousal support is an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is
without merit.
David next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to
pay $ 1, 750. 00 per month in final spousal support because Taryn does not need the
support and he does not have the ability to pay the support. He also argues that the
award of final spousal support exceeds one- third of his net income, in violation of
La. C. C. art. 112( D).
Final periodic support may be awarded when a spouse has not been at fault
prior to the filing of a petition for divorce and is in need of support. La. C. C. art.
111. An award of final periodic support is based on the needs of the party in need
of support and the ability of the other party to pay. La. C. C. art. 112. In
determining the amount and duration of final support, the court considers all
relevant factors, including: ( 1) the income and means of the parties, including the
liquidity of such means; ( 2) the financial obligations of the parties, including any
interim allowance or final child support obligation; ( 3) the earning capacity of the
parties; (
4) the effect of custody of children upon a party' s earning capacity; ( 5) the
time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or
employment; ( 6) the health and age of the parties; ( 7) the duration of the marriage;
8) the tax consequences to either or both parties; and ( 9) the existence, effect, and
duration of any act of domestic abuse committed by the other spouse upon the
claimant or a child of one of the spouses, regardless of whether the other spouse
was prosecuted for the act of domestic violence. La. C. C. art. 112( B). Subject to
exceptions in situations involving domestic abuse, the award of final periodic
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support shall not exceed one- third of the obligor' s net income. La. C. C. art.
112( D).
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow and fix the amount
of final periodic support, to be exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard
to what is just and proper under the facts of the case. Prestenback v. Prestenback,
2008- 0457, p. 5 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 11/ 18/ 08), 9 So. 3d 172, 176. An award of spousal
support should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id.As previously addressed herein, we find no manifest error in the trial court' s
conclusions regarding Taryn' s need for support and David' s ability to pay. In this
assignment of error, David argues that Taryn is voluntarily unemployed, since she
chose to relinquish her real estate license after twenty years. However, as noted by
the trial court, Taryn' s income from real estate over the years was minimal at best.
In the last four years of her career, Taryn' s income from real estate was less than
5, 000. 00 per year. Further, Taryn testified that her management of David' s
Investments was essentially a full-time job, which prevented her from devoting
much time to real estate. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say that the
trial court' s conclusion regarding Taryn' s need for support was manifestly
erroneous.
We next turn to David' s assertion that the trial court erred in awarding an
amount of final spousal support that exceeds one- third of his net income.
Although a trial court' s award of final periodic spousal support is given great
weight, such an award cannot be allowed to stand when there has been a clear
abuse of the trial court' s discretion or when the amount exceeds the statutory limit
of one third of the payor' s net income. See Ennis v. Ennis, 2016- 0423, p. 7
La.App. 1 Cir. 5/ 8/ 17), 2017WL1900328, * 3; La. C. C. art. 112( D). For purposes
of setting spousal support, considering the lack of evidence regarding David' s
income, the trial court determined that David has a gross income of $60, 000. 00 per
10
year or $ 5, 000. 00 per month. The final spousal support award of $1, 750. 00 per
month exceeds one-third of David' s gross income, in clear violation of La. C. C.
art. I 12( D). However, no evidence was presented as to David' s net income, and the
trial court did not make a finding as to his net income. Although the amount of the
final spousal support award is clearly in error, the record on appeal lacks sufficient
information to allow this court to amend the judgment. For this reason, we reverse
the trial court judgment insofar as it awards final spousal support in the amount of
1, 750. 00 per month and remand this matter to the trial court for the purpose of
determining the amount of David' s net income and awarding final spousal support
in an amount that does not exceed one- third of that amount.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed only insofar as it sets the amount
of final spousal support at $ 1, 750. 00 per month. In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the amount of David Creekbaum' s net income and award final spousal
support in an amount that does not exceed one- third of that amount. Each party
shall bear his or her own appeal costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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