Mark A. Davidson v. State of Louisiana, Jerry Jones, in his official capacity as District Attorney of Ouachita Parish, and Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2019 CA 1180
MARK A. DAVIDSON
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, JERRY JONES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF OUACHITA PARISH; AND
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
JU Q 2 2020
Judgment Rendered:
APPEALED FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 0647640, SECTION 22
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. KELLEY, JUDGE
Jeff Landry Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant
Attorney General State of Louisiana
and
Colin Clark
Erica McLellan
Emma DeVillier
Assistant Attorneys General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Robert Tew
Fourth Judicial District Attorney
Geary Aycock
Assistant District Attorney
Monroe, Louisiana
Adrienne Aucoin
Department of Public Safety
And Corrections
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
G. Adam Cossey Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Monroe, Louisiana Mark A. Davidson
2
McDonald, J.
In this case the plaintiff pled guilty to two counts of video voyeurism— a sex
offense— in 2005, receiving a sentence of two years at hard labor for each count
from the Fourth Judicial District Court in Ouachita Parish. The Fourth Judicial
District Court suspended plaintiff' s sentence conditional on his completion of three
years supervised probation. Upon plaintiff' s completion of his supervised
probation in July 2007, the court set aside his conviction and dismissed the
prosecution against him pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 893. After completing his
probation, plaintiff moved to Florida, his current domicile, and registered there as
a sex offender in December 2007. Plaintiff initiated the instant suit in the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court in April 2016, seeking a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief from his obligation under La. R. S. 15: 544 to register as a sex
offender in Louisiana because his 2005 conviction was set aside. After further
proceedings, ultimately the Nineteenth Judicial District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, relieving him of his duty to register as a sex
offender. The State appealed. After de novo review, we reverse and render.
On July 20, 2005, Mark A. Davidson was charged in Ouachita Parish by bill of
information with two counts of video voyeurism under La. R. S. 14: 283, a sex offense
as defined in La. R. S. 15: 541. On October 31, 2005, Davidson entered a plea of
guilty on both counts and received a sentence of two years at hard labor per count
from the Fourth Judicial District Court; however, the sentence was suspended and
Davidson was placed on supervised probation for three years. On July 26, 2007,
Davidson completed his supervised probation, and the Fourth Judicial District Court
3
set dismissed the prosecution against him pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 893. 1 In
December 2007, Davidson moved to Florida, where he currently resides, and
registered there as a sex offender.
On April 16, 2016, Davidson, considering moving back to Louisiana, initiated
the instant suit in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court through ordinary civil
proceedings pursuant to La. R. S. 15: 544. 1 against the State of Louisiana, the District
Attorney of Ouachita Parish, 2 and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections ( collectively the State), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from
his obligation to register as a sex offender in Louisiana under La. R. S. 15: 544.
Davidson made two arguments in his petition: first, that the setting aside of his
2005 conviction eliminated his duty to register as a sex offender in Louisiana, and
second, that Louisiana' s refusal to give him credit in Louisiana for his registration in
Florida violated his constitutional right to travel.
After filing answers, the State moved for summary judgment, citing State v.
Cook, 2016- 1518 ( La. 5/ 3/ 17), 226 So. 3d 387, as binding precedent. Nineteenth
Judicial District Court Commissioner Nicole Robinson presided over the hearing on
the State' s motion and recommended that the trial court deny the State' s motion
as to the issue of registration and grant the motion as to the issue of constitutional
freedom of movement. Thereafter, the trial court ruled in line with the
recommendations, dismissing the State' s motion for summary judgment
addressing Davidson' s requirement to register as a sex offender pursuant to La. R. S.
15: 544, and granting the State' s motion for summary judgment addressing the
constitutionality of La. R. S. 15: 544( D)( 2).
1 Davidson completed his supervised probation in less than three years.
Z
During the course of this litigation, Fourth Judicial District Attorney Jerrylones retired, and newly elected
District Attorney Robert Tew was substituted in the proceedings.
19
Following the trial court' s ruling on the State' s motion, Davidson filed his own
motion for summary judgment on both issues. Commissioner Robinson presided
over the hearing on Davidson' s motion and made recommendations consistent
with her prior recommendations. First, Commissioner Robinson found that the
setting aside of Davidson' s conviction exempted him from the requirement to
register as a sex offender under the enactment of La. R. S. 15: 544( A) effective at the
time Davidson filed the instant suit, and therefore recommended that the trial
court grant summary judgment in favor of Davidson on this issue; and second, she
found that Davidson failed to meet his burden of proving that Louisiana' s sex
offender registration laws do not suitably further the government' s interest in
protecting the public from sex offenders, and thus recommended that the trial
court deny summary judgment on that issue.
The trial court agreed with the commissioner' s recommendations, and
issued a final judgment on July 19, 2019, granting summary judgment in favor of
Davidson on the registration issue and in favor of the State on the constitutional
issue. The State appeals the trial court' s judgment on the registration issue.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is
no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant.
See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 3). A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo,
with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court' s
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate: i. e., whether there is
any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Samaha v. Rau, 2007- 1726 ( La. 2/ 26/ 08), 977 So. 2d 880, 882-
I
In this case, there is no disputed material fact; instead, the parties'
disagreement concerns the correct interpretation of Louisiana' s sex offender
registration statutes, La. R. S. 15: 540 etseq., and whether to apply the laws in effect
in 2007, when the Fourth Judicial District Court set aside Davidson' s conviction and
dismissed the prosecution against him, or the laws currently in effect, as amended
by the legislature in 2017. After de novo review, we find that Davidson has a duty
to register as a sex offender in Louisiana under both versions of the statutes and
that the 2017 enactment applies retroactively as an interpretative change.
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. C. C. art.
9. When the wording of a Section of the Revised Statutes is clear and free of
ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit. La. R. S. 1: 4. It is presumed that the legislature enacts each statute with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Thus,
legislative language is interpreted by the courts on the assumption that the
legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial
decisions interpreting those statutes. State v. Benoit, 2010- 1766 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
5/ 6/ 11), 69 So. 3d 492, 497, writ denied, ( La. 3/ 30/ 12), 85 So. 3d 106. In the
interpretation of statutes, the specific controls the general. State in Interest of
A. C., 93- 1125 ( La. 1/ 27/ 94), 643 So. 2d 719, 730. Courts should give effect to all
parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any
part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Allen v. Allen, 2013-
2778 ( La. 5/ 7/ 14), 145 So. 3d 341, 346.
G
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 893( E)( 2) provides that "[ t] he
dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as acquittal[.]" This
language indicates that an art. 893 dismissal, which necessarily follows a proper
adjudication of guilt by plea or conviction, is not an acquittal, but merely has the
same effect.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15: 541( 7) currently states that "[ a] dismissal
entered after a period of probation, suspension, or deferral of sentence shall be
included in the definition of 'conviction`` for purposes of this Chapter." Under the
unambiguous language of this definition, the 2007 art. 893 dismissal, which the
Fourth Judicial District Court entered " after a period of probation [ and] suspension
of sentence," constitutes a " conviction."
Conversely, the provision of La. R. S. 15: 541 effective in 2007 stated the
following:
4) " Conviction or other disposition adverse to the
subject" means any disposition of charges, except a
decision not to prosecute, a dismissal, or an acquittal,
except when the acquittal is due to a finding of not guilty
by reason of insanity and the person was committed.
However, a dismissal entered after a period of probation,
suspension, or deferral of sentence shall be considered a
disposition adverse to the subject.
La. R. S. 15: 541( 4). This provision mandates the same effect in different terms;
given that an art. 893 dismissal is not an acquittal, but merely has " the effect of an
acquittal," the 2007 dismissal was " a disposition adverse to the subject" under this
definition since it followed a period of probation and suspension of sentence.
The term "[ c] onviction or other disposition adverse to the subject," without
separate definitions for " conviction" and " disposition adverse to the subject,"
indicates that " convictions" and " other disposition[ s] adverse to the subject" are
effectively equivalent. A reading in which the two terms are not equivalent renders
7
the specific definition of " disposition adverse to the subject" - a term otherwise
appearing only in La. R. S. 15: 541— superfluous. See La. R. S. 15: 541( 8), ( 19).
Construing the terms as equivalent effectuates the legislature' s stated interest—
protecting the public from those who have committed sex offenses— in enacting
La. R. S. 15: 540 et seq. See State v. Cook, 226 So. 3d at 391- 92. Thus, the 2007
dismissal, as a" disposition adverse to the subject," is legally identical to a
conviction" under the prior La. R. S. 15: 541.
These definitions apparently conflict with La. C. Cr. P. art. 893' s mandate that
an art. 893 dismissal " shall have the same effect as an acquittal"; however, since
La.
R. S. 15: 540 et seq. deals specifically with sex offender registration following
proper adjudications of guilt— including guilty pleas— in sex crime cases, whereas
art. 893 provides a general rule for all felonies, the definitions in La. R. S. 15: 541
control in this case. Under the unambiguous wording of the 2017 enactment of La.
R. S. 15: 541, and under a reading giving effect to every part of the statutes effective
in 2007, the 2007 dismissal constitutes a conviction in both versions of La. R. S.
15: 540 et seq.
We next examine whether the conviction gives Davidson a duty to register
as a sex offender under the respective versions of the statutes if he moves back to
Louisiana. The sex offender registration statutes have mandated a duty to register
for those who have been convicted of sex offenses since 1992. See La. R. S.
15: 542( A)( 1); compare La. R. S. 15: 542( A) ( 1992). Act 307 of 2017 added language
that specifies a duty to register and notify for those whose convictions have been
reversed, set aside, or vacated pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article
893"; therefore, the current statutes unambiguously require Davidson to register if
he moves back to Louisiana in the future. La. R. S. 15: 544(A).
P
On the other hand, in 2007, La. R. S. 15: 542. 1 stated the following:
H. Duty to register. ( 1) A person required to register
under this Section as a sex offender or child predator shall
register and maintain his registration pursuant to the
provisions of this Section for a period of ten years after
the date on which the person was released from prison,
placed on parole, supervised release, or probation for a
conviction giving rise to the requirement to register,
unless the underlying conviction is reversed, set aside or
vacated. The requirement to register shall apply to an
offender who is pardoned. ( Emphasis added.)
Davidson argues that a setting aside and dismissal under La. C. Cr. P. art. 893
constitutes an " underlying conviction [ that] is ... set aside"; however, in light of
the definitions in La. R. S. 15: 541 as they existed in 2007— under which a " dismissal
entered after a period of probation, suspension, or deferral of sentence"
constitutes a " conviction"—
even a conviction set aside pursuant to art. 893 is a
conviction," not a " conviction ... set aside," for the purposes of La. R. S. 15: 540 et
3
seq.
Under a reading effectuating both of these conflicting provisions, we
determine that the exception for " underlying conviction ... reversed, set aside, or
vacated" in La. R. S. 15: 542. 1( H)(
1) includes erroneous convictions overturned by
general legal processes available in all criminal cases, such as appeals or retrials,
while "
dismissal entered after a period of probation, suspension, or deferral of
sentence" in 15: 541( 7) is a process specific to La. C. Cr. P. arts. 893 and 894.
Therefore, we find that an art. 893 dismissal does not constitute an " underlying
conviction [ that] is ... set aside" under La. R. S. 15: 542. 1( H)( 1), the prior registration
statute.
Therefore, even under the prior La. R. S. 15: 540 et seq., we conclude that
Commissioner Robinson found that a conviction set aside under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 is also an " underlying
conviction ...
set aside" under La. R. S. 15: 542. 1( H)( 1) in the 2007 enactment; however, she did not address
the legislature' s refusal to change the language of La. R. S. 15: 541( 7) to reflect such a rule. We assume that
the legislature knew of La. R. S. 15: 541( 7) and deliberately declined to alter it when adding the cited
exception to La. R. S. 15: 542. 1( H)( 1);
thus, we attempt to give effect to both provisions in the following
paragraph.
0j
Davidson, as the subject of a " conviction," is "[ a] person required to ... maintain
his registration pursuant to the provisions of this Section," and must register and
provide notification if he moves back to Louisiana in the future.
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply
prospectively only: procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively
and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary. La. C. C.
art. 6. No Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so
stated. La. R. S. 1: 2. Although La. C. C. art. 6 and La. R. S. 1: 2 superficially appear to
conflict, this conflict is apparent, not real, as the jurisprudence has construed the
general proscription against retrospective effect of laws as applying only to
substantive, as opposed to procedural or interpretive, laws. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 ( La. 1992). Absent a conclusive expression of
legislative intent, we must proceed to classify an amendment pursuant to La. C. C.
art. 6 as either substantive, procedural or interpretive. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 609 So. 2d at 817.
Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights, and duties or change
existing ones, while interpretive laws do not create new rules, but merely establish
the meaning that the interpretive statute had from the time of its enactment; it is
the original statute, not the interpretive one, that establishes the rights and duties.
Id. When an existing law is not clear, a subsequent statute clarifying or explaining
the law may be regarded as interpretive, and the interpretive statute may be given
retrospective effect because it does not change, but merely clarifies, pre- existing
law. Id. Act 307 of 2017 did not include any language mandating its prospective or
retroactive application; therefore, we must determine whether the addition of the
10
language " except for those convictions that were reversed, set aside, or vacated
pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893 or 894"— added as an
exception to the exception to registration if "the underlying conviction is reversed,
set aside, or vacated"— is substantive or interpretative.
An art. 893 dismissal does not relieve a sex offender of that obligation under
the current La. R. S. 15: 544( A). As discussed above, the definition of " conviction or
other disposition adverse to the subject" in the prior La. R. S. 15: 541 included " a
dismissal entered after a period of probation, suspension, or deferral," a category
that encompasses a dismissal pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 893. Because an art. 893
dismissal operated at that time as a " conviction," and not an " underlying conviction
set aside" under La. R. S. 15: 544( A), it did not relieve a sex offender from the
obligation to register and notify under the prior statute.
Given the apparent conflict between the definitions in La. R. S. 15: 541 and
the exception to the duty to register for " underlying convictions ... set aside" in
La. R. S. 15: 542. 1( H)( 1),
we find that the prior law was unclear. Since the duty to
register and notify following an art. 893 dismissal did not change between the 2007
and the present day, and since the language of the prior statutes was unclear, we
conclude that Act 307 of 2017 made clarifying interpretative changes that apply
retroactively.
Davidson suggests that the 2017 changes are substantive for two reasons:
first, because they changed his duty to register, and second, because this court
stated recently in Panaro v. Landry, 2018- 1725, ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 27/ 2019), 286
So. 3d 1049, 1052, writ denied, 2019- 01885 ( La. 1/ 22/ 20), 291 So. 3d 1046, that the
registration laws were " substantively rewritten" by the 2017 legislation. The first
argument fails since the 2017 amendments did not change Davidson' s duty to
11
register, which existed in 2007 and would exist upon his return to Louisiana' for the
reasons discussed above. The second argument fails because this court did not
consider in Panaro v. Landry' whether the 2017 changes were substantive or
interpretative in the context of retroactive application; thus, the cited language—
which lacks any reasoning that Act 307 enacts substantive changes— does not
constitute a holding on the issue and does not bind the court in this case.
r.
For the above reasons, we find that Mark A. Davidson is required to register
as a sex offender in Louisiana pursuant to La. R. S. 15: 544, and we reverse the July
19, 2019, trial court judgment on the registration issue. Costs of this appeal are
assessed against Mark A. Davidson.
4 In Panaro v. Landry, 286 So. 3d at 1053- 54, this court held that the duty to register for an offender who
obtained a La. C. Cr. P. art. 893 dismissal while he was living in New York was subject to the law effective
upon his return to Louisiana in 2016, rather than the law effective at the time his conviction was set aside.
The holding in Panaro hinged on the rule established by the supreme court in State v. Clark that the initial
duty to register under La. R. S. 15: 544(A) does not commence until " residency is established in this state";
retroactivity did not bear on the holding. Panaro, 286 So. 3d at 1053; see State v. Clark, 2012- 1296 ( La.
5/ 7/ 13), 117 So. 3d 1246,
12