Commonwealth v. Hernandez

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us
SJC-11574
COMMONWEALTH vs. ARIEL HERNANDEZ.
Middlesex. October 9, 2015. - December 29, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.
Homicide. Robbery. Armed Home Invasion. Home Invasion.
Firearms. Felony-Murder Rule. Evidence, Firearm.
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause.
Probable Cause. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle,
Probable cause, Inevitable discovery. Practice, Criminal,
Capital case, Motion to suppress, Severance, Trial of
indictments together.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 10 and 22, 2009.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas
P. Billings, J., and the cases were tried before him.
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant.
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
HINES, J. Based on an armed robbery that occurred during
the evening of October 22, 2009, and an armed home invasion and
double murder that occurred several hours later, a jury
2
convicted on indictments charging the defendant with two counts
of armed robbery; two counts of murder in the first degree on
the theory of felony-murder (with armed home invasion and
attempted armed robbery as the underlying felonies); and one
count each of home invasion, unlawful possession of ammunition,
and possessing a firearm without a license. The defendant's
trial was joined with the trials of two codefendants, cousins
Karon and Jamal McDougal,1 on each of their indictments charging
two counts of felony murder and one count of home invasion, and
with Jamal's indictments for firearms offenses. Karon and Jamal
were acquitted of all charges. On appeal, the defendant argues
(1) error in the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm
used in the armed robbery and murders and (2) error in the
joinder of trial with his codefendants and in the joinder of the
armed robbery charges and charges relating to the home invasion.
We affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to suppress
as well as the defendant's convictions, and we discern no basis
to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
1. Motion to suppress. a. Background. Prior to trial,
the defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence,
claiming, on State and Federal constitutional grounds, that
police lacked probable cause for the warrantless search and the
1
Where the codefendants share a common surname, we refer to
each by their first name.
3
search exceeded the bounds of a proper inventory search. The
motion judge, who was also the trial judge, held an evidentiary
hearing, at which one witness, Officer Christian Hanson of the
Lowell police department, testified. The judge denied the
motion and made the following findings of fact, "which we
supplement with evidence in the record that is uncontroverted
and that was implicitly credited by the motion judge," see
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015). On October 23,
2009, Officer Hanson reported for his shift at approximately 1
A.M. and learned of a reported armed robbery of two females that
had occurred at approximately 8:30 P.M. on October 22, 2009.
The robbery had taken place on Second Avenue in Lowell and a
handgun was used. The two female victims who reported the
robbery described the vehicle as a green Honda Civic sedan,
bearing a specified license plate number, and with a Dominican
Republic flag hanging from the rear view mirror. The
perpetrators were described generally as Hispanic males.
Officer Hanson was assigned to Lowell's eastern sector and
was driving alone and uniformed in a marked cruiser. At 1:33
A.M., Hanson learned through a police dispatch that an armed
home invasion had occurred at a home on Marshall Terrace, that a
handgun had been used, and that two occupants had been shot.
Hanson knew that the location of the invasion was approximately
fifty yards from the earlier armed robbery. At approximately
4
2:20 A.M., a dispatch alerted him that the same vehicle was
involved in the earlier armed robbery and the home invasion and
noted the address of the vehicle's registered owner as Phillips
Street.2
Officer Hanson drove towards Phillips Street, looking for
the vehicle. Within minutes of the second dispatch, while
heading in a westerly direction on Broadway Street, he came up
behind a vehicle matching the exact description, including the
license plate number and the Dominican flag. Hanson followed
the vehicle as it turned left twice so that it was heading
parallel to Broadway in the opposite direction, away from
Phillips Street. He called for backup. Hanson saw the vehicle
fail to stop at a stop sign. Officer Hanson stopped the vehicle
at an intersection as two other cruisers arrived. The driver of
the vehicle pulled over at Officer Hanson's command. Hanson and
two other officers got out of their cruisers and approached the
vehicle with weapons drawn.
2
There was no evidence as to how the police obtained the
description of the vehicle used in the home invasion and, as
such, the motion judge properly did not include the description
or registered owner's address in his probable cause calculus.
See Commonwealth v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 492, 494-495 (1992) ("Where
the police rely on a police radio call to conduct an
investigatory stop, under both Federal and State law, the
Commonwealth must present evidence at the hearing on the motion
to suppress on the factual basis for the police radio call in
order to establish its indicia of reliability").
5
Officer Hanson and one of the officers approached the
driver's side and Hanson ordered the occupants to raise their
hands and keep them in plain sight. The defendant, who was the
driver, was loud and belligerent and shouted, "What the fuck did
I do?" The defendant was "moving around" in the driver's seat
and then reached for the center console. At that point, the two
officers pulled the defendant to the ground outside the vehicle
and handcuffed him. The third officer did the same to Giovanni
Hill who was in the passenger's seat. The officers searched the
vehicle, and after finding no weapons or contraband in the
passenger's compartment, they opened the trunk and found a
handgun. Officer Hanson testified that they had searched the
trunk because they were looking for the firearm involved in the
earlier armed robbery.
Shortly thereafter, one of the robbery victims was brought
to the scene for a showup identification. She identified Hill
as one of the robbers. Specifically, Officer Hanson testified
that the victim said that Hill was standing "next to the man
that was holding the gun with the hood or a mask over his face"
during the robbery. The police arrested the defendant on
firearms charges and Hill for armed robbery.
The judge concluded that the search was justified under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement because, quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925), there was
6
enough evidence to "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief' . . . that the handgun would be in the vehicle, perhaps
in the trunk and out of sight." The judge reasoned that the six
hours that had passed between the robbery and the automobile
stop were not fatal where "it was reasonable to think that one
or both of the occupants at the time of the stop had probably
been using the vehicle at the time of the robbery," the
occupants of the vehicle "fit the very general description of
the robbers," and a handgun had been used in both the robbery
and the later home invasion. Moreover, the judge concluded that
the police had "ample probable cause" to search the entire
vehicle, including the trunk, after the showup identification,
at which Hill was identified as one of the robbers.
The defendant maintains on appeal that the firearm should
have been suppressed because the police lacked probable cause to
search the trunk and because the warrantless search was not
justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine.3
b. Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of his
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'" Commonwealth v.
3
The defendant also argues that the search was not
justified on safety grounds or as a search incident to arrest,
but the Commonwealth does not argue on appeal that either theory
justifies the search, and the motion judge agreed with the
defendant on these grounds.
7
Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 26 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott,
440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). "The judge determines the weight and
credibility of the testimony." Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass.
707, 717, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014), citing
Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 321 (2001). We,
however, "make an independent determination of the correctness
of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found." Woods, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Mercado,
422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, under
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, subject only
to 'a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'" Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 792 (2012),
quoting Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624 (2008).
"Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the
search of a motor vehicle is reasonable and permissible where
probable cause exists to support the search." Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011). If the police lacked probable
cause under the automobile exception or otherwise performed an
illegal search, the inevitable discovery doctrine permits the
admission of evidence that ordinarily would be prohibited by the
exclusionary rule. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330,
345-346, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628 (2013). The issue, then,
8
is whether the police had probable cause to search the trunk
before the showup identification; and if not, whether the
Commonwealth met its burden to prove that the firearm is
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
i. Automobile exception. A warrantless search of an
automobile is permissible "where the police have probable cause
to believe that a motor vehicle parked in a public place and
apparently capable of being moved contains contraband or
evidence of a crime." Gouse, 461 Mass. at 792, quoting Bostock,
450 Mass. at 624. "The existence of probable cause depends on
whether the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge at the time of making the search or seizure were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
defendant had committed, or was committing, an offense."
Bostock, 450 Mass. at 624, quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 366
Mass. 387, 391 (1974). If the police had probable cause to
search any part of the vehicle under the automobile exception,
the police were entitled to search "all containers, open or
closed, found within." Gouse, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.
Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 908 (1990).
Officer Hanson, acting on the reliable information before
him, had probable cause to search the trunk. Gouse, 461 Mass.
at 794, quoting Cast, 407 Mass. at 895 ("In dealing with
probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with
9
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act"). The
information supporting probable cause included the following:4
(1) a robbery involving a firearm occurred at 8:30 to 8:45 P.M.;
(2) the vehicle involved in the robbery was a green Honda Civic
sedan, bearing a specified license plate number, and with a
Dominican Republic flag hanging from the rear view mirror; (3)
the perpetrators were described as two Hispanic males; (4) an
armed home invasion, where two people were shot, occurred
approximately five hours after and approximately fifty yards
from the armed robbery; (5) a vehicle matching the exact
description of the vehicle used in the armed robbery was going
in the general vicinity of the two crimes approximately six
hours after the robbery; (6) the vehicle changed direction after
the police cruiser approached, turning 180 degrees from its
original direction; (7) the vehicle failed to stop at a stop
4
The information contained in the second dispatch, the
descriptions of the vehicle and "two Hispanic males" and the
address of the registered owner of the vehicle, was not
considered by the motion judge and, likewise, is not considered
in our determination of probable cause. The Commonwealth did
not offer the basis of knowledge for the source of the
information contained in that dispatch, and therefore, the
Commonwealth has not shown that the information is reliable.
See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 155-156 (2009)
(Commonwealth must show reliability of police broadcast through
"basis of knowledge of the source of the information . . . and
the underlying circumstances demonstrating that the source of
the information was credible or the information reliable").
10
sign after the police cruiser approached; (8) the occupants of
the vehicle were two Hispanic-appearing males; (9) the driver of
the vehicle was belligerent and made furtive gestures; and (10)
no weapons or contraband were located inside the interior of the
vehicle. The sum of the information known to police formed a
sufficient basis on which to search the entire vehicle,
including the trunk, because the officers could have
appropriately concluded that the vehicle used in the armed
robbery, occurring hours prior in the same general proximity to
the location of the stop, contained evidence of that crime.
The defendant's argument against probable cause hinges on
the six-hour gap between the armed robbery and the stop, and the
lack of a specific description of the perpetrators. We disagree
that either factor is fatal. Although "[f]acts supporting
probable cause must be 'closely related to the time of the issue
of the warrant [so] as to justify a finding of probable cause at
that time,'" we conclude that the temporal component was
satisfied under these circumstances. See Commonwealth v.
Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 792 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Cruz,
430 Mass. 838, 843 (2000).
Our conclusion is guided by the nature of the crime and of
the evidence. "A nexus between the items to be seized and the
place to be searched need not be based on direct observation and
may be found in 'the type of crime, the nature of the missing
11
items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment,
and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to
hide stolen property.'" Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 703,
715-716 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197,
213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). Here, Officer Hanson
knew that a firearm was used in an armed robbery by occupants of
a vehicle that was stopped six hours after the crime occurred.
Although it is possible that the perpetrators of the robbery
could have hidden the firearm elsewhere in the time that passed,
it is a reasonable inference that the firearm, evidence not
easily disposed of, was hidden in the trunk. See Burt, supra at
716 ("because the hasty disposal of large amounts of coins could
have been risky to the alleged thieves, the inference that some
of the coins would be found in the defendants' residences and
vehicles was reasonable").
Further, it was not unreasonable to suspect that the
current occupants of the vehicle were using the vehicle six
hours earlier where there was no information that the vehicle
was a rental and the occupants matched the very general
description of the perpetrators. Cf. Commonwealth v. Jordan,
469 Mass. 134, 146 (2014) (police lacked probable cause where
vehicle with license plate number matching that involved in
shooting two days earlier known to be rented and officers did
not know identity of renter or terms of rental arrangement). In
12
addition to providing a precise description of the vehicle, the
victims described the perpetrators as two males of Hispanic
descent, which narrowed the range of possible suspects and
corresponded with the description of the males in the vehicle
during the stop. See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367,
371 (1996) (general description of two Hispanic males narrowed
"range of possible suspects" for reasonable suspicion).
In addition to the evidence discussed above, the driver's
evasive movements after the marked cruiser approached -- failing
to stop at a stop sign and turning 180 degrees from his initial
direction -- may be considered. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376
Mass. 349, 354 (1978) (evasive movements insufficient, but
relevant, for determining probable cause). Further supporting
our analysis is the defendant's belligerent behavior between the
stop and the search that heightened the officers' suspicions
when he reached towards the center console when instructed to
keep his hands up. See Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass.
99, 106 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542,
551 (1995) (exiting vehicle at red light when approached by
police and "furtively reach[ing] into his pocket" are
"additional factor[s] that allows us to conclude that, at the
time of the search, the police officers had probable cause to
believe that the defendant had committed, or was committing, a
crime").
13
ii. Inevitable discovery. Even if the officers acted
prematurely in opening the trunk, the firearm would still be
admissible so long as the Commonwealth proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the firearm would have been inevitably
discovered. Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 16 (2002).
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence may be
admissible as long as the Commonwealth can demonstrate that
discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a
practical matter, "the officers did not act in bad faith to
accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular
constitutional violation is not so severe as to require
suppression." Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810
(1997), citing Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117-118
(1989). This is a "demanding test." Balicki, supra, quoting
Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 548 (1990).
After the showup identification, the police had robust
evidence supporting probable cause. At that point, they had
direct evidence that an occupant of the vehicle was involved in
the armed robbery that occurred six hours before the stop.
Thus, the Commonwealth met its burden in this regard.
The defendant argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine
is not applicable where Hill had no connection to the vehicle
other than as a passenger, it was not certain that the police
would search the trunk after the identification, and the police
14
acted in bad faith. The defendant's arguments are unavailing.
Hill's presence supports the inference that the firearm was
hidden in the vehicle. It was "certain as a practical matter"
after Hill was identified that the police would search the trunk
because evidence from the armed robbery was not in the passenger
compartment and the officers were still looking for the firearm.
Sbordone, 424 Mass. at 810. Lastly, the officers did not act in
bad faith where the defendant was not harmed by the potentially
premature search of the trunk. The bad faith component of the
inevitable discovery rule is designed to ensure that "the
Commonwealth's case is not aided (or the defendant's case
harmed) by the unlawful, premature discovery of the evidence."
O'Connor, 406 Mass. at 119. The firearm was properly admitted
where it would have been discovered during the course of the
stop and there is no allegation that the firearm played any role
in the victim's identification of Hill.5
The evidence supports the denial of the defendant's motion
to suppress.
5
The defendant does not dispute that the stop and showup
identification were both lawful. The identification properly
occurred during the stop. See Commonwealth v. Salerno, 356
Mass. 642, 646-647 (1970), quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 34 (1963) ("An expeditious collateral inquiry which might
result in the suspects' arrest or prompt release is not
unreasonable when done to meet 'the practical demands of
effective criminal investigation and law enforcement'").
15
2. Trial. a. Background. As key witnesses at trial,
Commonwealth presented testimony from the two armed robbery
victims, Sophia Deno and Ashley Cardoso; from witnesses inside
Marshall Terrace during the home invasion and murders, Kyle
Delgado and Brian Staples; and from several cooperating
witnesses who were with the defendant during the evening of the
armed robbery and home invasion: Hill, Darien Doby, and Joshua
Silva. We recite the facts the jury could have found based on
the Commonwealth's case. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.
671, 676-677 (1979). Prior to the armed robbery, a vehicle
drove slowly by the victims, Deno and Cardoso, two times and
then parked around the corner from them. The vehicle was a
green Honda Civic with a Dominican flag hanging from the rear-
view mirror and owned by the defendant's sister. The vehicle
contained the defendant, Hill, Doby, and Tim Brown. The
defendant got out of the vehicle with Hill and removed a firearm
from the trunk. The defendant approached Deno and Cardoso and
asked them to give him their "stuff." When they did not
immediately agree, the defendant pointed a gun at Cardoso's arm
and took both victims' purses. During the encounter, Hill stood
five to ten feet away laughing.
The defendant was wearing a khaki or green colored
sweatshirt with a hood covering all of his face except his
mouth. Cardoso's statement to police was read in evidence, in
16
which she said, "I could tell by his face and the tone of his
voice that he was Spanish," and described the defendant as five
feet, nine inches to five feet, ten inches tall, with a "little
kind of moustache" and maybe "a little bit of chin hair." Hill
was wearing a red and tan jacket.
After the robbery, the two reentered the vehicle; the
defendant sat in the driver's seat with the two purses and
firearm on his lap, and Hill entered the passenger side of the
vehicle. The group then drove to Simon Phanthai's house where
Phanthai, at the defendant's request, gave the defendant a black
sweatshirt to wear instead of his green hooded sweatshirt.
Phanthai joined the group, and after a brief separation,
Phanthai, the defendant, Hill, Brown, and Doby met at Brown's
house.
At Brown's house, the defendant went through the victims'
purses and retrieved eighty dollars. He told Hill to take one
of the victim's debit cards to a bank's automated teller machine
to try to withdraw money. After trying to withdraw money at two
banks, Hill returned unsuccessful.
At about 11:45 P.M., the two codefendants at trial, Jamal
and Karon, arrived at Brown's house. Either Jamal or Karon
asked the defendant if he wanted to be involved in a robbery.
The defendant agreed to join them and to bring his gun. Silva
drove his 1995 Toyota Camry to Brown's house to meet the group
17
and agreed to be the driver for the robbery. The defendant,
Jamal, and Karon all changed into different clothes provided by
Brown. The defendant put on a Boston Red Sox sweatshirt with a
large "B" on it, Jamal put on a black sweatshirt with a hood,
and Karon put on sweatpants. Jamal obtained a gun from Brown.
The defendant, Jamal, Karon, and Silva left Brown's house.
Jamal instructed Silva where to drive. Silva remained in the
vehicle and watched the other three walk towards the residence
and through a garage.
The two murder victims, Luis Antonio Martinez Delgado,
known as "Tony," and Hector Delgado, lived at Marshall Terrace
with Brian Staples and Michael DelGreco. The Delgados sold
marijuana from their four-story house. All four residents, in
addition to the Delgados' nephew, Kyle Delgado, were at the home
during the crime. Kyle and Tony were on the fourth floor,
Hector and Staples were in their rooms on the third floor, and
DelGreco was on the couch on the second floor.
At or around 1 A.M., there was a loud bang, like a
"battering ram" on the door. Tony yelled to see who was there
and someone responded "Nicole." Tony went downstairs and told
Kyle to remain upstairs. Kyle was hiding during most of the
home invasion and did not see any intruders. Staples came down
from the third floor and saw two males, each with a gun. One
male was holding a gun to Tony's head and the second male
18
started walking toward Staples with his gun drawn when Staples
came down the stairs. Staples testified that the male with Tony
was broad, wearing a black or gray jacket with a hood, and
"maybe a little bit taller" than Tony, who was five feet, eight
inches or five feet, nine inches tall. The male who approached
Staples was a "little shorter" with a "smaller frame" than the
male with Tony, was wearing a "reddish" jacket with an emblem
and a hood pulled down to his nose, had a "little goatee," and
had "dark skin, Spanish."6
The male with Tony asked, "Where is it?" Tony responded,
"I don't have anything," and Staples ran upstairs to his bedroom
to call 911. Kyle and Staples both heard gunshots while hiding.
When they emerged, they found Hector lying on his back in his
bedroom with a visible bullet hole in his stomach. Tony was
lying on his stomach at the top of the stairs leading to the
fourth floor with a visible bullet hole in his back.
Silva waited in his vehicle outside Marshall Terrace.
Karon returned three to four minutes after he had left the
vehicle and Jamal and the defendant returned to the vehicle
approximately five minutes after Karon. Jamal told the
defendant that he was a great shot and the defendant responded,
6
In an array containing the defendant's photograph, Staples
pointed to the defendant but said he was not able to positively
identify anyone. The defendant's photograph "looked similar in
bearded features," but Staples "couldn't be 100 percent
positive, since he felt the beard was a little bit longer."
19
"I know once I seen them jump on you I started shooting." The
group returned to Brown's house. A surveillance system from an
automotive garage nearby Marshall Terrace showed Silva's Toyota
Camry automobile driving down Orford Street, which is parallel
to Marshall Terrace.
Back at Brown's house, the defendant and Jamal conversed
about the events that had occurred. The jury heard that Karon
tried to kick in the door, that somebody answered "Nicole" to a
person in Marshall Terrace, that Jamal was going to Boston to
hide, and that the defendant and Jamal would act like they did
not know each other if the police came.
The defendant, Hill, and Doby left Brown's apartment
together in the vehicle belonging to the defendant's sister.
Hill placed the defendant's gun in the trunk of the vehicle.
The defendant dropped off Doby and was headed to Hill's house
when he and Hill were stopped by police and subsequently
arrested.
Gunshot residue samples were taken from the defendant and
Hill after the arrest; the sample from the defendant tested
positive and the sample from Hill tested negative. A ballistics
expert from the State police opined that the firearm obtained
during the search of the trunk fired the cartridge casing and
projectiles recovered from Marshall Terrace and from the bodies
of Tony and Hector.
20
In closing arguments, defense counsel for all three
defendants argued that other persons present at Brown's
apartment on the evening leading to the armed home invasion and
double murder were responsible. The defendant's counsel argued
that Silva and Brown were the perpetrators, not the defendant
and the McDougal codefendants. Karon's counsel named Brown,
Silva, and Hill as culpable parties. Jamal's counsel argued
that the four persons involved were Brown, Silva, Doby, and
Hill.
b. Joinder. The defendant argues that his right to due
process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and as applied to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated by the joinder of his trial with the
McDougals and the joinder of his offenses. The defendant's
argument is unavailing.
i. Joinder of defendant and codefendants at trial. Prior
to trial, the defendant moved to sever his case from the cases
of Jamal and Karon, arguing that he, Jamal, and Karon would
present inconsistent defenses for a number of reasons. Defense
counsel renewed the motion several times during trial, and each
time, the motion was denied.7 As his primary contention on
7
The defendant argued that the defenses were inconsistent
because: (1) Jamal and Karon each moved to enter photographs of
individuals, including the defendant, holding firearms; (2)
statements made by Jamal after the homicide about details of the
21
appeal, the defendant argues that he was prejudiced by Jamal and
Karon's trial strategy because Jamal and Karon, African-American
men, effectively "point[ed] the finger" at the defendant by
highlighting testimony that the perpetrators of the home
invasion were Hispanic. Jamal and Karon's counsel moved to
sever from the defendant on similar grounds, asserting that
Jamal and Karon "want these two intruders to be Spanish" and the
defendant's attorney "wants the two intruders to be black" or
"some other color but certainly not Spanish." The judge denied
the motions after reasoning that the defenses did not require
the jury to determine that one defendant or another was guilty,
noting that "[t]here are lots of black people and lots of
Hispanic people to go around."
It is presumed that individuals will be tried together when
criminal charges "arise out of the same criminal conduct."
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 542 (2011),
quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (b), 378 Mass. 859 (1979), and
citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 418 Mass. 120, 125 (1994). A
judge may sever trials if it appears that joinder "is not in the
best interests of justice," Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (d), and should
murder would prejudice the defendant's case; (3) Jamal and
Karon's counsel highlighted the description of the home invasion
intruder as "sounding Hispanic"; (4) Jamal's counsel introduced
a statement allegedly made by the defendant while in jail naming
Jamal as the shooter; and (5) Jamal's counsel introduced
evidence that gunshot residue was found on the steering wheel of
the vehicle the defendant was driving.
22
sever trials if: (1) the defenses are mutually antagonistic
where the "sole defense of each [is] the guilt of the other,"
Siny Van Tran, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 Mass.
25, 31 (2007); or (2) "the prejudice resulting from a joint
trial is so compelling that it prevents a defendant from
obtaining a fair trial." Siny Van Tran, supra, quoting
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982). "Nonetheless,
'even mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses do not
require severance if there is sufficient other evidence of
guilt.'" Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 257 (2013),
quoting Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 838 (2012).
There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motions to sever because the defenses at trial were not mutually
exclusive and joinder did not prevent the defendant from
obtaining a fair trial. Although the codefendants differed in
the descriptive characteristics they wanted the jury to remember
about the intruders, the defendant did not need the jury to
believe that Jamal or Karon were guilty in order to obtain an
acquittal. See Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. at 542. Instead of
naming each other, the three codefendants all named other third
parties as the actual perpetrators.8 Counsel for each defendant
argued that the witnesses who testified for the Commonwealth in
8
The defenses also were consistent in that each asserted
inadequate police investigation under Commonwealth v. Bowden,
379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).
23
exchange for deals were lying to protect themselves and other
friends and all asserted that Brown and Silva were involved in
the murders instead of their clients.
The defendant also argues on appeal that joinder was
prejudicial where Jamal's counsel introduced a statement
allegedly made by the defendant while in jail, naming Jamal as
the shooter. The judge instructed the jury to disregard any
reference to the defendant as the declarant. The jury are
presumed to follow instructions. Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468
Mass. 543, 549 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465
Mass. 672, 681 (2013). Moreover, any harm that the defendant
may have suffered by the admission of this evidence should be
viewed against the benefit he received as a result of the
joinder with Karon. Because the defendant's trial was joined
with Karon's, the jury did not hear a statement made at Brown's
house wherein the defendant asserted that he shot two people
inside Marshall Terrace. Although discussion of events before
and after the home invasion were admitted against all three
defendants, this statement was excluded because the theory of
adoptive admission was not satisfied where there was
insufficient evidence that Karon actually entered the home. The
judge noted that he would likely have admitted the statement had
Karon's trial been severed.
24
Lastly, there was no error where considerable evidence
linked the defendant to the crime. See Akara, 465 Mass. at 257.
The firearm belonging to the defendant, which was located in the
trunk of the vehicle he was driving in the early morning hours
following the murder, fired the projectiles recovered from the
bodies of the victims. Gunshot residue was found on the
defendant's hands shortly after the murders. Even if the
defenses at trial were irreconcilable, denial of the motions to
sever would not require a new trial where there was
"considerable independent evidence" of the defendant's guilt.
Akara, supra, quoting Vasquez, supra at 838; id. at 838 n.10
("For purposes of severance, independent evidence is evidence
that is not offered by one defendant against another at their
joint trial").
ii. Joinder of charges. The defendant claims that the
trial for armed robbery should not have been joined with the
indictments stemming from the home invasion and murders. He
argues that joinder of the charges was prejudicial and improper
where the indictments were unrelated and the potential for
prejudice outweighed any governmental interest in a single
trial. Specifically, the defendant argues that, other than the
firearm, "no evidence relating to either set of charges . . .
could have been introduced in a trial of the other set of
25
charges" and propensity to engage in criminal activity likely
contributed to convictions on both charges.
Joinder "shall" be allowed when a defendant is charged with
two or more related offenses unless the trial judge "determines
that joinder is not in the best interests of justice." Gray,
465 Mass. at 334-335, quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 9. To succeed
on a claim of misjoinder, the defendant "bears the burden of
demonstrating that the offenses were unrelated, and that
prejudice from joinder was so compelling that it prevented him
from obtaining a fair trial." Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass.
175, 180 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245,
260 (2005). The trial judge's decision whether to join offenses
will not be reversed unless there has been a "clear abuse of
discretion." Pillai, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 442
Mass. 185, 199 (2004).
"For purposes of joinder, offenses are related 'if they are
based on the same criminal conduct or episode or arise out of a
course of criminal conduct or series of criminal episodes
connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or
plan.'" Pillai, 445 Mass. at 180, quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 9
(a) (1). Factors that may be considered when determining
whether offenses are related include factual similarities,
closeness of time and space, and "whether evidence of the other
26
offenses would be admissible in separate trials on each
offense." Pillai, supra.
The defendant failed to demonstrate that the offenses are
unrelated. The offenses were factually similar in that the
defendant used his firearm in an attempt to coerce the victims
of each incident to relinquish money and the crimes were close
in time and space, occurring within approximately fifty yards of
each other and within a time span of five hours.
Moreover, evidence of each offense would be admissible in
separate trials. Although evidence of other bad or criminal
acts are not admissible to show "bad character or propensity to
commit the crime charged," it may be admissible "for some other
probative purpose, including to show intent, motive, state of
mind, or some other relevant issue at trial." Commonwealth v.
Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 14 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v.
Morgan, 460 Mass 277, 289 (2011).
In this case, evidence of the armed robbery, in which the
defendant obtained eighty dollars and was unsuccessful in
obtaining more money through the use of the victim's debit card,
was relevant to show the defendant's intent, motive, and state
of mind when participating in the home invasion. The evidence,
therefore, would have been admissible at trial on the home
invasion and murders. Dung Van Tran, supra.
27
Similarly, evidence of the home invasion would have been
admissible at trial on the armed robbery. The "'prosecution
[is] entitled to present as full a picture as possible of the
events surrounding the incident itself,' as long as the
probative value of the evidence presented is not substantially
outweighed by any prejudice to the defendant." Commonwealth v.
Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v.
Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67 (1998). The defendant presented a
third-party culprit defense to the armed robbery, arguing that
there was insufficient evidence to convict him where the only
identification of his participation was made by Hill, a
cooperating witness. While evidence of the murders may not have
been admissible, evidence of the home invasion, which was
"inextricably intertwined" with the defendant's earlier attempts
to obtain money through the armed robbery, would have been
permitted. Marrero, supra at 67-68, quoting Commonwealth v.
Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982) (prior bad act evidence
"inextricably intertwined" with charged offense allowed to rebut
inference of "inexplicable act of violence").
The defendant also argues that joinder was improper because
the best interests of justice supported severance. The "best
interests of justice" are determined by "weighing the
defendant's interests against judicial economy." Gray, 465
Mass. at 335, quoting Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 388 Mass. 749,
28
758 (1983). The defendant's argument is unavailing because
considerable evidence of the home invasion and armed robbery
would have been admissible in separate trials. Additionally,
the judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the Commonwealth
had the burden of proving each separate indictment beyond a
reasonable doubt.9 Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the
denial of the defendant's motion to sever. See Gray, supra at
336-337.
3. Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We have
examined the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, and we discern no basis on which to grant the defendant
relief.
So ordered.
9
In addition to instructing the jury in the preliminary and
final instructions that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of each offense, the judge
gave the following preliminary instructions:
"What I do want to discuss at this point is that each
defendant is entitled to individual judgment and the
Commonwealth is entitled to your individual judgment as to
each defendant. And that goes for each defendant and each
count. So, although we have a number of counts against
each defendant and we have a number of defendants together
in the courtroom, it’s not a case of one for all and one
for all. It may be that you find all the defendants not
guilty, or some guilty and some not guilty, or some perhaps
guilty on some charges and not the others. So I guess a
short way to say that is that everybody concerned is
entitled to have you exercise individual judgment as to
each defendant and each charge."