Meikle v. Nurse

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SJC-11859
GARTH MEIKLE vs. PATRICIA NURSE.
Suffolk. November 5, 2015. - April 27, 2016.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk,
& Hines, JJ.
Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary process, Counterclaim
and cross-claim. Landlord and Tenant, Security deposit,
Termination of tenancy, Eviction.
Summary process. Complaint filed in the Boston Division of
the Housing Court Department on June 11, 2014.
The case was heard by MaryLou Muirhead, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Louis Fisher (Patricia Whiting with him) for the defendant.
Garth Meikle, pro se.
Peter Vickery, for Worcester Property Owners Association,
Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Maureen McDonagh & Julia Devanthéry, for City Life/Vida
Urbana, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
HINES, J. In this appeal we decide whether a tenant may
assert a violation of the security deposit statute, G. L.
2
c. 186, § 15B, as a defense to a landlord's claim for possession
in a summary process action brought under G. L. c. 239, § 1A.
The issue arises from a Housing Court judge's disposition of a
summary process action brought by Garth Meikle, the landlord,
against Patricia Nurse, the tenant. After a trial, the judge
ruled that the tenant properly could assert a violation of the
security deposit statute as a counterclaim for damages, but that
a counterclaim on this basis is not a defense to the landlord's
claim for possession. The tenant appealed, arguing that the
plain language of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, buttressed by its
legislative history, establishes that a violation of the
security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a
landlord's claim for possession and that the judge erred in
rejecting this interpretation of the statute. We transferred
the appeal to this court on our own motion.1
We conclude that a violation of the security deposit
statute is encompassed within the definition of "counterclaim or
1
The judge's ruling in this case conflicts with other
Housing Court decisions on this issue. See, e.g., Patnod vs.
King, Worcester Hous. Ct., No. 14-SP-3620 (Sept. 29, 2014)
(landlord failure to notify lessee of location of security
deposit and failure to deposit in interest-bearing account
created defense to possession); Gouveia vs. Noel, Southeast
Hous. Ct., No. 13-SP-02987 (Sept. 19, 2013) (failure to place
security deposit in interest bearing account constituted defense
to no-fault eviction); Dunn vs. Cox, Boston Hous. Ct., No. 99-
SP-03639 (Aug. 23, 1999) (statutory violation of security
deposit law prohibited landlord action to recover possession).
3
defense" in G. L. c. 239, § 8A, and that a counterclaim or
defense on that basis may be asserted as a defense to a
landlord's possession in a summary process action under G. L.
c. 239, § 1A. Therefore, we reverse the Housing Court judgment
granting possession to the landlord and remand for a hearing in
accordance with the provisions of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par.2
Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,
which we accept unless they are clearly erroneous. Martin v.
Simmons Props., LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014). In October, 2011,
Nurse moved into a residential building owned by Meikle. The
parties executed a one-year lease under which Nurse paid a
security deposit in the amount of $1,300, equivalent to one
month's rent. Meikle failed to give Nurse a receipt
acknowledging acceptance of the deposit, failed to provide Nurse
with a receipt indicating the bank account into which he
deposited the funds, and failed to pay Nurse interest earned. On
expiration of the lease, Nurse continued to live in the premises
as a tenant at will until Meikle terminated the tenancy in
April, 2014, to provide housing to members of his extended
family. Meikle then instituted a no-fault summary process
action for possession of the premises, G. L. c. 239, § 1, and
for recovery of monies due for use and occupancy, G. L. c. 239,
2
We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by City
Life/Vida Urbana and Worcester Property Owners Association, Inc.
4
§ 2, for the months of May, June, and July, 2014. Nurse
counterclaimed,3 alleging violations of G. L. c. 186, § 15B
(security deposit statute), and G. L. c. 93A, in addition to
improper termination, insufficient notice to quit, retaliation,
and breach of the warranty of habitability.
After a two-day bench trial, the judge found for Meikle on
all but the security deposit claim, ruling that his failure to
provide Nurse with an acceptance receipt, a bank deposit
receipt, and the interest earned from the security deposit
violated G. L. c. 186, §§ 15B (2) (b),4 (3) (a),5 and (3) (b),6
3
Pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 8A, "tenant[s] or occupant[s]"
may defend against a landlord's claim of possession. This
includes lessees, tenants at will, and tenants at sufferance who
meet the statutory requirements to attain standing. See Rubin
v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281, 290-291 (1972) (declining to rule
whether tenants at sufferance are barred from raising sanitation
code violations as defense to summary process but nonetheless
reaching § 8A claims of tenants at sufferance); Hodge v. Klug,
33 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 754 (1992) ("the statute would be
defanged if a tenant at sufferance could not employ its
machinery"). Thus, Patricia Nurse may enlist § 8A in defense of
her tenancy.
4
General Laws c. 186, § 15B (2) (b), requires that "[a]ny
lessor or his agent who receives a security deposit from a
tenant or prospective tenant shall give said tenant or
prospective tenant at the time of receiving such security
deposit a receipt indicating the amount of such security
deposit, the name of the person receiving it and, in the case of
an agent, the name of the lessor for whom such security deposit
is received, the date on which it is received, and a description
of the premises leases or rented. Said receipt shall be signed
by the person receiving the security deposit." (Emphasis added.)
5
respectively. The judgment awarded possession and unpaid rent
($3,900) to Meikle, to be offset by the amount due to Nurse on
her security deposit counterclaim ($1,304.61), resulting in net
damages to Meikle in the amount of $2,595.39. Nurse's motion to
reconsider was denied, and she timely appealed.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review questions
of statutory interpretation de novo." Commerce Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006). Here we apply
the "general and familiar rule . . . that a statute must be
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be
remedied and the main object to be accomplished." Lowery v.
Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins,
5
General Laws c. 186, § 15B (3) (a), provides in relevant
part: "A receipt shall be given to the tenant within thirty
days after such deposit is received by the lessor which receipt
shall indicate the name and location of the bank in which the
security deposit has been deposited and the amount and account
number of said deposit. Failure to comply with this paragraph
shall entitle the tenant to immediate return of the security
deposit." (Emphasis added.)
6
General Laws c. 186, § 15B (3) (b), requires that "[a]
lessor of residential real property who holds a security deposit
pursuant to this section for a period of one year or longer
. . . shall . . . pay interest at the rate of five per cent per
year . . . payable to the tenant at the end of each year of the
tenancy."
6
286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). The language of a statute is
interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, and if the
"language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the
intent of the Legislature." Commissioner of Correction v.
Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of
Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 (2006), citing Commonwealth v.
Clerk-Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court
Dep't, 439 Mass. 352, 355-356 (2003). Also, insofar as relevant
here, "a remedial statute . . . should be given a broad
interpretation . . . in light of its purpose and to 'promote the
accomplishment of its beneficent design.'" Seller's Case, 452
Mass. 804, 810 (2008), quoting Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't
of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995).
2. Violation of the security deposit statute as a defense
to possession. The trial judge, without explaining her
reasoning, ruled that the tenant's counterclaim for violation of
the security deposit statute, while properly asserted as a claim
for damages, did not constitute a defense to Meikle's action for
possession. This was error.
General Laws c. 239, § 8A, sets forth in broad outline the
defenses and counterclaims available to a tenant in a summary
process action and, in certain circumstances, authorizes a
prevailing tenant to retain possession of the premises. More
specifically, G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., provides in
7
relevant part:
"There shall be no recovery of possession under
this chapter if the amount found by the court to
be due the landlord equals or is less than the
amount found to be due the tenant or occupant by
reason of any counterclaim or defense under this
section. If the amount found to be due the
landlord exceeds the amount found to be due the
tenant or occupant, there shall be no recovery of
possession if the tenant or occupant, within one
week after having received written notice from
the court of the balance due, pays to the clerk
the balance due the landlord, together with
interest and costs of suit, less any credit due
the tenant or occupant for funds already paid by
him to the clerk under this section." (Emphasis
added.)
Drawing from the plain language of the statute, a tenant may
retain possession only if two conditions are met: (1) the
tenant prevails on a counterclaim or defense brought "under this
section"; and (2) the damages on that defense or counterclaim
exceed the amount due the landlord, or if the damages are less
than the amount due the landlord, the tenant pays to the court
the amount due within one week. The matter of damages is purely
a factual question and needs no further explanation. Therefore,
we focus on the specific issue of statutory interpretation
presented here: whether we may deem the tenant's counterclaim
for violation of the security deposit statute to have been
brought "under this section."
To begin the analysis, we accept that the only logical
interpretation of the "under this section" language in G. L.
8
c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., is as a reference to G. L. c. 239,
§ 8A, first par., the sole statutory provision describing the
counterclaims or defenses that may be asserted by a tenant in a
summary process action. The reference to "counterclaim[s] or
defense[s] [brought] under this section" without further
explication necessarily connects the two provisions. They are
to be read together in determining whether, in a given case, a
tenant may defeat a landlord's claim for possession. We turn
then to the definition of counterclaims and defenses in G. L.
c. 239, § 8A, first par., taking note that "[w]here the
Legislature uses the same words in several sections which
concern the same subject matter, the words 'must be presumed to
have been used with the same meaning in each section.'"
Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 747 (2011), quoting
Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184,
188-189 (1969).
a. General Laws c. 239, § 8A, first par. Section 8A,
first par., specifies that a tenant who faces eviction in a
summary process action for nonpayment of rent, or because the
tenancy is terminated without fault of the tenant, has the right
to raise certain defenses or counterclaims in that proceeding.
It provides, in relevant part:
"In any action under this chapter to recover possession of
any premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes,
brought pursuant to a notice to quit for nonpayment of
9
rent, or where the tenancy has been terminated without
fault . . . , the tenant or occupant shall be entitled to
raise, by defense or counterclaim, any claim against the
plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property,
rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a
breach of any material provision of the rental agreement,
or for a violation of any other law" (emphasis added).
Based on the plain language of the statute, an actionable
counterclaim or defense under this provision must meet two
requirements: (1) the defense or counterclaim must "relat[e] to
or aris[e] out of" the tenancy; and (2) the subject matter of
the defense or counterclaim must be based on either "a breach of
warranty," "a breach of any material provision of the rental
agreement," or "a violation of any other law." Id.
The first requirement, that a counterclaim or defense be
related to or arise out of the tenancy or occupancy, reflects
the Legislature's concern that summary process actions be
unencumbered by landlord-tenant disputes that have nothing to do
with the tenancy. Thus, it imposes an appropriate limitation on
the defenses or counterclaims that may be asserted by the
tenant. A counterclaim or defense based on a violation of the
security deposit statute fits squarely within this framework; it
indisputably relates to or arises out of the tenancy. The
tender of a security deposit by a tenant to a landlord is well
established as a prerequisite to most residential tenancies.
The centrality of a security deposit to the landlord-tenant
relationship is further evidenced by the Legislature's enactment
10
of the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B, as part of
an elaborate scheme of rights and duties to prevent abuses and
to insure fairness to the tenant.
The second requirement, that the counterclaim or defense
must relate to a breach of warranty, breach of any material
provision of the rental agreement, or a violation of any other
law, further limits the subject matter of the actionable
counterclaims or defenses to these specific categories. As
neither a breach of warranty nor a breach of the rental
agreement is applicable here, we consider only whether the
violation of the security deposit statute fits within the
remaining category, "violation of any other law."
Although the Legislature's choice of the phrase "violation
of any other law" suggests that the universe of laws might be
available as the source of a tenant's counterclaim or defense,
we see no need to assume such an intent in this case. In the
context of a summary process action, we have no difficulty
interpreting the phrase "violation of any other law" to include
any law enacted to protect a tenant's rights in the landlord-
tenant relationship.7 See Lawrence v. Osuagwu, 57 Mass. App. Ct.
60, 63 (2003) (interpreting "violation of any other law" to
7
Our confidence is buttressed by language in the same
paragraph, permitting "such other damages as may be authorized
by any law having as its objective the regulation of residential
premises." G. L. c. 239, § 8A, first par.
11
include counterclaim for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment
under G. L. c. 186, § 14). The security deposit statute is one
such law. Indeed, the security deposit statute has no raison
d'être other than to insure fairness to a tenant who pays a sum
to the landlord and relies on the landlord's good faith for the
return of the portion to which he or she is entitled at the end
of the tenancy.
Our cases involving the security deposit statute
demonstrate its importance in the scheme of protections afforded
a tenant. This court has recognized for some time that the
Legislature views violations of the security deposit statute,
G. L. c. 186, § 15B, as serious violations. See Hampshire
Village Assocs. v. District Court of Hampshire, 381 Mass. 148,
151-152, cert. denied sub nom. Ruhlander v. District Court of
Hampshire, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980) ("Section 15B is not without
reason. The question of security deposits has long been
agitated; the problems are well known; and the Legislature has
attempted progressively to deal with them" [footnote omitted]).
Indeed, the security deposit statute provides for treble
damages, costs, and attorney's fees. See G. L. c. 186,
§ 15B (7). Thus, it would be contrary to legislative intent to
interpret "violation of any other law" in a manner that would
undermine a tenant's right to assert the range of protections
available under the summary process statute.
12
The legislative history of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, supports
this interpretation. Within a ten-year time frame, the
Legislature acted on more than one occasion to increase the
availability of counterclaims to tenants. See St. 1965, c. 888
(creating counterclaims to allow enforcement of sanitation
code); St. 1967, c. 420, § 1 (permitting counterclaims for
sanitary code violations in no-fault evictions); St. 1975, c.
467, § 3 (expanding counterclaims to include breach of
warranty). The most substantive expansion occurred in 1977,
when the Legislature removed the language that had limited
defenses or counterclaims to the condition of the premises and
retained the current language permitting "any claim against the
plaintiff . . . for a violation of any other law" (emphasis
added). St. 1977, c. 963. The steady progression in the
availability of tenant defenses, culminating in the elimination
of conditions-based restrictions, confirms the Legislature's
intent to provide tenants with a broad set of defenses and
counterclaims in the summary process action, including the
defense asserted by the tenant in this case.
b. Application of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par. Having
determined that a counterclaim for violation of the security
deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to possession, we
now address whether the judge properly applied G. L. c. 239,
§ 8A, fifth par., in granting possession to the landlord. Here,
13
the judge's ruling erroneously foreclosed the tenant's right to
make payment as required to retain possession of the premises.
Where a tenant prevails on a defense or counterclaim and is
awarded damages in an amount less than the amount owed to the
landlord, the statute provides that "no judgment shall enter
until after the expiration of the time for such payment and the
tenant has failed to make such payment." Id. Accordingly, the
tenant is entitled to the opportunity to pay the amount due
within one week and retain possession.
Last, for the sake of clarity, we emphasize that a tenant
who retains possession under this provision of the statute does
not enjoy that right in perpetuity. The statute does not impose
an obligatory tenancy on the landlord. Nothing in the statute
prevents the landlord from bringing a second summary process
action for possession after he or she has remedied the violation
of the security deposit statute. Also, even where the tenant
agrees to pay the amount due the landlord to exercise the right
to possession, the landlord may thereafter commence a summary
process action. We interpret the Legislature's intent in
providing for the tenant's right to retain possession as a time-
limited equitable remedy for the particular conduct underlying
the tenant's defense or counterclaim.
Conclusion. For the reasons explained above, we reverse
the judge's order granting possession to the landlord and remand
14
for entry of an order providing notice to the tenant of the
right to retain possession in compliance with G. L. c. 239,
§ 8A, fifth par.
So ordered.