Commonwealth v. Smith

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SJC-11624
COMMONWEALTH vs. RASHIDI J. SMITH.
Plymouth. December 4, 2014. - April 9, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk,
& Hines, JJ.
Homicide. Constitutional Law, Waiver of constitutional rights
by juvenile, Admissions and confessions. Evidence,
Admissions and confessions. Practice, Criminal, Admissions
and confessions. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence
of inferior courts.
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on August 17, 2007.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Jeffrey
A. Locke, J., and the case was tried before him.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant.
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services &
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
2
LENK, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of
murder in the second degree in the death by shooting of fourteen
year old Marvin Constant. At the time of his arrest for the
shooting, the defendant was seventeen years and five months old.
The Commonwealth's evidence at trial included, among other
things, incriminating statements that the defendant made to
police after waiving his Miranda rights. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The defendant sought,
unsuccessfully, to suppress these statements. He argues on
appeal that their introduction at trial was error given our
common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to consult with an "interested adult"
before waiving his or her Miranda rights, since he did not have
such an opportunity.
The interested adult rule, as we have defined it to date,
applies only to those who have not yet reached the age of
seventeen. Several years after the defendant was convicted,
however, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, c. 84 (2013 act),
which amended an array of statutory provisions to treat
seventeen year olds as juveniles.
The 2013 act does not affect the current case, both because
it is prospective in its application and because it does not
itself modify the interested adult rule, which is a creature of
our common law. We therefore affirm the defendant's conviction.
3
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to expand the reach of
our rule to encompass seventeen year olds, but do so on a
prospective basis.1
1. Background. a. The crime. The facts that could have
been found by the jury include the following. In June, 2007,
members of two gangs were present at a cookout at a home on
Crescent Street in Brockton. The defendant was associated with
one of the two gangs. A fight broke out at the cookout, and a
window was broken.
The next day, the defendant arrived at the Crescent Street
home, wearing a red sweatshirt with black sleeves. The
defendant spoke to a member of the gang with which he was
associated, saying that the events of the previous night had
been "messed up." The defendant then had a conversation with
the victim, who belonged to the other gang.
The defendant and the victim left the house together. A
few minutes later, witnesses heard three gunshots. A witness
saw the victim lying in the street and a person wearing a red
sweatshirt ride off on a bicycle. An autopsy revealed that the
victim had been killed by two gunshot wounds.
1
We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Committee for
Public Counsel Services, the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and Citizens for Juvenile
Justice.
4
By happenstance, police officers were, at that time,
driving an unmarked sport utility vehicle (SUV) in the area.
They saw the defendant drop a bicycle to the ground, run, and
hurriedly flag down and enter a passing green Honda automobile.
Before getting into the vehicle, the defendant was seen
clutching his waistband area in a manner that suggested to the
officers that he might be concealing a weapon there. After
briefly following the Honda, the detectives stopped it. They
found a gun on the floor of the Honda where the defendant had
been sitting. The gun's ten-bullet magazine had seven bullets
in it, and the gun was jammed; that type of jam could have
occurred only if the gun had been fired. Ballistics testing
subsequently indicated that the gun had been used to shoot three
cartridge casings and one spent projectile that were recovered
in the vicinity of the victim's body.
b. Statements to police.2 The defendant, then seventeen
years and five months old, was arrested and taken to the
Brockton police station. The defendant previously had been
involved in several delinquency cases, and had been charged with
firearm-related offenses that ultimately were dismissed. Police
booked the defendant and informed him of his Miranda rights.
They then provided the defendant with a Miranda waiver form and
2
The facts in this section, which are not in dispute, are
drawn primarily from the written decision of the Superior Court
judge denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
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asked him to read the form aloud. When the defendant had
difficulty doing so, a detective read the form to the defendant,
pausing to ask after each line whether the defendant understood.
The defendant initialed each of the rights on the form as well
as the word "YES" at the bottom of the form. He also agreed
orally to waive his rights and to tell his side of the story.
During the first hour of questioning, the defendant
maintained that he had not been present when the victim was
shot, and that he had gotten into the green Honda only to "hang
out" with a friend who was in the vehicle. When police officers
told the defendant that they knew he had been at the scene and
believed that he had been the shooter, the defendant said that
he had nothing to add, and the interview was terminated.
On the way back to the holding cell, the defendant asked
the detectives why they did not believe him. One of the
detectives said, "I saw you." The defendant asked, "You were in
the SUV?" When the officer answered affirmatively, the
defendant requested that the interview resume. He then told
police that he had been present when the victim was shot, and
that a man named "Triz" had been the shooter.
c. Proceedings. The defendant was charged with murder.
Before trial, he moved to suppress his statements to police.
The defendant argued, among other things, that his Miranda
waiver had not been valid because he had not had a meaningful
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opportunity to consult with an interested adult. After an
evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion to
suppress in a detailed written decision. The judge determined
that the interested adult rule was not applicable because
although, at seventeen years of age, the defendant was a
"minor," he was not a "juvenile" subject to that rule. Based on
the evidence presented, including a recording of the interviews
with the defendant, the judge found that "the circumstances
surrounding the defendant's waiver of rights show[], beyond a
reasonable doubt[,] that it was voluntarily and intelligently
made."
At trial, the defendant testified that a friend, Terrence
Young, had been the shooter. Young had died by the time of the
trial. The defendant stated that he had made up the name "Triz"
when he spoke to police in order to protect Young. The jury
convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, and the
Appeals Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Smith, 84 Mass. App.
Ct. 1116 (2013). We granted the defendant's application for
further appellate review, limited to the issue of the
application of the interested adult rule.
2. Discussion. a. Legal framework. The Commonwealth is
subject to "a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination." Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 Mass. 31, 34 (1991),
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quoting Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405 Mass. 497, 500 (1989). This
burden grows heavier still when the defendant is a juvenile,
because studies have shown that "most juveniles do not
understand the significance and protective function of the[ir]
rights even when they are read the standard Miranda warnings."
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 131 (1983) (A
Juvenile). "Special caution" therefore must be exercised when
police present juveniles with the option of waiving their
Miranda rights, see Commonwealth v. Berry, supra at 34, in order
"to ensure that the juvenile defendant has understood his rights
and the consequences of waiving them." Commonwealth v. McCra,
427 Mass. 564, 568 (1998) (citations omitted).
In A Juvenile, supra at 134, and subsequent cases, we
sought to give shape to the caution appropriate in such
circumstances by establishing the following rules. First, "in
the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen . . . no
waiver can be effective" unless "a parent or an interested adult
was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to
explain [the] rights to the juvenile." Id. Next, juveniles
between fourteen and seventeen years old must be "afforded the
opportunity to consult with an interested adult." See
Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 Mass. at 35, citing Commonwealth v.
Guyton, supra at 500-502, and Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 399
Mass. 71, 78 (1987). Even if this opportunity is not given, a
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Miranda waiver made by a juvenile of fourteen to seventeen may
be valid if "the circumstances . . . demonstrate a high degree
of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the
part of the juvenile." A Juvenile, supra.The interested adult rule provides "additional protection[]
under the common law . . . that go[es] beyond what the Supreme
Court would require in similar circumstances." See Commonwealth
v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 303, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010),
quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 531 (1992). This
rule is essentially a prophylactic device, which seeks to
"establish[] . . . definite procedures" that "inform[] police
and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in
conducting custodial interrogation" and "inform[] courts under
what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation
are not admissible." Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804,
812-813 (1993), quoting A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 135.
b. Analysis. As noted, the defendant in this case was
several months older than seventeen when he was interviewed by
police. We have stated repeatedly that a "defendant [is] no
longer entitled to interested adult protections at age
seventeen." See Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 132 (2014),
citing Commonwealth v. Trombley, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 186
(2008). See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 4 n.6
(2007); Commonwealth v. Considine, 448 Mass. 295, 297 n.7
9
(2007); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 855 n.12
(2000); Commonwealth v. Carey, 407 Mass. 528, 537 (1990). The
defendant's contention that his statements to police should have
been suppressed under the interested adult rule is therefore
unavailing. The motion judge correctly determined that the rule
did not apply. There was also no error in the judge's
determination that, given the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights, the waiver was
voluntary and intelligent beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant argues that the passage of the 2013 act
entitles him to the protection of the interested adult rule. As
mentioned, this statute expands the definition of the term
"juvenile," in various contexts, to include seventeen year olds.
The defendant's argument fails for two reasons.
First, the 2013 act, which became law on September 18,
2013, states that it "shall take effect upon its passage."
St. 2013, c. 84, § 34. In Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49(2014), we considered whether the 2013 act applies retroactively
to cases pending when the act took effect. We noted there,
among other things, that "[r]etroactive application of the
act . . . would present potential legal and appellate issues
concerning the effect of proceedings that had already taken
place," including challenges to "the admissibility of statements
made by a juvenile who was seventeen years of age to
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police . . . if the juvenile did not have the opportunity to
consult with a parent, interested adult, or attorney." Id. at
59, citing A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 134. Our analysis of the
2013 act's history, substance, and underlying purpose led us to
conclude that the act applies prospectively only. The defendant
was interviewed by police more than six years prior to the
effective date of the 2013 act, and his motion to suppress was
denied more than three years before that date. The propriety of
the defendant's Miranda waiver and the admissibility of his
statements are not, therefore, affected by the passage of the
2013 act.
Moreover, the 2013 act does not itself modify the scope of
the interested adult rule. The interested adult rule is a rule
of our common law, not one constitutionally mandated or
legislatively enacted. See Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. at
303. The various statutory provisions addressed by the 2013 act
do not expressly or implicitly concern the interested adult
rule. Consequently, the 2013 act would not have entitled the
defendant to the protection of the interested adult rule even
had it taken effect before the defendant was interviewed by
police.
c. Future cases. While the 2013 act does not, itself,
modify the interested adult rule, we take this opportunity to
extend the rule, on a prospective basis, to seventeen year old
11
defendants. Like the interested adult rule itself, this
modification is not constitutionally or statutorily required.
Nevertheless, in the wake of the 2013 act, seventeen year olds
will be treated as juveniles in a myriad of contexts. See,
e.g., St. 2013, c. 84, § 1, amending G. L. c. 6, § 167 (criminal
record information); St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 7-27, amending sections
of G. L. c. 119 (proceedings against delinquent children);
St. 2013, c. 84, § 30A, amending G. L. c. 276, § 87 (placement
in custody of probation officer); St. 2013, c. 84, § 31,
amending G. L. c. 276, § 89A (appointment of counsellors to
juvenile offenders); St. 2013, c. 84, § 33, amending G. L.
c. 280, § 6B (imposition of criminal assessments).
Considerations of consistency and ease of application thus
support the extension of our rule, too, to seventeen year olds.
Because our modification of the scope of the interested
adult rule is "not a new constitutional rule, but rather an
exercise of our power of superintendence 'to regulate the
presentation of evidence in court proceedings,'" it will apply
only to interrogations conducted after the issuance of the
rescript in this case. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass.
707, 720, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014), quoting
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 720–721 (2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005). See also Commonwealth v. Clemente,
452 Mass. 295, 305 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009);
12
Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 736 (2007), and
cases cited; E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure
§ 1:21, at 37 (4th ed. 2014). Contrast Commonwealth v.
Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 201-202 (1992) (discussing retroactive
application of constitutionally required rule).3 Prospective
application is particularly appropriate in the current context,
given that the interested adult rule is specifically intended to
establish fixed procedures that may be relied upon by police and
by the courts. See Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. at 812-
813, quoting A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 135. This goal would be
3
In Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 667 (2005), we
"for the first time [applied] a new rule of criminal law, not
constitutionally mandated, to the defendant before us, even
though we said in the decision that the new rule would apply
prospectively." Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718,
736 (2007). This was a "most unusual" exception "to our normal
practice of prospective application." See Commonwealth v.
Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 305 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181(2009). We deemed that exception warranted because,
essentially, the doctrine that we updated in Commonwealth v.
Adjutant had been "paramount" in that case, and had resulted in
exclusion of evidence that, "[g]iven [its] probative value . . .
may have been enough to create reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt." See Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, supra at
736, quoting Commonwealth v. Adjutant, supra at 666. See also
Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 479 (2015) (declining to
apply new rule to defendant where we were "not concerned that in
the absence of the new rule there may have been a miscarriage of
justice"); Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 252-253
(2014) (explaining that the Adjutant rule was subsequently
applied in Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson because, in the
circumstances, the "integrity of [the] verdict was suspect").
Given the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements
to police, as well as the limited role that those statements
played at his trial, we are satisfied that our normal practice
of prospective application works no injustice here.
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unnecessarily compromised by the application of our revised
interested adult rule to the defendant or to others similarly
situated after the fact. See Commonwealth v. Watts, 468 Mass.
at 59.
Judgment affirmed.