Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enterprises, Inc.

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SJC-12548
ANA ARIAS-VILLANO & others1 vs. CHANG & SONS ENTERPRISES, INC.,
& others.2
Franklin. November 5, 2018. - March 15, 2019.
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker,
JJ.
Labor, Overtime compensation. Agriculture.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 17, 2015.
The case was heard by Michael K. Callan, J., on motions for
summary judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
Susan E. Garcia Nofi (Leticia Medina-Richman also present)
for the plaintiffs.
1 Jorge Alvarez, Noelia Gomez-Garcia, Beatriz Perez-
Hernandez, Marlyn Sosa-Saucedo, Edwin Merida-Lopez, Jacobo
Lopez-Funes, Adrian Cervantes-Acosta, Florindo Alvarado-Argueta,
David Pacheco-Herrera, Maria Soto-Aguilera, Ronaldo Carrillo-
Funes, Edilmar Morales-Matias, Reynaldo Morales-Morales, Rolando
Alvarado-Argueta, & Paulino Chaparro-Bravo.
2 Sidney Chang and Tso-Cheng Chang.
2
Sandra E. Lundy (David G. Gabor also present) for the
defendants.
Christopher J. Schulte, of the District of Columbia, for
American Mushroom Institute, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
William C. Newman & Harris Freeman, for American Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae,
submitted a brief.
BUDD, J. The issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs,
who work for the defendants' company that grows, harvests,
packages, and distributes bean sprouts, are entitled to overtime
pay for the hours they worked over forty each week under G. L.
c. 151, § 1A (overtime statute). A judge of the Superior Court
determined that the work that the plaintiffs performed fell
under the agricultural exemption to the overtime statute, G. L.
c. 151, § 1A (19), and, on cross motions for summary judgment,
allowed the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs'. We
conclude that, under the plain language of the statute and the
legislative history, the agricultural exemption does not apply
to the plaintiffs, and therefore, they are entitled to overtime
wages.3 Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and the denial of the plaintiffs'
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American
Mushroom Institute, as well as the amicus brief submitted by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Massachusetts
Law Reform Institute, Pioneer Valley Workers Center, United Food
and Commercial Workers Local 1459, University of Massachusetts
Labor Relations and Research Center, and Michael Wishnie.
3
motion. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment shall be
allowed.
1. Background. We set forth the material facts contained
in the judge's written decision on the motions for summary
judgment, supplemented with undisputed facts from the record.
Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 347 (2012). The
defendants grow, harvest, package, and distribute bean sprouts
in a 44,000 square foot facility that operates year-round. Ten
fifteen-by-fifty square foot rooms are dedicated to growing the
bean sprouts, a hydroponic operation that is mostly automated.
Beans are fed into machines that pasteurize them and then
discharge them into containers where they sprout without the use
of soil. Computers monitor the sprouts and dispense water and
fertilizer into the containers when needed.
The plaintiffs, who were employed by the defendants for
various periods of time from 2012 to 2015, were not involved in
the growing operations, but instead cleaned, inspected, sorted,
weighed, and packaged the bean sprouts. They also cleaned the
facility and discarded waste. The plaintiffs regularly worked
more than forty hours per week; some weeks they worked as many
as seventy hours. However, the plaintiffs were never paid the
4
overtime rate for the hours they worked in excess of forty hours
weekly.4
The plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court,
claiming that the defendants, their former employers, failed to
pay them overtime wages as required by law. The defendants
contended that the plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime wages
because their work falls under the agricultural exemption, which
states that the overtime pay requirement shall not apply to
those "engaged in agriculture and farming on a farm." G. L.
c. 151, § 1A (19).
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The motion judge
allowed the defendants' motion and denied that of the
plaintiffs. We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct
appellate review.
2. Discussion. As the case was decided below on motions
for summary judgment on an undisputed record, "one of the moving
parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation
and citation omitted). Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund
v. Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841 (2016). "The single issue
4 Some plaintiffs were paid less than minimum wage for up to
two months at the beginning of their employment. Although this
rate would have violated the general minimum wage law and, after
January 1, 2015, the special minimum wage rate for agricultural
workers, the plaintiffs only allege violations of the overtime
statute.
5
raised is one of statutory interpretation, and we review the
motion judge's decision de novo." Id.
a. The overtime statute. The overtime statute provides
that "no employer in the commonwealth shall employ any of his
employees in an occupation . . . for a work week longer than
forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one
and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed."
G. L. c. 151, § 1A.
The overtime statute was enacted in 1960 as a provision of
the minimum wage law, G. L. c. 151, which until that time did
not provide for overtime compensation. See St. 1960, c. 813.
See also G. L. c. 151, §§ 1, 2, as amended through St. 1959, c.
190. The purpose of the overtime statute was three-fold: "to
reduce the number of hours of work, encourage the employment of
more persons, and compensate employees for the burden of a long
workweek." Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass.
526, 531 (2008).
However, the overtime statute includes twenty categories of
exceptions from the overtime pay requirement that exempt work
performed in certain locations, see, e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A
(13) ("in a gasoline station"); certain types of work, see,
e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A (2) ("as a golf caddy, newsboy or child
actor or performer"); certain types of businesses, see, e.g.,
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G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11) ("by an employer licensed and regulated
pursuant to [G. L. c. 159A, motor vehicle common carriers]"); or
a combination of factors. The agricultural exemption, at issue
here, applies to laborers "engaged in agriculture and farming on
a farm." G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19). Thus, the scope of the
agricultural exemption turns on the meaning of the phrase
"agriculture and farming."
"Our primary duty is to interpret a statute in accordance
with the intent of the Legislature." Pyle v. School Comm. of
S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996). See Boston Police
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-720 (2002), and
cases cited. At the outset, we note that, "as a remedial
measure, the overtime statute must be broadly construed in light
of its purpose, which is in part to compensate for a long work
week." Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 797 (2018).
Any exemptions are therefore to be construed narrowly. See Wood
v. Executive Office of Communities & Dev., 411 Mass. 599, 604-
605 (1992).
In determining the meaning of "agriculture and farming" as
used in G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19), we look first to definitions
provided in the chapter that apply to the overtime statute. See
2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction
§ 47:7 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("When a legislature does define
statutory language, its definition usually is binding on courts,
7
even if the definition varies from a term's ordinary meaning").
See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). General
Laws c. 151, § 2, defines "[a]gricultural and farm work" as
"labor on a farm and the growing and harvesting of agricultural,
floricultural and horticultural commodities," "unless the
context clearly requires otherwise."5
The definition refers to "growing and harvesting"
commodities but does not include postharvesting activities.
Thus, under the plain language of G. L. c. 151, § 2, the type of
work that the plaintiffs performed, i.e., cleaning, sorting, and
packaging the sprouts, does not fall within the scope of the
statute. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447
Mass. 651, 660 (2006), quoting Perez v. Bay State Ambulance &
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 413 Mass. 670, 675 (1992)
("[statutory] definition [that] declares what a term means . . .
excludes any meaning that is not stated").
b. Legislative history. A narrow interpretation of the
agricultural exemption is supported by the legislative history
of the minimum wage and overtime statutes. See Commonwealth v.
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Wright v.
5 Although G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19) uses the terms
"agriculture and farming," and G. L. c. 151, § 2 defines
"[a]gricultural and farm work," "when similar words are used in
different parts of a statute, the meaning is presumed to be the
same throughout." Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 330
Mass. 79, 82 (1953).
8
Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996)
(ordinary meaning given to words in statute must be reasonable
and supported by purpose and history of statute).
When originally enacted in 1947, the minimum wage statute
was explicitly inapplicable to "domestic service in the home of
the employer or labor on a farm" (emphasis added). See St.
1947, c. 432. The overtime statute, which was enacted in 1960
and worked in tandem with the minimum wage statute, similarly
excluded farm labor.6 See St. 1960, c. 813; G. L. c. 151, §§ 1A,
2, as amended through St. 1959, c. 190. The agricultural
exemption, enacted seven years after the passage of the overtime
statute, was part of a legislative reform package entitled "An
act establishing minimum wage for farm workers and providing for
the annual inspection of farm labor camps." See St. 1967,
c. 718. As the title of the act suggests, the legislation was
intended to benefit farm workers by, among other things,
ensuring that they received a minimum wage. See id. at § 3,
inserting G. L. c. 151, § 2A.
The legislation was preceded by report of the Legislative
Research Council that detailed the struggles faced by migrant
farm laborers in the Commonwealth. The Legislature commissioned
6 Both the minimum wage and overtime requirements applied to
those employed only in an "occupation," which the Legislature
had defined in 1947 to exclude "labor on a farm." See St. 1947,
c. 432. See also St. 1960, c. 813.
9
the report to better understand "what if any changes may be
necessary to improve the status of the migrant worker without
creating undue hardship on the Massachusetts farmer." See 1967
Senate Doc. No. 1303, at 7. Because of the seasonal nature of
the industry, migrant workers faced incomes below the poverty
level due to the lack of consistent, year-round employment.7 See
id. at 14-15 ("[the migrant worker] can expect to be unemployed
for as much as half the year").
The report acknowledged opposition to providing overtime
pay to agricultural workers from employers, who argued that a
forty-hour work week was impractical given the time-sensitive
nature of growing and harvesting perishable fruits and
vegetables. See id. at 28 ("If the overtime provisions of
current law are applied, employers may avoid night and overtime
work. Thus, the full harvest may not be collected and of equal
importance the worker is denied a chance to earn extra money").
Given these competing interests, St. 1967, c. 718, appears
to have been an attempt to balance the needs of workers and
employers. Thus, St. 1967, c. 718, § 3, established a fair
minimum wage for agricultural workers, but St. 1967, c. 718,
7 Migrant workers also suffered from isolation and
substandard living conditions in temporary settlements. See
1967 Senate Doc. No. 1303, at 14-15.
10
§ 1, exempted them from receiving overtime wages. See G. L.
c. 151, §§ 1A (19), 2A.
c. Comparison to cognate Federal overtime provision. The
defendants argue that this court should adopt the broad
definition of "[a]griculture" contained in the Federal overtime
provision. We decline to do so.
It is true that the Massachusetts overtime statute is
analogous to, and was patterned upon, the overtime provision of
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which similarly
requires that covered employees be paid an overtime rate for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1). See Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass 443, 447
(2004); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 40 (1st
Cir. 1999). Even so, the two are not identical. In fact, the
Massachusetts overtime statute was enacted, in part, to provide
overtime compensation for many of those workers not covered by
the FLSA. See Swift, supra at 448-449. Compare, e.g., G. L.
c. 151, § 1A (19), with 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(12)-(13).
Unlike the minimum wage law, the FLSA defines
"[a]griculture" to include "farming in all its branches and
among other things comprises the cultivation and tillage of the
soil, . . . the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting
of any agricultural . . . commodities . . . and any practices
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. . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation
for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for
transportation to market" (emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 203(f).
See 29 C.F.R. § 780.105 (July 1, 2018 ed.).
We see no indication that the Legislature intended that the
FLSA definition of agriculture be applied to the agricultural
exemption of the Massachusetts overtime statute. Indeed, the
history of the legislation leads to the opposite conclusion.
The House bill first introducing the agricultural exemption in
1967 referenced a broad definition of agriculture and farming
found in G. L. c. 128, § 1A, which is nearly identical to the
definition of agriculture in the FLSA.8 However, the statute
that was ultimately enacted contained a much more narrow
8 The House bill that introduced the agricultural exemption
contained the following language: "laborer on a farm engaged in
agriculture and farming as defined in [G. L. c. 128, § 1A]."
See 1967 House Doc. No. 4653, at 3. The 1967 version of G. L.
c. 128, § 1A, defined farming and agriculture to "include
farming in all of its branches and the cultivation and tillage
of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and
harvesting of any agricultural, floricultural or horticultural
commodities, the raising of livestock, the keeping and raising
of poultry, swine, cattle and other domesticated animals used
for food purposes, bees, fur–bearing animals, and any practices,
including any forestry or lumbering operations, performed by a
farmer, who is hereby defined as one engaged in agriculture or
farming as herein defined, or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparations
for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for
transportation to market." See St. 1960, c. 181.
12
definition of "agricultural and farm work," which can now be
found in G. L. c. 151, § 2, discussed supra. For this reason,
we reject the defendants' suggestion that the Legislature
removed the reference to the broad definition of farming and
agriculture merely to make the statute "less wordy," and decline
to adopt the FLSA's definition of "agriculture" for the purposes
of the agricultural exemption. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-433 (1983), citing
International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 854-855
(1983) (Where "the language of a statute differs in material
respects from a previously enacted analogous Federal statute
which the Legislature appears to have considered, a decision to
reject the legal standards embodied or implicit in the language
of the Federal statute may be inferred").
3. Conclusion. By reading the plain language of the
exemption in G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19), narrowly to include only
the work of planting, raising, and harvesting crops,9 we give
effect to the statutory definition of agricultural and farm work
in G. L. c. 151, § 2, as well as to the legislative intent to
balance the interests of workers and employers.
As the plaintiffs here were not "engaged in agriculture and
farming" within the meaning of the agricultural exemption, we
9 We need not decide how the exemption should apply to
agricultural operations that do not involve crops.
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conclude that they were entitled to overtime pay for work
performed in excess of forty hours per week, as provided by the
overtime statute.10
The judgment allowing the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
10Having determined that the plaintiffs were not "engaged
in agriculture and farming" as required by the agricultural
exemption, we need not here opine on whether the plaintiffs
performed their work "on a farm." See Somerset v. Dighton Water
Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 743 (1964) (conjunction in statute should
not be read as disjunctive unless it gives effect to recognized
legislative purpose).