Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds

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SJC-11818
ALFREDO TIRADO vs. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY
POLICIES AND BONDS (and two consolidated cases1).
Norfolk. Worcester. Suffolk. May 5, 2015. - July 28, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds.
Motor Vehicle, License to operate. License. Registrar of
Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate. Carrier,
License. Practice, Criminal, Conviction, Admission to
sufficient facts to warrant finding, Continuance without a
finding.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
January 3, 2013.
The case was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
February 28, 2013.
The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
1
John J. Kelly vs. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & another;
and Scott Channing vs. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & another.
2
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
March 28, 2013.
The case was heard by Judith Fabricant, J., on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
After consolidation of the cases in the Appeals Court, the
Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the
defendants.
Dana Alan Curhan for Scott Channing.
Ryan E. Alekman, for Alfredo Tirado, was present but did
not argue.
Cornelius J. Madera, III, for John J. Kelly, was present
but did not argue.
William A. Quade, for United States Department of
Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
SPINA, J. In these consolidated appeals, we are asked to
determine if a defendant's admission to sufficient facts to
warrant a finding of guilty and a judge's continuance of the
case without a finding (CWOF) constitute a "conviction" as that
term is defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1,2 governing the licensure of
commercial drivers. Judges in the Superior Court determined
that it did not and vacated the decisions of the Board of Appeal
on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) upholding
the suspension of the commercial drivers' licenses (CDLs) at
issue by the registrar of motor vehicles (registrar). The board
2
"Conviction," as defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, includes "a
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply
with the law in a court of original jurisdiction."
3
and the registrar appealed. The Appeals Court consolidated the
three appeals, and we granted the parties' joint application for
direct appellate review. As we explain, we vacate the decisions
of the Superior Court and enter judgment in favor of the board.3
1. Background. The facts are undisputed. The specific
details of each of the three appeals are not material to
answering the question before us. Rather, it is enough to say
that each plaintiff was licensed as a commercial driver and at
some time was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. Each plaintiff
subsequently admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilty, and the judge accepting each admission continued the
case without a finding of guilty. Consequently, the registrar,
after determining that the admission and CWOF were a
"conviction" as defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, suspended the CDL
of each plaintiff pursuant to G. L. c. 90F, § 9 -- in two cases,
for life because the new offense was a subsequent offense.
Each plaintiff appealed the decision of the registrar to
the board. The board, after a hearing, affirmed each decision
of the registrar. Each plaintiff then sought judicial review of
the board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. Judges of the
3
We acknowledge the letter submitted by the United States
Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration in lieu of an amicus brief.
4
Superior Court determined that a CWOF is not a conviction as
that term is used in G. L. c. 90F and vacated the board's
decision in each case.
2. Statutory framework. a. The 1986 act. General Laws
c. 90F is the Legislature's adoption of the Federal Commercial
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-
570, codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 31301 et seq. (1986 act). Enacted
to address public concern over the substantial social and
economic losses associated with accidents involving large trucks
and buses, the purpose of the 1986 act was to improve the safety
of commercial motor vehicle operations. 52 Fed. Reg. 20,574,
20,575 (1987). Congress identified two major issues it sought
to address: (1) the practice by commercial drivers of obtaining
licenses from multiple States, which facilitated the avoidance
of consequences of license suspensions and revocations, and (2)
a lack of uniformity or vitality in licensing procedures,
qualifications, and evaluations among the States. Id. at
20,576.
To ensure uniformity in the application of the 1986 act
among the several States, it requires Federal highway funds be
withheld from a particular State if that State fails to comply
substantially with a number of stated requirements. 49 U.S.C.
§§ 31311(a), 31314 (2012). One of these requirements involves
the consequences of operating while under the influence of
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alcohol (OUI). States are required to suspend the CDLs of those
convicted of OUI or who refuse to be tested on suspicion of OUI.
In the case of a first conviction or refusal, the suspension is
for one year. 49 C.F.R. § 383.51 (Table 1) (2013). A second
conviction or refusal results in a lifetime disqualification or
revocation. Id.
"Conviction" is defined very broadly in the Federal
regulations to include not only an "adjudication of guilt" but
also a determination by an appropriate authority, judicial or
administrative, that "a person has violated or failed to comply
with the law." 49 C.F.R. § 383.5 (2013), added by 53 Fed. Reg.
39,044, 39,051 (1998). Under this definition of "conviction," a
person "referred to a remedial program as a substitute for the
imposition of a penalty, fine, or other sanction" would be
subject to a CDL suspension. 53 Fed. Reg. at 39,047.
b. The antimasking amendment. Despite these efforts,
Congress in 1999 determined that safety on the roads could be
improved further. It enacted the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748
(1999 act). The 1999 act increased the range of offenses that
could disqualify a person from maintaining a CDL. For example,
before 1999 only convictions of operating commercial vehicles
while under the influence of alcohol resulted in
disqualification. See 100 Stat. 3207-177 to 3207-178. Under
6
the 1999 act, convictions of operating noncommercial motor
vehicles under the influence of alcohol are now included. See
113 Stat. 1759. Additionally, States are explicitly forbidden
from disguising or masking the recording of convictions for such
offenses. 49 U.S.C. § 31311(a)(19) (2012). The corresponding
regulations state that the "State must not mask, defer
imposition of judgment, or allow an individual to enter into a
diversion program that would prevent a . . . conviction" from
appearing in the national database. 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 (2013),
added by 67 Fed. Reg. 49,742, 49,762 (2002) and amended by 76
Fed. Reg. 26,895 (2011). In promulgating this regulation, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) explained
that the antimasking provision was "intended to prohibit States
not only from masking convictions, but also from using diversion
programs or any other disposition that would defer the listing
of a guilty verdict on a CDL driver's record. . . . The FMCSA
urges State Executive Branch agencies to work with the State
Judicial Branch to eliminate the practice of masking. This
practice allows unsafe drivers to continue to pose a risk to
other motorists by allowing their continued operation on the
nation's highways." 67 Fed. Reg. at 49,749-49,750.
c. State adoption. The Legislature first adopted the 1986
act in 1990 and codified it as G. L. c. 90F. St. 1990, c. 246,
§ 2. In response to Congress's 1999 efforts, the Legislature
7
further amended c. 90F in 2006. St. 2006, c. 119, §§ 2-7. The
2006 amendment included the new antimasking provision and
specifically referenced 49 C.F.R. § 384.226. St. 2006, c. 119,
§ 19. Additionally, regulations promulgated by the registrar
specifically incorporate all the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part
383. 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(9) (1999).
3. Standard of review. The issue raised in this case is
one of statutory interpretation -- whether an admission to
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and CWOF is a
determination that a person "has violated or failed to comply
with the law" within the meaning of "conviction" as that term
appears in G. L. c. 90F, § 1. This question does not involve
any gaps in the statute to which the board needs to apply its
specialized knowledge relating to motor vehicles and driving
rules to give the statute meaning. The interpretive question
here is purely legal and we review it de novo because "[t]he
duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the
courts." Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227,
229-230 (2012), and cases cited.
4. Discussion. We arrive then at the heart of the
question in the case before us. The board4 argues that the
4
For the purpose of clarity in the remainder of this
opinion, we refer to the board and registrar collectively as the
board.
8
plaintiffs' admissions to sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilty and CWOFs are convictions for the purposes of c. 90F.
Relying primarily on our decision in Souza, supra at 235, the
Superior Court reasoned that an admission to sufficient facts
and CWOF were not a "determination that a person has violated or
failed to comply with the law." G. L. c. 90F, § 1.
In Souza, we considered whether an admission to sufficient
facts and CWOF were a "conviction" for the purposes of G. L.
c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1). Souza, 462 Mass. at 227-228. Under
the terms of the version of that statute at issue in Souza, "a
person shall be deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere or was found or adjudged guilty by a
court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not he was placed on
probation without sentence or under a suspended sentence or the
case was placed on file . . . ." G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d).
There the board argued that, although an admission to sufficient
facts was not explicitly included in the definition of
"convicted" in § 24 (1) (d), the statute's purpose of increasing
the penalties of repeat drunk driving required a liberal reading
of the statutory language. See Souza, supra at 231. We
rejected this argument and stated that the failure of the
definition of "convicted" to include an admission to sufficient
facts was fatal to the board's argument when the Legislature had
9
included that specific term elsewhere in the same statute. Id.
at 232.
The plaintiffs note that after our decision in Souza, the
Legislature amended G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d), to include an
admission to sufficient facts within the definition of
"convicted." St. 2012, c. 139, § 98. They urge that a similar
result should follow in this case. While we agree that
legislative action specifically including an admission to
sufficient facts in the definition of "conviction" in G. L.
c. 90F would definitively settle the question before us, the
reasoning in Souza when applied to the statute here leads us to
the opposite conclusion from that of Souza because the
definition of conviction in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, is broader than
in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d). Under G. L. c. 90F, § 1, the
definition of "conviction" encompasses an admission to
sufficient facts and CWOF.
An "admission to sufficient facts" means an admission to
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty. Commonwealth
v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 838 (1982). "An admission to
sufficient facts is very much like an Alford plea or a plea of
nolo contendere, in that the defendant does not explicitly admit
guilt." Reporters' Notes to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court
Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1490 (LexisNexis 2014).
The plaintiffs argued -- and the Superior Court agreed -- that
10
an admission to sufficient facts is not "a determination that a
person has violated or failed to comply with the law" because
the defendant admitting the facts is not admitting his guilt.
G. L. c. 90F, § 1.
The plaintiffs further contend that no judicial
determination takes place at all because the disposition of a
CWOF merely continues the case to a future date. Successful
fulfilment of the probationary conditions during the pendency of
the continuance results in the dismissal of the complaint or
indictment. Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 722-723
(1996). Violation of the probationary conditions of a CWOF does
not result in the automatic imposition of the stayed sentence
but instead "may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and
imposition of sentence" (emphasis added). Commonwealth v.
Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 (2002). The fact that a criminal
defendant avoids either admitting his or her guilt or having a
court adjudicate his or her guilt under this practice is the
linchpin to the plaintiffs' argument that no determination that
a person has violated or failed to comply with the law has
occurred.
We do not think the issue of admission or adjudication of
the guilt of a defendant is dispositive of the question whether
a determination has been made that a person has violated or
failed to comply with the law. Such an argument acknowledges
11
only the form of the end result of the practice without regard
for its operation and purpose. The mutual benefits of a
pretrial disposition of charges are well known and do not need
to be repeated here. See Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843. The
procedure by which a court allows the case against a defendant
to be continued without a finding of guilty necessarily requires
that the defendant admit to sufficient facts to warrant such a
finding -- that is to say, the facts that would demonstrate that
he or she had violated or failed to comply with the law.
An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilty "triggers the same safeguards required when a defendant
offers to plead guilty." Commonwealth v. Lewis, 399 Mass. 761,
763 (1987). See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (a) (2), (a) (3), as
appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015). "The judge shall conduct a
hearing to determine the voluntariness of a plea or admission
and the factual basis of the charge" (emphasis added). Mass. R.
Crim. P. 12 (c) (5), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004). The
rule further describes the procedures to be followed for a plea
or admission to sufficient facts. Commentators and the
established practice in the District Court indicate that a judge
would not and should not accept an admission to sufficient facts
unless that admission had a factual basis to support a finding
of guilt of the crime charged. See E.B. Cypher, Criminal
Practice and Procedure § 24:76 (4th ed. 2014). Indeed, it is
12
illogical to conclude that a defendant could receive the
disposition of a CWOF without first admitting to sufficient
facts that satisfied the judge that he or she was guilty. See
Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (b), 378 Mass. 898 (1979). See also
Commonwealth v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 727 n.5 (1996).
The reason an admission to sufficient facts triggers the
same safeguards as a guilty plea is that a violation of the
conditions of a CWOF may result in the immediate adjudication of
guilt and imposition of sentence without requiring the
Commonwealth to offer any further evidence of the underlying
offense. See Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 Mass. 592, 596-597
(2002). See also Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 397 Mass. 314, 316
(1986). If a judge can enter a finding of guilty and impose
sentence without taking any further evidence of the underlying
offense after a violation of the conditions of a CWOF, it
follows that an implicit determination has been made that the
defendant "has violated or failed to comply with the law." We
therefore conclude that a CWOF falls within the definition of
"conviction," as that term is used in G. L. c. 90F, § 1.
Our analysis is bolstered by the statutory scheme itself.
The Legislature, in enacting c. 90F, required that it be
"liberally construed to promote the public health, safety and
welfare" and emphasized that "[t]o the extent that the
provisions of this chapter conflict with the general operator
13
licensing provisions of [G. L. c. 90, which was the chapter at
issue in Souza], this chapter prevails" (emphasis added). St.
1990, c. 246, § 1. The Legislature is clearly acting within its
powers when it defines a general term beyond its ordinary
meaning for use in a particular piece of legislation. See
Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 114-115 (1997). The definition
of "conviction" at issue here compels the result we reach. See
G. L. c. 90F, § 1 ("As used in this chapter . . ."). Finally,
the specific reference in G. L. c. 90F, § 13, to 49 C.F.R.
§ 384.226 and the complete incorporation of 49 C.F.R. Part 383
by 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(9) (1999) clearly demonstrate the
intent of the Legislature to fully comply with the Federal
framework and its interpretations, which would arrive at the
same conclusion we have here today.
5. Conclusion. For the reasons stated, we hold that an
admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and
the continuance of the case without a finding of guilty is a
"conviction" as that term is defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1.
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Superior Court in
each case and enter judgment for the board.
So ordered.