Chin v. Merriot

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SJC-11715
CHESTER CHIN vs. EDITH E. MERRIOT.1
Franklin. October 6, 2014. - January 30, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment,
Separation agreement. Statute, Retroactive application.
Complaint for divorce filed in the Franklin Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department on January 11, 2011.
A complaint for modification, filed on March 11, 2013, was heard
by Beth A. Crawford, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.
William Sanford Durland, III, for Chester Chin.
Leslie H. Powers for Edith E. Merriot.
The following submitted briefs amicus curiae:
Rachel B. Biscardi for Women's Bar Association of
Massachusetts.
Richard M. Novitch, Maureen McBrien, & Charles P. Kindregan,
pro se.
David H. Lee & Holly A. Hinte, pro se.
DUFFLY, J. After twelve years of marriage, Chester Chin and
1
Formerly known as Edith E. Chin.
2
Edith E. Merriot were divorced by a judgment of divorce nisi in
August, 2011. At the time of the divorce, Chin was sixty-seven years
old and Merriot was sixty-nine. Pursuant to a merged provision of
the parties' separation agreement, Chin was obligated to pay alimony
to Merriot in the amount of $650 per month until "the death of either
party or the wife's remarriage."
In March, 2013, Chin filed an amended complaint for modification
in the Probate and Family Court in which he sought to terminate his
alimony obligation. To support his claim for relief, Chin asserted
as "changed circumstances" that he had attained the age of
sixty-eight, "full retirement age" as defined by G. L. c. 208, § 48.
He argued that, pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (retirement
provision), "general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the
payor attaining the full retirement age." Chin thereafter filed an
amended complaint asserting, as a further change in circumstances,
that Merriot had "been cohabiting with another person . . . and
maintaining a common household" for more than three months;
cohabitation alone is a basis for termination of alimony under G. L.
c. 208, § 49 (d) (cohabitation provision).
The retirement and cohabitation provisions on which Chin relies
were enacted as part of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011,
c. 124 (alimony reform act or act). The act was made effective as
of March 1, 2012, more than seven months after entry of the parties'
3
judgment of divorce nisi. Following a trial on the complaint for
modification, a Probate and Family Court judge concluded that neither
provision applied retroactively to divorce judgments ordering
general term alimony that were in existence prior to the effective
date of the alimony reform act. Applying the change of circumstances
standard in effect before March 1, 2012, the judge determined that
Chin had not shown a material change of circumstances warranting
modification of the alimony order,2 and dismissed the complaint.
Chin appealed from the judgment of dismissal,3 and we allowed his
petition for direct appellate review.
The question we confront in this case is whether modification
of an obligation to pay periodic or general term alimony that is
contained in a merged provision of a divorce judgment is governed
by the alimony reform act, where the act became effective after the
date of entry of the judgment.4 We conclude that, with respect to
2
Chin does not challenge the judge's conclusion that he did not
show a material change in the parties' circumstances, the applicable
standard prior to enactment of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St.
2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act).
3
The complaint sought also to terminate Chin's obligation to
maintain life insurance for the benefit of Edith E. Merriot. The
judge denied the request; that denial is not part of Chin's appeal.
4
Because both the judgment nisi and the judgment absolute
predate the effective date of the alimony reform act, we need not
decide whether language in the act that its provisions "apply
prospectively" to "alimony judgments" refers to judgments nisi or
to absolute judgments.
4
the alimony obligation at issue here, both the retirement provision
and the cohabitation provision apply prospectively, and therefore
afford no basis upon which to terminate the alimony order. That the
Legislature intended these provisions to apply prospectively is
reflected in the language of several uncodified provisions of the
alimony reform act, which we consider together with the codified
provisions at issue here. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
dismissal.5
1. Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,
adding certain uncontested facts from the record. Chin and Merriot
were married in Massachusetts on November 28, 1998. Both had been
married previously; Chin has two children from his prior marriage,
and Merriot has four children from hers. The parties' marriage
produced no children. During their marriage, Chin had been a teacher
and Merriot a paraprofessional and substitute teacher. By the time
of the divorce, each had retired.
The parties last lived together in January, 2011. On August
17, 2011, they entered into a separation agreement allocating their
real and personal property. Article VI of that agreement provided
that Chin "shall pay to the Wife alimony in the monthly amount of
six hundred and fifty ($650) dollars . . . . The Husband's alimony
5
We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Women's Bar
Association of Massachusetts; Richard M. Novitch, Maureen McBrien,
and Charles P. Kindregan; and David H. Lee and Holly A. Hinte.
5
obligation shall terminate upon the death of either party or the
Wife's remarriage." Under the terms of the separation agreement,
"Article VI . . . shall be merged and incorporated into the divorce
judgment and shall not retain independent legal significance."6
A judgment of divorce nisi entered on August 17, 2011.7 The
judgment reflects that the judge found the parties' agreement to be
"fair, equitable and reasonable, voluntarily entered into and not
the product of coercion or duress." The judgment provides also that
the agreement "shall survive and remain as an independent contract
between the parties, except with respect to Article VI, which is
incorporated and merged herein." When the divorce judgment nisi
entered, Chin was sixty-seven years old.
One year after the effective date of the alimony reform act,
6
The agreement also allocated responsibility for outstanding
debt, made provision for medical insurance and uninsured dental and
medical costs, and contained general representations that the
parties had made full financial disclosure to each other; stated that
they had entered into the agreement freely, voluntarily, and fully
apprised of their rights; and stated that they believed the agreement
to be "fair, adequate and reasonable . . . commensurate with [their]
needs, income, and financial worth, and their previous standard of
living and with full consideration of . . . all factors" set forth
in G. L. c. 208, § 34.
7
The judgment of divorce nisi was amended due to a scrivener's
error. The amended judgment was entered on the Probate and Family
Court docket on August 26, 2011, dated nunc pro tunc to August 17,
2011. A judgment of divorce becomes absolute ninety days after the
entry of a judgment nisi. See G. L. c. 208, § 21. It is unclear
from the record why the judgment absolute in this case entered on
January 19, 2012.
6
Chin filed a complaint for modification asserting that he had reached
"full retirement age" according to the act, and seeking termination
of his obligation to pay alimony. Merriot denied that there had been
a material change in circumstances because, at the time the divorce
judgment entered, her former husband already had passed "full
retirement age." Chin thereafter amended his complaint to include
as an additional ground for modification that Merriot had been
cohabiting with another person since November 19, 2012.
Following a trial on the complaint for modification, the judge
found that Chin had remarried in 2012, and, at the time of trial,
Chin, his new wife, and her sixteen year old son were residing
together. Chin was the primary source of support for his new wife
and stepson, and his wife contributed some income from child support
and part-time employment. Merriot "moved in with her significant
other" in September, 2012, and, by the time of trial, he and Merriot
were "in a committed relationship and . . . [were] economically
interdependent"; they had "continuously maintained a common
household for more than three months."
The judge concluded that modification of the alimony order was
not governed by either the retirement provision or the cohabitation
provision, because uncodified § 4 of the alimony reform act provides
that G. L. c. 208, § 49, applies prospectively to alimony judgments
entered on or after March 1, 2012. St. 2011, c. 124, ' 4 (uncodified
7
section). The judge therefore looked to the statute governing
modification of divorce judgments that was in effect prior to
enactment of the alimony reform act to inform her determination
whether there had been a material change in the parties'
circumstances warranting modification of the amount of alimony. See
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293 (2009), quoting Schuler v.
Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981). The judge concluded that Chin
had not established a material change in circumstances and dismissed
the amended complaint.
2. Discussion. Under the alimony reform act, the periodic
payment of support to an economically dependent spouse falls within
the definition of "general term alimony." G. L. c. 208, § 48. See
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 656 (2014) (prior alimony statute
"recognized only one category of postjudgment alimony, which the
[alimony] reform act now classifies as 'general term alimony'").
Chin contends that, under the retirement provision, his obligation
to pay alimony must be terminated because, "[o]nce issued, general
term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full
retirement age." See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f). Chin also maintains
that he is entitled to termination of the alimony order under the
cohabitation provision, which provides:
"General term alimony shall be suspended, reduced, or
terminated upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse when
the payor shows that the recipient spouse has maintained a
8
common household, as defined in this subsection, with another
person for a continuous period of at least [three] months."
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d). Chin's argument effectively disregards the
uncodified provisions of the alimony reform act, contained in St.
2011, c. 124 §§ 4-6 (uncodified sections). These provisions reflect
the Legislature's intent that the act apply prospectively except as
to "durational limits," which are based on the length of the parties'
marriage, and the clear indication that neither retirement nor
cohabitation constitute durational limits.8
a. Standard of review. We review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737
(2014). Under well-established principles of statutory
construction, "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent
of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection
with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the
purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Commonwealth v.
Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc.
8
The term "durational limits" is not defined in the uncodified
sections of the alimony reform act, St. 2011, c. 124, §§ 4-6
(uncodified sections). However, the term is also used in G. L.
c. 208, § 49 (b), inserted by St. 2011, c. 124, § 3. We interpret
"durational limits" as it appears in the uncodified sections as
referring specifically and solely to the provisions of G. L. c. 208,
§ 49 (b).
9
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).
Although we look first to the plain language of the provision at issue
to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we consider also other
sections of the statute, and examine the pertinent language in the
context of the entire statute. "Significantly, a statute must be
interpreted 'as a whole'; it is improper to confine interpretation
to the single section to be construed." Johnson v. Kindred
Healthcare, Inc., 466 Mass. 779, 784 (2014), quoting Commonwealth
v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012). Cf. Abramski v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267 (2014), quoting Maracich v. Spears,
133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013) ("we must [as usual] interpret the
relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory
context, 'structure, history and purpose'").
The same standards of construction are applicable to both
codified and uncodified provisions of the general laws. We
therefore construe the language of the uncodified sections of the
alimony reform act together with the codified sections, according
to their plain meaning, unless reliance on the literal words would
produce an absurd result, or a result contrary to the Legislature's
manifest intent. See Murphy v. Department of Correction, 429 Mass.
736, 737-738 (1999), and cases cited.
Sections 4 through 6 of the uncodified provisions of the alimony
reform act provide essential context. As a general matter,
10
uncodified provisions of an act express the Legislature's view on
some aspect of its operation; they are not the source of the
substantive provisions of the law. Uncodified provisions may, for
example, address when the legislation will take effect, state if it
will have retroactive effect, and provide mechanisms for handling
special situations during the transition period between the date of
enactment and the effective date of the new statute. See, e.g.,
Murphy v. Department of Correction, supra at 737 (uncodified
provision stating act's effective date and that act will apply
retroactively); Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Sec. Corp., 298 Mass.
285, 309 (1937) (uncodified provision precluding application of act
to agreements existing prior to act's effective date which were valid
under earlier statute); Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 85 Mass. App. Ct.
150, 153-154 (2014) (uncodified provision "imposes early deadline
for submission of" biological samples). Uncodified provisions also
may include severability clauses, savings clauses, and statements
concerning the fiscal consequences of legislation. See, e.g.,
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 4th 647, 661-662
(2013).
Here, uncodified § 7 of St. 2011, c. 124, sets March 1, 2012,
as the effective date of the alimony reform act; uncodified §§ 4
through 6 describe whether, to what extent, and when, the act will
11
be applied to alimony judgments in existence prior to that date.9
9
"SECTION 4. (a) [General Laws c. 208, § 49,] shall apply
prospectively, such that alimony judgments entered before March 1,
2012 shall terminate only under such judgments, under a subsequent
modification or as otherwise provided for in this act.
"(b) [G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-55], inclusive, . . . shall not be
deemed a material change of circumstance that warrants modification
of the amount of existing alimony judgments; provided, however, that
existing alimony judgments that exceed the durational limits under
[G. L. c. 208, § 49,] shall be deemed a material change of
circumstance that warrant modification.
"Existing alimony awards shall be deemed general term alimony.
Existing alimony awards which exceed the durational limits
established in [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] shall be modified upon a
complaint for modification without additional material change of
circumstance, unless the court finds that deviation from the
durational limits is warranted.
"(c) Under no circumstances shall [G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-55],
inclusive, . . . provide a right to seek or receive modification of
an existing alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that
their alimony judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties
have expressed their intention that their agreed alimony provisions
survive the judgment and therefore are not modifiable.
"SECTION 5. Any complaint for modification filed by a payor
under [§] 4 of this act solely because the existing alimony judgment
exceeds the durational limits of [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] may only be
filed under the following time limits:
"(1) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [five]
years or less, may file a modification action on or after March 1,
2013.
"(2) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [ten]
years or less, but more than [five] years, may file a modification
action on or after March 1, 2014.
"(3) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [fifteen]
years or less, but more than [ten] years, may file a modification
action on or after March 1, 2015.
12
b. Prospective application of retirement and cohabitation
provisions. Of particular import here is uncodified § 4 (a), which
states that G. L. c. 208, § 49, "shall apply prospectively, such that
alimony judgments entered before March 1, 2012 shall terminate only
under such judgments, under a subsequent modification or as otherwise
provided for in this act." This sentence sets out three separate
circumstances under which alimony included in a judgment that
predated the effective date of the alimony reform act will be
terminated. Chin appears to read the sentence as meaning that,
because the alimony reform act expressly provides for termination
of alimony on retirement or cohabitation by the recipient spouse,
he currently is entitled to terminate his alimony obligation. We
disagree. To explain our reasoning, it is useful to review each of
the circumstances allowing termination that are set out in uncodified
§ 4 (a).
(i) Termination "under such judgments". The first clause of
uncodified § 4 (a) provides that alimony judgments entered before
"(4) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [twenty]
years or less, but more than [fifteen] years, may file a modification
action on or after September 1, 2015.
"SECTION 6. Notwithstanding clauses (1) to (4) of [§] 5 of this
act, any payor who has reached full retirement age, as defined in
[G. L. c. 208, § 48,] or who will reach full retirement age on or
before March 1, 2015 may file a complaint for modification on or after
March 1, 2013."
13
March 1, 2012, may terminate "only under such judgments." We
interpret this to mean that alimony judgments entered into before
the effective date of the alimony reform act may be terminated only
in accordance with provisions governing termination that are
contained within the existing judgment, either by a judge following
a trial or by the parties through a negotiated agreement incorporated
in the judgment. Orders for payment of alimony in judgments issued
based on evidence in a contested divorce generally will be subject
to modification on a showing of a material change in circumstances.10
See Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981); G. L. c. 208, § 37.11
10
The change in circumstances standard by which alimony may be
modified was established through decisional law. See, e.g., Schuler
v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981), citing Robbins v. Robbins,
343 Mass. 247, 249 (1961), and Hinds v. Hinds, 329 Mass. 190, 191-192
(1952); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 325 Mass. 573, 576 (1950); Whitney v.
Whitney 325 Mass. 28, 31-32 (1949). Under that standard, "[w]hile
alimony is modifiable on the showing of a material change in
circumstances, . . . property settlements are not." Heins v. Ledis,
422 Mass. 477, 483 (1996).
11
The first paragraph of G. L. c. 208, § 37, provides:
"After a judgment for alimony or an annual allowance . . .
for the spouse . . . , the court may, from time to time, upon
the action for modification of either party, revise and alter
its judgment relative to the amount of such alimony or annual
allowance and the payment thereof, and may make any judgment
relative thereto which it might have made in the original
action."
This paragraph has been in effect, employing substantially the same
language, since at least 1860. See Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass. 314,
317-318 (1871) (court may "from time to time, on the petition of
either party, revise and alter any decree respecting the amount of
14
When parties to a divorce negotiate an agreement for alimony that
is "incorporated and merged into [such a] judgment" upon approval
by a judge and in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 1A or 1B, the
judgment also is subject to modification based on a material change
in circumstances.12 Even where provisions regarding alimony in a
separation agreement are merged and do not survive the divorce
judgment, "it is nevertheless appropriate for a judge to take heed
of the parties' own attempts to negotiate terms mutually acceptable
to them" when determining whether to modify or terminate alimony.
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 302 (2009), quoting Bercume v.
Bercume, 428 Mass. 635, 644 (1999).
Thus, an order for alimony in a divorce judgment that entered
prior to March 1, 2012, includes, as part of its terms, the standards
for modification existing at the time the judgment entered, unless
the parties explicitly agreed otherwise, or the alimony reform act
itself unequivocally provides a specific exception that a provision
governing modification is to have retroactive effect. See Hay v.
Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 253 (1983), quoting Hanscom v. Malden &
such alimony or . . . the payment thereof, . . . and may make any
decree respecting the same which it might have made in the original
suit"); Gen. Stats. c. 107, § 47 (1860).
12
To modify an agreement that survives the judgment, "something
more than a 'material change of circumstances' must be shown."
Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 515 (1982).
15
Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3 (1914).13
(ii) Termination "under a subsequent modification". The
second clause of uncodified § 4 (a) provides that alimony judgments
that entered prior to March 1, 2012, may be terminated "only . . .
under a subsequent modification." We interpret "words in a
statute . . . in light of the other words surrounding them."
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 462 (2012), quoting
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428 (1974). The placement
of the phrase "under such judgments," immediately preceding the
phrase "under a subsequent modification," indicates that the
Legislature intended the latter to refer to the former, and that the
language of the alimony reform act must be read to state that alimony
judgments entered prior to March 1, 2012, may terminate only under
a "subsequent modification" of such judgments. In other words, such
alimony judgments, as well as subsequent modifications of such
judgments, may be modified only under the terms and standards of
modification existing at the time the judgment entered.
The mere filing of a complaint after March 1, 2012, seeking
modification of an alimony judgment that entered prior to that date,
based on the retirement or cohabitation provisions, cannot be what
13
The issue of alimony was not before the court in Hay v.
Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 253 & n.7 (1983). In that case, we addressed
the retroactive effect of new factors to be considered in connection
with aspects of G. L. c. 208, § 34, concerning the division of marital
property.
16
the Legislature intended by "subsequent modification." Such a
reading not only would disregard the context in which the phrase
appears in uncodified § 4 (a), but also would not take into account
the remaining provisions of uncodified §§ 4, 5, and 6. By
emphasizing the limitations on prospective application of the
alimony reform act in three separate provisions in the uncodified
sections of the act, the Legislature could not have expressed its
intent more clearly: only a claim for modification based on
durational limits may, but will not always, apply retroactively to
existing alimony judgments.
This point is made evident by considering uncodified § 4 (a)
in combination with uncodified § 4 (b). That section states that
G. L. c. 208, §§ 48 to 55, which include the retirement and
cohabitation provisions, "shall not be deemed a material change of
circumstance that warrants modification of the amount of existing
alimony judgments; provided, however, that existing alimony
judgments that exceed the durational limits under [G. L. c. 208, § 49
(f),] shall be deemed a material change of circumstance that warrant
modification." The Legislature's intent as expressed in § 4 (b) is
unambiguous. Alimony judgments entered prior to the alimony reform
act may be modified only under the existing material change of
circumstances standard, with the single exception that the new
17
durational limits of the act14 will be considered a material change
of circumstances for purposes of this standard. It follows,
therefore, that the provisions of G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) and (f),
do not warrant relief in the absence of a material change of
circumstances.
(iii) Termination "as otherwise provided for in this act."
Chin focuses particularly on the third clause of uncodified § 4 (a),
which states that G. L. c. 208, ' 49, "shall apply prospectively,"
except "as otherwise provided for in this act." He argues that the
new provisions for termination of alimony in the cohabitation
retirement provision fall within the meaning of the phrase "as
otherwise provided for in this act."
We do not agree that uncodified § 4 (a) was intended to
incorporate, as an exception to the alimony reform act's general rule
of prospective application, all of the provisions in G. L. c. 208,
§ 49. Such a reading renders meaningless the specific exclusions
from prospective application set forth in uncodified § 4 (b), and
is inconsistent with principles of statutory construction under
which we "give effect to all words of a statute, assuming none to
be superfluous." Commonwealth v. Semegen, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 478,
14
Chin does not dispute that the cohabitation and retirement
provisions, set out in G. L. c. 208, § 49(d) and (f), respectively,
are not durational limits, which are defined in G. L. c. 208, § 49
(b).
18
480 (2008). Chin argues in essence that the provision should be read
as follows: General Laws c. 208, § 49, "shall apply prospectively,
such that alimony judgments entered before March 1, 2012 shall
terminate . . . as otherwise provided in [§ 49]." This view requires
that we read into the provision language that the Legislature did
not include. We will not "read into the statute a provision which
the Legislature did not see fit to put there." Commissioner of
Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County
of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006).
Moreover, the reading Chin proposes is inconsistent with the
over-all scheme of the alimony reform act. Where possible, we seek
to harmonize the provisions of a statute with related provisions that
are part of the same statutory scheme "so as to give full effect to
the expressed intent of the Legislature." Commonwealth v. Hampe,
419 Mass. 514, 518 (1995). As stated, G. L. c. 208, § 37, governs
alimony judgments entered prior to the act's effective date, under
the material change in circumstances standard then in effect.
c. Material change in circumstances. In this case, the judge
found that no other circumstances warranted a finding that there were
changed circumstances that would require an adjustment to the amount
of alimony Chin had been ordered to pay. See Bush v. Bush, 402 Mass.
406, 412 n.9 (1988), quoting Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617,
625 (1986) (rejecting claim that alimony should be modified "solely
19
on the basis of a finding of cohabitation"). See also Pierce v.
Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 302 (2009) (rejecting claim that retirement
triggers termination of alimony obligation without showing of
material change in circumstances, because "no such provision was
included within the separation agreement"). A judge has
considerable discretion in fashioning an appropriate modification
judgment, and we will not disturb her judgment in the absence of an
abuse of discretion. See Pierce v. Pierce, supra at 293; Heistand
v. Heistand, 384 Mass. 20, 26-27 (1981). Nothing in the record
suggests that there was an abuse of discretion here.
Judgment affirmed.