Commonwealth v. Caetano

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SJC-11718
COMMONWEALTH vs. JAIME CAETANO.
Middlesex. December 2, 2014. - March 2, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Firearms. Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms. Self-
Defense. Practice, Criminal, Indictment placed on file.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division
of the District Court Department on September 30, 2011.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert V. Greco, J.; the
case was heard by Martine G. Carroll, J., and a motion for
sentencing was considered by her.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for the defendant.
Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.
Eugene Volokh, of California, Michael E. Rosman & Michelle
A. Scott, of the District of Columbia, & Lisa J. Steele, for
Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment, amicus curiae,
submitted a brief.
2
SPINA, J. The defendant, Jaime Caetano, asks us to
interpret the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), and District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), to afford her a
right under the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of
self-defense. The defendant was arrested for possession of a
stun gun in a supermarket parking lot, claiming it was necessary
to protect herself against an abusive former boy friend. She
now challenges the constitutionality of G. L. c. 140, § 131J,
which bans entirely the possession of an electrical weapon with
some exceptions not applicable here. We hold that a stun gun is
not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment
protection, see Heller, supra at 622, and we affirm the
defendant's conviction.1
1. Background. At approximately 3 P.M. on September 29,
2011, Ashland police officers responded to a call about a
possible shoplifting at a supermarket. The manager of the
supermarket had detained someone in the store, and he informed
police that the defendant and a man with whom she left the store
also may have been involved. The manager pointed to a man
standing next to a motor vehicle in the parking lot outside the
1
We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Commonwealth
Second Amendment and Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment in
support of the defendant.
3
supermarket. The defendant was seated in the vehicle. Officers
approached it. Following a conversation with officers, the
defendant consented to a search of her purse. Inside the purse,
the defendant had an operational stun gun.2 The defendant told
police that the stun gun was for self-defense against a former
boy friend. Police charged her with possession of a stun gun in
violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131J.3
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 131J in
a pretrial motion to dismiss. She argued that the stun gun is
an "arm" for purposes of the Second Amendment, that it is a
weapon primarily for self-defense and in common use in the
United States for that purpose, and that she kept her stun gun
for purposes of self-defense. As such, she argued that her
2
The stun gun was a black electronic device with two metal
prongs and a switch. Once the switch was thrown, an electrical
current appeared between the prongs. Stun guns are designed to
stun a person with an electrical current after the prongs are
placed in direct contact with the person and the switch is
thrown.
3
General Laws c. 140, § 131J, forbids the private
possession of a "portable device or weapon from which an
electrical current, impulse, wave or beam may be directed, which
current, impulse, wave or beam is designed to incapacitate
temporarily, injure or kill" except by specified public officers
or suppliers of such devices, if possession is "necessary to the
supply or sale of the device or weapon" to agencies utilizing
it. Violation of this section is punishable "by a fine of not
less than $500 nor more than $1,000 or by imprisonment in the
house of correction for not less than [six] months nor more than
[two and one-half] years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." Id.
4
possession of the stun gun was protected by the Second
Amendment. The motion was denied.
At a jury-waived trial, the parties stipulated that the
device in question was a stun gun regulated by G. L. c. 140,
§ 131J. The defendant testified that the stun gun was for self-
defense against a former boy friend. She further testified that
her former boy friend was violent, and that previously she had
displayed the stun gun during a confrontation with him. She
said that she had been homeless and living in a hotel. The
judge found the defendant guilty of possession of the stun gun
and placed the case on file. The defendant consented to having
the case placed on file. Approximately two and one-half months
later the defendant filed a written objection to the case being
placed on file, and she moved for sentencing.
A hearing was held on the motion. The Commonwealth
recommended the imposition of the minimum fine. The defendant
proposed a fine less than the minimum. Both the Commonwealth
and the judge recognized that the purpose of the hearing was to
preserve the defendant's right of appeal. After discussion, the
judge again placed the case on file over the defendant's
objection in the belief that this action would preserve the
defendant's right of appeal.
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We granted
her application for direct appellate review.
5
2. Appellate jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the
Commonwealth argues that this appeal is not properly before the
court. The basis of this argument is that no judgment resulted
from the defendant's conviction because a conviction placed on
file is not a judgment from which an appeal may be taken.
Generally, a judgment in a criminal case is the sentence, and a
defendant has no right of appeal until after the sentence is
imposed. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 713 n.2
(1997) (conviction placed on filed suspends defendant's right to
appeal alleged error in proceeding); Commonwealth v. Delgado,
367 Mass. 432, 438 (1975) (no appeal until after judgment "which
in criminal cases is the sentence"). See also Mass. R. Crim. P.
28 (e), 453 Mass. 1501 (2009) (court may file case after guilty
verdict without imposing sentence).
We have recognized that a defendant has a right to appeal a
conviction on file without her consent. Delgado, supra. It was
clear to all involved that the defendant wanted to pursue an
appeal on the constitutionality of the criminal statute of which
she was adjudged guilty, and that she withdrew her consent and
moved for sentencing for that purpose. We conclude that the
defendant may proceed with her appeal. See id.
3. Discussion. Where we must determine whether the
Massachusetts ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment, we
are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the
6
matter. The Supreme Court recently interpreted the Second
Amendment in a historical context that focused on the meaning of
various words and phrases in the amendment as they probably were
understood and used by Congress at the time of the Second
Amendment's enactment. In accord with that analysis we must
determine whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated
by Congress in 1789 as being protected by the Second Amendment.
In Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, the United States Supreme Court
held that "[a] ban on handgun possession in the home violates
the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering
any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of
immediate self-defense." The Court in Heller was confronted
with a total ban on handgun possession in the home, and a
further requirement that any lawful firearm kept in the home be
rendered inoperable. Id. at 628. The Court reasoned that
"the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the
Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a
prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful
purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home,
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning
from the home 'the most preferred firearm in the nation to
"keep" and use for protection of one's home and family,'
. . . would fail constitutional muster." (Footnote
omitted; emphasis added.)
Id. at 628-629, quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d
370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court extended this
interpretation of the Second Amendment to the States in
7
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. The defendant now urges that the
outright prohibition on the private possession of stun guns in
Massachusetts violates the right articulated in Heller.4
"Since Heller, '[c]ourts have consistently recognized that
Heller established that the possession of operative firearms for
use in defense of the home constitutes the 'core' of the Second
Amendment.'" Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 235
(2013), quoting Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.
2012). Moreover, the Supreme Court said in Heller that the
Second Amendment individual right to keep and bear arms is "not
unlimited." 554 U.S. at 595. The Court identified certain
examples of lawful prohibitions and limitations on the Second
Amendment right including, but not limited to, "prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill." Id.
at 626. In addition to the lawfulness of prohibitions against
possession of arms by certain persons, the Court recognized the
existence of
4
At issue here is only the applicability of the Second
Amendment to the statute. The cognate Massachusetts
constitutional provision, art. 17 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, previously has been held to encompass a
collective, and not an individual, right to bear arms. See
Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886, 888 (1976). The Heller
Court, before reaching its conclusion, first conducted a survey
of Second Amendment jurisprudence. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-628 (2008). In so doing, the Court
concluded that the Second Amendment secured an individual right
to bear arms for defensive purposes. Id. at 602. We therefore
view the defendant's claim only through the lens of the Second
Amendment.
8
"another important limitation on the right to keep and
carry arms. [United States v.] Miller said, as we have
explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those
'in common use at the time.' . . . We think that
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting carrying of 'dangerous and unusual
weapons.'"
Heller, supra at 627, quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 179 (1939).
The conduct at issue in this case falls outside the "core"
of the Second Amendment, insofar as the defendant was not using
the stun gun to defend herself in her home, see Hightower 693
F.3d at 72 & n.8, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, and involves
a "dangerous and unusual weapon" that was not "in common use at
the time" of enactment. "From Blackstone through the 19th-
century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that
the [Second Amendment] right was not a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose." Heller, supra at 626. Without further guidance from
the Supreme Court on the scope of the Second Amendment, we do
not extend the Second Amendment right articulated by Heller to
cover stun guns.
Here, we are concerned not with ensuring that designated
classes of people do not gain access to firearms or weapons
generally, but rather with prohibiting a class of weapons
entirely. The traditional prohibition against carrying
9
dangerous and unusual weapons is not in dispute. See Heller,
554 U.S. at 627, citing 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769).
The question of the dangerousness of a weapon is well fixed
in the common law through the distinction drawn between weapons
that are dangerous per se and those that are dangerous as used.
See Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1004 (1980) (setting out common-law definitions of
dangerous weapons). See also Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459
Mass. 745, 748-755 (2011) (analyzing term "dangerous weapon" in
context of G. L. c. 269, § 10 [j], barring possession of
dangerous weapons on school grounds). At common law, a weapon
is dangerous per se if it is an "instrumentality designed and
constructed to produce death or great bodily harm" and "for the
purpose of bodily assault or defense." Appleby, supra at 303.
Weapons of this type include "firearms, daggers, stilettos and
brass knuckles" but not "pocket knives, razors, hammers,
wrenches and cutting tools." Id. The weapons not so classified
all share the same characteristic: they were designed primarily
as tools and only secondarily utilized as weapons. The Court in
Heller confirms this method of analysis in discussing Miller,
307 U.S. at 178. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622 (Miller decision
concerned with design or "type of weapon at issue" and not use
[emphasis omitted]).
10
The statute at issue here explicitly prohibits "a portable
device or weapon from which an electrical current, impulse, wave
or beam may be directed, which current, impulse, wave or beam is
designed to incapacitate temporarily, injure, or kill." G. L.
c. 140, § 131J. From this statutory definition, we easily
conclude that any weapon regulated by § 131J would be classified
as dangerous per se at common law. The parties have stipulated
that the stun gun at issue here falls within the purview of
§ 131J and is a weapon. Accordingly, we consider the stun gun a
per se dangerous weapon at common law. The record demonstrates
no evidence or argument that its purpose is for anything other
than "bodily assault or defense." Appleby, 380 Mass. at 303.
We turn next to the question whether a weapon is unusual.
Historically, when considering challenges to the ban of
dangerous and unusual weapons under the Second Amendment or
equivalent State statutes, courts have asked whether the weapon
in question is unusual by ascertaining if it is a weapon of
warfare to be used by the militia. See Hill v. State, 53 Ga.
472, 474-477 (1874); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158-160
(1840); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476-477 (1871); State v.
Workman, 335 W. Va. 367, 372-374 (1891). The Supreme Court
utilized this approach in Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, and approved
its use in Heller. The Court said,
"'In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms]
weapons used by militia men and weapons used in defense of
11
person and home were one and the same.' State v. Kessler,
289 Ore. 359, 368 . . . (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords
and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254
[1973]). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the
Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose
announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say
only that the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."5
Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-625. Thus, the questions whether a
weapon is "unusual" and whether the weapon was "in common use at
the time" of enactment are interrelated. Id. at 627-628.
The ban on the private possession of stun guns will not
burden conduct that falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment if a stun gun is a weapon not "in common use at the
time" of enactment of the Second Amendment and would be
dangerous per se at common law without another, primary use,
i.e., as a tool. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-625, 627, quoting
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. For reasons that follow, there can be
no doubt that a stun gun was not in common use at the time of
enactment, and it is not the type of weapon that is eligible for
Second Amendment protection. See Heller, supra at 622.
The record is silent as to the development of the stun gun.
The record indicates only that stun guns have been available
commercially for private purchase since the early 1990s. We
5
In State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368 (1980), the Oregon
Supreme Court described the type of weapons typically used by
militiamen in defense of home and for purposes of the militia as
being a musket or rifle, a hatchet, sword and knife or pike (a
long shaft with a spear head).
12
note that that the first patent for stun gun was filed in 1972.
See Weapon for Immobilization and Capture, U.S. Patent No.
3,803,463 (filed July 10, 1972). The recent invention of this
weapon clearly postdates the period relevant to our analysis.
We therefore conclude that stun guns were not in common use at
the time of the Second Amendment's enactment. A stun gun also
is an unusual weapon. In her motion to dismiss the complaint
against her, the defendant acknowledged that the "number of
Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms."
Moreover, although modern handguns were not in common use at the
time of enactment of the Second Amendment, their basic function
has not changed: many are readily adaptable to military use in
the same way that their predecessors were used prior to the
enactment. A stun gun, by contrast, is a thoroughly modern
invention. Even were we to view stun guns through a
contemporary lens for purposes of our analysis, there is nothing
in the record to suggest that they are readily adaptable to use
in the military. Indeed, the record indicates "they are
ineffective for . . . hunting or target shooting." Because the
stun gun that the defendant possessed is both dangerous per se
at common law and unusual, but was not in common use at the time
of the enactment of the Second Amendment, we conclude that stun
guns fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment. See
Heller, 554 U.S. at 622, 627.
13
The question remains whether the total ban on stun guns has
a rational basis. Those who challenge the constitutionality of
a statute that burdens neither a suspect group nor a fundamental
constitutional right bear a heavy burden in overcoming the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the statute's
validity. See English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass.
423, 427, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1989). Such is the case
before us. For due process claims, the test under "the Federal
Constitution is 'whether the statute bears a reasonable relation
to a permissible legislative objective' . . . and, under the
. . . State Constitution [is] whether the statute 'bears real
and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or
some other phase of the general welfare'" (citations omitted).
Id. at 430. For equal protection claims, the test is the same
under both Constitutions, namely, whether the statute is
"rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate State
interest" (citations omitted)". Id. at 428. Under the State
Constitution the test also "includes a requirement that an
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class."
Id. at 429, quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). The defendant
does not challenge the statute on the basis of any group
14
classification. We therefore focus on the challenge under
principles of due process.
The defendant does not articulate any basis for challenging
the statute under the rational basis test. Nevertheless, we
note that stun guns deliver a charge of up to 50,000 volts.
They are designed to incapacitate a target by causing disabling
pain, uncontrolled muscular contractions, and general disruption
of the central nervous system. See Amnesty International, Less
than Lethal? Use of Stun Weapons in U.S. Law Enforcement, 1-2,
6-7 & nn.17, 18 (2008), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/amr510102008en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JK53-XMR3] (last visited February 26,
2015). It is difficult to detect clear signs of use and misuse
of stun guns, unlike handguns. Stun guns can deliver repeated
or prolonged shocks without leaving marks. Id. at 1-2. The
Legislature rationally could ban their use in the interest of
public health, safety, or welfare. Removing from public access
devices that can incapacitate, injure, or kill a person by
disrupting the central nervous system with minimal detection is
a classic legislative basis supporting rationality. It is
immaterial that the Legislature has not banned weapons that are
more lethal. Mathematical precision by the Legislature is not
constitutionally required. See Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 369
Mass. 925, 927-928 (1976). The statute easily passes the
15
rational basis test under both the Federal and State
Constitutions.
Self-defense when homeless. Although we already have
concluded that the defendant's possession of a stun gun was in
violation of a statute regulating a weapon not protected by the
Second Amendment, we touch briefly on her claim that her
homelessness at the time of her arrest should not deprive her of
her right to defend herself. As noted above, the Supreme
Court's holding in Heller stressed the particular importance of
the right to defend hearth and home as the core of the Second
Amendment. See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72 & n.8 (noting emphasis
in Heller on "hearth and home" and subsequent interpretations).
A homeless person may indeed have a home for constitutional
purposes, and this question must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. For example, constitutional protections against
unreasonable search and seizure can be extended to a variety of
living situations. See Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass.
254, 260-261 (2010) (holding reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in transitional living space); Commonwealth v. Paszko,
391 Mass. 164, 184-185 (1984) (hotel room during rental period).
However, where a stun gun itself is not a type of weapon the
possession of which is protected under the Second Amendment, we
need not decide whether a hotel room may be treated as a home
under the Second Amendment. Moreover, the stun gun was found
16
not in the defendant's hotel room but on her person in a motor
vehicle, outside the "core" of the Second Amendment.
Finally, neither the legislative ban on stun guns nor our
decision affects the defendant's right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment. Barring any cause for disqualification the
defendant could have applied for a license to carry a firearm.
See G. L. c. 140, §§ 129B, 131 (c). In addition, again barring
any disqualification, possession of mace or pepper spray for
self-defense no longer requires a license. See G. L. c. 140,
§ 122D, inserted by St. 2014, c. 284, § 22. We hold only that
the defendant's weapon of choice, the stun gun, is not protected
by the Second Amendment. We acknowledge that stun guns may have
value for purposes of self-defense, but because they are not
protected by the Second Amendment and because a rational basis
exists for their prohibition, the lawfulness of their possession
and use is a matter for the Legislature.
Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we hold that
G. L. c. 140, § 131J, does not violate the Second Amendment
right articulated in Heller. We affirm the defendant's
conviction of possession of an electrical weapon in violation of
G. L. c. 140, § 131J.
So ordered.