Commonwealth v. Pridgett

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SJC-12574
COMMONWEALTH vs. MAURICE R. PRIDGETT.
Suffolk. November 8, 2018. - February 12, 2019.
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker,
JJ.
Receiving Stolen Goods. Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor
vehicle. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Probable
Cause.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 9, 2016.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas
S. Kaplanes, J.
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory
appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to
the Appeals Court. After review by the Appeals Court, the
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate
review.
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
William M. Driscoll for the defendant.
BUDD, J. The defendant, Maurice R. Pridgett, was arrested
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while sitting alone in the passenger seat of a motor vehicle
that had been reported stolen. He was charged with receiving a
stolen motor vehicle, subsequent offense, in violation of G. L.
c. 266, § 28 (a), and receiving stolen property over $250, in
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60, in connection with items found
in the motor vehicle. He filed a motion to suppress his
postarrest statements, contending that the police lacked
probable cause to arrest.
A judge in the Boston Municipal Court Department allowed
the defendant's motion following an evidentiary hearing, and the
Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appeals Court
affirmed in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its
rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. Pridgett, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1105
(2018). We granted the Commonwealth's application for further
appellate review, and we conclude, as did the Appeals Court,
that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause
that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen, a requisite
element of the crime of receiving a stolen motor vehicle. G. L.
c. 266, § 28 (a).1 We therefore affirm the order of the motion
1 General Laws c. 266, § 28 (a), states in pertinent part:
"Whoever . . . receives, possesses, . . . or obtains control of
a motor vehicle . . . , knowing . . . the same to have been
stolen, . . . shall be punished . . . ."
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judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress.2
1. Background. The following facts are derived from the
testimony of the police officer who made the observations of the
defendant prior to his arrest; the testimony of the officer, who
was the sole witness at the suppression hearing, was fully
credited by the motion judge.
While working undercover, the officer observed the
defendant, who was leaning on a motor vehicle, talking on a
cellular telephone (cell phone) and looking around. Upon
investigating the vehicle's license plate, the officer learned
that the vehicle had been reported stolen. The officer further
observed the defendant open the vehicle's front passenger's side
door to toss something into the vehicle. The defendant then
shut the door and resumed leaning on the vehicle. After a
period of time, the officer observed the defendant open the
front passenger's side door and sit in the front passenger's
seat. At that point the officer radioed to uniformed police
2 The motion judge allowed the motion because he found that
"the officers seized and arrested the [d]efendant prior to [one
officer's] administration of the Miranda rights." We have never
held that Miranda warnings must be administered prior to the
seizure or arrest of a suspect. However, we may affirm the
allowance of the motion on any lawful ground provided in the
record. See Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102
(1997) ("An appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on
grounds different from those relied on by the motion judge if
the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by
the record and the findings").
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officers, directing them to "move in." The uniformed officers
removed the defendant from the vehicle and handcuffed him.
After he was read Miranda warnings, the defendant made
incriminating statements including that he knew the motor
vehicle was stolen, and that items recovered from the motor
vehicle during an inventory search3 may have been stolen. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress his postarrest statements
on the basis that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest
him. The motion was allowed.
2. Discussion. In reviewing a decision on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear
error and "make an independent determination of the correctness
of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205
(2011). Probable cause to arrest exists when, "at the moment of
arrest, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
police are enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that
the individual arrested has committed or was committing an
offense." Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980). Here, at the moment of the
defendant's arrest, police must have had probable cause to
believe that (1) the motor vehicle was stolen, (2) the defendant
Officers recovered a cell phone and a computer "tablet"
3
device from the motor vehicle.
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possessed the motor vehicle, and (3) the defendant knew or had
reason to know the vehicle was stolen. G. L. c. 268, § 28 (a).
See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 750 (2015).
The Commonwealth contends that there was sufficient
evidence prior to the defendant's arrest that provided the
police with a reasonable belief that all three elements of the
crime were satisfied.4 For his part, the defendant concedes that
the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle was
stolen, but he disputes that police had probable cause to
believe that he was in possession of the vehicle or that he knew
it was stolen. We conclude that, at the time of the arrest,
4 The Commonwealth argues for the first time that the
defendant was not under arrest at the time he was handcuffed,
and therefore all that was required was reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant. Because this argument was not raised at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, it is waived on appeal.
Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 781-782 (2004). We note,
however, that whether the seizure of a defendant constitutes an
investigatory stop or an arrest depends on the existence of one
or more factors.
For example, the handcuffing of a suspect may not transform
a seizure into an arrest where there is a possibility of flight
or suspicion of a violent crime, or if the safety of the
officers is at risk. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass.
617, 627 (2008) (handcuffing defendant and placing him in police
car did not constitute arrest "because of the violent nature of
the reported crimes, [defendant's] attempt to flee, and the
possible danger to the safety of the officers as well as the
potential occupants of the house"); Commonwealth v. Williams,
422 Mass. 111, 118-119 (1996) (seizure of defendant did not
constitute arrest because defendant "posed a substantial flight
risk" and "a significant safety risk" to officers and public).
Here, there were no factors present that would suggest that the
seizure was not an arrest.
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although the officer had probable cause to believe that the
defendant was in possession of a stolen vehicle, the
observations he made did not rise to the level of probable cause
to believe that the defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen.
a. Possession. Where there is evidence that an individual
exercised "dominion and control" over a motor vehicle, probable
cause exists to believe that that individual possessed the
vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Darnell D., 445 Mass. 670, 672-673
(2005). See also Commonwealth v. Paniaqua, 413 Mass. 796, 801
(1992), citing Commonwealth v. Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 409
(1989) ("possession is the intentional exercise of control over
an item"). Dominion and control may be shown by circumstantial
evidence. Ramos, 470 Mass. at 750.
Here, the defendant argues that evidence of his presence in
the vicinity of the stolen vehicle and sitting in the
passenger's seat is not enough to warrant a reasonable belief
that he possessed the vehicle. We agree that mere presence in
the passenger's seat of a motor vehicle would not be sufficient
to indicate possession. See Darnell D., 445 Mass. at 673,
citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217
(2003). However, the defendant's presence near the vehicle was
not the only observation that the officer made. The officer
also observed the defendant leaning on the vehicle, opening and
closing the vehicle's door, tossing something inside the
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vehicle, and sitting in the vehicle's passenger's seat.
Importantly, no one else was in the vicinity of the vehicle
while the officer made these observations of the defendant.
These actions suggested that, for all intents and purposes,
the defendant had exclusive access to the inside of the vehicle,
utilized that access, and had at least some degree of control
over the vehicle. Taken together, the officer's observations
were sufficient to establish probable cause to reasonably
believe the defendant had dominion and control over the vehicle,
that is, that he possessed it.5
b. Knowledge. To arrest the defendant for receiving a
stolen motor vehicle, the police also needed probable cause to
believe the defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen. See
Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 393 Mass. 132, 137-139 (1984)
(possession of stolen vehicle alone is not sufficient to
establish that defendant had knowledge that vehicle was stolen).
5 The defense points to observations that the officer did
not make of the defendant, including operation of the vehicle,
sitting in the driver's seat, or attempting to conceal the fact
that the automobile was stolen. See Commonwealth v. Namey, 67
Mass. App. Ct. 94, 100 (2006); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 50 Mass.
App. Ct. 565, 569-570 (2000). Although such observations would
have added to the probable cause calculus, they are not
necessary to determine that the defendant exercised dominion and
control over the vehicle. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1986
Volkswagen GTI Auto., 417 Mass. 369, 371, 375 (1994) (defendant
exercised dominion and control over vehicle that was regularly
parked where defendant resided and had stereo system that
defendant altered for his benefit).
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The Commonwealth argues that circumstantial evidence and
"reasonable inferences" established the defendant's knowledge
that the vehicle was stolen. See id. at 136 ("A person's
knowledge . . . is a matter of fact . . . which may not be
susceptible of proof by direct evidence"). We are not
convinced.
The Commonwealth notes that when one is in possession of
recently stolen property, knowledge of its status as stolen may
be inferred. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 388 Mass. 178, 183
(1983); Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 600-
602 (1988). Here, however, there was no evidence presented at
the hearing that the officer knew when the vehicle had been
stolen.
The Commonwealth acknowledges that the record does not
reflect the timing of the theft, but nevertheless urges us to
conclude that the officer could have inferred that the vehicle
was recently stolen based on the fact that the original license
plates were still attached. The Commonwealth reasons that this
inference is permissible because a thief presumably would want
to hide the vehicle's stolen status as soon as possible, and
thus the lawful owner's license plates would likely be removed
or replaced soon after the theft. However, the Commonwealth
provides no case law -- and we can find none -- that supports
this proposition. Further, there was no testimony at the
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hearing that even hinted at such a correlation. The
Commonwealth points to no other evidence that the officer had
probable cause to believe that the suspect knew that the motor
vehicle had been stolen.
Although the police did not have sufficient evidence to
support probable cause as to the knowledge element of receiving
stolen property, the circumstances did provide a basis for
reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being
committed. However, reasonable suspicion justifies only a
Terry-type investigative stop, not an arrest. See Commonwealth
v. Willis, 415 Mass. 814, 817 (1993) (reasonable suspicion
exists where there are "specific articulable facts . . . that
the defendant had committed or was committing a crime");
Commonwealth v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984). Given the
information that the motor vehicle was stolen, the officers
could have performed an investigative stop. They could have
asked the defendant for the vehicle registration and inquired
about his relationship to the vehicle and his knowledge of its
ownership. If, after such inquiry, the police still had
probable cause to believe that the vehicle was stolen, they
could have seized and impounded the vehicle without a warrant.
See Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 172-176 (1982). And,
if the information the defendant provided in response to their
questioning indicated his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen,
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they might then have had probable cause to arrest him. On the
record before us, however, the arrest was premature.
3. Conclusion. Because there was no probable cause to
believe that the defendant knew that the motor vehicle was
stolen, the defendant's arrest was unlawful and his postarrest
statements were properly suppressed as the fruit of that
unlawful arrest. The motion to suppress was properly allowed.
So ordered.