Citation Numbers: 277 Mass. 325
Judges: Sanderson
Filed Date: 12/2/1931
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/25/2022
This is an action of contract in which the plaintiff seeks to recover $333.33 a month for five months for services as an employee of the Joseph T. Wood Company, a corporation, herein called the Wood Company. The defendant is a manufacturer of skates. The plaintiff testified that he had been working for a shoe company, herein called the Herman Company,, and was in charge of all its shoes sold as skating shoes at a salary with a commission amounting to $7,200 a year. The Herman Company made shoes but not skates. The plaintiff while in the employ of that company arranged through
Under adequate instructions two questions were submitted to the jury which, with the answers thereto by the jury, were as follows: “Question 1. Did Collinson purporting to act for the defendant in 1927 make an oral agreement with the plaintiff to the effect that if the plaintiff would enter the employ of Wood Company the defendant would pay the plaintiff so long as he remained in the employ of the Wood Company at the rate of $4,000 a year payable $333.33 a month. The jury answer, ‘Yes.’ Question 2. If the answer of the jury to question number 1 is 'Yes’, what was the date of that agreement? The Jury answer 'Latter part of November, 1927.'” The court then directed a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff duly excepted thereto.
The report contains all of the evidence material to the issues involved. At the request of the plaintiff the judge reported the issues raised by the above rulings and refusals to rule for the determination of this court, for such disposition as the law may require.
The only question argued by the defendant is whether
A by-law of the defendant provided that the treasurer should be the chief executive officer of the company, having general superintendence and direction of all other officers except the president, and in the recess of the board of directors shall have the general control and management of its business and affairs, subject, however, to the right of the board of directors to delegate any specific powers. The plaintiff did not have the burden of proving that specific powers had not been delegated. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove that the directors limited the power thus given the treasurer by appointing an executive committee to operate its business in accordance with authority given by another by-law, and that the plaintiff was notified that a committee had been appointed to take charge of affairs and more or less to subordinate Collinson and restrict his authority so that he was limited in what he could do without the consent of two others. Collinson also testified that he carried out the operations of the defendant under the direction of an executive committee. The jury, however, had the right to weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and could find that no information as to limitation of Collinson’s authority had been given to him and that no limitation of the general authority given the treasurer in the by-law had in fact been made. They could also have found that Collinson was not acting under the direction of an executive committee. The plaintiff testified that his attention had not been brought to any of the defendant’s by-laws. But the evidence as to the authority of Collinson was not confined to the provisions of the by-law. The plaintiff testified in direct examination without objection that Collinson had the title of treasurer and general manager of the defendant. In cross-examination the witness said that he knew Collinson held those positions from his signing of official correspondence, but not in any other way. The defendant’s answers to interrogatories stated his position to be
The remaining question is whether a contract, made in behalf of the defendant to pay the plaintiff, as stipulated, was so unusual in its nature that the corporation is not bound by it. It may be assumed that it is not often that it could be found to be in the ordinary course of business of one corporation to pay a part of the salary of a man if he would become an employee of another corporation. But the business of the defendant as a manufacturer of skates was unusual in that the skates were manufactured to be sold attached to shoes manufactured by some other concern. It was reasonably necessary when the arrangement with the Herman Company was about to come to an end that it should enter into an agreement with some other shoe manufacturer by which the shoes and skates could be sold as a unit. Upon the testimony in the case the defendant could not accomplish the result it desired of joining with the Wood Company and having the plaintiff enter its employment as salesman of the completed unit without agreeing to contribute to the plaintiff’s salary. The plaintiff testified that he sold the defendant’s skates only when he was with the Wood Company,
The case is distinguishable in its facts from Sears v. Corr Manuf. Co. 242 Mass. 395, and New Hampshire National Bank v. Garage & Factory Equipment Co. 267 Mass. 483.
As the parties stipulated that the plaintiff entered the employ of the Wood Company on January 1, 1928, and continued therein to and including May 31, 1928, and as the jury has found that Collinson, purporting to act for the defendant, agreed that if the plaintiff would enter the employ of the Wood Company the defendant would pay Viim so long as he remained so employed at the rate of $4,000 a year, payable $333.33 a month, under the terms of the report that the case be disposed of as the law requires, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,666.65 with interest from May 5, 1928.
So ordered.