Citation Numbers: 350 Mass. 629, 216 N.E.2d 87, 1966 Mass. LEXIS 794
Judges: Spiegel
Filed Date: 4/28/1966
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/9/2024
This is an appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board upholding the denial by the appellee board of assessors of Wenham (assessors) of an application for the abatement of real estate taxes for 1960. The case was heard in the Appellate Tax Board on an “Agreed Statement of Facts.”
On January 1, 1960, and at the time of her death on September 9, 1960, one Ruby Boyer Miller, mother of the appellant William, was the owner of a parcel of real estate in Wenham. As of January 1, 1960, the property was assessed at $331,700. It is conceded that “ [t]he fair Cash value . . . was Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars ($260,000).” At the time of her death Mrs. Miller was domiciled in Michigan. Her sole heir and next of Mn was the appellant. Mrs. Miller’s will, in which the appellant was named as executor, was filed for probate in Michigan on September 15,1960. The appellant “was not a resident of Michigan and under the laws of that State, could not
The Fiduciary Trust Company of Boston was the trustee of a revocable trust established by Mrs. Miller. Under the provisions of that trust, “From and after the death of the Settlor, and so long as the Settlor’s son . . . shall live, the Trustee shall pay and distribute the net annual income of the trust estate . . . one-half to . . . [the appellant]; and one-half to and among a class of beneficiaries consisting of . . . [the appellant], his wife and his issue living . . . in such proportions as the Trustee in its discretion shall each year determine.” In addition, Article Sixth of the trust provides in pertinent part as follows: “The Trustee shall pay to the Settlor’s estate, upon the written request of the Settlor’s executor or administrator: (a) such amount as said executor or administrator may certify to be neces
The assessors maintain that the appellant was without standing to bring an application for abatement. The appellant asserts that he had standing under Gr. L. c. 59, § 59, which reads in pertinent part as follows: “A person upon whom a tax has been assessed or the administrator of the estate of such a person or the executor or trustee under the will of such a person, if aggrieved by such tax, may . . . on or before October first of the year to which the tax relates . . . apply in writing to the assessors, on a form approved by the commissioner, for an abatement thereof, and . . . upon an assessment of any of his property in excess of its fair cash value, they shall make a reasonable abatement. ... If a person other than the person to whom a tax on real estate is assessed is the owner thereof, or has an interest therein, or is in possession thereof, and pays the tax, he may thereafter prosecute in his own name any application, appeal or action provided by law for the abatement or recovery of such tax, which after the payment thereof shall be deemed for the purposes of such application, appeal or action, to have been assessed to the person so paying the same” (emphasis supplied).
It is the appellant’s contention that his later appointment as ancillary executor validated his act in applying for an abatement as an executor designate. The assessors contend that the executor must be appointed prior to the application for abatement. They argue that there is “no method . . . whereby on October 1st of any given year the assessors can distinguish a person who may later become an executor from one who may not,” and “ [i]f haste is required to prevent a loss to the estate, temporary administration may be taken out under Gr. L. c. 193.”
Although an executor “under the will” may obtain an abatement of the tax in behalf of the estate, he cannot be reimbursed in the amount of the abatement until he is appointed by the court. General Laws c. 59, § 69, provides for reimbursement solely to “[a] person whose tax has been abated,” and an executor designate has no rights to money due the estate. In the instant case, however, the appellant was appointed an ancillary executor, and thus was entitled to receive the amount abated.
In view of our holding, we need not discuss the appellant’s requests for rulings. The decision of the Appellate Tax Board is reversed, and an abatement of the 1960 tax is to be granted in the amount of $3,800.10 with interest and costs.
So ordered.