Citation Numbers: 423 Mass. 534
Judges: Abrams, Connor
Filed Date: 8/20/1996
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/25/2022
The plaintiffs, former at-will employees of the defendant corporation, seek damages based on their assertion that the defendant required them, as a condition of their continued employment, to work on Christmas Day in contravention of their “creed or religion as required by that creed or religion” in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A) (1994 ed.). The plaintiffs also claim entitlement to relief under G. L. c. 93, § 102 (1994 ed.) (Massachusetts Equal Rights Act). The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to liability. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendant’s motion and denied that of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their application for direct appellate review. We affirm the judgment for the defendant, although our reasoning differs from that of the Superior Court judge.
The following undisputed facts are established by the summary judgment materials: The plaintiffs were employed by the defendant as part-time parimutuel clerks at the Raynham-Taunton Greyhound Track. On December 18, 1992, the defendant posted a notice informing all regularly scheduled employees that they would be required to work on Christmas night, Friday, December 25, 1992. The plaintiffs were regularly scheduled to work on Fridays, but requested Christmas off to observe the holiday. The defendant denied their requests. The plaintiffs failed to appear for work on December 25. The parties differ as to whether they were “terminated” or “suspended.” In any event, they suffered “adverse action” for purposes of c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A).
“Church law forbids servile work on Sundays and holy days of obligation, but exceptions are made for those functions that are necessary for the well-being of society, or for those who must support their family or to maintain their livelihood.”
“Based on the authorities provided by the parties, [the motion judge] rule[d]” as follows: “Catholic dogma does not require worshippers to abstain from working on Holy days. The only requirement the church absolutely imposes upon its followers is to attend mass. Plaintiffs were not denied the opportunity to attend mass, and therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that they were forced to forgo a practice required by their religion. The fact that plaintiffs wished to further observe the Christmas holiday does not constitute a religious requirement. See Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., [397 Mass. 761, 772 (1986)]. As plaintiffs’ claim for violation of G. L. c. 15IB, [§] 4 (1A) fails, so too must their claims premised on G. L. c. 93, [§] 102.” (Emphasis in original.)
General Laws c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), provides in pertinent part the following:
*537 “It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice for an employér to impose upon an individual as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment any terms or conditions, compliance with which would require such individual to violate, or [forgo] the practice of, his creed or religion as required by that creed or religion including but not limited to the observance of any particular day or days or any portion thereof as a sabbath or holy day and the employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of such individual. . . . The employee shall have the burden of proof as to the required practice of his creed or religion.”
This court construed G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), in Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 771 (1986). We held, “The statute does not deal with the full panoply of religious beliefs, practices, preferences, and ideals. . . . The application of the statute is much more narrow. It prohibits an employer from requiring an employee, as a condition of employment, to violate or forgo the practice of her religion as required by that religion. It follows that the threshold showing an employee must make is whether the activity sought to be protected is a religious practice and is required by the religion.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 771-772. Later, in Kolodziej v. Smith, 412 Mass. 215 (1992), in which the plaintiff sought damages and other relief “on the ground that the defendants made her retention of employment conditional on her forgoing the practice of her ‘creed or religion as required by that creed or religion’ in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A),” id. at 216, we held that the judge in the Superior Court had correctly directed verdicts for the defendants on that claim. We reasoned as follows:
“In Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 771 (1986), we observed that this ‘statute does not deal with the full panoply of religious beliefs, practices, preferences, and ideals,’ but focuses instead on required religious practices. The plaintiff produced no evidence that the defendants’ condition for her continuing as controller, attendance at the seminar, required her to miss any religious service or to compromise her faith. There was no evidence that Roman Catholic dogma forbade her attendance at the seminar.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 221.
“To salvage the constitutionality of the statute it must be applied broadly to protect holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion. Applied in that manner, since the plaintiffs have proven that the dictates of their own consciences and their religious beliefs founded on those dictates prohibited them from working on what to them was the most holy day of the year, and since their employer fired them for refusing to violate their religious beliefs, they were entitled to summary judgment as to liability.”
No question concerning the constitutionality of c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), was raised in Lewis or Kolodziej. That question is presented to this court for the first time in this case. As we shall explain later in this opinion, we agree that G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4(1 A), as construed by this court in those cases, and as we construe it in this case, is unconstitutional. We do not agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the appropriate remedy is for us to interpret the statute as “protecting] holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion.” Instead, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ reliance on that statute, unconstitutional as it is, is unwarranted.
“[Statutes are to be construed so as to avoid an unconsti
General Laws c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A), declares unlawful an employer’s imposition on an employee of “terms or conditions, compliance with which would require such individual to violate, or [forgo] the practice of, his creed or religion as required by that creed or religion” (emphasis added). In order to construe 15 IB, § 4 (1A), as protecting “holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion,” as urged by the plaintiffs, we would be required to ignore, that is, treat as surplusage, the words “as required by that creed or religion.” It is unlikely that the Legislature intended such a result. See Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85 (1946) (“None of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous . . .”). The effect of the quoted statutory language is to limit the application of the statute to persons whose practices and beliefs mirror those required by the dogma of established
We come now to our discussion of the constitutionality of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1A). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”
A statute that prefers one or more religions over another violates the establishment clause. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985). Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). Also, “in order for a belief to be a protected religious belief, it is not necessary that it be shared by an organized sect or church.” Kolodziej v. Smith, supra at 220. “If [religious] beliefs be sincerely held they are entitled to the same protection as those more widely held by others.” Dalli v. Board of Educ., supra at 758. Thus, G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), which distinguishes between (1) an individual’s sincerely held religious belief that is shared with others belonging to an organized church or sect and (2) a belief that is not similarly shared, violates the establishment clause.
General Laws c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), also offends the establishment clause by promoting excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Courts avoid such entanglement by abstaining from the resolution of controversies regarding religious matters. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
The plaintiffs rely on G. L. c. 93, § 102, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, as well as on G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A). In their brief, the plaintiffs do little more than assert in conclusory fashion that the judge in the Superior Court should have analyzed their c. 93, § 102, claim “under the more strict requirements of art. 2 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights].” The plaintiffs’ treatment of that issue is insufficient appellate argument. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
Judgment affirmed.
We need not consider or discuss the plaintiffs’ assertion that c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A), as we construe it, also violates art. 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.